Unintended consequences of regulatory globalisation : an evaluation of World Bank initiated legal reform in India's electricity sector : the case of Andhra Pradesh by Chintapanti, Adithya
 warwick.ac.uk/lib-publications  
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD at the University of Warwick 
 
Permanent WRAP URL: 
http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/108831  
 
Copyright and reuse:                     
This thesis is made available online and is protected by original copyright.  
Please scroll down to view the document itself.  
Please refer to the repository record for this item for information to help you to cite it. 
Our policy information is available from the repository home page.  
 
For more information, please contact the WRAP Team at: wrap@warwick.ac.uk  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Unintended Consequences of 
 Regulatory Globalisation  
An Evaluation of World Bank Initiated Legal Reform 
in India’s Electricity Sector: The Case of Andhra Pradesh 
 
 
 
 
By 
Adithya Krishna Chintapanti  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of  
a Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.) degree in Law. 
 
University of Warwick, School of Law 
May 2018  
 
 
 
Table of Contents  
 
Table of Figures ............................................................................................. 1 
Acknowledgements ........................................................................................ 2 
Declaration ..................................................................................................... 3 
Abbreviations and Use of Terminology .......................................................... 4 
Abstract .......................................................................................................... 8 
Chapter 1 – Introduction ................................................................................ 9 
1.1. Setting the Context .................................................................................................. 9 
1.2. Importance of Electricity as a Source of Energy and Role of the Indian State in 
its Provision and Regulation ........................................................................................... 12 
1.3. Hypothesis .............................................................................................................. 16 
1.4. Research Questions ............................................................................................... 16 
1.5. Research Methodology and Method ..................................................................... 17 
1.6. Chapter Outline ...................................................................................................... 18 
Chapter 2 - Changing Role of the State in Economic Activity and Significance 
of a Spatial Analysis for Understanding Regulatory Reform ........................ 26 
2.1. Introduction ................................................................................................................ 26 
2.2. Changing Role of the State in the Economy ................................................................ 28 
2.2.1. The Interventionist State ..................................................................................... 28 
2.2.2. Neoliberal Economic Policies and Roll-back of the Interventionist State ............ 30 
2.2.3. Regulatory State as the Neoliberal Embodiment of the Role of the State in 
Economic Activity ........................................................................................................... 31 
2.2.4. Neoliberal Economic Globalisation and Developing Countries ........................... 34 
2.3. Depoliticising Economic Regulation and Bank Sponsored Legal Reform .................... 35 
2.4. A Spatial Analysis of Regulatory Interventions ........................................................... 39 
2.4.1. Regulatory Space.................................................................................................. 39 
2.4.2. Less than Intended Consequences of Regulatory Globalisation .......................... 42 
2.4.3. Regulatory Globalisation and Legal Pluralism ...................................................... 45 
2.5. Notion of Living Constitutions and Evolution of Unique Attributes of a Space .......... 47 
2.5.1. Living Constitutions .............................................................................................. 47 
2.5.2. Regulatory Interventions and Living Constitutions .............................................. 49 
2.5.3. Electoral Expectations and Living Constitutions .................................................. 50 
2.6. Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 51 
3. Tensions in the Indian State and the Emergence of Unique Attributes of 
the Role of the State in Economic Activity ................................................... 53 
 
 
3.1. Introduction ................................................................................................................ 53 
3.2. Democratic Political Process and Role of the Indian State in Economic Activity ........ 55 
3.2.1. The Freedom Movement, Political Expectations and Role of the State in 
Economic Activity ........................................................................................................... 56 
3.2.2. The Role of the State in Economic Activity in the Indian Constitution as 
Juridification of Political Expectations from the State ................................................... 57 
3.2.3. Debates in the Constituent Assembly on the Role of the State in Economic 
Activity and the Directive Principles of State Policy ...................................................... 58 
3.2.4. Debates Pertaining to Legal Enforceability of the Directives .............................. 60 
3.2.5. Debates Pertaining to Juridifying a Particular Economic Ideology – A ‘Changing 
Constitution’ Approach .................................................................................................. 61 
3.3. Practice of Democratic Politics and Rising Expectations from the State – The Nehru 
Era (1947 - 1966) ................................................................................................................ 63 
3.4. From Socialism to State Ownership - Indira Gandhi (1966-1980) .............................. 65 
3.4.1. Declining Congress Dominance and Emergence of Politics of Resource Disbursal
 ....................................................................................................................................... 67 
3.4.2. Redistributionist State and Pro-Property Rights Court ........................................ 69 
3.4.3. Contest to Interpret the Constitution and the Role of the State in Economic 
Activity ........................................................................................................................... 71 
3.5. Interventionist State and Pranab Bardhan’s Observation of a ‘Heterogeneous 
Dominant Coalition’ ........................................................................................................... 72 
3.5.1. Emergence of ‘Professional Politicians’ Appealing to ‘Particularistic Interests’ .. 74 
3.5.2. Ability of Rich Farmers to Influence Agricultural Voting Preferences ................. 74 
3.5.3. Growing Power of the Bureaucrats and Bureaucrat-Politician Nexus ................. 75 
3.6. Expansion of the Indian State’s ‘Public Sphere’ and Judicial Interpretation .............. 77 
3.7. Imposition of Emergency by Indira Gandhi (June 1975-March 1977) ........................ 81 
3.8. Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi in 1980s – India as a ‘Pro-Business’ State ................ 82 
3.9. Can a Pro-business Indian State be categorised as a Developmental State? ............. 84 
3.10. Preparing for the Opportune Time to Liberalise ....................................................... 86 
3.11. Inter-Institutional Tensions after Emergency – Populist Pro-Poor Court and a Pro-
Business State .................................................................................................................... 87 
3.12. Indian Regulatory Space – From Liberalisation until Today ...................................... 91 
3.12.1. 1991 Crisis & Reform by Stealth ........................................................................ 91 
3.12.2. The 1990’s – Developments After Liberalisation ............................................... 92 
3.13. Liberalisation and Interpretation of Distributive Role of State in Economic Activity
 ........................................................................................................................................... 96 
3.14. The Growing Centrality of the Indian State to Economic Activity ............................ 99 
3.15. Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 101 
 
 
4. An Interventionist Role for the State in Economic Activity & the Electricity 
(Supply) Act 1948 ...................................................................................... 105 
4.1. Introduction .............................................................................................................. 105 
4.2. Role of Electricity in Enhancing Individual Capabilities and Promoting Economic 
Growth ............................................................................................................................. 107 
4.3. The Interventionist State & Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 ........................................ 110 
4.4. Statutory Scheme of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 ............................................ 112 
4.4.1. State Electricity Board – Statutory Structure and Functions ............................. 112 
4.4.2. Nature of State Financial Control over the SEB ................................................. 113 
4.5. Electricity Led Growth & Emergence of the SEB as the Dominant Sectoral 
Organisation ..................................................................................................................... 114 
4.6. State Provision of Electricity, Politics of Resource Mobilisation and Sectoral Losses
 ......................................................................................................................................... 116 
4.6.1. Politics of Resource Disbursal and Sectoral Losses ............................................ 117 
4.6.2. Early Attempts at Reducing Sectoral Losses ...................................................... 119 
4.7. Interventionist State and International and Bilateral Financing Options ................. 122 
4.7.1. World Bank & India 1947-1991 .......................................................................... 122 
4.7.2. Sectoral Financing and the role of the World Bank, Asian Development Bank and 
Bilateral Donors ........................................................................................................... 124 
4.8. Conclusion ................................................................................................................. 127 
Chapter 5 – Regulatory State & the Enactment of the Electricity Act 2003 129 
5.1. Introduction .............................................................................................................. 129 
5.1.1. Methodology of Principles Actors and Mechanisms ......................................... 131 
5.2. The 1991 Financial Crisis and Policy Linked Financing .............................................. 132 
5.3. Contextualising State Level Sectoral Reforms .......................................................... 133 
5.4. The 1993 Policy Paper ............................................................................................... 136 
5.5. Implementation of the 1993 Policy through Legislative Intervention ...................... 141 
5.6. Contextualising SEB Reforms within the Context of the Bank’s State Level Policy 
Reform Approach ............................................................................................................. 143 
5.7. Actors Associated with State Level Sectoral Reform ................................................ 145 
5.7.1. The Reformist Chief Minister ............................................................................. 146 
5.7.2. International Consultants .................................................................................. 147 
5.7.3. Bilateral Aid Agencies and Technical Assistance ................................................ 150 
5.8. The Reform Process in Orissa and Institutional Mechanisms Giving Effect to the 
Regulatory State ............................................................................................................... 150 
5.8.1. Outcome of Reform Process in Orissa ............................................................... 153 
5.9. Attempts at Generating a National Consensus for Sectoral Reform ........................ 155 
 
 
5.9.1. Common Minimum National Action Plan for Power – 1996 ............................. 155 
5.9.2. Electricity Regulatory Commission’s Act - 1998 ................................................. 156 
5.9.3. Blue Print for Power Sector Development - 2001 .............................................. 158 
5.10. Conclusion - The Electricity Act, 2003 and the Sectoral Regulatory State .............. 159 
Chapter 6 - Regulatory Globalisation, Legal Instrumentalism and Legal 
Pluralism .................................................................................................... 162 
6.1. Differing Notions of Legal Pluralism.......................................................................... 164 
6.2. Relevance Legal Pluralism to the Spatial Approach Uncovering India’s Regulatory 
Attributes ......................................................................................................................... 167 
6.3. Relationship between Plural Legal Orders ................................................................ 170 
6.3.1. Relationship between State Law and Non-State Legal Orders .......................... 172 
6.4. The Semi-Autonomous Social Field........................................................................... 174 
6.5. Studies Applying the Methodology of SASF .............................................................. 179 
6.6. The Unique Attributes of the Indian State as the Reason for the Emergence of SASF 
and Resultant Legal Pluralism within the State ............................................................... 183 
6.7. SASF, Self-Regulation and Horizontal Organization .................................................. 185 
6.8. Semi – Autonomy and Self- Regulation .................................................................... 186 
6.8.1. Self- Regulation as a Characteristic of SASF ....................................................... 186 
6.8.2. Advantages and Drawbacks of Self-Regulation ................................................. 189 
6.9. ‘Juristic’ and ‘Social Science’ View of Legal Pluralism and Conceptualising the ‘Legal’ 
in Legal Pluralism ............................................................................................................. 191 
Chapter 7 – Regulatory Attributes of the Role of the State in Sectoral Activity 
in Andhra Pradesh ..................................................................................... 195 
7.1. Introduction .............................................................................................................. 195 
7.2. Reasons for Choosing Andhra Pradesh as the Focus Jurisdiction ............................. 198 
7.3. Andhra Pradesh – Demography and Socio-Economic Indicators ............................. 200 
7.4. Andhra Pradesh 1956-1983 – Congress Party and Redistributive Politics ................ 202 
7.5. The Electricity Sector in Andhra Pradesh from 1956-1983 ....................................... 203 
7.5.1. The Establishment of the SEB and the Expansion of Capacity and Network ..... 203 
7.5.2. Farmers’ Movements and Shift in Allocation from Industry to Agriculture ...... 204 
7.6. 1983 – Entry of Telugu Desam Party and Advent of Competitive Politics ................ 206 
7.7. 1983-1989: TDP, Governance and Social Movements .............................................. 207 
7.7.1. Subsidy Allocation and Governance............................................................. 207 
7.7.2. Rise of Left Wing Extremism in Telangana ......................................................... 208 
7.7.3. Violence against Lower Castes and the Dalit Movement in Andhra Region ..... 209 
7.7.4. Women’s Agitation against Arrack – Political Support for NTR in the 1994 
Elections ....................................................................................................................... 210 
 
 
7.8. 1989-1994: Congress & Economic Liberalisation ...................................................... 212 
7.8.1. Issues in the 1994 Assembly Elections and Subsequent Fiscal Deficits ............. 213 
7.9. Politicisation of Provision of Electricity and Dwindling Finances of APSEB .............. 215 
7.10. NTR & Sectoral Reforms: The Report of the High Level Committee ....................... 218 
7.10.1. Sectoral Reform Strategy under NTR ............................................................... 218 
7.10.2. Mandate, Composition and Approach of the HLC ........................................... 218 
7.10.3. Restructuring APSEB and a Coordinatory Role for APSEB ............................... 220 
7.10.4. Establishment of Regulatory Commission, Composition and Functions ......... 221 
7.10.5. A Pro-Active and Distributary Role for the Regulatory Commission ............... 222 
7.11. Nara Chandrababu Naidu and the State’s Engagement with the Bank .................. 224 
7.12. Bank Sponsored Sectoral Restructuring Process – Sectoral ................................... 228 
Disaggregation and Centripetal Institutional Framework ............................................... 228 
7.12.1. Pre-Reform Commitments – Policy Ownership ............................................... 231 
7.13. Resistance to New Sectoral Regulatory Arrangements .......................................... 232 
7.13.1. Resistance in Legislature .................................................................................. 232 
7.13.2. Employee Resistance and the Tripartite Agreement ....................................... 232 
7.14. The Andhra Pradesh Electricity Reform Act, 1998 .................................................. 235 
7.14.1. An Autonomous Commission ........................................................................... 235 
7.14.2. Unbundling of the State Electricity Board ....................................................... 236 
7.14.3. Sectoral Role of State Government and Relationship with APERC .................. 237 
7.15. 1999-2004: Re-election of Nara Chandrababu Naidu and Implementation of 
Reforms ............................................................................................................................ 239 
7.15.1. Consumer Resistance to Electricity Reforms ................................................... 241 
7.16. 2004 Elections – Losing the Plebiscite on Reforms ................................................. 242 
7.17. 2004-2014: Congress and Return to Indira’s Rule .................................................. 245 
7.18. Provision of Free Power and Resource Exploitation ............................................... 246 
7.19. Conclusions ............................................................................................................. 248 
Chapter 8 – Sectoral Semi-Autonomous Social Field and Legal Pluralism in 
State Law in Andhra Pradesh .................................................................... 252 
8.1. SASF and Self-Regulation as an Attribute of SASF .................................................... 254 
8.1.1. Structural and Behavioural Elements of Sectoral Self-Organising Processes in 
Andhra Pradesh ............................................................................................................ 255 
8.2. Structural Aspects of the Sectoral SASF .................................................................... 256 
8.3. Principle of Commercialisation and Corporatisation – Disaggregation of the SEB... 258 
8.4. Political Ramifications of Distribution Companies Functioning on Commercial Basis
 ......................................................................................................................................... 258 
8.5. The APPCC – Coordinating the Statutorily Disaggregated Utilities ........................... 260 
 
 
8.5.1. APPCC, Composition and Functions – Coordination between the Transmission 
and Distribution Companies. ....................................................................................... 261 
8.5.2. Role of APPCC in the Tariff Setting Process ....................................................... 264 
8.6. Other Aspects Hindering Implementation of Principle of Corporatisation and 
Commercialisation ........................................................................................................... 265 
8.6.1. Continued Need of Political Approval of Utility’s Commercial Decisions .......... 265 
8.6.2. Rules of Corporate Governance Ignored ........................................................... 266 
8.6.3. Role of External Consultants in Erosion of Internal Decision-Making Capacity . 267 
8.7. Principle of Transparent Regulation - Erosion of Autonomy of Independent 
Regulatory Commission ................................................................................................... 268 
8.7.1. Method of Securing Information on Staffing Patterns ...................................... 269 
8.8. Staffing Patterns of the Chairman and Members of the Commission ...................... 271 
8.8.1. Chairman of the Commission ............................................................................. 272 
8.8.2. Members of the Commission ............................................................................. 274 
8.9. Staffing Patterns of the Officers of the Commission ................................................ 276 
8.9.1. Officers - Procedure and Qualifications for Selection ........................................ 276 
8.9.2. Category -1 Positions, Commission Secretary and Director Level Appointments
 ..................................................................................................................................... 278 
8.9.3. Joint Director and Deputy Director Positions .................................................... 279 
8.10 Sectoral SASF and Resultant Legal Pluralism ........................................................... 281 
8.11. Behavioural Characteristics of the Sectoral SASF ................................................... 283 
8.11.1. Methodology Adopted for Case Law Analysis ................................................. 284 
8.11.2. Impact of Self-Regulatory Arrangements on Non-Members of the SASF ........ 286 
8.11.3. Self-Regulation and Anti-Competitive Practices .............................................. 289 
8.11.4. Anti-Competitive Practices Emanating from Coordination between TRANSCO 
and DISCOMS ............................................................................................................... 294 
8.11.5. Coordination between DISCOMS and APGENCO ............................................. 295 
8.11.6. Billing Decisions of DISCOMS and their Financial Impact on APGENCO .......... 297 
8.11.7. Absence of Litigation between the DISCOMS and APGENCO .......................... 298 
8.11.8. Other Decisions of the Commission Adversely Affecting the Interests of Private 
Generators ................................................................................................................... 298 
8.11.9. Court’s Specific Observations Regarding the Coordination between the 
Commission and State Utilities .................................................................................... 300 
8.12. Intermittent Moments of Autonomy and the Emergence of the Commission as a 
Deliberative Space ........................................................................................................... 302 
8.13. Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 304 
Chapter 9 – Conclusion ............................................................................. 306 
9.1. Summing Up .............................................................................................................. 306 
 
 
9.2. Ability of the Indian State to Accommodate Competing and Conflicting Normativities
 ......................................................................................................................................... 312 
9.3. Need for Regulatory Interventions in India to Move Beyond Institutionalising a 
Particular Normativity ...................................................................................................... 314 
9.4. Regulation as Engaging Spatial Dynamics and Mediating Actor Relationships ........ 317 
9.4.1. Strengthening the Institution of the Regulator, i.e. the Commission ................ 318 
9.4.2. Making Regulatory Deliberations Part of the Larger Political Discourse ........... 319 
9.4.3. Acknowledging the True Nature of Sectoral Organisation and Adopting an 
Incremental Approach to Sectoral Reform .................................................................. 321 
Annexure I ................................................................................................. 324 
Annexure II................................................................................................. 326 
Annexure III................................................................................................ 333 
Annexure IV ............................................................................................... 337 
Bibliography ............................................................................................... 340 
Table of Cases ........................................................................................... 362 
List of Interviewees .................................................................................... 370 
Table of Statutes and Subordinate Legislation .......................................... 372 
 
1 
 
 
Table of Figures 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Number  Description  Pg.No. 
Figure 1 State of Orissa Political Map  
 
151 
Figure 2 Sectoral Institutional Organisation of the Interventionist 
and Regulatory State 
 
152 
Figure 3 State of Andhra Pradesh Political Map 
 
200 
Figure 4 State of Andhra Pradesh Prior to Merger and After 
Bifurcation 
 
201 
Figure 5 Percentage of Electricity Sales by Category of 
Consumer in Andhra Pradesh 
 
204 
   
   
   
   
2 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
I would like to firstly thank the University of Warwick for the generous 
Chancellor’s International Scholarship that made this journey comfortable. I 
would like to thank my supervisors, Prof. Abdul Paliwala and Dr. Kathryn 
McMahon who went that extra mile to ensure that I was on the right track. They 
understood me as a student and as a person. They revised innumerable drafts 
and patiently guided me through the process. I will be forever indebted to them. 
I would also like to thank Dr.Loraine Blaxter for her immense support during 
our stay at Warwick.  
I would like to thank my wife Uma Chalkapally whose support and 
encouragement made this thesis possible. Thank you, Uma, for believing in 
me. I would like to thank my parents V. Meera, C.V.Ramulu and my brother 
C.Tulasi Krishna for backing my decision to pursue a PhD. My thanks to my 
mentors Dr.Gautam Pingle, S.Narayanan, Dr.Usha Ramachandra, 
Prof.Upendra Baxi and R.Santhankrishnan who were instrumental in me 
undertaking this pursuit.  
I would like to thank the PhD community at Warwick, especially Sundu Madise, 
Satnam Kaur and Pedro Florencio for their help and support. Special thanks 
to Mr. Bhavani Prasad, present Chairman of the Andhra Pradesh Electricity 
Regulatory Commission who was very encouraging of my endeavour.  
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
Declaration 
 
  
I confirm that the thesis is my own work. I also confirm that the thesis has not 
been submitted for a degree at another university. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 
 
Abbreviations and Use of Terminology 
 
Abbreviations 
 
ADB                Asian Development Bank 
AIR                  All India Reporter  
ALD                 Andhra Legal Decisions  
ALT                  Andhra Law Times  
AP                   Andhra Pradesh 
APERC           Andhra Pradesh Electricity Regulatory Commission 
APCPDCL      Andhra Pradesh Central Power Distribution Corporation 
Limited 
APGENCO     Andhra Pradesh Power Generation Corporation Limited  
APHC              Andhra Pradesh High Court 
APPCC            Andhra Pradesh Power Coordination Committee 
APSEB            Andhra Pradesh State Electricity Board 
APTRANSCO Transmission Corporation of Andhra Pradesh Limited  
ASCI                 Administrative Staff College of India 
AT                     Appellate Tribunal  
Bank                  World Bank  
BJP                     Bharatiya Janata Party 
BSES                  Bombay Suburban Electricity Supply 
CAD                   Constituent Assembly Debates  
CAS                    Country Assistance Strategy 
CEA                    Central Electricity Authority   
CEO                    Chief Executive Officer  
5 
 
CIDA                  Canadian International Development Agency 
Congress or          Refers to the faction of Congress Party associated with 
the Nehru-Gandhi family. 
Congress 
Party      
  
CPI                        Communist Party of India 
CPI (M)                 Communist Party of India Marxist  
DFID                     Department for International Development 
Directives              Directive Principles of State Policy  
DISCOMS             Term used to denote the four regional distribution 
companies created out of the unbundled APSEB. 
ELR                       Manupatra Energy Law Reports  
EU                         European Union 
FDI                        Foreign Direct Investment 
FSA                       Fuel Surcharges Adjustment 
GATT                    General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
GDP                       Gross Domestic Product  
HLC                       High Level Committee 
IAS                         Indian Administrative Service 
IEA                         International Energy Agency 
IMF                         International Monetary Fund 
IPP                          Independent Power Producers 
LDC                        Less Developed Country 
MANU                    Manupatra Online Database  
Naidu                     Chandra Babu Naidu 
6 
 
NDA                       National Democratic Alliance headed by the BJP 
NHPC                    National Hydroelectric Power Corporation 
NTPC                     National Thermal Power Corporation 
NTR                       Nandamuri Taraka Rama Rao  
ODA                       Oversees Development Authority 
OSEB                     Orissa State Electricity Board  
PFC                        Power Finance Corporation Limited 
Powergrid               Power Grid Corporation of India Limited 
SASF                      Semi-Autonomous Social Field 
SCC                        Supreme Court Cases  
SCR                        Supreme Court Reports  
SEB                         State Electricity Board  
SLDC                       State Load Dispatch Centre 
SRAs                        Self-Regulatory Associations  
TDP                          Telugu Desam Party  
UK                             United Kingdom  
UNDP                        United Nations Development Programme  
UPA                           United Progressive Alliance headed by the Congress 
US/USA                     United States of America 
USAID                        United States Agency for International Development 
YSR                            Yeduguri Sandinti Rajasekhara Reddy 
 
Use of Terminology 
i. The words ‘national state’ and ‘national government’ have been used 
to describe the federal state or government. 
7 
 
ii. The use of the word ‘State’ (with capital ‘S’) has been used to describe 
the provincial or sub-national governments in India.  
iii. The words ‘state’ (in lower case) and ‘Indian state’ have been used in 
a generic sense to refer to both the national and State level states or 
connote public ownership.  
iv. The word ‘sectoral’ has been used to describe the electricity sector. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8 
 
Abstract 
 
Economic liberalisation initiatives at the behest of international financial 
institutions and bilateral donors have been accompanied by regulatory reform. 
This requires adoption of a standard regulatory template through legislative 
reform by the recipient jurisdiction. This thesis argues that every jurisdiction, 
given its unique social, political, economic and cultural attributes, possesses 
a unique character which in turn requires customised regulatory solutions. This 
thesis argues that a simplistic legal instrumentalist approach to regulatory 
reform, disregarding the unique regulatory attributes, is unlikely to succeed in 
achieving its regulatory objectives. In other words, it is bound to have ‘less 
than intended’ effect.  
The thesis discusses this phenomenon of global diffusion of regulatory norms 
in the context of legislative changes incorporating the World Bank’s global 
regulatory template in the electricity sector in India. Since the sector is 
administered at the State level, the thesis focuses on the implementation of 
the legislative arrangements regulating the state and privatising the state-
owned entities in the State of Andhra Pradesh. It argues that any regulatory 
reform initiative aimed at introducing a standard model is bound to encounter 
societal forces in the nature of co-option, resistance, uneasy co-existence etc. 
As a consequence, a standard model will not be able to bring about the 
intended social and economic changes and that the institutional and 
administrative processes associated with the standard model themselves 
undergo a transformation. It demonstrates that this was the reason for the 
reform measures not yielding the desired results in the State level electricity 
sector in India.  
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Chapter 1 – Introduction 
 
1.1. Setting the Context  
 
This thesis argues that every jurisdiction, given its unique social, political, 
economic and cultural characteristics, possesses distinct regulatory attributes, 
and therefore requires customised regulatory solutions. In saying so, the thesis 
argues that, to be effective, legal regulation of economic activity must engage 
the dynamics of the political-economy, rather than insulate economic decision 
making from politics. The thesis establishes this by examining the 
implementation of the World Bank’s global regulatory reform template for the 
electricity sector in the State1 of Andhra Pradesh in India.  
The thesis explores social, economic, legal and political developments in India 
from the late 1940s till June 2014, from a global, national and State 
perspective. June 2014 is the cut-off date for the present analysis as the focus 
jurisdiction i.e. the State of Andhra Pradesh was bifurcated into two separate 
States thereafter. Bifurcation of the State machinery also resulted in bifurcation 
of the institutions put in place through the reform process, making it difficult to 
observe them. The resultant States are also separate political units with 
differing socio-economic dynamics, making continued analysis difficult. Also, 
as will be discussed, the thesis establishes the emergence of pluralism in state 
law through a chronological analysis of political, social and economic 
                                                          
1 The use of the word ‘State’ (with capital ‘S’) has been used to describe the provincial or sub-
national governments in India. The words ‘national state’ and ‘national government’ have been 
used to describe the federal state or government. The words ‘state’ (in lower case) and ‘Indian 
state’ have been used in a generic sense to refer to both the national and State level states 
or connote public ownership.  
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developments, staffing patterns and case law. The relatively short time period 
between bifurcation and October 2017, i.e. 3 years, is insufficient to observe 
trends and draw conclusions relating to the newly formed States.  
 The period between the late 1940s and June 2014 is further divided into the 
‘interventionist’ (late 1940s till late 1980s) and the ‘regulatory’ (late 1980s till 
date) phases. The interventionist phase was globally and nationally associated 
with a greater role for the state in economic activity and characterised by direct 
ownership and control of economic activity. The period from the late 1980s till 
June 2014, both globally and in India, has been associated with endeavours 
to restrain the role of the state in economic activity, as evidenced in the 
provisions of the new sectoral (electricity sector) regulatory arrangements; this 
has been described as the ‘regulatory phase’ for the purposes of the present 
discussion. 
The thesis argues that the framers of the Indian Constitution assigned an 
interventionist role for the state in economic activity. This vision of the role of 
the state corresponded with the post–war global consensus and also emerged 
from the freedom movement’s critique of the colonial state. The framers were 
however reluctant to juridify the scope of state intervention and were of the 
view that the same ought to be decided through electoral preferences. The 
thesis argues that certain unique national regulatory attributes pertaining to 
the role of the state in economic activity emerged in the interventionist phase 
owing to a closed economy, politics of redistribution, and state ownership of 
key industries.  
11 
 
The regulatory phase is associated with economic liberalisation and 
corresponding regulatory reform initiatives, aimed at the state and state owned 
utilities, at the behest of international financial institutions and bilateral donors. 
Faced with a balance of payments crisis, unsustainable budgetary deficits and 
fiscal instability, India indicated its willingness to depart from the post-
independence interventionist philosophy and embraced economic 
liberalisation at the behest of international financial institutions such as the 
World Bank (hereinafter the Bank), the International Monetary Fund and 
bilateral donors. The international financial institutions and bilateral donors 
justified the need for regulatory reform with the claim that politicisation of 
sectoral regulatory decision-making burdened the public finances. The 
regulatory reforms aimed to reposition the role of the state from an owner and 
provider of goods and services to that of a regulator. In other words, the reform 
measures, in addition to opening sectors to private participation, also aimed at 
regulating the state and restraining its participation in economic activity. The 
regulatory reforms were brought into force by amending state law (both 
national and State), i.e. through legal instrumentalism. Therefore, state law 
was seen as an instrument to regulate (by control and contraction) the state, 
to depoliticise sectoral decision making, and to privatise state owned 
enterprises. The electricity sector in India was one of the first sectors identified 
as a burden on the public finances and became the face of the endeavour to 
reposition the Indian state as a regulatory state.  
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1.2. Importance of Electricity as a Source of Energy and Role of the Indian 
State in its Provision and Regulation 
 
Electricity is a modern source of energy (Bhattacharya 2006:3388; IEA 2010:8; 
Kanagawa & Nakata 2008: 2017). One of the means to address the 
multidimensional phenomenon of poverty has been to ‘promote opportunity’ 
through access to modern sources of energy such as electricity (Kanagawa & 
Nakata 2008:2016). Electricity consumption has a proven positive impact on 
a nation’s Human Development Index and Gross Domestic Product 
(Kanagawa & Nakata 2008: 2018). The United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) views ‘universal access to modern energy services’ as 
essential to achieving the millennium development goals (UNDP 2011). Its 
provision is indispensable for socio-economic development (IEA 2010:8).  
Underscoring the transition of the Indian state from colonial to post-colonial, 
Sunila Kale rightly observes that, just as the colonial extractive state invested 
in developing the railway network, independent India’s welfare state viewed 
the electricity sector as its ‘new strategic railway’ (Kale 2015:24). India is a 
federal polity and the institutional arrangements foreseen by the sectoral 
legislation during the interventionist phase made the State level state as 
opposed to the national state responsible for sectoral development. The State 
function was inextricably combined with the electricity utility. The State 
electricity utility performed the combined functions of generation, transmission 
and distribution, and was also the quasi-sectoral regulator. By the 1990s the 
State electricity utilities were serving 95% of all consumers (Chong 2004:111). 
From 1948 till 1991 the Bank aligned its lending priorities with the national 
government’s interventionist or state led sectoral development model. By 1990 
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it had provided a total funding of $35.3 billion to the sector. This amounted to 
15% of the Bank’s lending to the electricity sector world-wide and 60% of 
India’s external borrowing (Chong 2004: 114).  
Political competition and bad managerial practises led to the State electricity 
utilities incurring losses. In 1993, cumulative State electricity utility losses had 
reached around rupees 1.8 billion or $US 30,774,227, which amounted to 
nearly 0.5% of the GDP and was a drain on the state’s finances (Chong 
2004:114).2  Though the losses occurred at the State level and were a drain 
on the State’s finances, the States in India’s federal polity are dependent on 
the national state for revenues as the Constitution allocates a greater share of 
the tax revenues to the national government. Also, the Constitution vests the 
sectoral administration in both the national and State governments. In the early 
1990s India’s national government sought the Bank’s financial assistance 
owing to an external balance of payments crisis and internal budgetary deficits. 
The electricity sector had become the focal point for the financial restructuring 
programme aimed at reducing budgetary deficits (Chong 2004:114).  
The regulatory reform model suggested by the Bank and endorsed by the 
bilateral donors aimed to reduce the role of the state in sectoral economic 
activity and to usher in a regulatory state. The sectoral legislation incorporating 
the Bank’s global regulatory model promised a turnaround in the sector’s 
fortunes and to make it viable to sustain the nation’s dream of rapid economic 
development. The sectoral regulator was the institutional mechanism aimed at 
bringing about this separation of politics from economic decision making. In 
                                                          
2 As per the currency conversion rates on 19 May 2014.  
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terms of the industry’s structure the legislation foresaw an unbundling of the 
monolithic State owned electricity utility into generation, transmission and 
distribution entities in order to infuse greater transparency and efficiency and 
competition into the sector. The ultimate objective of the Bank sponsored 
reform prescription was privatisation of the sectoral utilities. The Bank’s 
regulatory reform prescription was first incorporated through State level 
legislative reform amongst other States in the States of Orissa and the focus 
jurisdiction of the present thesis, i.e. the State of Andhra Pradesh. The State 
level model was up-scaled with some changes to the national level through 
the national Electricity Act, 2003.  
More than a decade after the passage of the national legislation incorporating 
the Bank’s model, the majority of the electricity utilities are State owned and 
continue to incur losses, burdening the public exchequer. As per a study 
commissioned by India’s Planning Commission on the functioning of the 
distribution businesses in fifteen States and 91% of the power consumed 
nationally, the sectoral fortunes remain unaltered (Planning Commission 
2011:8). Although the reform legislation aimed to disaggregate the SEB into 
separate generation, transmission and distribution companies, the separation 
‘is only in the form and not in substance’ (Planning Commission 2011:1). It 
notes that the State level regulators did not show the requisite independence 
while discharging their obligations (Planning Commission 2011:64). The 
power sector debt equalled 5% of India’s GDP in the year 2011 (World Bank 
2015:4). The utility debt was more than 10% of the State’s GDP in the States 
of Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan, Meghalaya and Haryana.  
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An appropriate approach towards sectoral growth, sectoral regulation and the 
utilisation of sectoral resources becomes essential, given that in 2013 the 
International Energy Agency estimated that of the 1.3 billion people worldwide 
who did not have access to electricity nearly 306 million reside in India (IEA 
2013). Despite the progress made in terms of the sheer number of villages 
that have been electrified, wide disparities persist between States and regions 
in India (Patil 2010:17; Oda & Tsujita 2011:3087). The growth of electricity 
capacity across the country depended on the availability of resources for 
generation (Nouni et al. 2008:1191; ASCI 2002) and the ability of the state 
(both national and States) to invest in the sector. Electricity not only helps 
address poverty, but also help reduce ‘disparities’ between the electrified and 
not electrified villages (Oda &Tsujita 2011:3087) and it is in this context that 
rural electrification assumes great significance. One study examining the 
impact of electrification on villages in the State of Bihar notes that 
electrification had a positive impact on agricultural productivity (Oda &Tsujita 
2011:3094). However, it notes that villages in remote areas have less access 
to electricity (Oda &Tsujita 2011:3094). Oda and Tsujita (2011) also observe 
that the extension of electricity lines at the household level did not mean that 
electricity was available or supplied and its provision varied both in terms of 
quality and duration of supply (Oda &Tsujita 2011:3091-92). The role of 
electricity in enhancing individual capabilities and promoting economic growth, 
and its consequent electoral appeal will be discussed in detail in Chapter 4. 
This thesis argues that a simplistic legal instrumentalist approach to regulatory 
reform, disregarding the unique regulatory attributes, is unlikely to succeed in 
achieving its regulatory objectives. It demonstrates that this was the reason 
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for the reform measures not yielding the desired results in the State level 
electricity sector. It further argues that any regulatory reform initiative aimed at 
introducing a standard model is bound to encounter societal forces in the 
nature of co-option, resistance, uneasy co-existence etc. Consequently, a 
standardised model will not be able to bring about the intended social and 
economic changes and that the institutional and administrative processes 
associated with the standard model themselves undergo a transformation. 
This is demonstrated in the context of legislative changes incorporating the 
Bank’s regulatory template into sectoral state law (both national and State) in 
the electricity sector in India. Since the sector is administered at the State 
level, the thesis focuses on the implementation of the legislative arrangements 
regulating the state and privatisation of the state-owned entities in the State of 
Andhra Pradesh. 
1.3. Hypothesis  
 
State regulation of economic activity cannot be insulated from larger social 
and political dynamics. Regulatory models accompanying economic 
globalisation and implemented through state law will be effective only if they 
acknowledge the unique regulatory attributes of a regulatory space and 
engage them. 
1.4. Research Questions 
 
a. Should global regulatory diffusion pay attention to the national 
regulatory attributes? 
b. What are the unique regulatory attributes associated with the role of the 
Indian state in economic activity? 
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c. Does the Indian state (both at the national and State level) exhibit these 
attributes in the electricity sector? 
d. What happens to state initiated regulatory interventions that ignore the 
sectoral regulatory attributes? In particular, what are the implications of 
such interventions for state law and the institutional arrangements 
giving effect to it? 
1.5. Research Methodology and Method  
 
This thesis adopts a layered approach to uncovering the regulatory attributes 
of the State level sectoral regulatory space in Andhra Pradesh. The thesis 
firstly discusses the global and normative aspects of the role of the state in 
economic activity. It then discusses the regulatory attributes of the national 
state and the nationwide attributes of the electricity sector in India. It thereafter 
analyses the impact of the legal interventions, which ignore the regulatory 
attributes in the electricity sector of the State of Andhra Pradesh. The 
analytical construct of ‘regulatory space’ (Hancher and Moran 1989) and the 
notion of the unique attributes of the space or ‘regulatory character’ (Haines 
2003) are deployed in conjunction with the ‘living constitutions’ approach 
(Ackerman 2007) to establish the unique attributes of India’s regulatory space. 
The thesis draws on the dynamic concepts of ‘regulatory space’ along with 
that of ‘living constitutions’ to evaluate the efficacy of legislative interventions 
based on global templates which ignore the recipient jurisdiction’s regulatory 
attributes. In this context, the thesis relies on the theories associated with the 
emergence of legal pluralism and the processual methodology for establishing 
the existence of a ‘Semi-Autonomous Social Field’ (Moore 1973).  
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The research supplements doctrinal and contextual analysis with empirical 
qualitative methods. In addition to text based sources, the research comprised 
three separate trips to India to conduct field work and interact with 
organisations and actors associated with the electricity sector. Gatekeepers 
and informants known to the researcher through professional and personal 
acquaintance and through introductions facilitated the interview process. 
Methods for securing information included relying on the statutory process for 
obtaining information from governmental organisations based on the Right to 
Information Act, 2005. Information pertaining to staffing patterns of the 
regulator in Andhra Pradesh’s electricity sector for sixteen years from 1999 to 
2014 was secured through applications made under the Right to Information 
Act, 2005. The thesis also relies on an extensive case law review comprising 
88 cases appealed against the orders passed by the electricity sector regulator 
in Andhra Pradesh.  
1.6. Chapter Outline 
 
This thesis comprises nine chapters ordered in keeping with the layered 
approach to understanding the regulatory attributes of a particular 
jurisdictional space, be it sectoral or territorial (national and State level), as 
discussed in the methodology section above. Chapter 2 introduces the reader 
to the theoretical underpinnings of the thesis in order to contextualise its scope 
and approach. In particular, it highlights the importance of a spatial approach 
to regulatory processes in understanding the changing role of the state in 
economic activity. It categorises the role of the state in economic activity into 
the post-world war and post-colonial consensus of an ‘interventionist’ state 
(Chang 2003) and the neoliberal notion of a ‘regulatory’ state advocating a 
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withdrawal of the state from economic activity (Yeung 2010; Majone 1994). 
One of the key arguments against the interventionist state by the supporters 
of a regulatory state has been that the politicisation of economic decisions in 
an interventionist state leads to inefficient allocation of resources and that the 
invisible hand of the market can achieve better allocation of resources. Those 
supporting the notion of a regulatory state argue for an insulation of economic 
decision making from political processes. The Bank and the bilateral donors 
viewed law reform, accomplished by legislating appropriate state law, as a 
means to achieve this transformation in the role of the state in economic 
activity (Tshuma 1999; Faundez 2010). In this context, the chapter discusses 
complementarity between the literature pertaining to the spatial approach to 
regulation and views on limitations to bringing about social change through 
legal instrumentalism (Twining 2004; Griffiths 1986; 2003). It discusses the 
influence of pre-existing societal relationships described as attributes of the 
space (Hancher and Moran 1989) or as ‘regulatory character’ (Haines 2003) 
on legislative interventions. The chapter then explores the literature on the 
relationship between regulatory interventions accompanying economic 
globalisation and the notion of legal pluralism. Since the legislations intending 
to establish a regulatory state aim to regulate the state itself, the chapter 
examines the notion of regulatory choices accompanying economic 
globalisation having constitution like implications (Rawlings 2010; 
Schneiderman 2001). Such an approach acknowledging the impact of 
legislation on the constitutional scheme is in keeping with the notion of ‘living 
constitutions’ (Ackerman 2007). A living constitutions approach acknowledges 
the impact of judicial decisions and political choices in addition to regulatory 
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interventions on the constitutional mandate. The chapter explores the 
complementarity of the approach of ‘living constitutions’ with theories which 
centre on exploring the unique regulatory attributes of a particular regulatory 
space. This helps contextualise the exercise, which is aimed at mapping the 
unique attributes of the role of the Indian state in economic activity, and the 
reflexive relationship between the constitutional mechanisms and the actor 
dynamics both external and internal to the state. 
Chapter 3 identifies the unique attributes of the Indian state regarding its role 
in economic activity. It establishes the reluctance of the framers of the 
Constitution to juridify the role of the state in economic activity. The chapter 
argues that, although advocating an interventionist role for the state in 
economic activity, the Constitution leaves the scope of the interventionist state 
to the electoral processes. The chapter is thereafter organised into two global 
trends pertaining to the role of the state in economic activity, i.e. the 
interventionist and the regulatory as they play out in the Indian context. The 
chapter explores how the politics of resource allocation through the 
interventionist phase led to the capture of states’ resources by entrenched 
interests. It relies on Pranab Bardhan’s (1998) broad categorisation of these 
interests as rich farmers, industrialists, career professionals or bureaucrats 
and the politicians who mediate between these groups. The chapter endorses 
the view that this ‘dominant coalition’ of interests is ‘heterogeneous’ in nature 
(Bardhan 1998) and that the same places conflicting demands on the limited 
resources of the state, thereby generating tensions. The chapter also identifies 
the prevalence of tensions owing to factors both within the state, i.e. the 
interpretation of the redistributionist mandate of the Constitution by the 
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judiciary on one hand and the executive and legislature on the other, and the 
influence of the external factors associated with the global perception of the 
role of the state in economic activity. The phase of the regulatory state in the 
late 1980s generated tensions between the national state which had 
repositioned itself as a regulatory state and the States over resource allocation 
and the reluctance of the States to move away from the interventionist model. 
The attempts at establishing a regulatory state included legislative 
disaggregation of the state’s institutional apparatus through legal 
instrumentalism creating further tensions between the prevalent ‘centrifugal’ 
forces and the ‘centripetal’ legislative endeavour (Black 2007). In its attempt 
to establish the regulatory attributes, the chapter tries to construct a larger 
picture by correlating legislative, political and judicial developments, thereby 
endorsing a ‘living constitutions’ approach to identifying the role of the state in 
economic activity.  
Chapter 3 concludes that, given both internal and external tensions, the Indian 
state cannot act in an insular and autonomous manner (Bardhan 1998; 
Mukherji 2016). The chapter however agrees with Mukherji that, despite being 
surrounded by a powerful society, the state retains the capacity to bring about 
change (Mukherji 2016). It identifies five attributes pertaining to the role of the 
Indian state in economic activity. The first is the influence of the changing 
global notions of the role of the state in economic activity on the national state, 
be it during the interventionist state phase or the regulatory state phase. The 
second is the relative weakness of the Indian state vis-à-vis societal forces 
and entrenched interests in particular. The third is the continued dominance of 
the state as an actor in economic activity and its ability to influence change 
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despite its relative weakness. The fourth is the presence of entrenched 
interests of groups such as rich farmers, industrialists and bureaucrats 
associated with state led development resisting attempts to establish a 
regulatory state. The fifth is the semi-autonomous nature of the Indian state 
owing to tensions internal and external to the state.  
Chapters 4 and 5 explore the legislative developments and the corresponding 
sectoral dynamics in the electricity sector in India (at both the national and 
State levels) in the course of the interventionist state and the regulatory state 
phases. These chapters demonstrate how the electricity sector reflects the 
regulatory attributes of the national state in economic activity through the 
phases. The chapters portray the institutional arrangements ushered in 
through state law as reflective of the state’s self-perception of its role in 
sectoral economic activity. 
Chapter 4 discusses the political, economic, legal and social developments in 
the sector associated with the interventionist phase. It introduces the reader 
to the importance of the sector both from the perspective of enhancing 
individual capabilities and promoting economic growth. The electricity sector 
had captured the imagination of the newly independent interventionist Indian 
state. The Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948, modelled on the legislation of the 
British welfare state, was enacted to operationalise the interventionist role of 
the state. This led to the establishment of State Electricity Boards and the 
sectoral dynamics came to be associated with the States in India. The chapter 
thereafter traces the way in which increasing political competition led to a 
downturn in the finances of the State Electricity Boards and affected the fiscal 
health of the States. 
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Chapter 5 discusses the sectoral developments from the late 1980s 
corresponding to the emergence of the regulatory state. The chapter relies on 
the methodology of ‘principles, actors and mechanisms’ devised by 
Braithwaite and Drahos (2000) to trace the processes whereby the Indian state 
embraced economic liberalisation and its corresponding implications for the 
electricity sector. In this context, the chapter focuses on the role of the World 
Bank and bilateral donors in influencing sectoral policy aimed at changing the 
state’s (at both national and State level) role in economic activity through legal 
instrumentalism. The chapter discusses the architecture of the sectoral 
legislation proposed by the World Bank and the institutional mechanisms put 
in place to disaggregate the state and insulate regulatory oversight from 
political processes. 
Chapter 6 discusses theoretical perspectives pertaining to the implications of 
regulatory globalisation for the recipient jurisdiction. It argues that regulatory 
models external to the social, economic and political context of the recipient 
jurisdiction and introduced without an understanding of the unique regulatory 
attributes are bound to have ‘unintended consequences’, which include the 
emergence of legal pluralism (Tshuma 1999). The chapter discusses how a 
spatial approach to regulation facilitates observation of the processes and 
actor dynamics leading to the emergence of legal pluralism. The chapter 
thereafter focusses on Sally Falk Moore’s notion of the Semi-Autonomous 
Social Field (Moore 1973) in the context of the emergence of legal pluralism 
and its relevance given the non-autonomous attribute of the Indian state.  
Chapter 7 contextualises the discussion pertaining to the national regulatory 
attributes and the changing role of the Indian state in economic activity, as 
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discussed in the national and sectoral context of the State level electricity 
sector in Andhra Pradesh. This comprises the final layer of this layered 
approach to understanding the implementation of regulatory reform based on 
global models introduced through legal instrumentalism. The chapter 
establishes that the regulatory attributes of the electricity sector of the State of 
Andhra Pradesh reflect the non-autonomous nature of the Indian state owing 
to the tensions inherent to and external to the state. It discusses the political, 
social and economic developments associated with the interventionist phase. 
The chapter focuses on the dwindling fortunes of the State Electricity Board 
owing to the politicisation of sectoral decision-making and its implications for 
the State’s finances during the period corresponding with the interventionist 
phase. The chapter thereafter traces the legislative attempts to reposition the 
state as a regulatory state by the World Bank and bilateral donors with active 
encouragement of the national government. The Andhra Pradesh Electricity 
Reform Act 1998, endeavoured to implement the World Bank’s globalising 
sectoral regulatory template with the intention of depoliticising sectoral 
decision making. However, as Tshuma (1999) and Chang (1999) note, 
depoliticisation itself leads to reallocation and creates winners and losers. This 
in turn led to popular opposition and the electoral reversals for the party 
implementing the reforms, leading the political establishment to reconsider the 
State’s sectoral posturing. 
Chapter 8 examines the functioning of the sectoral institutional mechanisms 
put in place by the reform legislation to operationalise a regulatory state. This 
examination is undertaken from both structural and behavioural perspectives. 
It identifies the emergence of alternative institutional arrangements to what 
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Sally Falk Moore observes regarding how the state acknowledges the ‘diverse 
social fields within society and represents itself ideologically and 
organizationally in relation to them’ (Moore 2001:107). The chapter argues that 
the same is made possible because of the non-autonomous nature of the 
state, owing to tensions discussed in earlier chapters, and the State in Andhra 
Pradesh itself becoming a Semi-Autonomous Social Field. It concludes with 
the observation that the alternative institutional organisation giving effect to the 
interventionist state results in legal pluralism in sectoral state law. It 
categorises the plural forms of state law as legislated or ‘public law’ and self-
generated or ‘self-regulation’.  
Chapter 9 is the concluding chapter, it draws together the analyses in the 
preceding chapters and provides suggestions and conclusions pertaining to 
devising effective regulatory interventions, keeping in mind the attributes of the 
regulatory space associated with the role of the Indian state in economic 
activity.  
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Chapter 2 - Changing Role of the State in Economic Activity 
and Significance of a Spatial Analysis for Understanding 
Regulatory Reform 
 
2.1. Introduction  
 
This thesis argues that for legal regulation to be effective it must engage the 
dynamics of the political economy. It endeavours to identify the regulatory 
attributes of the role of the Indian state (national and States) in economic 
activity and to analyse their influence on the implementation of state law. This 
is examined in the context of the State of Andhra Pradesh legislating to 
implement a global regulatory template in the electricity sector. This chapter 
discusses theoretical approaches which help identify the regulatory attributes 
of the state (national and States) and the electricity sector in India. The 
influence of the regulatory attributes on the implementation of state law in India 
is in turn analysed in the context of legal interventions associated with the 
differing normative approaches to the role of the state in economic activity. For 
the purposes of this thesis, these differing normative notions have been 
categorised as ‘interventionist’ and ‘regulatory’. The chapter firstly discusses 
the normative underpinnings of the notions of the interventionist state and the 
regulatory state, which differ in their conceptualisation of the role of the state 
in economic activity. This exercise becomes relevant in the context of the 
Indian state (national and States) adopting an interventionist model after 
independence in 1947 and a regulatory approach from 1991 onwards.  
The chapter then discusses the analytical construct of ‘regulatory space’, 
which belongs to what Bronwen Morgan and Karen Yeung (2007) describe as 
‘institutionalist’ theories of regulation. The institutionalist theories ‘consider 
27 
 
institutional dynamics to have, in a sense a “life of their own” in regulatory 
regimes, such that they will often shape the outcomes of regulation in 
surprising ways, given the preferences and interests of regulatory participants’ 
(Morgan and Yeung 2007:53). Such an approach allows one to observe actor 
behaviour and institutional dynamics and helps identify the regulatory 
attributes in the Indian context. 
Since the exercise of identifying the regulatory attributes is undertaken in the 
context of identifying the role of the Indian state in economic activity, and since 
constitutions empower and restrain state action, the chapter discusses the 
notion of a ‘living constitution’ (Ackerman 2007). The notion of a living 
constitution acknowledges the role of political mandates, legislative 
interventions and judicial interpretation in influencing the scope and content of 
the constitution. The economic, political and judicial developments in India are 
explored through the perspective of living constitutions to ascertain the role of 
the Indian state in economic activity and the attributes associated with the 
same. Since the thesis proposes to examine the implementation of global 
regulatory models, the chapter briefly discusses literature pertaining to 
regulatory globalisation and its ‘less than intended effects’ (Haines 2003:482). 
The thesis argues that the emergence of legal pluralism in state law is one of 
the less than intended consequences of introducing the Bank’s regulatory 
model in the Indian electricity sector. 
The notions of regulatory space and living constitution complement one 
another. The former helps identify the broader attributes of a jurisdictional 
space and the latter facilitates the contextualisation of the influence of these 
attributes on the nature of the state. They facilitate construction of a 
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normatively neutral framework with which to observe the implementation of 
legal interventions associated with the differing normative notions informing 
the role of the state in economic activity i.e. interventionist and regulatory. The 
identification of the regulatory attributes of a particular jurisdiction also helps 
better observe the impact of the global dynamics on the national level and the 
national level on the States, as will be demonstrated in the forthcoming 
chapters. The next section discusses the characteristics of the interventionist 
and regulatory states. 
2.2. Changing Role of the State in the Economy  
 
2.2.1. The Interventionist State 
 
The role of the state in the economy has always been ‘controversial’ (Chang 
2003:1). Ha-Joon Chang observes that the interwar period saw the drawbacks 
of ‘liberal capitalism’ through events such as the Great Depression and the 
Russian Revolution (Chang 2003:3-4). He argues that this paved the way for 
‘interventionist economic theories’ of Keynesian economics and the New Deal 
in ‘advanced capitalist countries’ (Chang 2003:4,17). The same resulted in a 
greater role for the state in economic activity after the Second World War, with 
‘advanced capitalist economies’ embracing the welfare state and the spread 
of socialism (Chang 2003:4,17).  
Karen Yeung is of a similar view and observes that post war industrialised 
western countries envisaged a greater role for the state in economic activity 
(Yeung 2010: 65). In Yeung’s words 
‘There was widespread social consensus that the role of the state was 
that of macroeconomic planning, market stabilisation, the provision of 
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welfare, and acting as employer of last resort. To fulfil these ambitions, 
many states expanded their control over major resources, most visibly 
through ownership of key industries, including public utilities such as 
gas, electricity, water, telecommunications and the railways. This 
extended the state’s capacity to effect changes to macroeconomic 
policy unilaterally through discretionary direct intervention in the 
activities of key industries. The hierarchical authority exerted by the 
state over significant swathes of industrial activity was replicated in the 
organisation of the state’s bureaucratic apparatus, through a 
departmentally organised central government with executive control 
lying in the hands of a Minister situated at the pinnacle of each 
departmental hierarchy’ (Yeung 2010 :65-66).  
Giandomenico Majone observes that the move to nationalise utilities such as 
gas, electricity, telecommunications, etc., which were considered as ‘natural 
monopolies’, ‘was to protect the public interest against powerful private 
interests’ (Majone 1994:78). He however emphasises that ‘the purpose of 
public ownership was not simply to regulate prices, conditions of entry and 
quality of service, but also to pursue many other goals including economic 
development, technical innovation, employment, regional income 
redistribution, and national security’ (Majone 1994:79). In other words, 
regulation in an interventionist state viewed economic regulation as part of the 
larger social and political dynamics and sought to achieve inter-related goals 
including regional distribution, employment, etc. 
The period after the Second World War also witnessed many newly 
independent developing countries embracing the notion of an interventionist 
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state, often as a reaction to the ‘free-market’ approach of the colonial state 
(Chang 2003:4). The tilt towards state interventionism by newly independent 
states saw them leaning towards a welfare state model, with the state investing 
in industrial activity geared towards import substitution and development of an 
industrial base (Chang 2003:22-23). Another state interventionist policy 
adopted primarily by the emerging East-Asian economies such as Japan, 
Korea and Singapore in the post-war period has been defined as the 
developmental state model. The notion of the developmental state holds that 
‘economic development requires a state which can create and regulate the 
economic and political relationships that can support sustained 
industrialization’ (Chang 1999: 183). Immediately after attaining independence 
in 1947, India adopted an interventionist role for the state in economic activity. 
This aspect will be explored in Chapter 3, which undertakes a chronological 
examination of the dynamics of the Indian state culminating in the emergence 
of its unique regulatory attributes.  
2.2.2. Neoliberal Economic Policies and Roll-back of the Interventionist State  
 
The 1980s and 1990s once again witnessed a contestation pertaining to the 
role of the state in economic activity (Chang 2003:1). This time the argument 
was against state interventionism, favouring a roll back of the state. This was 
reflected in the collapse of the Soviet Union, which led to the introduction of 
capitalism in Eastern Europe and the abolition of economic planning (Chang 
2003:1). Chang categorises the ‘anti-interventionist’ theories under the broad 
nomenclature of ‘neoliberalism’ (Chang 2003:19). This thesis uses the term 
‘neoliberalism’ to name an approach advocating the withdrawal or reduction of 
role of the state in economic activity. The neoliberals critiqued the state 
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interventionist model of economic development.3 Chang notes that the 
neoliberal critique of the interventionalist state questioned the role of the state 
as ‘a guardian of public interest’ (Chang 1999: 183). Those advocating 
neoliberal economic policies portrayed the state ‘as an organization controlled 
by interest groups, politicians, or bureaucrats who utilize it for their own self-
interests, producing socially undesirable outcomes’ (Chang 1999: 184).  
In the context of this thesis, the term regulatory state is used to connote a roll-
back of the state from the policy of interventionism associated with the welfare 
state and the developmental state.4 The term ‘regulatory state’ will be used in 
the forthcoming chapters to mean and include certain characteristics that 
Yeung identifies across the differing variants of the regulatory state in the EU, 
the US and the UK (Yeung 2010:75). These are, a. the notion of separation 
between the policy making and service delivery functions of the state; b. 
regulatory agency as the institutional arrangement intended to give effect to 
the roll back of the state in economic activity and c. the necessity to depoliticise 
economic decision making in the interest of encouraging economic efficiency 
and competitiveness (Yeung 2010 :75).  
2.2.3. Regulatory State as the Neoliberal Embodiment of the Role of the 
State in Economic Activity 
 
Yeung observes that the term ‘regulatory state’ is essentially an analytical 
construct and that neoliberal scholars have given it a normative flavour to 
                                                          
3 It is to be noted that Majone’s (1994) observations are with regard to the welfare state in 
Europe whereas Chang’s (1999) pertain to a developmental state in East Asia, however since 
both the models argue for the need for an interventionalist state in the public interest, they are 
being discussed together here.  
4 Yeung argues that the notion of the ‘regulatory state’ cannot be deployed to mean a singular 
set of characteristics, and that there are several variations regarding what can be termed as 
a regulatory state (Yeung 2010 :76).  
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mean ‘minimal state intervention for the purpose of correcting market failure’ 
(Yeung 2010:71). The notion of a regulatory state in other words is premised 
on the neoliberal critique of the interventionist state.  
The objective of public regulation in a regulatory state differs from that of an 
interventionist state. As discussed, the objective of regulation in an 
interventionist state was not just to regulate prices but had ‘many other goals 
including economic development, technical innovation, employment, regional 
income redistribution, and national security’ (Majone 1994:79). Observing the 
emergence of a regulatory state in Europe, Majone states that ‘regulation has 
a single normative justification: improving the efficiency of the economy by 
correcting specific forms of market failure such as monopoly, imperfect 
information, and negative externalities’ as opposed to the numerous and 
‘conflicting’ regulatory objectives in a welfare state (Majone 1994:79). Thus, 
state regulation in the regulatory state is confined to economic issues alone. 
Yeung observes that ‘Majone’s account of the emergence of the European 
regulatory state resonates with rational choice theories, at least to the extent 
that individuals and institutions are portrayed as self-interested, rational actors 
seeking to maximise their power and position’ (Yeung 2010:70). Majone 
further observes that the regulatory agency is the institutional solution to 
enforce the insulation of economic decision making from politics (Majone 
1994:84). 
Chang questions the neoliberal critique of the interventionist state. He is of the 
view that, but for critiquing the state and advocating a reliance on the market, 
the neoliberals do not give any indication as to the nature of markets (Chang 
1999: 188). He is critical of the neoliberal policy suggestion ‘that developing 
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countries should copy the Anglo-Saxon economic institutions characterized by 
arm’s-length relationships between contracting partners’, as prevalent in the 
developed world, and their insistence on a singular universal institutional 
solution (Chang 1999: 188). The Bank’s regulatory model for the electricity 
sector as adopted by Andhra Pradesh was based on a similar neo-liberal 
policy suggestion and advocated a singular institutional arrangement across 
jurisdictions, irrespective of their regulatory attributes.  
Schneiderman says that economic globalisation institutionalises the political 
project of neo-liberalism. Schneiderman gives the illustration of the 1980s debt 
crisis in Latin America which led to an active push towards the privatisation 
model at the behest of the Bank in countries that had socialist constitutions. 
Schneiderman opines that, with the fall of the Soviet Union, these countries 
had ‘far fewer political options’ available apart from privatisation 
(Schneiderman 2001:88). The institutionalisation of political project of neo-
liberalism occurs through ‘rules and structures’ aimed at creating a ‘global 
vision of economic policy, property rights, and constitutionalism’ 
(Schneiderman 2001:83). In this regard, Schneiderman uses the term 
‘constitutionalism’ to imply a spirit or flavour of the constitutional scheme 
(Schneiderman 2001: 83). He observes that neo-liberal constitutionalism 
requires state institutions to give precedence to economic considerations over 
political ones (Schneiderman 2001:85). That the political project of neo-
liberalism requires the state to ‘recede from the market and that limits should 
be placed on the redistributionist capacity of the State’ (Schneiderman 
2001:85). The project of neo-liberal constitutionalism involves controlling the 
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government through constitution or ‘constitution-like limitations’ restraining it 
from interfering in the market (Schneiderman 2001:85).5 
2.2.4. Neoliberal Economic Globalisation and Developing Countries  
 
In a developing country context, Chang observes that 
 ‘[t]he neoliberal attack was, more than anything else, a “political 
economy” attack. The neoliberals argued that the apparent policy 
“errors” in many less developed countries (LDCs) had deeper causes 
than the technical incompetence of their bureaucracies or the 
“irrational” goals imposed by the political rulers, namely, the nature of 
interest groups and the nature of the state’ (Chang 1999: 189).  
He observes that, after attacking the dynamics of the political economy in the 
interventionalist state, the neoliberals went a step further and argued for 
‘depoliticizing the economy’ (Chang 1999: 190). The neoliberals ‘regarded 
politics as an “irrational” corrupting force that prevents a rational management 
of the economy. The neoliberals hold that the conflicting desires of different 
individuals and groups can be best reconciled by the “invisible hand” of the 
competitive market and that “political” resolutions of these differences will 
subject the process to abuses by those with privileged access to political 
power’ (Chang 1999: 190). The influence of interest groups in the nature of 
rich farmers, industrialists and bureaucrats on the Indian state during the 
interventionist phase will be discussed in Chapter 3. The notion of insulating 
economic decision making from political influence becomes essential in the 
                                                          
5 Amongst others, Schneiderman lists limitation on the redistributionist function of the state 
and the establishment of institutions which facilitate the same as examples of ‘constitution-like 
limitations’ (Schneiderman 2001:85). 
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Indian context, where the Constitution framers linked the state’s role in 
economic activity with electoral expectations from the state.  
Neoliberal reforms aimed at establishing a regulatory state in developing 
countries were implemented under duress from multilateral organisations like 
the Bank, the International Monetary Fund and bilateral donors (Dubash and 
Morgan 2013:4; Chang 2003:1). In other words, the reforms advocating a roll 
back of the state in developing jurisdictions were externally driven, as opposed 
to the internal notion of an interventionalist state that emerged in response to 
the laissez faire policies of the colonial state. India too embraced the neoliberal 
notion of the regulatory state, which aimed to insulate economic decision-
making from political considerations, as a pre-condition to avail the Bank and 
International Monetary Fund’s assistance owing to an external balance of 
payments crisis and internal fiscal deficits in the early 1990s. Dubash and 
Morgan correlate the establishment of a regulatory state in developing 
jurisdictions with the establishment of regulatory agencies in pursuance of 
state law owing to external pressures to promote economic efficiency (Dubash 
and Morgan 2013:3-4). As discussed earlier, the regulatory agency is the 
institution which enforces the actor relations envisaged by the regulatory state 
(Majone 1994; Yeung 2010). Chapters 5 and 7 will consider the World Bank’s 
sponsorship of legislative reforms aimed at institutionalising regulatory 
agencies to usher in a regulatory state in the Indian electricity sector.  
2.3. Depoliticising Economic Regulation and Bank Sponsored Legal 
Reform  
 
The neoliberals sought to transform the role of the state in economic activity 
by means of legal reform, establishing institutions which insulated economic 
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decision-making from political considerations. Lawrence Tshuma notes that 
the Bank has taken a lead in this legal reform initiative involving other regional 
development banks and bilateral donors (Tshuma 1999:76). The Bank’s 
approach to legal reform reflected the neoliberal Washington Consensus 
which advocated a shrinkage of the state (Faundez 2010: 183-184). In the 
reforms proposed by the Bank, ‘[l]aw has been accorded a pre-eminent role in 
confining the state to its proper place in the new neo-liberal dispensation’ 
(Tshuma 1999:76).  
Julio Faundez observes that legal reform meant tinkering with matters of 
policy, which was essentially political and beyond the Bank’s scope of 
intervention (Faundez 2010: 182). However, the neoliberal Washington 
Consensus required ‘institutional transformation’ and this facilitated the Bank’s 
foray into legal reform which was part of its governance agenda (Faundez 
2010: 181-183). Tshuma states that the Bank defended its foray in to 
governance reforms stating that though its previous programmes were 
‘technically sound’ they did not produce the desired outcomes given the 
shortcomings in the recipient government (Tshuma 1999:79). The Bank ‘made 
it clear that it is concerned with law reform only in so far as it relates to 
economic development’ (Tshuma 1999:81). Tshuma observes that the ‘Bank 
perceives the legal reforms it finances as technocratic and apolitical in 
character’ (Tshuma 1999: 83). He disagrees with this view of the Bank and 
opines that  
‘law reform by its very nature is a political process involving choices 
about restructuring social relations and the means of achieving them. 
As conceived by the Bank, law is an instrument of government for 
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achieving economic development. In this respect, it is an instrument of 
state power and its making and application involves gains and losses 
for different groups in society’ (Tshuma 1999:83).  
In the context of the separation of economic decision-making from politics, 
which forms the basis of the regulatory state, Chang wonders if depoliticisation 
can ever be possible, and whether it might only result in disempowering certain 
sections of society to the benefit of others (Chang 1999: 190-191). He gives 
the illustration of the weakening of labour unions in the interest of capitalists. 
Amongst other functions, he argues that the functions of ‘coordination’ and 
‘conflict management’ are integral to the role of the state in the economy 
(Chang 1999:192-197). He observes that the earlier purpose of development 
economics by the state was coordination to ensure that that there are 
‘complementary investments’ (Chang 1999: 192). With regard to ‘conflict 
management’, Chang argues that economic development necessarily implies 
reallocation of resources towards more productive endeavours and that the 
same gives rise to conflicts (Chang 1999). He gives the example of 
reallocation of resources meant for agriculture to industrial activity as an 
example of the same (Chang 1999: 196). He is of the view that the state has 
no other option but engage with the issue of conflict management. In his words 
‘The question is not whether the state should be involved in such 
conflicts, because, as the ultimate guarantor of property and other rights 
in the society, it is bound to be. The real question is how the state can 
manage such conflict in a forward-looking manner or, more concrete, 
help different groups in the society to come to an (explicit or implicit) 
agreement by which the losers would accept the need for adjustment 
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and the gainers would compensate them for the burdens of such 
adjustment’ (Chang 1999: 196-197). 
Tushma’s observation regarding the impossibility of a depoliticised role for 
state law and the inevitability of legal reform to affect the interests of different 
sections of society corresponds with Chang’s view that economic development 
necessarily involves reallocation of resources and generates conflict between 
different sections (Tshuma 1999; Chang 1999). As discussed earlier, Chang 
holds that neoliberalism champions the cause of markets and does not offer 
viable answers to the question of the nature of markets. It advocates a singular 
universal institutional solution adopted in developed jurisdictions as the 
framework for facilitating the functioning of markets around the world (Chang 
1999: 188). Tshuma explores this notion in the context of the legal solutions 
proposed by the Bank when endeavouring to roll back the intrerventionalist 
state. He notes that the Bank’s rule of law reform projects focus on formal state 
law and institutional reforms based on the notions of new institutional 
economics (Tshuma 1999). He observes that the work on legal pluralism and 
the notion of semi-autonomous social fields demonstrate the limitations of 
formal legal interventions and that the interaction between the formal and 
informal institutions produce ‘unintended consequences’ (Tshuma 1999:91). 
This thesis endorses Tshuma (1999) and Chang’s (1999) view that reforms 
aimed at depoliticising economic decision-making reallocate resources and 
create winners and losers. The thesis also argues that the neoliberal universal 
institutional solution aimed at insulating economic decision making from larger 
social and political processes will not achieve the desired results. This is 
demonstrated through the experience of the State of Andhra Pradesh in 
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implementing the Bank’s institutional solution aimed at insulating economic 
decision making from social and political processes in its electricity sector, 
which is discussed in Chapters 7 and 8.  
2.4. A Spatial Analysis of Regulatory Interventions  
 
2.4.1. Regulatory Space 
 
As discussed earlier, this thesis focuses on the interactions between the state 
and economy and the impact of state initiated legal interventions on economic 
activity. Bettina Lange is of the view that the interaction between state and 
economy cannot and does not take place in a ‘vacuum’ (Lange 2003:413). It 
is the space within which these interactions take place that helps identify the 
‘space of legal regulation’ (Lange 2003:413). It is argued that a spatial 
approach helps us understand the local regulatory dynamics in order to 
strategize responsive interventions as opposed to the singular institutional 
architecture of the regulatory state. A spatial analysis, by contextualising state 
legal regulation within the matrix of the wider political economy, helps us 
understand the reasons for what Tshuma (1999) calls the unintended 
consequences of legislative interventions and accompanying institutions 
mirroring the neoliberal role of the state.  
Lange categorises the meanings assigned to ‘space’ in legal regulation into 
‘abstract’ and ‘geographical’ (Lange 2003:414). The abstract portrayal of 
space occurs through the invocation of concept of ‘regulatory space’ as an 
analytical construct (Lange 2003:414; Hancher and Moran 1989:277).6 The 
                                                          
6 The phrase ‘regulatory space’ has been deployed by different authors for different purposes, 
Hancher and Moran (1989) have used it as an ‘analytical construct’, Colin Scott (2001) has 
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concept of ‘space’ shall be used both as an analytical construct and in 
geographical or territorial terms in the course of this thesis. As Hancher and 
Moran explain ‘dimensions and occupants can be understood by examining 
regulation in any particular national setting, and by analysing that setting in 
terms of its specific political, legal and cultural attributes’ (1989:277). 
Therefore, though initially appearing to be an abstract framework, the 
analytical construct helps study peculiarities of a geographical space (or any 
other imagined or demarcated space) based on its unique legal, political and 
cultural features.7 According to Colin Scott, the concept of ‘regulatory space’ 
is ‘linked to economic, sociological and political theories which emphasise the 
role of institutional structures (such as legal culture and organisational forms) 
in shaping change and public policy outcomes’(Scott 2001:333). 
Hancher and Moran reject both public interest and private interest theories and 
associated claims regarding the capture of regulatory power, and view 
organisations and associated organisational status as having an important role 
in economic regulation (1989:273-274). Spatial analysis of regulation 
acknowledges that the occupants of the space are competing for spatial 
advantage in a struggle involving relationships of power dictating who are 
included and excluded from the dynamics of the space (Hancher and Moran 
1989:277). A ‘regulatory space’ approach therefore helps generate a nuanced 
                                                          
used it as a ‘metaphor’ and Frank Vilbert (2014) has used as a means of ‘social framing’. This 
chapter and the thesis as a whole use the phrase as an analytical construct.  
7 Though the present discussion pertaining to attributes of space takes a geographical 
approach, Hancher and Moran are of the view that the concept of regulatory space need not 
necessarily be restricted to territorially situated communities and can also be deployed from 
an individual sectoral perspective. Amongst others, Hancher & Moran give examples of the 
automotive and the pharmaceutical sectors (Hancher and Moran 1989:277). 
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understanding of dynamics within the national space, helping one understand 
the role and limitations of state initiated legal regulation (Hancher and Moran 
1989). Scott observes that an approach associated with regulatory space 
differs from the ‘New Institutional Economics’ approach and does not consider 
the relationship between the regulators and regulatees to be hierarchical 
(Scott 2001:351). As will be discussed in the course of this thesis, such a non-
hierarchical approach to regulation helps one understand the way society 
responds to regulatory interventions.  
Scott associates the regulatory space analysis with theories in public policy 
and law which ‘emphasise pluralism in legal and policy processes’ (Scott 
2001:332).8 He agrees with Hancher and Moran that the nature of relationship 
between the actors in the regulatory space is defined by interdependence and 
that ‘fragmented possession of resources within the regulatory space is central 
to the more pluralistic re-conceptualisation of regulatory processes’ (Scott 
2001:335; Hancher and Moran 1989:275). He opines that ‘regulatory authority 
and responsibility are frequently dispersed between a number of 
organisations, public and private, and that authority is not the only source of 
power within a regulated domain’ (Scott 2001:331). The ‘dispersed nature of 
resources between organisations’ within the shared space make them 
interdependent and that the regulator ‘lacks monopoly over formal and 
informal authority’ (Scott 2001:330). Lange terms these interrelated and 
interdependent processes as described by Scott, Hancher and Moran to 
illustrate the ‘bounded nature of legal regulation’ i.e. legal regulation as being 
                                                          
8 The complementarity of a spatial approach to regulation to an analysis identifying legal 
pluralism shall be further discussed in Chapter 6 of the thesis. 
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intricately associated with societal processes (Lange 2003:414). In the Indian 
context, the unique attributes of the political economy which emerge as a result 
of constitutionally engineered dynamics will be relied on to characterise the 
nature of the space. In terms of geographical deployment of the notion of 
space, this thesis discusses the implications of adopting globalising regulatory 
norms for the national state, the States and the electricity sector in India.  
2.4.2. Less than Intended Consequences of Regulatory Globalisation  
 
Scott summarises the concept of regulation in the context of the notion of 
‘regulatory space’ as ‘a conception of regulation in which relations between 
organisations within regulatory domains are perceived as interdependent and 
the subject-matter of strategic action, but within which the institutions of culture 
and organisational form play an important role in delimiting the range of 
possible actions which the interdependent actors may take’ (Scott 2001:333). 
It is argued that, though abstract concepts, the notions of ‘culture’ and 
‘organisational form’ help delimit the space and predict the nature of 
interactions within it, making the analytical construct of ‘regulatory space’ a 
reliable framework for analysis of actor interaction within a community, 
geographical location, economic sector etc. (Scott 2001; Lange 2003). 
According to Lange, ‘[l]inking an analysis of space and culture also highlights 
the social construction of space and hence guards against its reification’ 
(Lange 2003:414). The importance of culture in a spatial analysis (both in its 
abstract and geographical sense) of regulation is further expanded by Fiona 
Haines (2003). Haines uses the term ‘regulatory character’ to observe ‘the 
interaction between social norms and formal laws’ with reference to the 
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implementation of international regulations or the translation of international 
regulation in local contexts (Haines 2003: 463-464).9 Haines is of the view that 
‘[r]egulatory character is in a sense a distillation of economic, political and 
cultural history’ (Haines 2003:468). She states that ‘[r]egulatory character 
provides the resources for both understanding and acting within a given set of 
circumstances and critically establishes the means to exert power and 
influence’ (Haines 2003:469). Haines is of the view that, such an analysis 
‘provides a means to understand how the ‘macro’ environment (‘globalization’) 
intersects with and is incorporated into the local environment. Finally, it can 
explain both the uniqueness of a given context as well as resonance of one 
context with another’ (Haines 2003:469). Haines argues that ‘[g]lobalization 
interacts with regulatory character, but regulatory character has an integrity 
which means that the effect of global policies may be less than intended’ 
(Haines 2003:482). As discussed earlier, Tshuma voices a similar opinion with 
regard to legal interventions accompanying economic globalisation and states 
that the ‘unintended consequences’ may include the emergence of legal 
pluralism (Tshuma 1999:91). In the context of impact and implementation of 
externally generated norms given the national context Sally Engle Merry 
observes that incorporation of international commitments into national practice 
necessarily involves a ‘cultural translation’ of ‘legal transplants’ into the local 
context (Merry 2006:134-135). In Merry’s words 
‘[t]ranslation is the process of adjusting the rhetoric and structure of 
these programs or interventions to local circumstances. Appropriated 
                                                          
9 Haines herself only describes the phenomenon and acknowledges an anonymous referee 
for coining the term describing the phenomenon.  
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programs are not necessarily translated, but they are more likely to be 
popular if they are. On the other hand if they are translated so fully that 
they blend into existing power relationships completely, they lose their 
potential for social change’ (Merry 2006:135-136) 
Dubash and Morgan are of the view that ‘rule based’ institutional solutions may 
not be the best way forward for developing jurisdictions and that they may not 
have the desired effect (Dubash and Morgan 2013:279). They advocate the 
need to understand the regulatory state in developing country context as ‘as 
positioned on a spectrum “between rules and deals”’ (Dubash and Morgan 
2013:279). According to them  
‘[t]oward the rules end of the spectrum, rational, technocratic rule-based 
regulation that rests on the separation of efficiency and distribution 
provides feasible and effective solutions to governance problems. 
Towards the deals end of the spectrum, rule-based regulation operated 
by independent regulators is unlikely to result in effective governance 
solutions. When rules are created, they are under stress because the 
underlying political pressures for deals remains in place, and 
institutional capacities and norms are insufficiently developed to resist 
these pressures’ (Dubash and Morgan 2013:281). 
This however does not mean that regulation becomes ‘irrelevant’, in their 
words, for the ‘deals end of the spectrum, but instead that its function shifts 
from defining, monitoring, and enforcing rules, to shaping, constraining, and 
legitimating spaces for negotiation’ (Dubash and Morgan 2013:281). To give 
effect to these arrangements they advocate the notion of ‘embedded 
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autonomy’, leaning on the literature of the development state, and advocate 
an ‘embedded regulatory state’ and proceduralisation involving deliberative 
politics (Dubash and Morgan 2013:289-293). 
This thesis endorses Haines’s (2003) view on the ‘less than intended’ effects 
of regulatory globalisation owing to a jurisdiction’s unique regulatory attributes. 
It also endorses Dubash and Morgan’s (2013) view that rule based regulation 
will not be able to bring about desired changes in developing jurisdictions as 
politics will always influence the implementation of the regulatory 
arrangements. The thesis however does not agree with Dubash and Morgan’s 
view that a regulatory state is the way forward for developing countries in the 
Indian context as it argues that the Indian state’s non-autonomous nature 
makes it impossible to institutionalise a particular normativity.  
2.4.3. Regulatory Globalisation and Legal Pluralism  
 
Both the institutionalist notion of ‘regulatory space’ and the phenomenon of 
‘legal pluralism’ rely on an analysis of relative power in the interaction between 
societal actors, necessarily implying a dispersal of power across the social 
spectrum as opposed to the notion of a state monopoly of regulatory power, 
which is the premise of legal centralism. Scott observes that the analytical 
construct of regulatory space complements the approach of legal pluralism by 
facilitating an analysis based on power relationships within the social sphere 
as opposed to portraying law and legal processes as being associated with 
the state alone (Scott 2001).  
The emphasis of a spatial analysis on the unique social, economic and cultural 
attributes of a space (Hancher and Moran 1989; Haines 2003) has similarities 
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to the rejection of a normative vacuum by authors critical of the legal 
instrumentalist approach to regulatory change (Twining 2004; Griffiths 1986; 
2003). It will be argued in the forthcoming chapters that incorporating a global 
regulatory model into domestic law or endeavouring to bring about normative 
change through legal instrumentalism, results in legal pluralism. 
The thesis observes that the Bank’s approach to regulatory change reflected 
a state-centric instrumentalist approach. This involved assuming a normative 
vacuum prior to the introduction of legislation. William Twining is of the view 
that an ideal type pertaining to legal diffusion only perceives a ‘Blank slate’ or 
a vacuum to be filled, ignoring social phenomena in the nature of ‘struggle’ 
and ‘resistance’ (Twining 2004: 17). John Griffiths voices a similar opinion; he 
argues that legal instrumentalism assumes a ‘normative vacuum’ in the 
process of communication of the legislative intent to the individual recipient 
(Griffiths 1986:33-34). Griffiths approaches legal instrumentalism from the 
perspective of legislative attempts, premised on a normative vacuum in a 
society, to reorder pre-existing societal relationships (Griffiths 1986; 2003). He 
argues that such a simplistic approach to state legal interventions results in 
legal pluralism. Griffiths’s argument regarding the absence of a normative 
vacuum preceding the introduction of legislation is similar to Lange’s 
observation that the interaction between state and economy cannot and does 
not take place in a ‘vacuum’ (Lange 2003:413). Griffiths notes that the absence 
of a vacuum is reflected in ‘pre-existing societal relationships’ (Griffiths 1986). 
This in turn is comparable to the notions of unique attributes of a particular 
space (Hancher and Moran 1989; Haines 2003). The regulatory space 
approach taken in the course of this thesis allows one to observe the way in 
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which legal interventions are influenced by ‘pre-existing, societal relationships’ 
culminating in the emergence of legal pluralism. The phenomenon of legal 
pluralism emanating as a result of regulatory interventions accompanying 
economic globalisation will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 6.  
2.5. Notion of Living Constitutions and Evolution of Unique Attributes 
of a Space 
 
2.5.1. Living Constitutions 
 
A living constitution approach brings to focus the implications of judicial 
interpretation, political mandates and regulatory legislation to the constitutional 
scheme (Ackerman 2007).10 As the thesis explores the role of state law in 
restraining the state’s role in economic activity, this approach helps better 
understand the nature of the Indian state. Ackerman terms this historical 
understanding of the constitution, incorporating landmark statutes, judicial 
interpretation and political mandate, an ‘organic approach’ as opposed to a 
‘mechanical’ one, i.e. an understanding relying on the text of the constitution. 
Ackerman however hastens to emphasise reliance on an ‘organic approach’ 
should not ignore the relevance of ‘foundational machinery’ i.e. the text of the 
constitution (Ackerman 2007: 1810).  
A living constitution approach does not merely view a constitution as a 
document constituting a state, a polity, and economic activity therein, but views 
                                                          
10 Colin Scott, relying on Ackerman, states that ‘it is frequently misleading to restrict the 
concept of constitution to those instruments because an array of accompanying norms and 
processes tend to spring up within constitutional practice which, together with the foundational 
documents, comprise the ‘‘living constitution’’. Indeed these additional elements of a living 
constitution are not restricted to judicial pronouncements interpreting constitutional texts, but 
extend also to actions and processes that engage the legislative and executive branches of 
government’ (Scott 2010:25).  
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the relationship between them as being reflexive and responsive. It allows for 
an analysis of the influence of non-state processes and political developments 
on the constitution. A living constitution approach helps identify the true nature 
of the state in a jurisdictional context, transcending the limitations of the written 
word and acknowledging the role of non-state or informal processes and 
politics in shaping the nature of the state. The same makes an approach of 
living constitutions compatible with approaches of legal pluralism and 
regulatory space, which analyse actor relationships from the perspective of 
power dynamics as opposed to the notion of attributing hierarchical power and 
authority to a state and its agencies alone. More importantly, the living 
constitutions approach complements an exercise exploring the strengths and 
limitations of state law, and helps identify the plural legal processes by 
ascertaining the nature of the state and state law in India.11 
There are three main characteristics of this approach. The first factor being the 
very role of constitutions which are the juridification of a particular political 
consensus (Grimm 2005: 447) of the role of the state vis a vis citizens and 
across every conceivable aspect of national life including economic activity. 
This also strengthens Hancher & Moran’s and Fiona Haines’s argument that 
the conceptualisation of the role of law in a community is closely tied with 
political, cultural and democratic expectations from the state (Hancher and 
Moran 1989:272; Haines 2003). The second factor is that a living constitution 
approach acknowledges the influence of both the internal and external factors 
in constitutional development. In the context of this thesis, it takes into account 
                                                          
11 The notion of ‘living constitutions’, for the purposes of this thesis, is assumed to subsume 
the concept of ‘political constitutionalism’.  
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the role of global, national and State level dynamics in determining the role of 
the Indian state in economic activity. This becomes important in the present 
endeavour in gauging the impact of external regulatory influences. The third 
factor is that ‘living constitutions’ approach incorporate a simultaneous 
coevolution of the legal, political and economic aspects defining the nature 
and role of the state. This approach informs the examination of the dynamics 
of the regulatory space of the national state and the State of Andhra Pradesh 
in course of this thesis.  
2.5.2. Regulatory Interventions and Living Constitutions  
 
Richard Rawlings suggests that regulatory choices have constitutional 
implications and share a reflexive dynamic with the constitution (Rawlings 
2010:9). This approach has been endorsed by Colin Scott (Scott 2010: 24), 
who is of the view that ‘the routinisation within government of new mechanisms 
for monitoring and controlling such things as public expenditure and the 
promulgation of new regulatory rules also has the potential to fundamentally 
affect the stock of constitutional controls over the exercise of power.’ In other 
words, it is not just judicial interpretation but executive and legislative actions 
that have the effect of altering a constitution (Scott 2010:25). As observed 
earlier the regulatory arrangements imposed by multilateral financial 
institutions and bilateral donors aim to restrain the state (Tshuma 1999; 
Faundez 2010) and therefore have constitutional ramifications. External 
developments in the nature of changing ‘international economic environment’ 
have been observed to have implications for domestic ‘constitutionalism’ 
(Schneiderman 2001:87). The thesis explores the impact of regulatory 
interventions undertaken at the Bank’s insistence on India’s constitutionalism.  
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2.5.3. Electoral Expectations and Living Constitutions  
 
This thesis argues that constitutional dynamics, incorporating electoral 
expectations, impart a unique flavour to the role of the state in economic 
activity in India. This has also limited the efficacy of the reforms aimed at 
establishing a regulatory state in India, and this is evident in a study of the 
reforms in the State level electricity sector in Andhra Pradesh. Ackerman, 
emphasises the effects of ‘popular mandate’ (Ackerman 2007:1774) on the 
scope and content of a constitution.12 Ackerman’s observation on the 
relationship between constitution and popular mandate in the context of an 
organic interpretation can be related to Neil Walker’s rejection of a strictly legal 
interpretation of the polity (in his words ‘Kelsenian’) and instead  ‘to posit the 
mutual constitution of law and politics in a dynamic and ongoing process’ 
(Walker 2002:340).13 This approach reinforced by Dieter Grimm’s view that 
constitutions should only juridify certain political expectations and not aim to 
 ‘assert total juridification of the state. That would render politics 
impossible and ultimately dissolve it into a mere implementation of the 
constitution. The constitution is not to make politics superfluous but only 
to channel it, commit it to certain principles, and contain it within certain 
limits. It prescribes certain principles and procedures, not outcomes. 
But it is comprehensive insofar as no one who lacks constitutional 
                                                          
12 Ackerman in this context relies on the example of the U.S. Civil Rights Act of 1964. 
13 Neil Walker makes this observation in the context of developing his argument on 
constitutional pluralism given the limitations of a Westpahlian model in a post-Westphalian 
order. Upon a reading of Neil Walker’s description of a Westphalian model as conceptualising 
the statist constitutional project post-French-revolution (Grimm 2005), it can be reasonably 
gathered that the model relies on a hierarchical organisation of control over the exercise of 
public power (made coextensive with state power) through the constituent document.  
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legitimation is entitled to exercise public power, and no act of rule can 
claim validity that is not consistent with constitutional requirements’ 
(Grimm 2005: 452).  
Hancher and Moran also visualise legal regulation as an expression of the 
popular will reflecting the shared conception of role of law in a particular 
community. To quote them,  
‘The exercise of public power, in other words, rests on legal authority, 
and this legal authority is made legitimate in turn by appeal to popular 
will. Of course by no means all economic regulation is cast in the form 
of legal rules, but the central importance of the principle of 
constitutionalism means that the range and form of regulation is deeply 
influenced by the particular conception of the scope and purpose of law 
which prevails in any particular community at any particular time’ 
(Hancher and Moran 1989:272). 
Haines endorses the centrality of politics alongside the geographical place of 
regulation when examining ‘regulatory change’ (Haines 2003:466). The thesis 
argues that the dynamics set in motion by the framers of the Indian 
Constitution associating the scope and content of the role of the state in 
economic activity with electoral expectations led to a reflexive relationship 
between the two. 
2.6. Conclusion 
 
This thesis therefore takes the position that legislative arrangements 
regulating economic activity are not value neutral, but are informed by an 
underlying normativity associated with the role of the state in economic activity. 
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For the purposes of the present discussion of the role of the Indian state in 
economic activity, the chapter categorises these normativities into 
‘interventionist’ and ‘regulatory’. The thesis analyses the legal interventions 
through the framework of ‘regulatory space’, which argues that legal 
interventions are influenced by the social, economic and political dynamics 
unique to a particular jurisdiction. By endorsing a regulatory space approach, 
the thesis disagrees with the neoliberal notion that economic decision-making 
can be insulated from the larger political and social processes by means of 
institutions established in pursuance of state law. The notions of ‘regulatory 
character’ and the unique attributes of the regulatory space help identify the 
characteristics of the social and political processes. The thesis further takes 
the position that the so called apolitical legal reform is itself political in nature 
as it influences the allocation of resources, creating winners and losers. The 
notion of living constitutions helps contextualise the implications of the 
dynamics of regulatory space in terms of the state and state law. The living 
constitutions approach also becomes relevant in the Indian context where the 
framers of the Constitution made a conscious choice to not over juridify the 
role of the state in economic activity, but rather to link it with electoral 
expectations from the state. The next chapter tries to chart India’s regulatory 
attributes in the context of the role of the state and state regulation in economic 
activity. It does so by tracing the co-evolution of the political, economic and the 
legal processes from 1947 till 2014. This will be undertaken within the context 
of the larger global shift from an interventionist state to a regulatory state.  
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3. Tensions in the Indian State and the Emergence of Unique 
Attributes of the Role of the State in Economic Activity 
 
3.1. Introduction  
 
The chapter brings to the fore tensions in the Indian state (both national and 
State) arising from competing conceptualisations of its role in economic 
activity. These tensions arise owing to the state in India being susceptible to 
both external (global) and internal (societal) pressures from different interest 
groups. The presence of tensions associated with the role of the Indian state 
in economic activity also imply that the space between the state and society 
mediated through law is not a vacuum but comprises competing interests. It is 
argued that an understanding of the nature of these tensions helps establish 
the nation’s regulatory attributes and that this helps predict the efficacy and 
limitation of state law and to devise responsive legal interventions. The 
tensions are traced on the basis of two broad self-projections of the Indian 
state in economic activity i.e. that of an interventionist state from 1948-1991 
and a regulatory state from 1991-2014.  
It is argued that an understanding of the national regulatory attributes is 
essential in the context of understanding the State level regulatory character 
of the electricity sector. This is because the constitutional scheme has 
bestowed increased power (i.e. executive, legislative and fiscal) on the 
national government. Such centralisation made many a commentator opine 
that India is a federation with a unitary bias. From a sectoral perspective, 
mapping of the national space and role of national state becomes important 
as electricity is in the ‘concurrent’ legislative list in the Constitution, allowing 
both national and State governments to participate in the sectoral economic 
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and regulatory activity.14 Also, although the sectoral political dynamics came 
to be increasingly associated with the States, the States were dependent on 
the national state for sectoral investments. The national state also influenced 
the sectoral investments through national finance corporations and through its 
ability to channel private investments to the States. Subsequently in the mid-
1990s, given the changing global perception of the role of the state in 
economic activity, the national government began persuading the States to 
withdraw from sectoral economic activity. This was sought to be implemented 
through legal instrumentalism, i.e. by changing the sectoral state law.  
This chapter traces the emergence of unique regulatory attributes from the 
interventionist phase emanating from the political struggle against the colonial 
state. This was in keeping with the then post-war global consensus on the role 
of the state in economic activity. The chapter then traces the attempts by the 
national government to establish a regulatory state owing to the influence of 
international financial institutions, such as the Bank and IMF, and the 
democratic resistance to the same. The chapter concludes by identifying five 
unique regulatory attributes of the role of the Indian state in economic activity. 
These are, firstly, the influence of changing global notions of the role of the 
state in economic activity on the Indian state. Secondly, relative weakness of 
the Indian state vis-à-vis social forces. Third, the continued dominance of the 
state as an engine of economic activity and its ability to influence economic 
change. The fourth attribute being the entrenched interests of a 
‘heterogeneous’ and ‘dominant coalition’ (Bardhan 1998). This coalition 
                                                          
14 Item 38 of the Concurrent List in Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India. Article 246 
of the Constitution of India titled ‘Subject-matter of laws made by Parliament and by 
Legislatures of States’ facilitates the concurrent exercise of legislative and executive powers. 
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comprises industrialists, rich farmers, career bureaucrats and the politicians 
who act as middle men to ensure continued privileged access to resources for 
these groups to the exclusion of other groups. The fifth attribute is the non-
autonomous nature of the Indian state owing to the tensions generated by the 
groups vying for its resources, the intra-institutional tensions between the 
judiciary on the one hand and the executive and legislature on the other, and 
between the national state and the State level state.  
The chapter adopts the spatial approach to regulation discussed in Chapter 2, 
whilst observing the actor interactions across the interventionist and regulatory 
state phases in India. It also relies on the living constitutions approach to trace 
the co-evolution of the political, economic, legal and societal developments 
contributing to the emergence of the unique regulatory attributes of the Indian 
state.  
3.2. Democratic Political Process and Role of the Indian State in 
Economic Activity  
 
India achieved independence from the United Kingdom in 1947, after the 
Second World War, and the Indian Constitution came into force on 26th 
January 1950 because of the efforts of an elected Constituent Assembly. The 
framers of the Constitution, whilst emphasising interventionism, did not deem 
it appropriate to juridify a particular ideology regarding the role of the Indian 
state (national and State) in economic activity.  They considered it appropriate 
that the role of the state in economic activity be determined through the 
electoral processes, thereby moulding the state’s role to dynamic political 
expectations. This section discusses the constitutional origins of the same.  
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3.2.1. The Freedom Movement, Political Expectations and Role of the State 
in Economic Activity 
 
Electoral politics in India can trace their origins to the Government of India Act 
of 1935 of the British Parliament (Austin 1972:17). There was a gradual 
evolution of representative politics and enfranchisement of Indians in British 
India (Austin 1972:40). Many members of the Constituent Assembly, which 
was an elected body, were part of the electoral process in 1937 and 1946 
(Austin 1972:40).15 The long struggle for freedom, the slow process of transfer 
of power to the Indian political leaders and the commitment to democratic 
values of the political establishment gave rise to a culture of democracy in 
India (Krishna 1995:166). The freedom struggle, in addition to giving rise to 
national political consciousness, also helped formulate a critique of the 
economic policies of the colonial state. The 1931 Karachi session of the 
Congress declared that the Indian state shall own and manage key industries, 
and economic planning was seen as a means to promote development 
(Chandra et al 2008:30). This can be seen as a very early indication of the 
developing linkage between political expectations and the role of the state in 
economic activity in the Indian regulatory space. This required an expansion 
of the Indian state from what Sudipta Kaviraj describes as the marginality of 
the colonial state, as reflected in its ‘limited public sphere’ (Kaviraj 2000:43-
46). The next section discusses how the framers of the Indian Constitution 
                                                          
15 Universal adult suffrage was introduced through Article 326 of the Constitution in 1950.  
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endeavoured to link the role of the state in economic activity with the 
democratic expectations from the state. 
3.2.2. The Role of the State in Economic Activity in the Indian Constitution as 
Juridification of Political Expectations from the State  
 
Constitutions are considered to be the ‘foundation of legal order’ and as 
‘providing the basis of the legitimacy of legality’ (Loughlin 2010:50).16 The 
moment of constitution making or, to borrow Upendra Baxi’s phrase, 
‘constituent time’ (Baxi 2014: xiii) is an ‘attempt to open a new chapter in the 
nation’s political development’ (Loughlin 2010:48). As evidenced in the 
illustration of American and French revolutions, constitutions are formulated at 
crucial junctures of a nation’s history and promote a ‘particular theory of 
government’ (Loughlin 2010:48). It is however argued that the notion of 
‘constituent time’ itself signifies a culmination of the political developments 
preceding it, rather than being merely a solitary moment in a nation’s history. 
This is because written constitutions are also an ‘ideological response to the 
societal conditions and consensus prevailing during the period of their 
formulation’ (Sah & Daintith 1993:471). In relation to the role of the state in 
economic activity, constitutions can be broadly divided into two types: those 
empowering the state and foreseeing a greater role for the state in the 
economy, and those which aim to restrain the power exercised by the state. 
                                                          
16 Grimm refers to the concept of the adoption of constitutions as ‘constitutionalism’ (Grimm 
2005: 453). Schneiderman uses the term more as a spirit and flavour of the constitutional 
scheme (Schneiderman 2001). Martin Loughlin (Loughlin 2010:55-56) views constitutionalism 
as the theory of limited government, which requires ‘accepting the authority of the Constitution’ 
and putting into action institutional arrangements to run the government as per the 
constitutional goals. Hereinafter unless otherwise specified, the term ‘constitutionalism’ will be 
used to describe a particular spirit or flavour of the constitutional mandate for the state.  
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These two broad categories correspond with notions of an interventionist state 
on the one hand and the neoliberal notion of a regulatory state on the other.  
Sah and Daintith are of the view that some constitutions codify the ‘political 
ideology of the economic role of the State’ (Sah & Daintith 1993:471). They 
observe that some ‘constitutional systems’ are not economically neutral and 
give the examples of the socialist constitutions of the erstwhile Soviet Union, 
the Peoples Republic of China and Brazil (Sah & Daintith 1993:465). On the 
other hand, they categorise the unwritten constitution of United Kingdom as 
being economically neutral (Sah & Daintith 1993:465). Tony Prosser, in his 
comparative analysis of the privatisation process in United Kingdom and 
France (Prosser 1990), notes that, though the privatisation of public 
enterprises were undertaken in both jurisdictions with similar political 
motivations, the entrenchment of principles of public ownership in the 
constitutional scheme generated greater deliberations and judicial 
pronouncements around the privatisation process in France. The framers of 
the Indian Constitution foresaw an interventionist role for the state in economic 
activity, however left its scope and extent to be determined by the democratic 
political process. The entrenchment of the notion of an interventionist state in 
the public consciousness, and its percolation into the political processes as 
evidenced in the electoral expectations from the state, led to popular 
resistance to the introduction of the regulatory state.  
3.2.3. Debates in the Constituent Assembly on the Role of the State in 
Economic Activity and the Directive Principles of State Policy  
 
Granville Austin observes that the members of the Constituent Assembly did 
not work in a ‘vacuum’ (Austin 1972: xviii). A deep understanding of the 
59 
 
societal conditions and an accommodative approach dominated the 
proceedings (Austin 1972: xviii; Chandra et al 2008: 36). The Congress Party’s 
‘long-standing affinity with the Irish nationalist movement made the example 
of constitutional socialism expressed in the Irish Directive Principles of Social 
Policy especially attractive to a wide range of Assembly members’ (Austin 
1972:76). The incorporation of the Irish Directives can be viewed as an 
instance of the influence of the global on the national constitutional 
development. The Directives Principles of State Policy (hereinafter Directives) 
prescribe an interventionist or proactive role for the Indian state (national and 
States) in economic activity. The Constitution declares the Directives to be 
‘fundamental in the governance of the country’.17 The Indian state is duty 
bound to apply these principles in the course of making laws.18  
The Directives require the state to reduce inequalities, be they individual, 
vocational, societal, group or geographical in nature.19 They require the state 
to ensure that the distribution of the community’s resources serves the 
‘common good’20 and that the economic activity does not lead to concentration 
of wealth and means of production, to the ‘common detriment’.21 At an 
individual level, the Directives mandate the state to promote equality of access 
to facilities and opportunities,22 to promote adequate means of livelihood 
irrespective of gender;23 to ensure a living wage, a decent standard of life, full 
                                                          
17 Article 37 of the Constitution of India.  
18 Article 37 of the Constitution of India.  
19 Article 38(2) of the Constitution of India. 
20 Article 39(b) of the Constitution of India. 
21 Article 39 (c) of the Constitution of India.  
22 Article 38 of the Constitution of India, titled ‘State to secure a social order for the promotion 
of welfare of people’.  
23 Article 39(a) of the Constitution of India, requires the State to direct its policy towards 
securing, ‘that the citizens, men and women equally, have the right to an adequate means of 
livelihood’.  
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enjoyment of leisure and social and cultural opportunities;24 to promote 
childhood education,25 educational and economic interests of the scheduled 
castes, scheduled tribes and other weaker sections; and to improve standards 
of living and improve public health.26 The Directives therefore, very early on, 
emphasise the relationship between individual capabilities and economic 
growth, and the role of a redistributionist state in achieving the same.27 The 
Directives were not adopted by consensus and their scope and applicability 
were fiercely debated in the Constituent Assembly. As will be demonstrated in 
the following discussion, both their enforceability and scope i.e. extent of state 
intervention, was left to the operation of the democratic electoral processes.  
 
3.2.4. Debates Pertaining to Legal Enforceability of the Directives  
 
The Directives adopted by the Constituent Assembly, though fundamental to 
the governance of the country, are not enforceable in a court of law. 28  Some 
members of the Constituent Assembly opined that the Directives would remain 
meaningless if they were unenforceable and that there was a need to have a 
specific timeline to make them enforceable (7 C.A.D.:474). Members 
defending the non-enforceable nature of the Directives were of the view that a 
court of law may not be able to enforce them even if made enforceable, given 
their very nature, i.e. involving resource constraints of the state. It was argued 
                                                          
24 Article 43 of the Constitution of India, titled ‘Living wage, etc., for workers’.  
25 Article 45 of the Constitution of India, titled ‘Provision of early childhood care and education 
to children below the age of six years’.  
26 Article 47 of the Constitution of India, titled ‘Duty of State to raise the level of nutrition and 
the standard of living and to improve public health’.  
27 Amartya Sen points to the complementarity between individual capabilities and economic 
growth (Sen 2000).  
28 These debates occurred in the Constituent Assembly in the context of adopting the present 
Article 37 of the Constitution of India. The draft article stated that the Directives are not 
enforceable in a court of law, but are ‘nevertheless fundamental in the governance of the 
country and it shall be the duty of the State to apply these principles in making laws’. 
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that ‘public opinion’, as expressed through the cyclical electoral process, will 
make the government act on their enforcement (7 C.A.D.:475). It is argued 
that the constituent text, by assigning a proactive role for the state in economic 
activity and testing its delivery through the political processes, endeavoured to 
generate a reflexive relationship between state action (including legal 
intervention), political power and electoral expectations. Since these principles 
needed to be applied in the law making process, law was to reflect this 
constitutionally generated reflexivity29 making the Constitution a living 
document.30 As will be argued in course of this thesis, this constitutionally 
generated reflexivity ensured that electoral expectations determined the role 
of the state in economic activity.  
3.2.5. Debates Pertaining to Juridifying a Particular Economic Ideology – A 
‘Changing Constitution’ Approach 
 
The debates pertaining to juridifying a particular economic ideology and its 
enforceability took place in the course of discussing the scope of Articles 38 
and Article 39(b) and 39(c) of the Constitution.31 It appears that the Constituent 
Assembly resolved the debate involving choices to be made regarding the 
normative framework by adopting a procedural solution reflective of the 
political aspirations from the Indian state, rather than a substantive solution or 
juridification of the ideological role of the Indian state in economic activity. 
                                                          
29 ‘Reflexivity’ is used to denote the mutually constitutive nature of constitutional law and 
politics as opined by Neil Walker (2002).  
30 The phrase is used in the context of the notion of a living constitution (Ackerman 2007). 
31 Article 39(b) of the Constitution of India, in its present form, requires the state to direct its 
policy towards securing ‘that the ownership and control of the material resources of the 
community are so distributed as best to subserve the common good’. Article 39(c) of the 
Constitution of India requires the state to direct its policy towards securing ‘that the operation 
of the economic system does not result in the concentration of wealth and means of production 
to the common detriment’. 
62 
 
Article 38 (1) mandates that the ‘[s]tate shall strive to promote the welfare of 
the people by securing and protecting as effectively as it may a social order in 
which justice, social, economic and political, shall inform all the institutions of 
the national life’. 
Quite a few members had objections to this ‘vague’ phraseology (7 
C.A.D.:487). As Damodar Swarup Seth, a member of the Socialist party put it, 
it ‘does not convey any clear indication as to the economic nature of the social 
order to be established’ (7 C.A.D.:487). K. Hanumanthaiya, opined that 
different perceptions of the role of the state occupied the imagination of 
governments over a period of time (7 C.A.D.:489-490). He was of the view 
that, whereas it was laissez faire in the immediate past, it was apparent that 
socialism held its sway as the preferred mode of governance at the time of the 
Constituent Assembly debates (7 C.A.D.:489-490). This intervention can be 
seen as an acknowledgement of the global shifts regarding the role of the state 
in economic activity. This opinion of K. Hanumanthaiya would turn out to be 
prophetic with the global turn towards a rollback of the state in economic 
activity in the 1980s and 1990s.  
In the ensuing discussion, it was felt that the phraseology of the Constitution 
must allow flexibility for all party ideologies to be implemented through it. B.R. 
Ambedkar, opposing the amendment proposed by Damodar Swarup Seth, 
which aimed at juridifying the role of the state in economic activity, was of the 
view that the Constitution endeavoured to promote both political and economic 
democracy. He was of the opinion that the phraseology of the Constitution 
must accommodate multiple paths to economic democracy be it individualistic, 
socialist or communist (7 C.A.D.:494). The phraseology, therefore, aimed at 
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what Ambedkar termed a ‘changing constitution’ approach to accommodate 
different political perspectives, leaving people to make an appropriate 
democratic choice to be implemented by the elected government (7 
C.A.D.:494-495).32 In other words, the opinion of Ambedkar and others at the 
Constituent Assembly appear to be in accord with Dieter Grimm’s view that 
constitutions should only juridify certain political expectations and not aim to 
‘assert total juridification of the state’ (Grimm 2005:452).33 It is argued that 
though the Indian Constitution is not ideologically explicit, to borrow the words 
of Martin Loughlin, in its ‘theory of government’ (Loughlin 2010:48), it 
envisages a proactive or interventionist role for the state in economic activity, 
whose economic policy will be reflexive to political expectations.  
3.3. Practice of Democratic Politics and Rising Expectations from the 
State – The Nehru Era (1947 - 1966) 
 
The Nehru era, immediately after independence, laid the foundation for 
institutionalising democratic processes in India and therefore helped in 
                                                          
32 K.T.Shah proposed an alternate phraseology for Article 39 clause (b) and (c) so as to 
incorporate an explicit ‘socialist’ mandate within the Constitution. Sibban Lal Saksena, 
supporting Shah’s amendment was of the view that the word ‘socialist’ must be incorporated 
in the Preamble to the Constitution (7 C.A.D.: 515-516). He was of the view that the 
Constitution must explicitly provide for nationalisation of all key industries and that the same 
must be mentioned in Art.39 (b) of the Constitution (7 C.A.D.: 515-516). Responding to the 
proposed amendments, Ambedkar was of the view that, he would have considered Shah’s 
amendment if he could be satisfied that the general language of the provision would not be 
able to address the requirements of Shah’s particular use of phraseology. In Ambedkar’s 
words, ‘I think the language that has been used in the Draft is a much more extensive language 
which also includes the particular propositions which have been moved by Professor Shah, 
and I therefore do not see the necessity for substituting these limited particular clauses for the 
clauses which have been drafted in general language deliberately for a set purpose’ (7 
C.A.D.:518-519). 
33 Further Grimm is of the view that juridification of the state ‘would render politics impossible 
and ultimately dissolve it into a mere implementation of the Constitution. The Constitution is 
not to make politics superfluous but only to channel it, commit it to certain principles, and 
contain it within certain limits. It prescribes certain principles and procedures, not outcomes. 
But it is comprehensive insofar as no one who lacks constitutional legitimation is entitled to 
exercise public power, and no act or rule can claim validity that is not consistent with 
constitutional requirements’ (Grimm 2005:452). 
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creating a public sphere (Kaviraj 2000: 47; Krishna 1995:170-171). The 
practice of democratic politics also made the ‘electoral cycle’ the ‘iron law’ of 
politics in India, linking governmental performances with citizen expectations 
(Nandy 2000:77). With the growth of the role of the state, the Nehruvian era 
also witnessed growing expectations from the state. Development soon 
became ‘a huge state-centred project of social change’, right from promoting 
development, to eradicating untouchability, to achieving social justice (Kaviraj 
2000:47). The Nehruvian vision of state led development did help India 
emerge from the grip of neo-colonial pressures and to develop a good base in 
‘capital goods’ and a ‘diversified economy’ based on the principle of self-
reliance (Kaviraj 2000:48). Correspondingly, the adoption of a mixed 
economy34 enabled greater flexibility in the operation between politics and 
‘economic system’ (Kaviraj 2000:48). It is argued that the mixed economy 
model was in keeping with the larger national endeavour to accommodate the 
interests of various groups and generate a consensus regarding the scope 
and content of economic development. A Congress party resolution in 1955 
sought to establish a ‘socialistic pattern of society’ through the implementation 
of a social order encompassing social, economic and political justice (Chandra 
et al 2008:181, 446).35  This vision was subsequently incorporated in the 
second and third five year plans and the Industrial Policy Resolution of 1956 
(Chandra et al 2008:181, 446). Economic planning as a policy was adopted 
from the former Soviet Union.  
                                                          
34 The term ‘mixed economy’ denotes the compromise between private business activity and 
the role of the Indian state in economic activity arrived at after independence. Where certain 
infrastructure and key sectors were reserved for the state and the other sectors were open for 
private participation. This was prominently reflected in the Industrial Policy Resolution of 1956.  
35 It must be noted that this was a political party decision and not a constitutional requirement.  
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Nehru’s death in 1964 saw Lal Bahadur Shastri of Congress assume the reins 
of leadership. Nehru’s demise also witnessed the rise of the syndicate i.e. a 
group of regional leaders with political clout as key decision makers within the 
party (Chandra et al 2008:275). Lal Bahadur Shastri’s demise in 1966 
witnessed internal divisions within the Congress. The Congress Parliamentary 
Party ultimately elected Nehru’s daughter, Indira Gandhi as its leader and 
Prime Minister. The then consensus in the ‘syndicate’36 was to make Indira 
Gandhi a transitional Prime Minister till the 1967 general elections (Austin 
1999:175).  
3.4. From Socialism to State Ownership - Indira Gandhi (1966-1980) 
 
By the mid-1960s increased state expenditure through the first three five year 
plans led to an increasing dependence on foreign aid. The country was also 
dependent on foreign aid owing to an increase in food imports and a 
precarious balance of payments situation (Chandra et al 2008:457). The 
United States used this to leverage and arm twist India and its foreign policy, 
especially to tone down its opposition to the Vietnam war and undertake 
economic reforms (Chandra et al 2008:281-282). This led to India giving in to 
the combined pressure of the United States, the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and undertaking economic measures 
prescribed by them (Chandra et al 2008:458). Indira Gandhi’s government 
devalued the rupee with disastrous consequences for the economy and faced 
accusations that the government had given in to foreign pressure (Chandra et 
al 2008:282). India was also reliant on food aid from the United States of 
                                                          
36 The ‘syndicate’ was the name given to a grouping of State level Congress leaders who 
collectively controlled the party after Nehru’s death. 
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America, and this further escalated India’s perception of vulnerability (Zanini 
2001:10). To make matters worse, the promised aid was not dispatched and 
the food imports were released in a piecemeal manner to keep a tab on India’s 
stand on Vietnam (Chandra et al 2008: 282). This ‘ship-to-mouth’ approach 
was humiliating and resented (Chandra et al 2008:282).  
The ruling Congress party, under the leadership of Indira Gandhi, faced 
electoral losses in the ensuing 1967 parliamentary elections as a result of 
implementing unpopular economic policies at the behest of the Bank (Kapur 
et al. 1997:465; Zanini 2001:10; Chandra et al 2008:286-287). Accepting 
policy linked aid, therefore, became associated with political disaster (Kapur 
et al. 1997:466). In contrast to its previous electoral performances, the 
Congress did not fare well in the 1967 elections, winning only 283 out of 516 
seats, which just about constituted a bare majority in the house (Panagariya 
2011). Also, the promised aid in lieu of devaluation could not be secured by 
the donor community and the insiders within the national government who had 
backed the reforms felt let down. As a consequence, India decided to reduce 
its reliance on foreign aid and started building its foreign exchange reserves 
(Zanini 2001:10; Kapur et al. 1997:466). 
The coercive tactics of the donors made India realise the need to be self-
sufficient (Chandra et al 2008: 462). This drive intensified in the course of the 
green revolution era, which aimed at increasing agricultural productivity and 
reducing reliance on foreign aid (Dreze & Sen 2014:27). The push for a green 
revolution coincided with the oil shock of 1973. A nation facing balance of 
payments constraints could literally no longer ‘fuel’ the green revolution with 
diesel pumps, and attention turned to electricity as the preferred source of 
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power for irrigation pumps (World Bank 1979:1). India chose to rely on 
electricity generated by coal, abundantly available within the country, to power 
the irrigation pumps necessary for achieving food security, this also made 
India increasingly rely on electricity as a primary source of energy (World Bank 
1979:1). The focus on rural electrification to enhance agricultural productivity 
can also be correlated with Amartya Sen’s observation that in a democracy 
famines become a ‘political disaster’ as it generates public debate and protest 
against the government (Sen 2010:343). Greater state investments in the 
electricity sector and expansion of rural electrification can thus be directly 
correlated with external factors like oil shocks and condition laden foreign aid 
coupled with the politics associated with famines in a democracy. Electricity is 
an input for increasing agricultural productivity, therefore is closely connected 
with the notion of ‘political disaster’ (Sen 2010:343) associated with famines in 
a democracy. The centrality of the electricity sector for the state driven project 
of economic growth shall be further discussed in Chapter 4. 
3.4.1. Declining Congress Dominance and Emergence of Politics of 
Resource Disbursal  
 
Politics has always influenced economic decision-making in India (Kohli 
2011:502). However, the Indira Gandhi era was known for a more intense 
influence of politics on the economy both in terms of the distributive politics of 
the 1970s and the ‘pro-business’ politics of the early 1980s (Kohli 2011:502). 
The present form of distributive politics can trace their origin to Indira Gandhi 
in 1967 when Congress began losing power in the States, which had a 
corresponding impact on its national performance in the parliamentary 
elections (Chhibber 1995:78-79). The politics of the opposition to Congress, 
68 
 
which was in power in the States, was not ideologically different from that of 
the Congress, but the electoral politics revolved around access to the state 
and its resources. This resulted in competitive politics of resource disbursal to 
garner votes.  
Correspondingly, the Congress Party, which was in power in the national 
government, engaged in a strategy of mobilizing national government 
resources so as to counter the groups vying for power in the States (Chhibber 
1995:79). It increased the allocation of food grains, intervened in the 
agriculture sector, established public sector utilities and the flow of private 
investment in States so as to influence electoral outcomes (Chhibber 1995:80-
87). The findings of a study based on panel data from 15 States comprising 
95% of India’s population for the time period 1972 to 1998, indicated that 
States ruled by the party in power in the national government had a higher 
deficit spending given the national government’s ability to provide access to 
‘subsidized credit from financial markets’ it controlled (Khemani 2007:693). 
State level deficits are financed both through loans from the national 
government, which constitutes 60% of deficit financing, and the remainder 
through borrowing from the financial markets, which primarily consists of public 
sector banks controlled by the national government. Therefore, the national 
government has an important role to play in deficit financing not only through 
direct loans ‘but also indirectly through regulation of market loans and bailouts 
of state-owned enterprises’ (Khemani 2007:697). The study concludes that 
mere delegation of fiscal disciplining power to the national government does 
not result in the national party enforcing fiscal discipline when it comes to 
State’s spending. Though there could be a disciplinary impact on the States 
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governed by other political parties, there is no incentive for the party in power 
to promote fiscal discipline in the States governed by it (Khemani 2007:707).  
The Congress national government also intervened politically in the States 
through increased use of the tool of President’s rule.37 As Rudolph and 
Rudolph (2008) observe, the pre-1991 economy and politics were 
characterized by national control of the economy and polity. This was made 
possible economically through disbursal of national resources to the States 
and the dominance of the Congress Party in both the national and State 
legislatures. 
3.4.2. Redistributionist State and Pro-Property Rights Court  
 
As discussed, after independence the Congress Party enjoyed majorities in 
both the houses of the national parliament and State legislatures (Sathe 
2002:7). This tilted the balance of power in favour of the executive and 
legislature (Sathe 2002:7). In many ways the 1967 case of L.C.Golaknath v. 
State of Punjab (hereinafter the Golaknath case)38 can be seen as the 
beginning of the inter-institutional tensions concerning the interpretation of the 
Constitution. The case was filed challenging the land reform legislation, which 
limited the quantum of land that can be held by individuals, with the aim of 
redistributing the excess amongst the landless. The petitioners claimed that 
the said legislation infringed their fundamental right to property and freedom 
                                                          
37 The Constitution of India establishes a federal structure which vests ‘autonomy’ in the 
States in the constitutionally delineated areas (Chandra et al. 2008). The term President’s 
Rule denotes the national government taking over the governance of a particular State or 
States despite an elected government being in place citing breakdown of constitutional 
machinery under Article 356 of the Constitution. As Chandra and others observe this provision 
was ‘frequently used in the 1970s to dismiss inconvenient Opposition-ruled state governments 
or to discipline the state units of the ruling party’ (Chandra et al. 2008:679). 
38 L.C.Golaknath v. State of Punjab, AIR 1967 SC 1643.  
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to practice a profession of their choice. The Supreme Court held that the 
legislature could not take away or abridge fundamental rights. S.P.Sathe, an 
eminent Indian constitutional expert, rightly observed that for the judiciary to 
rule in such a manner, was very unsettling at that time (Sathe 2002:7).  
After electoral victory of 1967, Indira Gandhi was keen to assert her role in the 
party, it is however noted that ‘she lacked the necessary political base’ 
(Panagariya 2011). It will be pertinent to note that Indira Gandhi never used 
the word ‘socialist’ in the course of the 1967 election. It was only in 1969 that 
she leant towards the socialists within the party so as to upstage the 
‘syndicate’. Indira Gandhi’s tilt towards the socialists within the party for 
support led to interpreting the redistributionist constitutional mandate in the 
Directives as greater state ownership, nationalisation of private businesses 
and curtailment of the right to property. This was followed by Indira Gandhi 
announcing bank nationalisation and abolition of privy purses, i.e. allowances 
given to erstwhile rulers in return for surrendering their sovereignty to the 
Indian republic, in a bid to widen her political base (Panagariya 2011).  
The Supreme Court set aside the move to nationalise the banks as the same 
did not involve ‘just and equivalent compensation’ in 1970.39 It also set aside 
the abolition of privy purses in 1971.40 Indira Gandhi perceived these decisions 
of the Court as political interventions supporting the views of her opponents, 
namely ‘the old guard of the Congress Party and the right wing parties such 
as Swatantra and Jan Sangh’ (Sathe 2002:68). This interpretation of the 
                                                          
39 Rustom Cavasjee Cooper v. Union of India, AIR 1970 SC 564.  
40 His Highness Madhav Rao Jivaji Rao Scindia V. Union of India , AIR 1971 SC 530. 
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redistributionist mandate amongst others led to increasing tension between 
the judiciary on one hand and the executive and legislature on the other.  
3.4.3. Contest to Interpret the Constitution and the Role of the State in 
Economic Activity  
 
Political power play by the Indira Gandhi led Congress resulted in the 
interpretation of the Constitution’s redistributionist mandate as emphasising 
state ownership, with the amendment of its written word where required. The 
political manoeuvring also eroded the constitutional guarantees of autonomy 
for the civil services, resulting in greater political control over the bureaucrats. 
The elections in the 1970’s set the stage for the politics of populism with the 
help of ‘committed bureaucrats’ or bureaucrats loyal to Indira Gandhi (Nandy 
2000:78). This was contrary to the constitutional endeavour to insulate 
bureaucracy from political influence. The stage-managed politics also led to 
media houses, journalists and academicians raising the expectations from the 
state exponentially (Nandy 2000:78). The 1971 general election to the 
parliament, amongst other issues, was fought on making fundamental 
amendments to the Constitution (Sathe 2002:68). Sathe opines that the 2/3rds 
majority in the Parliament for the Indira Gandhi led Congress Party could be 
seen as an indication of a mandate to amend the Constitution (Sathe 2002:68). 
The electoral win was also attributed to the campaign slogan ‘garibi hatao’ i.e. 
‘eradicate poverty’ which gave an overwhelming majority to Indira Gandhi led 
Congress Party (Austin 1999:236).  
After the elections (1971) Indira Gandhi’s government introduced the 24th 
Constitutional Amendment (Govt of India 1971a) reasserting Parliament’s 
‘unqualified’ power to amend the Constitution (Sathe 2002:68). The 
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amendment’s statement of objectives pointed out that its purpose was to 
reverse the finding in the (land reform) Golaknath case.41 The amendment 
allowed the Parliament to curtail fundamental rights, which at that time 
included the right to property, in order to give effect to the redistributive 
Directives. The subsequent 25th Amendment aimed to reverse the decision of 
the Court in the Bank Nationalisation case (Govt of India 1971b). The 26th 
Amendment aimed at undoing the Supreme Court’s decision in the privy 
purses case and expressly abolished privy purses (Govt of India 1971c). 
The case of Kesavananda Bharathi v. State of Kerala (hereinafter 
Keshavananda case) questioned the validity of the 24th, 25th and 26th 
amendments.42 In the Keshavananda case, the Supreme Court, whilst 
agreeing that the Parliament had the power to amend the Constitution, 
qualified the same by stating that the Parliament, through amendment, could 
not alter the basic structure of the Constitution (Suresh & Narain 2014:7). The 
basic structure, according to the court, comprised certain unalterable aspects 
of the Constitution and included democracy, federalism, supremacy of the 
Constitution, the principle of separation of powers, etc.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
3.5. Interventionist State and Pranab Bardhan’s Observation of a 
‘Heterogeneous Dominant Coalition’  
 
The state control of resources led to competition between interest groups for 
access to these resources. Pranab Bardhan identifies ‘industrial bourgeoisie’, 
‘rich farmers’, whom he describes as ‘numerously most important’, and the 
                                                          
41 L.C.Golak Nath v. State of Punjab, AIR 1967 SC 1643. 
42 His Holiness Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru and Ors. v. State of Kerala and Anr, AIR 
1973 SC 1461. 
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‘professional class’, which included both the professionals in the public sector 
and the bureaucrats, as the ‘heterogeneous dominant coalition’ that competed 
with one another for the resources of the state (Bardhan 1998:40-61). 
Bardhan, however, notes that ‘conflicts’ persist between the constituents of the 
‘dominant coalition’. That these tensions emerge between the ‘urban industrial 
and professional classes’ and the ‘rural hegemonic class of rich farmers’ 
(Bardhan 1998: 54), and that ‘conflicts’ also persist between the ‘professional 
classes’ and the industrialists who seek access to state’s resources and 
licenses (Bardhan 1998: 54). No one class amongst the dominant classes can 
assert total control over the Indian state because ‘the ethnic and regional 
diversity of Indian society militate against the emergence of a single dominant 
class whose writ can be enforced throughout the country’ (Bardhan 1998:61). 
Bardhan argues that the different interests associated with the dominant 
coalition pull the state in ‘different directions’ and that the Indian state tries to 
pacify them through resource allocation which leads to ‘reduction in available 
surplus for public capital formation’ (Bardhan 1998:61). Varshney endorses 
Bardhan’s view and opines that ‘resources that could have gone towards 
investment were frittered away in grants and subsidies’ (Varshney 2013:295). 
The sectoral dynamics in the State of Andhra Pradesh as will be discussed in 
Chapter 7, reflect the entrenched interests of the constituents of the ‘dominant 
coalition’. As discussed in Chapter 2, the neoliberal critique of the 
interventionist state questioned the role of the state as ‘a guardian of public 
interest’ (Chang 1999:183). They portrayed it ‘as an organization controlled by 
interest groups, politicians, or bureaucrats who utilize it for their own self 
interests, producing socially undesirable outcomes’ (Chang 1999:184). The 
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resource disbursing Indian state appears to have fallen into this trap of 
dominant interests laying siege to its resources and influence.  
3.5.1. Emergence of ‘Professional Politicians’ Appealing to ‘Particularistic 
Interests’ 
 
In addition to the three classes of the dominant coalition, Bardhan identifies 
the politicians as ‘brokers, who act as agents for different bargaining interest 
groups, and, of course, take a cut for themselves for services rendered’ 
(Bardhan 1998:66). Kaviraj observes that the aggregation of the resources 
with the state and the notion of the redistributionist state also created a new 
class of ‘professional politicians’ (Kaviraj 2000:53). He defines this class as 
individuals whose only vocation is politics and who look to popular support as 
a means to garner a share of the resources of the state (Kaviraj 2000:53). This 
new cohort of politicians also appealed to ‘particularistic interests’ so as to stay 
in power and correspondingly directed the distribution of the aggregated 
resources at the state’s disposal to their constituencies (Kaviraj 2000:54).  
3.5.2. Ability of Rich Farmers to Influence Agricultural Voting Preferences 
 
The electoral competition in the 1960’s also saw the newly emergent farmers’ 
lobby renegotiate the dispersal of state resources at the State level with the 
Congress under Indira Gandhi (Kaviraj 2000:54). Bardhan also voices a similar 
opinion regarding the rising political clout of the rich farmers who, though 
scattered across the nation, had strength in numbers (Bardhan 1998:57). Such 
was the influence of rich land lords that they effectively frustrated the 
implementation of land redistribution legislation (Bardhan 1998:49). The rich 
farmers also exerted considerable influence on the landless ‘agricultural wage 
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labourers’, who were both employees and debtors to the rich farmers (Bardhan 
1998:47). The middle income farmers threw their lot in with the rich farmers 
for the state’s resources (Bardhan 1998:47-48). Therefore, there was a 
consolidation of agricultural voting preferences under the leadership of 
influential rich farmers.  
3.5.3. Growing Power of the Bureaucrats and Bureaucrat-Politician Nexus  
 
The burgeoning bureaucracy, in keeping with the enhanced role of the state in 
economic activity, became an interested party, deriving its power to allow or 
disallow an activity in a system tightly regulated by the state (Kaviraj 2000:53; 
Varshney 2013:295). With particular reference to state led industrialisation, the 
public sector was supervised by the bureaucracy. This scenario of supervision 
of the bureaucracy by the bureaucracy was ultimately to the benefit of the 
bureaucracy (Kaviraj 2000: 54). During the Indira Gandhi era, the role of the 
bureaucrats was politicised, culminating in the notion of ‘committed 
bureaucracy’ (Chandra et al 2008:82). As former bureaucrat Vittal notes ‘[b]ut 
the commitment that was elicited during the Emergency appeared to border 
on the brink of becoming a ‘loyalty test’, implying that ‘if you are not committed, 
you are omitted’. On the other hand, some officials exploited the idea of a 
committed civil service as ‘a means of rapid professional advancement’ (Vithal 
1997:223). Reciprocally when Indira Gandhi was ousted from power after the 
emergency, the bureaucrats loyal to her were sent into administrative oblivion 
(Chandra et al 2008:82).  
The Indian Administrative Service (hereinafter IAS) is the successor of the 
colonial Indian Civil Service and occupies the topmost position in the hierarchy 
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of the organisation of civil services (Vithal 1997:209). It is the only service 
‘which has direct working acquaintance with the politician at the state level’ 
(Vithal 1997:214). Iyer and Mani note that the IAS ‘staff the most important 
positions in district administration, state and central government secretariats, 
and state-owned enterprises’ (Iyer and Mani 2008:5). The Constitution 
provides safeguards from political interference through provisions regulating 
their appointment and removal.43 They are appointed by the President of India 
and cannot be removed by ‘state-level elected representatives’ (Iyer and Mani 
2008:6). The elected representatives at the State level however can influence 
the job postings or departmental assignment of the IAS officers (Iyer and Mani 
2008). 
Iyer and Mani argue that this ability to transfer bureaucrats between what the 
bureaucracy considers as desirable and less desirable postings allows State 
politicians to influence bureaucratic behaviour (Iyer and Mani 2008:1). This is 
because bureaucrats ‘define career success by the importance of the posts 
that they are assigned to’ (Iyer and Mani 2008:9). IAS officers can be 
reassigned or transferred between postings by the Chief Secretary, the top 
bureaucrat within the State who reports to the Chief Minister, a role equivalent 
to the Prime Minister at the State level in India (Iyer and Mani 2008:7). Iyer 
and Mani’s study involves information on the career histories of all IAS officers 
serving as of October 2005. The study focuses on 4047 officers posted in 19 
States constituting 96% of the nation’s population (Iyer and Mani 2008:13). 
                                                          
43 Articles 310 and 311 of the Constitution of India.  
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They observe that there is a significant rise in intra-State transfers whenever 
a new Chief Minister assumes office (Iyer and Mani 2008:17).  
Though the phenomenon of the politician-bureaucrat nexus is not that rampant 
at the national level, bureaucrats clamouring for political favours at the State 
level has led to an enhanced ‘politician – official nexus’ (Chandra et al 
2008:82). This is more prominent in States where parties with caste as a 
political base came to power, with such elected leaders giving preference to 
bureaucrats of their castes or communities (Chandra et al 2008:82). As will be 
evident in the analysis of the implementation of the Bank’s model for sectoral 
reform in Andhra Pradesh, the three interest groups, namely the rich farmers, 
politicians and career bureaucrats, including sectoral technocrats, come to 
represent the sectoral dominant coalition and play an important role in 
allocation of electricity.  
3.6. Expansion of the Indian State’s ‘Public Sphere’ and Judicial 
Interpretation 
  
The expansion of the role of the state in economic activity also witnessed the 
judicial expansion of the notion of ‘state’ operating through different 
instrumentalities. The Constitution assigns a broad definition to the word 
‘state’. In the words of the noted commentator D.D. Basu, ‘[f]ar from restricting 
the concept of State it enlarges the scope to embrace of all authorities under 
the control of Government' (Basu 2011:57). Article 12 of the Constitution 
defines the ‘state’ in the context of enforceability of fundamental rights 
restraining the power of the state in Part III of the Constitution enumerating 
civil and political rights. This definition of ‘state’ is equally applicable to Part IV 
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of the Constitution which prescribes the Directives.44 Article 12 of the 
Constitution defines the ‘state’ as follows:  
‘In this Part, unless the context otherwise requires, “the State” 
includes the Government and Parliament of India and the other 
authorities within the territory of India or under the control of the 
Government of India.’  
The Court has over the years expanded the scope of the phrase ‘other 
authorities’ in Article 12 of the Constitution to address the issues of state power 
exercised through statutory corporations and other entities constituted under 
statute in pursuance of the idea of an interventionist state. The case of 
Rajasthan State Electricity Board v. Mohan Lal and Ors decided in 1967 
(hereinafter the SEB case) set the tone for the interpretation of the phrase 
‘other authorities’ under the Constitution.45 The decision is important given the 
fact that it pertains to the State Electricity Boards (SEBs), which were the 
institutional mechanism through which the interventionist state sought to 
coordinate and encourage economic activity, build individual capabilities and 
bridge regional disparities. The decision recognised that, ‘all constitutional or 
statutory authorities on whom powers are conferred by law’ fall within the ambit 
of the category ‘other authorities’. The Supreme Court observed that the nature 
of the duty being discharged by the State Electricity Board was in pursuance 
of the Directives, which requires the state to take special care to promote the 
educational and economic interests of the weaker sections.46 The Supreme 
                                                          
44 Article 36 of the Constitution of India titled ‘Definition’ states that, ‘[i]n this part, unless the 
context otherwise requires, “the State” has the same meaning as in Part III’.  
45 Rajasthan State Electricity Board, Jaipur V. Mohan Lal and Ors, [1967] 3 SCR 377.  
46 The Supreme Court in this respect was referring to Article 46 of the Constitution of India. 
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Court therefore concluded that the definition of state would include bodies 
created to discharge this constitutional mandate. It held that the Constitution 
vests in the state the power to carry on any trade or business,47 therefore, 
despite the Board undertaking commercial activity, it was still categorised as a 
‘state’.  
In the subsequent case of Sukhdev Singh v. Bhagat Ram (hereinafter the 
Statutory Corporations case),48 the Court observed that concept of state had 
undergone a sea-change over the years and that it had to be viewed from the 
perspective of ‘service corporation’.49 Justice Matthew’s, reasoning in the 
Statutory Corporations case, explores the possibility of the expansion of the 
concept of ‘other authorities’ from a narrow definition of constitutional or 
statutory corporations with the power to pass regulations having the power of 
law, to that of ‘instrumentality of the state'. In Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. 
International Airport Authority of India and Ors, the Supreme Court endorsed 
Justice Mathew’s observation in the Statutory Corporations case, i.e. that the 
instrumentality of the public corporation was established given the 
bureaucratic inability to address a multiplicity of tasks of a welfare state.50 As 
a consequence it observed that statutory corporations fall within the purview 
of ‘other authorities’ and therefore qualify to be categorised as ‘state’.  
                                                          
47 Article 298 of the Constitution of India, titled ‘Power to carry on trade, etc’.  
48 Sukhdev Singh, Oil & Natural Gas Commission, Life Insurance Corporation, Industrial 
Finance Corporation Employees Associations V. Bhagat Ram, Association of Clause II. 
Officers, Shyam Lal, Industrial Finance Corporation, [1975] 3 SCR 619.  
49Sukhdev Singh, Oil & Natural Gas Commission, Life Insurance Corporation, Industrial 
Finance Corporation Employees Associations V. Bhagat Ram, Association of Clause II. 
Officers, Shyam Lal, Industrial Finance Corporation [1975] 3 SCR 619, Para 80.  
50 Ramana Dayaram Shetty V. International Airport Authority of India and Ors, 
(1979)3SCC489.  
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The next case was that of Ajay Hasia and Ors v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi 
and Ors (hereinafter Educational Society case).51 The issue before the 
Court was whether a society constituted under the Societies Registration 
Act, 1860 can be categorised as an ‘other authority’. The most significant 
contribution of the Educational Society case was a clear enunciation of 
principles to determine whether a corporation or other instrumentalities were 
to be an instrumentality of agency of the government i.e. ‘other authorities’. 
The prerequisite criteria can be used either individually or collectively to 
determine whether an agency or instrumentality can be categorised as a 
state. The criteria amongst others includes that the entire share capital of 
the corporation must be owned by the government, and that there has to be 
substantial financial assistance for the entire expenditure of the corporation 
from the government.52 The Supreme Court also clarified that it was no 
longer relevant whether a corporation was created by statute or under a 
statute. The line of reasoning in these cases emerging out of the expanding 
scope of the interventionist state has been upheld by the Supreme Court in 
subsequent decisions.53 The decisions of the Supreme Court ensured that 
behaviour of the state instrumentalities was in conformity with the standards 
imposed on the core state i.e. the state departments. 
                                                          
51 Pradeep Kumar Biswas and Ors V. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology and Ors, (2002) 5 
SCC 111, Para 25.  
52 The other criteria formulated by the court in the case include the monopoly or state protected 
status of the corporation, and the presence of deep and pervasive state control over the 
activities of the corporation. If the functions of the corporation are public in nature or are related 
to governmental functions, and if a government department has been transferred to the 
corporation, then the same makes a strong case for the corporation to be categorised as an 
agency or instrumentality of the state. 
53 Pradeep Kumar Biswas and Ors V. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology and Ors, (2002) 5 
SCC 111. 
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3.7. Imposition of Emergency by Indira Gandhi (June 1975-March 1977) 
 
In 1975 the High Court of the State of Uttar Pradesh set aside Indira Gandhi’s 
election to the Parliament for violation of the electoral laws. Indira Gandhi 
declared a ‘State of Emergency’ (hereinafter ‘the Emergency’). Though the 
declaration of emergency was made under Article 352 of the Constitution of 
India to protect the security of the nation, it was evident that it was invoked by 
Indira Gandhi to save her Prime Ministership. This allowed the national 
government to suspend civil liberties and fundamental rights and interfere with 
the administration in the States (Chandra et al. 2008:321). As Chandra and 
others observe, ‘the Emergency concentrated unlimited state and party power 
in the hands of prime minister to be exercised through a small coterie of 
politicians and bureaucrats around her’ (Chandra et al. 2008:322). The period 
during which Emergency was imposed also witnesses suppression of political 
dissent and imprisonment of opposition and protestors. The Emergency lasted 
from 25 June 1975 till 21 March 1977. During the Emergency, the Indira 
Gandhi-led government tried to curtail the Supreme Court’s powers and 
asserted the power of the national government at the expense of the States 
and the judiciary through constitutional amendments (November 1976) 
(Suresh & Narain 2014:8). The 42nd Amendment to the Constitution enacted 
at the behest of the Indira Gandhi administration aimed at further reducing the 
powers of the judiciary whilst attempting to make the Constitution ‘Socialist’ by 
explicit inclusion of the word in the Preamble (Govt of India 1976).  
One of the direct repercussions of the 42nd constitutional amendment to the 
right to property was that the legislative measures implementing the 
redistributionist Directives could not be questioned as being violative of 
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fundamental rights under Articles 14, 19 or 31.54 Shortly after the passage of 
the amendment, elections were called by Indira Gandhi’s government and the 
Congress Party lost power for the first time since independence. The first non-
Congress Party government, headed by the Janata Party, set about undoing 
the amendments. The Janata Party-led government undid most of the 42nd 
Amendment (Govt of India 1976) through the 44th Amendment (Govt of India 
1978). It however did not undo the amendment relegating the right to property 
from a fundamental right to a mere constitutional right. 
3.8. Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi in 1980s – India as a ‘Pro-Business’ 
State  
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the 1980s witnessed a global change in 
perception of the role of the state in economic activity from interventionism to 
that of restraint. Indira Gandhi’s return to power after the January 1980 election 
saw a decisive shift from her pro-poor socialist and redistributionist approach 
to a more pro-business and growth oriented approach (Kohli 
2010:152,158,161). The slow economic growth in the 1970’s, the inefficient 
public sector when contrasted with the success of the green revolution, 
premised on governmental encouragement to private farming activity through 
appropriate inputs, was one of the reasons for the change in Indira Gandhi’s 
economic policy (Kohli 2010:153). The 1980s also made a marked shift as to 
the economic objectives of the Indian state from being redistributonalist to 
being a facilitator of economic growth (Kohli 2010:153-154, 158,161).  
                                                          
54 Previously this was restricted to legislations enacted in pursuance of Art 39 Clauses (b) and 
(c) only. 
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The 1980s saw the Indian state change its position from being anti-capitalist 
to relying on the constituency to encourage economic growth (Kohli 2010:142). 
Kohli argues that the Indian state after 1980s assumed a ‘pro-business’ as 
opposed to a ‘pro-market’ approach. He defines a ‘pro-market’ approach as 
giving the market forces a free hand much in line with the ‘Washington 
Consensus’. This includes a withdrawal of the Indian state from economic 
activity, disinvestment and privatisation of the state owned utilities, a rollback 
of subsidies etc. (Kohli 2010:144-145). For a ‘pro-business’ approach he gives 
the example of the developmental states, which made it easier for the private 
businesses to conduct business through favourable labour regulations, 
taxation, access to finance and other business related concessions and 
protectionist strategies (Kohli 2010:146). In the 1980s, the Indian state moved 
towards adopting the East Asian developmental state model (Kohli 2010:147). 
This was followed by appropriate amendments made to the Monopolies and 
Restrictive Trade Practices Act, allowing business expansion, easing access 
to credit and legislation, and disciplining labour unions and their activities 
(Kohli 2010:155-56). This however did not see a corresponding cut in public 
expenditure despite India obtaining a loan from the IMF to stave off a potential 
balance of payments crisis (Kohli 2010:157). Indira Gandhi’s son Rajiv Gandhi 
continued the reforms initiated by his mother with a decisive state push 
towards greater private business activity reasserting the shift in state priorities 
from redistributionist socialism to enhancing economic growth (Kohli 
2010:159).  
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3.9. Can a Pro-business Indian State be categorised as a 
Developmental State?  
 
As discussed, Kohli views the Indian State’s ‘pro-business’ tilt to be 
comparable with the East Asian Developmental State (Kohli 2010). This view 
has however been challenged. Mukherji argues that India cannot be 
characterised as a developmental state (Mukherji 2016:217). He relies on 
Peter Evans characterisation of a development state as one displaying 
‘Embedded Autonomy’ (Mukherji 2016:219). Mukherji describes the notion of 
‘Embedded Autonomy’ as follows, ‘[i]t was embedded in the sense that the 
state maintained very important ties to capital. But the state was also 
autonomous of capital. This autonomy from capital enabled the East Asian 
state to discipline capital in a manner that made it competitive in the world 
economy…’ (Mukherji 2016:219-220). Mukherji observes that the Indian state 
on the other hand ‘is so penetrated by social actors’ that it does not display 
the requisite autonomy like a development state (Mukherji 2016:219-220). 
Mukherji concludes with the observation that ‘India is not a classic 
“developmental state” that can easily discipline social actors ranged against it. 
This is due to the fact that it cohabits a rather powerful society around a 
relatively weak state and a democratic political system’ (Mukherji 2016:219-
233). This makes ‘[s]ociety-centered’ approaches to analysis particularly 
relevant to the Indian context (Mukherji 2016: 220).  
Bardhan notes that the relative autonomy of the state from politics, as 
evidenced in the context of Korea and Japan, is not possible in the Indian 
context (Bardhan 1998: 72-73). In his words 
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‘But in a polyglot and vastly more heterogeneous and fragmented 
society like that of India, this insulation has been difficult to achieve and 
maintain alongside a pluralist open polity. In the initial years after 
Independence, the stature and special legitimacy of the Indian 
leadership allowed it some leeway in this insulation process. But with 
the increasing plurality of contending interests in the dominant coalition 
and with the complexity of their mutual interaction often resulting in log-
rolling arrangements, the public economy became increasingly 
exposed’ (Bardhan 1998: 73). 
This thesis endorses Bardhan’s (1998) and Mukherji’s (2016) view of the 
Indian state as one that is contested and captured by various interests as 
opposed to Kohli’s (2010) assertion of the Indian state is gravitating towards a 
developmental state model. This is because of the very nature of the Indian 
state and its highly-contested role in economic activity. This makes the Indian 
state a hybrid embodiment of the varying expectations of the different societal 
strata and interests. The same is in keeping with the core argument of this 
chapter, i.e. that the tensions in the state give rise to its unique regulatory 
attributes. The Indian state, as Sally Falk Moore puts it in the context of 
changing nature of the state, ‘acknowledges diverse social fields within society 
and represents itself ideologically and organizationally in relation to them’ 
(Moore 2001:107). Chapter 8 of this thesis argues that this trait leads to 
alternate institutional organisation and the emergence of legal pluralism in 
state law.  
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3.10. Preparing for the Opportune Time to Liberalise 
 
As discussed, India sought aid from the Bank and the IMF in 1991 to tide over 
an external balance of payments crisis and internal fiscal deficits. This aid was 
conditional upon the country undertaking reforms ushering in a regulatory 
state. Kohli is of the view that the assertion of 1991 as the date of India’s 
market liberalisation is a kind of misnomer, as the move to the right began in 
the early 1980s (Kohli 2010:141-143). Mukherji is in agreement with this view 
of a slow build-up of consensus culminating in the final move to liberalise in 
1991 (Mukherji 2016). Advisors to Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi included 
Montek Singh Ahluwalia and Manmohan Singh, who played an important role 
through the period of reforms initiated in 1991 (Kohli 2010:159). Nevertheless, 
it becomes evident that there was a substantial internal lobby and mood 
waiting for an opportune time to make a ‘political decision’ to break from the 
past, though the reforms were very much underway, Kohli opines that the 1991 
balance of payments crisis, aggravated by fiscal deficits owing to increased 
state expenditure, produced this opportunity (Kohli 2010:160-163). 1991 was 
also important given the change in external circumstances, i.e. the fall of the 
Soviet Union, India’s political and military ally, which forced India to break from 
the socialist model and engage with the United States (Kohli 2010:167; Nayar 
2007:30). This change in the national state’s policy can be attributed to what 
Chang observes to be a larger global shift towards rollback of the 
interventionist state in the 1980s and 1990s (Chang 2003:1). This is also 
indicative of the fact that the Indian state’s role in economic activity is 
influenced by the corresponding dominant global consensus regarding the role 
of the state in economic activity.  
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3.11. Inter-Institutional Tensions after Emergency – Populist Pro-Poor 
Court and a Pro-Business State  
 
Aditya Nigam observes that after the Emergency the judiciary appeared to take 
a cue from Indira Gandhi’s populism (Nigam 2014:24). This period is termed 
as that of ‘judicial activism’ when the court realised that ‘its elitist social image 
would not make it strong enough to withstand the future onslaught of a 
powerful political establishment’ (Sathe 2002:107). Opinions vary about the 
posturing of the court between that of Upendra Baxi, who termed the 
phenomenon as the ‘Supreme Court of India becoming the Supreme Court for 
Indians’ (Baxi 1985:289) to a more cautious S.P.Sathe, who viewed it as 
institutional posturing aimed at self-legitimisation (Sathe 2002:107). It is, 
however, opined that the truth is somewhere in between. Judicial opportunism 
from an institutional perspective could only happen because of the weakening 
of the previously powerful executive and legislature. This increase in relative 
power allowed judges like P.N.Bhagawathi and Krishna Iyer to give a 
redistributionist and interventionist interpretation to the constitutional 
provisions. This, coupled with the deference to precedents in a common law 
jurisdiction like India, helped mould judicial interpretation of the role of the state 
in economic activity. As will be observed, the court in this context interpreted 
the redistributionist mandate of the state far more vociferously long after Indira 
Gandhi herself abandoned it, with a decisive shift towards encouraging private 
activity after 1980.  
Perhaps the most notable case in this context, emerging out of the 
nationalisation endorsing the redistributive aspects of state ownership is that 
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of State of Karnataka V. Ranganatha Reddy55 (hereinafter the Road 
Transport Nationalisation case). This case involved a challenge to the 
enactment fixing compensation for acquisition of private transport businesses 
by the statutory State Transport Corporation. It was argued that the 
acquisition would not result in the material resources of the community being 
distributed for the common good.56 Justice Krishna Iyer held that 
constitutional interpretation cannot be undertaken in a vacuum and had to 
take into account socio-economic realities. The court in this case observed 
that nationalisation has a direct connection with distribution and that ‘material 
resources’ include both public and private resources of the community.57  
The next case dealing with the redistributive mandate enshrined in Art.39 (b) 
involved nationalisation of coal mines (hereinafter the Coal Mine 
Nationalisation case).58 Amongst other issues, it was argued that neither coal 
nor coking coal mines and plants owned by private players were material 
resources of the community. It was submitted that they would become material 
resources of the community only after they were acquired by the state.59 The 
Supreme Court was not in agreement with such a narrow interpretation of the 
phrase ‘material resources of the community'. It favoured a wider approach 
                                                          
55 The State of Karnataka and Anr V. Ranganatha Reddy and Anr (1977) 4 SCC 471.  
56 Article 39(b) of the Constitution of India.  
57 The State of Karnataka and Anr V. Ranganatha Reddy and Anr, (1977) 4 SCC 471, Para 
97. Cosmo Graham (Graham 2000: 3) refers to Tony Prosser’s observations in the context of 
public ownership and nationalisation in the United Kingdom after World War II being justified 
as being in the ‘public interest’. He voices Tony Posser’s concern with the use of the phrase 
‘public interest’ as the same was not defined. In the Indian context, however, there appears to 
be a more definitive justification for nationalisation i.e. ‘distribution’.  
58 Sanjeev Coke Manufacturing Company V. Bharat Coking Coal Limited and Anr. AND 
Bharat Coking Coal Limited and Anr. V. Sanjeev Coke Manufacturing Company, (1983) 1 
SCC 147. 
59 Sanjeev Coke Manufacturing Company V. Bharat Coking Coal Limited and Anr. AND 
Bharat Coking Coal Limited and Anr. V. Sanjeev Coke Manufacturing Company, (1983) 1 
SCC 147, Para 19.  
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and held that the scope of the phrase ‘material resources of the community’ 
was not restricted to natural resources and publicly owned resources but 
applied to all resources, be they natural or manmade, public or privately 
owned. These cases, which linked state interventionism with the redistributive 
mandate of the Constitution, were decided at the same time when the Indian 
state began taking a pro-business approach in response to the global shift 
towards a regulatory state. This rekindled tensions between the judiciary and 
the other branches of the state.  
The question of whether electricity was a material resource of the community 
under Article 39(b) of the Constitution came up before the Supreme Court in 
cases involving nationalisation of private electricity companies by the 
governments of the States of Assam and Maharashtra.60 In the Assam case, 
it was contended by the private electricity provider that the legislation effecting 
nationalisation of the electricity companies under the pretext of complying with 
Article 39(b), was a questionable exercise.61 It was contended that the State 
government aimed to deny them appropriate compensation by enacting 
nationalisation legislation instead of a straightforward commercial transaction. 
It was argued that the legislation was enacted to take advantage of Article 31C 
of the Constitution, which granted certain Directives immunity from judicial 
review. In this context, the Supreme Court held that ‘electricity’ is a material 
resource of the community.62 It relied on the decision in the Coal Mines 
                                                          
60 Tinsukhia Electric Supply Co. Ltd V. State of Assam and Ors, (1989) 3 SCC 709; 
Maharashtra State Electricity Board V. Thane Electric Supply Co. & Ors, (1989) 3 SCC 616.  
61 Tinsukhia Electric Supply Co. Ltd V. State of Assam and Ors, (1989) 3 SCC 709. 
62 Tinsukhia Electric Supply Co.Ltd V. State of Assam and Ors, (1989) 3 SCC 709, Para 27. 
The court gave a similar verdict in a similar case dealing with the determination of the quantum 
of compensation for the nationalisation of the electricity service provider. See, Maharashtra 
State Electricity Board V. Thane Electric Supply Co. (1989) 3 SCC 616.  
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Nationalisation case, where privately owned resources were construed to be 
included within the scope of the phrase ‘material resources of the 
community'.63 
In a similar case, legislation altering the quantum of compensation paid by the 
State of Maharashtra to a nationalised power utility was held to be immune 
from judicial review, as it proposed to further the objectives of Article 39(b) of 
the Constitution of India.64 In this matter, the Supreme Court referred to the 
Assam nationalisation case.65 The Supreme Court reiterated that electricity 
was a material resource of the community. It further clarified that the idea of 
nationalisation was closely associated with the concept of distribution of the 
community’s resources under Article 39(b). Consequently, it held that the 
legislation altering the quantum of compensation was immune from judicial 
review. It would be pertinent to note that the decisions endorsing the 
distributive aspect of nationalisation or state participation in the electricity 
sector were given in 1989. It would be barely two years before the economic 
liberalisation by the executive and legislature in 1991, and four years before 
the national government endorsed the Bank’s 1993 sectoral policy aimed at a 
withdrawal of the state from economic activity.  
                                                          
63 Sanjeev Coke Manufacturing Company V. Bharat Coking Coal Limited and Anr. AND 
Bharat Coking Coal Limited and Anr V. Sanjeev Coke Manufacturing Company, (1983) 1 
SCC147.  
64 Maharashtra State Electricity Board V. Thane Electric Supply Co. & Ors., (1989) 3 SCC 616 
65 Both decisions were delivered on the same day and by the same bench.  
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3.12. Indian Regulatory Space – From Liberalisation until Today  
 
3.12.1. 1991 Crisis & Reform by Stealth 
  
The 1991 fiscal crisis was attributed to an increased expenditure on subsidies 
by the national government (Chhibber 1995:75). Kohli is of the view that in 
1990’s the Indian capitalists took differing political positions between those 
who preferred greater liberalisation and protectionism creating the right 
atmosphere for the ‘technocratic elite’ to bring about policy change (Kohli 
2010:167-169). The balance of payments crisis of 1991 gave the narrow 
constituency of political leadership, technocrats and certain segments of the 
industry the opportunity to embrace the IMF’s conditionality as a means to 
bring about their desired internal reforms (Kohli 2010:169). Despite a very 
active democracy the economic changes were brought about by a small and 
elite group and by ‘stealth’ (Kohli 2010:169; Nayar 2007:33). For example, 
many reforms were introduced by executive announcements rather than 
through parliamentary resolutions; similarly, key interventions in the nature of 
the withdrawal of subsidies were announced at a time when parliament was 
not in session (Kohli 2010:169).  
According to Varshney,  
‘Elite politics is typically expressed in debates and struggles within the 
institutionalised settings of a bureaucracy, a parliament, a cabinet. 
Mass politics takes place primarily on the streets. Touched off by issues 
that unleash citizen passions and emotions, the characteristic forms of 
mass politics include large-scale agitations, demonstrations, and civil 
disobedience... The more direct the effect of a policy, the more people 
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are affected by it, and the more organised they are, the greater the 
potential for mass politics’ (Varshney 2007:147).  
Economic reforms were primarily the domain of elite politics, whereas ‘[e]thnic 
conflict and identity politics’ were the drivers of India’s mass politics.  The then 
prevailing atmosphere of communal strife and polarised politics gave the 
minority government headed by Congress political room to usher in the 1991 
reforms, the agenda of which included exchange rates, foreign investment and 
encouraging the growth of capital markets (Varshney 2013:282). The reason 
for the success of the 1991 reforms was because they were not politically 
sensitive (Varshney 2013:282). While Varshney’s analysis is with regard to 
national politics, it is also arguably applicable to the electricity sector at the 
State level. In Andhra Pradesh, the withdrawal of the State level state from 
sectoral economic activity in order to usher in a regulatory state, at the 
insistence of the national state triggered mass political unrest as roll back of 
subsidies and tariff increase directly affected the common man. This will be 
discussed in Chapter 7. 
3.12.2. The 1990’s – Developments After Liberalisation 
  
Between 1991 and 1996, the national government only implemented policies 
concerned with elite politics, avoiding reforms which may attract mass 
mobilisation and protests (Varshney 2013:306). In the 1990s, the national 
state could not privatise the public sector nor bring about labour reforms; the 
deficits, though much smaller, continued to reflect the need for state 
expenditure (Kohli 2010:173). In other words, the reforms had to be more 
tempered to play to a diverse gallery of democratic expectations.  
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From 1995 the United Front, a coalition government with a left leaning 
ideology, was in power at the national level for nearly two years (Nayar 
2007:33). The United Front coalition did not, however, reverse the measures 
of liberalisation initiated in 1991 (Nayar 2007:33). After the United Front 
coalition, the BJP led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) was in power from 
1998-2004. Despite its support for liberalisation, the NDA only focussed on 
public sector reforms after encountering resistance to the policy of 
disinvestment of public sector enterprises (Nayar 2007:36). In fact, it went to 
poll in 2004 on a development and growth plank, with its campaign slogan 
‘India Shining’ demonstrating its role in enhancing economic growth (Nayar 
2007:35). However, the irrelevance of the growth maximising strategy to the 
larger polity was demonstrated by NDA’s defeat in the elections.66 There was 
also widespread public perception that the reforms only favoured the rich and 
the privileged (Varshney 2013:306). Varshney observes from the results of the 
National Election Study 2004 and 2009 that, the lower one descended the 
social ladder, the larger the perceived inequity of the reform process 
(Varshney 2013:306). The socio-economically challenged sections of Indian 
society, including Muslims, Dalits (the lowest caste in the Hindu caste 
hierarchy) and the backward castes, believed that the reforms favoured the 
privileged (Varshney 2013:307). 
In the 2004 elections, the Congress and its allies, i.e. the United Progressive 
Alliance (UPA), rallied around the issues of the poor, projecting the NDA as a 
coalition of the rich (Nayar 2007:37). The slogan of ‘Aam Admi’, i.e. ‘common 
                                                          
66 Also, the Chief Ministers who actively wanted to roll back the state in the States S.M.Krishna 
of Congress in Karnataka and Chadrababu Naidu of Telugu Desam Party in Andhra Pradesh 
lost power (Varshney 2013:306). 
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man’, galvanised electoral support. Nayar however observes that the UPA, led 
by the Congress, did not have an economic ideology of its own and in its 
attempt to keep the NDA at bay effectively became hostage to a left leaning 
ideology and was not able to infuse speed into the reform process (Nayar 
2007:37). Nayar attributes Congress led UPA’s tilt to the left to supporters of 
left ideology within the Congress itself (Nayar 2007:37,41). As a result, the 
public sector remained untouched and subsidies were expanded (Nayar 
2007:37,41).  
UPA – I (2004-2009) and UPA – II (2009-2014) which boasted a line-up of 
reformers, including Manmohan Singh, the Prime Minister, and Monteksingh 
Ahluwalia, as the Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission, had to 
explore redistributionary policies to quell this growing discontent (Varshney 
2013:308). The need to make reforms inclusionary was now accepted across 
political ideologies, in fact the then opposition, the NDA led by BJP, did not 
oppose legislation promoting the right to work, food and education (Varshney 
2013:310).67  
The present Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) led National Democratic Alliance 
(NDA), which came to power in May 2014, appears to have continued the 
economic philosophy of the Congress led UPA, in terms of ongoing sectoral 
liberalisation, whilst continuing the welfare schemes which owe their existence 
to the positive mandate of the Directives. However, the present government’s 
public position appears to be more neo-liberal, reminiscent of the Congress 
                                                          
67 These include the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act, 2005, The 
Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 and The National Food 
Security Act, 2013. 
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after announcing economic liberalisation in 1991 and NDA’s own India Shining 
campaign in 2004. Though the period after June 2014 is not part of the present 
analysis, it is opined that it is but a matter of time before the government will 
be forced to reconcile with its interventionist and pro-welfare role. In this 
context, it is pertinent to refer to Pranab Bardhan’s epilogue to his essay on 
‘The Political Economy of Development in India’, titled ‘Epilogue on the 
Political Economy of Reform in India’ (Bardhan 1998). There, Bardhan 
dismisses the claims of those supporting market reforms, i.e. that the state in 
India is on the retreat and that his thesis on the ‘heterogeneous’ ‘dominant 
coalition’ no longer rings true (Bardhan 1998). In Bardhan’s words 
‘Many economists assume that market liberalism and competition is the 
natural order of things, and its unfolding in India has been blocked all 
these years only by our intellectual elites’ socialist infatuation. It is not 
usually appreciated that Indian political culture may have a dominant 
anti-market streak that will not easily disappear, even if that supposedly 
imported infatuation fades away. Our collective passion for group 
equity, for group rather than individual rights, and the deep suspicion of 
competition in which the larger economic interests are given an 
opportunity to gobble up the small, work against the forces of market 
and allocational efficiency…..Major strands in the Indian political culture 
thus provide a none-too-hospitable climate for market reforms, and, 
contrary to the wishful thinking of many economists and journalists of 
the Indian ‘pink press’, the process of economic reforms is not likely to 
be smooth sailing for quite some time to come. The prospects for more 
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reforms are not bleak, but one should not underestimate the scale and 
nature of opposition’ (Bardhan 1998:136-137).  
3.13. Liberalisation and Interpretation of Distributive Role of State in 
Economic Activity  
 
The Supreme Court has consistently taken the position that the phrase 
‘distribute’ is to be given a broad interpretation.68 A more recent discussion on 
the scope of the phrase ‘distribute’ took place in the 2012 decision in Centre 
for Public Interest Litigation & Ors V. Union of India and Ors (hereinafter 2G 
Spectrum Allocation case).69 It involved the telecommunications sector that 
was owned and managed by the national state, but eventually liberalised by 
successive governments after 1991. The Petitioners were of the view that the 
recommendation of the Telecom Regulator to the Licensor/Government to 
grant licences in 2007 on the basis of an entry fee determined in 2001 was 
arbitrary.70 The Supreme Court observed that spectrum was a scarce resource 
that has to be used efficiently. It observed that it had always given an 
‘expansive interpretation of the concept of natural resources’ relying on the 
Directives.71 It was of the view that, ‘[l]ike any other State action, 
constitutionalism must be reflected at every stage of distribution of natural 
resources’.72 The Court was of the view that, though the Telecom Regulator 
was an expert statutory body in the field of telecommunications, it could not 
make recommendations in violation of the fundamental constitutional 
                                                          
68 State of Tamil Nadu V. L. Abu Kavur Bai, (1984) 1 SCC 515.  
69Centre for Public Interest Litigation & Ors V. Union of India and Ors, (2012) 3 SCC 1. 
70 Centre for Public Interest Litigation & Ors V. Union of India and Ors,(2012) 3 SCC 1, Para 
48.  
71 Centre for Public Interest Litigation & Ors V. Union of India and Ors, (2012) 3 SCC 1, Para 
66.  
72 Centre for Public Interest Litigation & Ors V. Union of India and Ors, (2012) 3 SCC 1, Para 
63. 
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principles.73 It held that the tacit approval of the continuation of entry fee, 
determined in the year 2001, in the year 2007 was wholly unrealistic and did 
not reflect the prevalent dynamic market conditions.74 The Supreme Court, 
therefore, observed that regulators, though statutorily empowered to 
administer the sector, were subject to constitutional limitations in terms of their 
actions. The Supreme Court’s insistence that the constitutional parameters 
enumerated under Article 39(b), were the sole determinants of the disposal of 
natural resources helps establish the relevance of constitutional tenets to the 
functioning of sectoral regulatory authorities and regulation as an activity per 
se.75 The Supreme Court in this case held that auction, and not the principle of 
first come first served adopted by the Government, was the only mode of 
allocation of natural resources.  
The insistence of the Supreme Court on auction as the only mechanism 
consistent with the Constitution to allocate spectrum resulted in a Presidential 
Reference case (also in 2012).76 It determined that the term ‘distribution’ 
cannot be construed to mean auction alone,77 but all the methods available to 
‘subserve the common good’. The Supreme Court held that the word 
                                                          
73 Colin Scott opines that regulation by statutory regulators amounts to a delegation of public 
power (Scott 2010:16). Therefore, the delegation of this public power is one of the important 
aspects of examination of regulatory arrangements from a constitutionalism point of view. The 
decision in the 2G Spectrum Allocation case appears to be in agreement with this view of 
Colin Scott.  
74 Centre for Public Interest Litigation & Ors V. Union of India and Ors, (2012) 3 SCC 1, Para 
75. 
75 In the context of exploring the accountability of regulators in the constitutional scheme, 
Cosmo Graham is of the view that constitutions perform two important functions, namely 
vesting powers in public institutions and defininge their relationship inter se, and, secondly, 
enumerating the modes of ‘exercise of public power’ (Graham 2000:2). Referring to I. Harden, 
Cosmo Graham states that a constitution has to be seen as a ‘map of public power’ (Graham 
2000:2). The interfacing between constitution and regulatory bodies occurs in the context of 
their location in the ‘map of public power’ and the individual expectation in terms of welfare 
(Graham 2000:3).  
76 In Re: Special Reference No.1 of 2012. (2012) 10 SCC 1. 
77 In Re: Special Reference No.1 of 2012. (2012) 10 SCC 1, Para 112. 
98 
 
‘distribute’ had ‘wide amplitude and encompasses all manners and methods 
of distribution, which would include classes, industries, regions, private and 
public sections, etc’.78 It further noted that ‘a narrower concept of equality’, 
bestowed under the right to equality under Article 14 may frustrate the broader 
conception of equality under Article 39(b) of the Constitution of India if the word 
‘distribute’ were to be given a narrow interpretation. Citing the case of Bennett 
Coleman and Co. and Ors V. Union of India and Ors,79 it determined that the 
norm for distribution has to be that which achieves ‘common good’ and that 
the phrase ‘common good’ was ‘elastic’ and will depend on the ‘economic and 
political philosophy of the government’.  
It further observed that, even applying ‘economic logic’, auction could not be 
seen as the only means to ‘subserve common good’. It further stated that in 
matters where ‘revenue maximisation’ was not an objective of the distribution, 
‘developmental considerations’ could be prioritised. In fact, in the Presidential 
Reference Case,80 the Supreme Court explored the scope of the word 
distribute in the context of the illustration of the Section 11A of the Mines and 
Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957. Section 11A provides for 
preferential allotment of coal blocks (creating an exception to auction 
purchase) if the beneficiary were to be engaged in electricity generation.81 The 
Supreme Court in this context observed that what appeared as a cost-free 
allocation was, in fact, an inherent condition to provide electricity at a lower 
tariff and was, therefore, in compliance with the state’s constitutional mandate 
                                                          
78 In Re: Special Reference No.1 of 2012. (2012) 10 SCC 1, Para 115. 
79 Bennett Coleman and Co. and Ors. V. Union of India and Ors, (1972) 2 SCC 788.  
80 In Re: Special Reference No.1 of 2012. (2012) 10 SCC 1. 
81In Re: Special Reference No.1 of 2012. (2012) 10 SCC 1, Para 162. 
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to ensure distribution of material resources so as to subserve the common 
good under Article 39(b). Therefore, the Supreme Court’s decision can be 
viewed as not requiring an immediate or direct nexus between allocation or 
creation of rights and distribution, but the ultimate aim of distribution has to 
serve the ‘common good’ which also includes consequential downstream 
distributive benefits. More importantly, in the context of provision of electricity, 
the decision can also be seen as a tacit acknowledgement of the obligation to 
provide electricity at lower tariffs. 
Therefore, be it in the paradigm of an interventionist state or the gradual 
ushering in of the regulatory state, the Supreme Court has consistently held 
that the Indian state has an interventionist and distributive function in terms of 
the allocation of the material resources of the country. This approach seems 
to be in conflict with that of the executive and legislature, which appear to have 
taken a neoliberal posture in certain aspects of economic activity.                                                                                                                                   
3.14. The Growing Centrality of the Indian State to Economic Activity  
 
Probably the biggest influence of the Nehru initiated process of making the 
state more visible was an expansion of the public space associated with the 
state. The state, owing to popular politics and increasing participation in 
economic activity, came to occupy a prominent place in the public imagination 
as opposed to its marginal, elite and colonial avatar (Kaviraj 2000:55).82 As 
                                                          
82 Kaviraj succinctly describes this phenomenon as follows, ‘[f]rom an agency which was 
spectacular, mysterious and distant, the state has become something vast, overextended, 
extremely familiar at least in its sordid everyday structures – the panchayat, the revenue 
department, the local courts, the post office, railways, public-sector industries, and above all 
the elections, an ambiguous combination of serious decision making, social festival and farce. 
Nevertheless, it seems that its domination of Indian society, in some form or other, is 
historically irreversible. The policies of the government may veer from interventionism to free 
market. Even the structure of the state may be relatively large or thin; under liberalization, it 
may shed some of its present responsibilities. But its general title to legislation, forming rules 
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Nandy points out the ‘most prominent feature of Indian political culture in 
recent years has been the emergence of the nation state as the hegemonic 
actor in the public realm’ with no resistance from other actors in the public 
realm (Nandy 2000:64). However, as Mukherji (2016) observes, despite 
having a domineering presence and being able to influence economic activity, 
the Indian state remains susceptible to societal pressures. 
It is argued that it was the constitutionally engineered reflexivity making the 
state responsive to political aspirations that has nurtured and sustained the 
pre-eminence of the Indian state. Nigam says that there is a consensus 
between the mainstream political parties regarding economic liberalisation, or 
what he terms ‘neo-liberal reforms’ after 1991 (Nigam 2014:32). However, it is 
also observed that there appears to be consensus and continuity regarding 
the redistributive role of the state. In fact, there is a clear link between the 
economic growth after liberalisation leading to an expansion of the Indian 
state’s tax base and the economic feasibility of the Indian state to make the 
unenforceable Directives a reality, by granting them the status of legislative 
entitlements. Writing in 2014, Jean Dreze and Amartya Sen observe that the 
gross tax revenues of the national government have increased fourfold in real 
terms from what they were two decades back (Dreze & Sen 2014:270). They 
argue that this provides the state an opportunity ‘to make good use of public 
revenue for enhancing living conditions through public services and support’ 
(Dreze & Sen 2014:270). The legislative and policy initiatives aimed at 
realising the Directives are reflective of the growing involvement of the Indian 
                                                          
which society has to live by, cannot be contested. Even to impose self-denial, or curtailment 
of its apparatus, it must exercise sovereignty’ (Kaviraj 2000: 56).  
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state in economic activity. Despite the legislature and executive taking a 
neoliberal stand in certain sectors of economic activity, judicial interpretation 
of the constitutional mandate and political expectations appear to be 
exercising counter pressures. These dynamics nevertheless generate 
tensions within the state. However, as Mukherji (2016) observes though 
‘penetrated’ by social forces the Indian state continues to be an important 
driver of change. 
3.15. Conclusion 
 
B.R. Ambedkar was of the opinion that inclusion of the word ‘socialist’ in the 
Directives with explicit state ownership would choke politics. However, this 
does not imply that the Constitution is neutral in terms of its economic 
philosophy. The reflexive relationship between political expectations from the 
state which dictate the enforceability and scope of state intervention in 
economic activity ensures that the state’s role continues to be that of an 
interventionist one in the economy. Similarly, it is argued that when one 
analyses the decisions of the Indian Supreme Court on the role of the state in 
economic activity, one sees a varying interpretation of the constitutional 
mandate. Such varying interpretation of the constitutional scheme was made 
possible by the Constituent Assembly’s intent, borrowing Grimm’s words, to 
avoid ‘total juridification of the state’ (Grimm 2005:452). This has also given 
rise to intra-institutional tensions between the judiciary, on one hand, and the 
executive and legislature, on the other, through the regulatory and welfare 
state phases. 
 Economic policy moved towards greater liberalisation from 1985 onwards and 
culminated in the initiation of reforms in 1991. More than 25 years later the 
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political expectations of the masses from the state remains the same. The 
Indian state (both national and State) appears to maintain a very delicate 
balance between private economic activity and issues pertaining to foreign 
direct investment and regulation of financial markets on the one hand, and 
provision of basic necessities in the nature of electricity, food or access to 
employment on the other. The state is torn between the tensions generated 
by ‘elite politics’ and ‘mass politics’ (Varshney 2007), and the competing 
notions of the developmental state, welfare state and regulatory state. The 
state in India after liberalisation appears to be constantly negotiating with and 
influenced by diverse interests so as to accommodate and manage these 
tensions.  
The foregoing narrative also establishes that the role of the Indian state in 
economic activity has always been influenced by changing global perceptions. 
This is reflected in the state taking an interventionist approach after the 
Second World War, a pro-market approach in the 1980s and a drift towards a 
regulatory state in the 1990s. However, the procedural solution tying the scope 
of the interventionist state with the political expectations has ensured that the 
external influences have always been internalised by the Indian state in a 
manner reflective of the dynamics of the larger political processes. In other 
words, the influence of the external on the internal dynamics of the Indian polity 
and state has always been what Fiona Haines terms as ‘less than intended’ 
(Haines 2003:482). 
On the basis of the preceding historical analysis, it is argued that five unique 
attributes of the Indian regulatory space influence the implementation of any 
regulatory intervention. These are firstly the evident influence of the dominant 
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global consensus of the role of the state in economic activity, be it during the 
interventionist phase or the present regulatory state phase. Secondly, the 
continued dominance of the Indian state (both national and State) as a 
participant and driver of economic activity. This is reflected in the continuous 
renewal of state participation in the economic life of the nation through 
democratic processes. The interventionist role of the state was also reiterated 
by the judiciary at a time when the executive contemplated ushering in a 
regulatory state. The reluctance of the framers of the Constitution to juridify 
the role of the state in economic activity allowed for renewal of the 
interventionist role of the Indian state through electoral mandates and judicial 
interpretation.  The third feature of the Indian regulatory space associated with 
the role of the state in the economy is the entrenched interest of groups 
associated with state led development. These groups are the industrialist 
bureaucrats, the rich farmers and the politicians who mediate between them. 
The fourth being, though occupying a prominent role in the nation’s regulatory 
space, the state in India itself is relatively weak when compared to societal 
forces (Mukherji 2016). The state in India is proliferated and influenced by 
societal forces and societal tensions are reflected in the nature and functioning 
of the state. This brings us to the fifth and final attribute of the non-autonomous 
nature of the state in India. This calls for a visualisation of the Indian state as 
being in a constant flux, which is indicative of the tensions it is trying to 
accommodate and mediate. This attribute results in the institutional 
reorganisation of the state in response to pressures both internal and external, 
and results in legal pluralism in state law, as will be discussed in the Chapter 
8.  The next chapter traces the emergence of these five attributes associated 
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with the regulatory space in the State level electricity sector in India. It argues 
that the presence of these attributes makes the sector a microcosm in which 
to observe the implementation of legislations aiming to redefine the role of the 
state in economic activity in India.  
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4. An Interventionist Role for the State in Economic Activity 
& the Electricity (Supply) Act 1948  
 
4.1. Introduction  
 
This chapter traces the role of the Indian state in economic activity, using the 
electricity sector as a case study. It takes the approach of tracing the sectoral 
developments through the co-evolution of the social, economic, political and 
legal at local, national and global levels in influencing attributes of a regulatory 
space. This chapter endeavours to highlight the relationship between state law 
and the state’s role in sectoral economic activity during the interventionist 
phase i.e. from the late 1940s to the late 1980s. As argued earlier, state law 
mirrors the state’s posturing in sectoral economic activity and is reflective of 
the ability of the state to intervene in the economy and regulate the behaviour 
of participants in economic activity. Accordingly, this chapter explores the 
relationship between the constitutionally assigned interventionist role, whose 
scope and content are determined by the electoral expectations from the state, 
and sectoral legislation. It explores this with reference to the legislative 
endeavours associated with the changing global conceptualisation of the role 
of the state in economic activity. It argues that state law in India is reflective of 
the state’s posturing in economic activity. This chapter considers the 
enactment of the Electricity (Supply) Act 1948, which leaned towards state 
intervention in economic activity. Chapter 5 discusses the Electricity Act 2003, 
which endorsed a rollback of the state from economic activity in keeping with 
the corresponding global trends to establish a regulatory state. 
The presence of tensions in the Indian state and the susceptibility of the state 
to societal influences (Mukherjee 2016), as discussed in the previous chapter, 
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necessarily implies that state law in India does not operate in a vacuum but 
must encounter, resist and co-opt societal tensions and that the state is in turn 
also influenced by counter expectations from the societal processes. 
Mukherji’s observation that the Indian state is ‘penetrated by social actors’ 
(Mukherji 2016:219-220) and does not have the requisite autonomy of a 
developmental state becomes relevant in the electricity sector and the 
reflexivity between state posturing and societal expectations. As will be 
discussed in Chapter 6, Sally Falk Moore observes the phenomenon of the 
state organising itself in response to societal expectations and the tensions 
within the state as reasons for the emergence of semi-autonomous social 
fields and legal pluralism (Moore 2001:107). The following narrative of the 
dynamics in the electricity sector in the Indian state’s interventionist phase 
brings to light the emergence of tensions associated with the role of the state 
in sectoral economic activity and the phenomenon of the susceptibility of the 
state to societal influences.  
The chapter demonstrates the centrality of the sector to the state driven project 
of economic development. It then discusses the facilitative role of electricity in 
realising the objectives of the Directives, and its contribution to individual 
welfare and economic growth. The section on the role of intergovernmental 
financial organisations, like the Bank and the ADB in the sector, reflects their 
lending priorities in the light of the larger global consensus on state led 
provision of utilities during the interventionist phase. It also describes the 
national government’s reluctance to bring about regulatory change given the 
popular backlash against accepting the Bank’s and IMF’s policy advice in the 
late 1960s as discussed in Chapter 3. It is argued that five decades of the 
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operation of the 1948 Act, coupled with politics of resource distribution, led to 
the evolution of sectoral regulatory attributes similar to the national regulatory 
attributes discussed in Chapter 3. It is further argued that the same makes the 
sector a microcosm to study the role of the Indian state in economic activity 
and legal interventions aimed at redefining it.  
4.2. Role of Electricity in Enhancing Individual Capabilities and 
Promoting Economic Growth 
 
The following discussion endeavours to contextualise the electoral appeal of 
electricity provision from the perspective of its role in enhancing individual 
capabilities and promoting economic growth. The provision of electricity helps 
reduce poverty by creating jobs and means of livelihood. UNDP has urged 
governments to promote universal access to energy (including electricity) as 
a ‘political priority’ (UNDP 2011). Electricity ‘is desired not for its own sake, but 
for its ability along with appliances, to produce goods and services that are 
more directly desired’ (Nouni et al. 2008:1188). Provision of infrastructure has 
a direct relationship with growth in ‘low income countries’ (Cook 2011:305). 
Electricity enhances economic activity and thereby helps generate income and 
improve livelihoods (Cook 2011:308). It is an essential prerequisite for 
economic development, as an infrastructural input for agricultural and 
industrial development (Nouni et al. 2008:1188; Oda & Tsujita 2011:3086).  
The UNDP observes that, ‘collecting fuel, pounding grain and hauling water is 
drudgery that denies poor women and children time for education or paid work’ 
(UNDP 2010). It notes that provision of electricity helps empower women by 
reducing the time involved in performing domestic chores and ‘freeing time’ for 
educational and economic pursuits (UNDP 2011; Kanagawa & Nakata 
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2008:2018). In India, it was observed that access to electricity improved the 
condition of women in low-income groups more significantly when compared 
to similarly situated households with no access (Pereira et al. 2011:1435). This 
was because it reduced the time involved in tasks such as cooking and 
gathering fuel and water.  
Inadequate lighting has a negative impact on the lives of people, and reliance 
on kerosene lamps is not only relatively expensive but is also ‘inefficient, 
unhealthy and dangerous’ (Agooramoorthy & Hsu 2009:513). Electricity, when 
compared to traditional forms of energy like kerosene or candles, has proved 
to be beneficial in terms of luminosity, convenience and health (IEA 2010:13). 
In South Africa and China, it was observed that the provision of electricity 
reduced household pollution levels by replacing the use of kerosene lamps 
and candles (Pereira et al. 2011:1431, 1433).  
Electricity enables better lightning, allowing an extended period of study at 
home and access to information through usage of radios, televisions and 
information communication technologies (Kanagawa & Nakata 2008:2019). A 
study by Kanagawa and Nakata in the State of Assam in India demonstrated 
that the provision of electricity had a positive impact on ‘educational 
attainment’ or the literacy rate of children over the age of six (Kanagawa and 
Nakata 2008:2020).83 This study was conducted to demonstrate the 
interrelationship between the provision of electricity and education, which is a 
foundational element in social and economic development.  
                                                          
83 The primary assumption of the study was that illiteracy prevents people from participating 
in economic activity (Kanagawa & Nakata 2008:2020).  
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Access to electricity has significant implications for the socio-economic welfare 
of people living in rural areas (Kanagawa and Nakata 2008:2017). It enhances 
opportunities for income generation, facilitates completion of tasks with 
relative ease and makes more leisure time available (Kanagawa and Nakata 
2008:2018). The extension of electricity infrastructure is a means to integrate 
far-flung populations into the national economy (Cook 2011:305). The 
availability of electricity also encourages the dispersal of industries in search 
of ‘low cost regions’ (Cook 2011:305). In Brazil, the provision of electricity 
brought to light the linkages between rural electrification and the reversal of 
migration from urban areas owing to the possibility of a comfortable lifestyle 
and facilities in rural areas (Pereira et al. 2011:1438-39).  
Access to electricity facilitates ‘social integration and accessibility of other 
equally essential services’ (Pereira et al. 2011:1428). Because of its benefits, 
rural electrification is a priority of governments in developing countries (Oda & 
Tsujita 2011:3086). An evaluation of the impact of state-sponsored rural 
electrification projects in South Africa, Brazil, India and China by Pereira and 
others demonstrates the benefits of its provision (Pereira et al. 2011). The 
study observes that the provision of electricity helps the economic and social 
development of populations who did not previously have access to the energy 
source (Pereira et al. 2011:1440). The study also established that access has 
enhanced the leisure time available for residents in rural areas (Pereira et al. 
2011:1433).84 
 
                                                          
84 The authors note that the figures suggest that the increase was also in absolute terms i.e. 
as opposed to non-availability of any time at all for leisure previously.  
110 
 
4.3. The Interventionist State & Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948  
 
The statement of the objects and reasons of the 1948 Act assigns a prominent 
role for the state in sectoral development. This is unsurprising as the 1948 Act 
was enacted by the same Constituent Assembly that drafted the Constitution 
of India in its capacity as Constituent Assembly Legislature.85 It further notes 
that the existing colonial Indian Electricity Act, 1910 could not facilitate active 
state participation in the sector. The 1948 Act facilitated state participation in 
the sector through the institution of the statutory State Electricity Board. The 
statement also establishes a clear link with the then global consensus 
regarding the interventionist role of the state in economic activity, especially 
the British welfare state and the importance of the public sector in post war 
reconstruction and development. It stated that the 1948 Act was moulded on 
the United Kingdom’s Electricity (Supply) Act, 1926. Given the 1948 Act’s 
geographical focus i.e. State level implementation, it can be seen as a clear 
example of an external model reflective of the then prevalent global consensus 
regarding the role of the state in economic activity, adopted by the national 
government and operationalised at the State level. This process is similar to 
India’s national government adopting the World Bank’s 1993 Policy 
prescription advocating a sectoral regulatory state and attempting to 
operationalise the same at the State level (World Bank 1993a). This will be 
discussed in Chapter 5.  
The statement of objects notes that there was a need to extend electricity to 
semi-urban and rural areas as electrification was an urban phenomenon at the 
                                                          
85 Section 8, Proviso (e), of the Indian Independence Act, 1947.  
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time of independence. It envisaged the creation of State Electricity Boards 
(SEB) as the institutional apparatus for giving effect to the interventionist role 
of the Indian state in the sector. As discussed in Chapter 2, this corresponds 
with Majone’s (1994) notion of regulation in a welfare state, which has multiple 
objectives and not just economic ones. In Majone’s words ‘the purpose of 
public ownership was not simply to regulate prices, conditions of entry and 
quality of service, but also to pursue many other goals, including economic 
development, technical innovation, employment, regional income 
redistribution, and national security’ (Majone 1994:79).  
The SEBs were vertically integrated entities combining the functions of 
generation, transmission and distribution. They were service providers and to 
a certain extent sectoral regulators (Ramachandra 2003:134). The 1948 Act 
did not prohibit the then existing private players, licensed under the earlier 
sectoral enactment, i.e. the Electricity Act 1910, from operating in the market. 
However, the Industrial Policy Resolution of 1956 (Govt of India 1956) saw a 
greater role for the ‘Public Sector’ in the provision of utilities. The Industrial 
Policy Resolution 1956 reserved all further activity in terms of generation and 
distribution of electricity for State level public utilities.86 This can be attributed 
to the Nehru led vision of the Congress party to establish a ‘socialistic pattern 
of society’ as discussed in Chapter 3 (Chandra et al 2008:181, 446). The 
expansion of the public sector, i.e. SEBs, saw the private sector role in 
generation and distribution decline. Also, quite a few private enterprises in the 
sector were acquired by the States and integrated into the SEBs, either after 
the expiry of their initial license or by enacting nationalisation legislation (ASCI 
                                                          
86 Item 17 of Schedule A of Industrial Policy Resolution 1956 (Govt of India 1956). 
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2002:22; World Bank 1979:5). As discussed in Chapter 3, judicial 
interpretation of the Constitution endorsed sectoral nationalisation as 
promoting the redistributionist mandate of the state.87 
The 1948 Act, assigned a coordinating role to the national government through 
the Central Electricity Authority, limiting the national government’s influence 
on the sector.88 Only two actors mattered at the State level, i.e. the State 
government and the SEB, and most regulatory decisions were taken between 
them. In all respects, the SEBs (despite apparent statutory autonomy) were 
extensions of the State government. As will be evident in the course of this 
chapter, the SEBs were increasingly administered as extended bureaucracies 
of the State government. The politics associated with the sector were restricted 
to the States, consequently access and affordability became electoral issues 
at the State level. 
4.4. Statutory Scheme of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 
 
4.4.1. State Electricity Board – Statutory Structure and Functions  
 
The 1948 Act vested in the State government the power to establish the 
SEBs.89 It stipulated that the board of the SEB shall consist of no less than 
three and no more than seven members.90 Amongst the members, it required 
three members of the board to have experience in commercial and 
                                                          
87 Tinsukhia Electric Supply Co. Ltd V. State of Assam and Ors, (1989) 3 SCC 709 and 
Maharashtra State Electricity Board V. Thane Electric Supply Co. & Ors, (1989) 3 SCC 616. 
88 Sections 3 to 4C of the Electricity Supply Act, 1948 provide for its establishment and 
functions. The Central Electricity Authority was envisaged as a technical institution in charge 
of developing the national power policy (ASCI 2002:21). It was required to resolve disputes 
between the State government and the SEBs and private licensees, and to advise the national 
government on matters pertaining to the sector. It was further required to provide training to 
the sectoral personnel and to facilitate supply of electricity (ASCI 2002:21: World Bank 
1979:4).  
89 Section 5 (1) of The Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948.  
90 Section 5 (2) of The Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948. 
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administrative matters, electrical engineering and accounting, and financial 
matters in a public utility, preferably an electricity undertaking.91 One of the 
three members with the said qualifications could be appointed by the State 
government as the Chairman of the SEB.92 The SEB had the power to appoint 
staff and employees to carry out its functions.93 The SEB was required to 
undertake and coordinate the activity of generation, transmission and 
distribution in an economical and efficient manner, and to give particular 
attention to areas that are not electrified or adequately supplied.94  
4.4.2. Nature of State Financial Control over the SEB  
 
The State government determined both the structure and supply of capital to 
the SEB.95 The SEB was required to submit an annual financial statement to 
the State government detailing estimated capital expenditure and revenue 
receipts for the forthcoming year, which would be laid before the State 
legislature.96 Barring a few exceptions, the 1948 Act prohibited the SEB from 
incurring any unbudgeted expenditure.97 The State government could provide 
aid or grants98 and loan moneys to the SEB.99 The State government also had 
the power to convert the loans advanced to the SEB into capital of the SEB.100 
The SEB could only borrow externally with the prior permission of the State 
government,101 and the State government was empowered to guarantee the 
                                                          
91 Section 5 (4) of The Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948. 
92 Section 5 (5) of The Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948. 
93 Section 15 of The Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948. 
94 Section 18(a) & (d) of The Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948. 
95 Section 12A of The Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948. 
96 Section 61 of The Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948. 
97 Section 62 of The Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948. 
98 Section 63 of The Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948. 
99 Section 64 of The Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948. 
100 Section 66A of The Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948. 
101 Section 65 of The Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948. 
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SEB’s loans.102 Therefore, the ability of the SEB’s to raise moneys from the 
market was severely curtailed.  
At this point it becomes pertinent to mention that the statutory scheme of the 
1948 Act and the Industrial Policy of 1956 required the State government to 
invest in the sector. However, as discussed in Chapter 3, fiscal division under 
the constitutional scheme vested more powers to raise revenues in the 
national government with the mandate to distribute them amongst the States. 
The State governments relied on the national government for monetary 
resources for sectoral investments. These resources were primarily allocated 
to the States through the planning process by the national government. The 
planned spending allocation for the electricity sector was larger than any other 
sector (Kale 2015:26). In its 1979 report the Bank observes that certain big 
states, like Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra and Madhya Pradesh, were 
allocating nearly 40 per cent of their planned expenditure towards the sector 
(World Bank 1979:36). As will be evident in the forthcoming discussion, the 
emergence of redistributionist politics increased the dependency of the States 
on national government funds as the SEBs were no longer profitable. This 
created tensions between the national government and the States.  
4.5. Electricity Led Growth & Emergence of the SEB as the Dominant 
Sectoral Organisation  
 
Much of India’s planned economic growth after independence was associated 
with industries which were electricity intensive (Dubash & Rajan 2001:3369; 
World Bank 1979:19). Industrial policy encouraged the establishment of 
                                                          
102 Section 66 of The Electricity (Supply) Act,1948. 
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industries in segments of aluminium, fertilizers, cement, and iron and steel 
considered essential for the nation’s development (World Bank 1979:19-20). 
As discussed earlier in this chapter, the provision of electricity prior to 
independence was restricted to urban areas, therefore the state invested in 
rural electrification.  
Though traditionally dependent on erratic rainfall, governmental interventions 
in the nature of canal irrigation and pump sets, led to an increase in the area 
under cultivation and multiple crops could be harvested annually (Dubash & 
Rajan 2001:3369). This drive intensified during the implementation of the 
programme of the green revolution aimed at increasing agricultural 
productivity. The drive to increase agricultural productivity was, in turn, to avert 
famines which generate public debate against the government (Sen 
2010:343). As discussed in Chapter 3, the Indian government decided to 
substitute oil with electricity generated through domestically available coal 
after the 1973 oil crisis. This led to a move from the diesel pump sets to 
electrical pump sets in the rural areas (World Bank 1979:1). This resulted in 
an increasing reliance on electricity as the predominant source of energy 
across sectors. Thus, it can be argued that electricity became a major input in 
the nation’s economic activity.  
The institutional arrangements of the 1948 Act made the SEB and State 
government inseparable. As discussed earlier, the 1948 Act defined the SEB’s 
institutional role as that of a quasi-sectoral regulator, combining the functions 
of generation, transmission and distribution, and as an engine of the state to 
secure sectoral development. As a result, the SEB emerged as the most 
prominent sectoral organisation at the State level. By 1990, SEBs were 
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functioning in 19 of the then 25 States in India and electricity was being 
provided through State departments in 6 other States (Sharma et al. 
2005:564).103 Around the same time, the SEBs were serving almost 95% of all 
consumers and contributed to 70% of the country’s electricity generation 
(Chong 2004:111).  
4.6. State Provision of Electricity, Politics of Resource Mobilisation and 
Sectoral Losses 
 
As evidenced in the above discussion, provision of electricity has a direct 
bearing on individual welfare and larger economic growth. Over the years, the 
supply led growth,104 i.e. the spread of state sponsored irrigation programmes 
and the growing dependence of agriculture on the electric pump sets, raised 
the expectations of the electorate on the basis of these facilities being 
extended by the state (Dubash & Rajan 2001:3369). This can be seen as a 
sectoral reflection of the larger phenomenon, described by Sudipta Kaviraj, of 
politicians appealing to ‘particularistic interests’ distributing the aggregated 
resources at the state’s disposal to their constituencies (Kaviraj 2000:54). This 
led to the emergence of the farmers’ lobby renegotiating the resource dispersal 
at State level from the 1960s under Indira Gandhi (Kaviraj 2000:54). The 
politicisation of distribution and allocation of electricity can also be viewed as 
what Chhibber describes as the phenomenon of the emergence of distributive 
politics from 1967 when Congress began losing power in the States, which 
                                                          
103 India presently has 29 States. The number of States has increased over a period of time 
owing to regional movements for separate statehood. The State of Andhra Pradesh was 
bifurcated in pursuance of one such movement for statehood for the Telangana region in the 
State in June 2016.  
104 Dr.Usha Ramachandra is of the view that the state in India actively encouraged the switch 
to electricity as a source of energy. She gives the illustration in the State of Karnataka in the 
initial days of extension of supply, when consumers were encouraged to consume more and 
avail discounts for higher units consumed (Ramachandra 2014a).  
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had a corresponding impact on its national performance in the parliamentary 
elections (Chhibber 1995:78-79). The dominant Congress party, which was in 
power in the national government and States for nearly twenty-five years after 
independence, was competing for electoral power with several other national, 
regional and State level parties from the mid-1970s (Khemani 2007:695). 
Political manifestos increasingly promised subsidised or even free power 
(Dubash & Rajan 2001:3369).  
4.6.1. Politics of Resource Disbursal and Sectoral Losses 
 
The politics of resource disbursal generated popular expectations for the 
provision of public goods by the State governments, which are responsible for 
their provision under the Indian Constitution. A sample survey was conducted 
in 2001 in 18 States comprising of 97% of the country’s population, so as to 
ascertain which public goods were important for a citizen’s day to day living 
(Chhibber et al 2004:341). The majority of participants in the survey indicated 
drinking water, electricity, roads, education and medical facilities were 
essential (Chhibber et al 2004:343). The survey on citizen expectations also 
indicated that the citizens are of the view that the state is responsible for 
providing the said public goods (Chhibber et al 2004:346). Chhibber and 
others observe that, ‘[g]iven the historically large role played by the Indian 
state, it is no surprise that most respondents looked to the state to address 
issues related to electricity supply, the construction of roads, the provision of 
clean drinking water, education, and medical facilities’ (Chhibber et al 
2004:348). In fact, 80% of the respondents were of the view that the State 
government (as opposed to the national and local/municipal government) was 
responsible for the provision of the public services (Chhibber et al 2004:352).  
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State level political fortunes were tied to the provision of electricity. Political 
considerations influenced decisions in the nature of extension of transmission 
lines as opposed to technical and efficiency requirements (Dubash & Rajan 
2001:3370). Joel Ruet rightly observes that SEB’s did not function on 
commercial lines like firms but were ‘administered’ and that it was this 
‘administrative nature’ that was the reason for them being inefficient (Ruet 
2003:26). The nature of political intervention was not restricted to macro 
advice as to the nature of investments but percolated to every small detail of 
functioning in the nature of ‘political strongholds’ that needed to be prioritised 
(Ruet 2003:27). Often the same led to commissioning simultaneous projects 
before elections so as to demonstrate results rather than prioritise scarce 
resources (Ruet 2003:27-28). This overstretching of resources led to delays 
and overburdened the existing transmission infrastructure beyond technical 
capacity (Ruet 2003:27-28). All the higher appointments, including the 
chairman and members of the SEB’s Board, were political in nature (Ruet 
2003:28). Political interference also extended to recruitment and promotion of 
staff, officers and unskilled workers to please political constituencies (Ruet 
2003:28). In this context, Joel Ruet quotes Rajiv Gandhi, the former Indian 
Prime Minister who termed SEBs as ‘State Employment Boards’ (Ruet 
2003:28). 
A number of State governments interfered with the tariff fixation process of 
their SEBs (ASCI 2002:34). As per one account, the politics and policies 
associated with subsidised or free electricity have their origin in the South 
Indian State of Karnataka (ASCI 2002:34). In 1975 there was a farmer’s 
agitation in Karnataka for subsidised agricultural electricity so that the cost of 
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irrigation was on par with the farmers being supplied through surface irrigation 
projects in the nature of canals (ASCI 2002:34). The low revenues compared 
to the transaction costs of monitoring was one of the reasons for the non-
installation of meters and the non-monitoring of consumption (Dubash & Rajan 
2001:3369).  
Heavy subsidies to the domestic and agricultural sector, theft and pilferage 
and high transmission and distribution losses were the hallmarks of the sector 
(Sharma et al 2005:565). Distribution losses in some states were as high as 
40 percent in the early 1990s and by 1996 the burden of subsidies to 
agricultural and domestic consumers was nearly 1.5% of the nation’s GDP 
(World Bank 1999b:vi). This adversely affected the SEB’s ability to invest in 
new generation capacities. On the generation front, approximately 53.9% of 
the thermal generation capacity was unused (Sharma et al. 2005: 565), with 
high transmission and distribution losses, further capacity additions could do 
little to increase the availability of power.  
4.6.2. Early Attempts at Reducing Sectoral Losses 
 
When one examines the statutory scheme of the 1948 Act it becomes 
apparent that the enactment never intended to make SEBs function as profit 
seeking commercial entities. Apart from a broad mandate to exercise fiscal 
prudence, i.e. to ‘supply electricity in the most economical and efficient manner 
possible’, the 1948 Act was silent as to the possibility of the SEBs functioning 
profitably. Section 67 of the 1948 Act stipulated that ‘provision for depreciation 
and interest on government loans need be met by SEBs only when surplus 
funds were available’ (Ganesh 2001:102). In fact, the financial worries of the 
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SEBs were becoming evident in the 1960s itself, when the national 
government constituted the Venkatraman Committee which submitted its 
report in 1964. The Venkatraman Committee stated that the SEBs ought to 
plan their finances in such a way that ‘their total revenues are adequate to 
meet all their expenses and also make a 3% return’ (ASCI 2002:34). The 1948 
Act was amended in 1978, requiring the SEBs to generate a surplus as 
required by the State government, but the quantum of surplus was still not 
specific (i.e. 3% as was recommended by the Venkatraman Committee) and 
the same was at the discretion of the State government (Ganesh 2001:102). 
It was only a subsequent amendment in 1983 that explicitly prescribed that the 
SEBs have to generate a surplus of not less than 3% of their net fixed assets. 
The amendment further stated that the State governments were at liberty to 
fix a higher level of surplus. It should, however, be noted that no State 
government ever fixed a surplus higher than the statutory minimum (Ganesh 
2001:103). This evidences the reluctance of the State governments to run the 
SEBs on a commercial basis. It also indicates that from the very onset of the 
politics of redistribution, the sector has been a financial drain on the State 
government’s budgets. However, as observed by Stuti Khemani (2007), the 
national government was both complicit in the politics of resource disbursal 
and desirous to fiscally discipline the States. Such a contradiction was 
reflective of the influence of different interest groups and the susceptibility of 
the Indian state to societal influences.  
In fact, it has been observed that the mandatory statutory 3% rate of return 
prescribed in the financial interest of the SEBs actually did great damage to 
the SEBs (ASCI 2002:34). The requirement of a 3% rate of return led to greater 
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State government interference in the tariff setting process of the SEB on the 
pretext that the State would be bearing the burden of the loss sustained (ASCI 
2002:34). In reality, SEBs were always undercompensated, leading to further 
deterioration of their financial fortunes (ASCI 2002:34). Even Ruet observes 
that compensation for the subsidy received by the SEBs was not proportionate 
to the costs incurred and led to further deterioration of their financial position 
(Ruet 2003:30). By the 1980s, the SEBs were only recovering 77% of their 
costs (Chong 2004:111). 
Low energy prices led to ‘high consumption and excessive investment to 
support this consumption’ (World Bank 1999b:vi). With a high proportion of 
consumption not being metered owing to low revenues compared to the cost 
of monitoring (Dubash and Rajan 2001: 3369), it was no longer possible to 
determine the exact amount of electricity being consumed. This unmetered 
electricity in turn was projected as transmission and distribution losses 
(Dubash & Rajan 2001: 3369). Though the State governments continued to 
subsidise the SEBs, the same did not prevent their downward spiral into 
bankruptcy. Another means adopted by the SEBs to counter the losses in 
agriculture was to cross-subsidise the agricultural consumption with industrial 
consumption. The high costs of electricity supplied to the industry resulted in 
industry investing in captive generation facilities (Dubash and Rajan 
2001:3370). Captive generation resulted in a fall in the proportion of industrial 
consumption from approximately 67% in the 1960s to 40% in 1991 (Dubash 
and Rajan 2001:3370). As a consequence, the cross subsidization strategy 
could not counter the losses on the agricultural front (Dubash & Rajan 
2001:3370). The sectoral dynamics therefore demonstrate that different 
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societal interests were influencing the state for access to the resource being 
generated, transmitted and distributed by it. It is in fact reflective of Bardhan’s 
observation of the ‘heterogeneous’ ‘dominant coalition’ that has laid siege to 
the resources at the command of the state to the exclusion of other societal 
groups (Bardhan 1998).  
4.7. Interventionist State and International and Bilateral Financing 
Options  
 
4.7.1. World Bank & India 1947-1991 
 
From 1948 until 1991, the Bank aligned its lending priorities with that of the 
national government’s state led sectoral development. This corresponded with 
the global consensus concerning the role of the interventionist state in 
promoting economic development for the corresponding period. It funded rural 
electrification initiatives, programmes associated with the green revolution and 
the SEBs. As will be discussed, India was a very important client for the Bank, 
and the Bank was careful not to jeopardise its relationship with it. It continued 
supporting the SEBs in the 1980’s despite advocating structural adjustment 
elsewhere in the world (Zanini 2001:9-10).  
As discussed earlier, by 1990 the Bank had provided a total funding of $35.3 
billion to the sector. This amounted to 15% of the Bank’s lending to the 
electricity sector world wide and 60% of India’s external borrowing (Chong 
2004:114). Accepting the Bank’s policy advice led to a political backlash in the 
1960s. The relationship began to improve only in the late 1960s and early 
1970s (Zanini 2001:10). Assistance was initially provided to the agricultural 
sector towards technology transfer for a programme aimed at enhancing 
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national agricultural productivity to attain self-sufficiency through the ‘green 
revolution’. This involved increasing inputs in the nature of fertilizers and high 
yielding varieties. The expansion of rural electrification and the provision of 
electricity driven pump sets were part of this initiative (Dubash & Rajan 
2002:51). Wary of the Bank’s propensity to foray into policy issues that were 
‘politically sensitive’, the national government declined Bank support for its 
poverty eradication programmes (Zanini 2001:10). In turn, focus was on 
exploring areas of convergence between the Bank’s programmes and 
government’s policies. The Bank avoided making use of conditionality through 
the 1970s. The 1979 report of the Bank titled ‘India – Economic Issues in the 
Power Sector’, reflects this approach of coordinating sectoral financing with 
national policy priorities (World Bank 1979). The Bank’s lending to the 
electricity sector was in keeping with the policy priorities of the national 
government through the 1980s till the release of its new 1993 Policy (World 
Bank 1999b).  
The Bank, for its part, pursued a policy of engagement with India during the 
1980s, and did not put pressure on India to undertake structural reforms, which 
was its then standard prescription the world over (Zanini 2001:11). Policy talk 
was carefully avoided ‘for fear of jeopardizing a strong lending relationship with 
a sensitive client’ (Zanini 2001:11). The Bank continued to finance projects 
whose outcomes conflicted with its own economic and sectoral policies (Zanini 
2001:12). This included financing state owned enterprises involved in the 
manufacture of cement, fertilizers, steel and, more importantly in the context 
of this thesis, the SEBs. The Bank continued financing the SEBs despite being 
aware that they were inefficient and loss making and, in its opinion, the main 
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culprits behind the financial troubles of the States (Zanini 2001:11). The 
financing of the SEBs in the 1980s, can be inferred as being part of the Bank’s 
strategy of relationship lending. Owing to political sensitivities, the Bank could 
not venture into poverty reduction and social sectors of education and health, 
even up until 1990 (Zanini 2001:11).  
4.7.2. Sectoral Financing and the role of the World Bank, Asian Development 
Bank and Bilateral Donors  
 
Given India’s defiant position regarding policy advice, the Bank focussed its 
programmes on the operational, managerial and financial performance of the 
SEBs in the 1970s and 1980s. However, the Bank in the course of its 
engagement with SEBs in transmission and rural electrification projects in the 
1970s could not persuade them to review their tariff fixation strategy (World 
Bank 1999b:2). From 1979 onwards the Bank focussed on its association with 
the national government which was making inroads into electricity 
generation.105 In its view, supporting national participation would benchmark 
good institutional practices in the power sector, which in turn would be followed 
by the SEBs. This was also in line with its sectoral approach (mirroring its 
national approach), i.e. to toe the national government’s line in areas of 
convergence of views. With this in mind, the Bank directed its lending towards 
National Public Sector Undertakings owned by the national government, 
which, as per its evaluation, performed satisfactorily and efficiently, achieving 
‘least cost power development’ (World Bank 1999b:2).  
                                                          
105 This was made possible through an amendment to The Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 in 
1976. The amendment enabled the national government, amongst other things, to enter the 
electricity generation segment.  
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ADB synchronised its activities in the electricity sector with that of the Bank,106 
in terms of co-execution of projects, State wise demarcation and engaging the 
national government (ADB 2007:27). Both the Bank and ADB funded the 
National Public Sector Undertakings such as the Power Finance Corporation 
(PFC) in the area of financing the power sector (World Bank 1999b:5), the 
Power Grid Corporation of India Limited (Powergrid) in the area of 
transmission, and the National Thermal Power Corporation (NTPC) in the area 
of generation (ADB 2000:8; ADB 2001:10). The Bank worked along with the 
Central Electricity Authority and the national government so as to impose 
‘financial discipline’ on the SEBs through the national government entities like 
NTPC, PFC and Powergrid (World Bank 1999b:2). In fact, by 2001, NTPC was 
the largest worldwide client of the Bank (ADB 2000:7).  
ADB acknowledges that it ‘leveraged’ its lending to the PFC and the Powergrid 
with an aim to use these National Public Sector Undertakings as the means to 
promote reforms of the client SEBs (ADB 2000:9; ADB 2001:12). The ADB’s 
loan to Powergrid restricted onward lending to only those SEBs with a good 
performance record, and required Powergrid to suspend supply to non-
compliant SEBs (ADB2001:6). PFC also received sizable support from 
bilateral donor agencies, like the United Kingdom’s Department for 
International Development (DFID) and the United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID) (World Bank 1996:4). As a result, PFC’s 
lending conditionality allowed it to advance loans to those SEBs which 
undertook to improve their performance through ‘Operational and Financial 
                                                          
106 ADB also terms it as ‘division of labour’ (ADB 2007:27). 
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Action Plans’, which were in turn vouched for by the State governments 
(Chong 2004:113). It was through this conduit that the national government 
tried to bring about institutional change at the State level but most State 
governments decided against availing the condition laden loans (Chong 
2004:114). This generated further tensions between the national government 
and the State governments.  
The Bank’s lending to the National Public Sector Undertakings did bring about 
an increase in the generation capacity, yet it was not able to bring about the 
necessary changes at the State level, i.e. the SEBs (World Bank 1999b:8). 
The fact remained that the distribution business, with its consumer interface, 
was vested with the State governments. As a consequence, the good practices 
of the National Public Sector Undertakings did not have the expected 
reforming effect on the SEBs, where it was business as usual. Therefore, 
towards the mid-1980s, the Bank once again directed its attention to 
institutional reforms at the SEB level (Chong 2004:93). Its reform programme 
in 1980 included, ‘financial restructuring, tariff adjustments to meet financial 
objectives, improved metering and collections, and shifting resources from 
supply expansion to focus on improving distribution efficiency’ (World Bank 
1999b:19). The reform undertaken at the level of the SEBs was considered 
‘incremental’ in the States of Maharashtra and Kerala (World Bank 1999b:19). 
At times, the reform process was reversed when a new government came to 
power as evidenced in the States of Karnataka and Uttar Pradesh (World Bank 
1999b:19). It was this reversal of governmental policy after the elections that 
subsequently prompted the Bank (and later ADB) to adopt the legislative 
solution in the 1990s. Enactment of legislation, in their opinion, would make 
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the reforms ‘irreversible’ and the reform process predictable (World Bank 
1999a:10; ADB 2008:14). The introduction of a legislative solution to remedy 
the policy reversals will be discussed in Chapter 5.  
4.8. Conclusion  
 
The 1948 Act incorporated the then global consensus on the role of the state 
in economic activity. The SEBs were the institutional conduit through which 
this interventionist role of the state in sectoral activity was operationalised. As 
discussed, the SEB’s day to day operations catered to sustain the politics of 
resource distribution driven by the ‘dominant coalition’ (Bardhan 1998). For the 
period from 1948 until 1991 it is evident that the State level sectoral regulatory 
space mirrors the attributes of the national state. This is reflected in the 
dominant role of the state in sectoral economic activity and the increasing 
politicisation of the issues of provision and allocation of the resource. This 
resulted in tensions owing to different societal groups laying claim to the 
resource being generated, transmitted and distributed by the state. The 
national government too had a role in the politics of resource disbursal as the 
provider of resources and controller of financial markets.  
Intergovernmental financial institutions, like the Bank and ADB, were 
associated with the sector throughout the period of politicisation. The Bank’s 
sectoral lending was in keeping with the policy priorities of the national 
government through the 1980’s (World Bank 1999b), even when it was 
insisting on structural reforms elsewhere (Zanini 2001:11). The Bank 
continued to finance the SEBs, notwithstanding its view that the SEBs were 
the main culprits behind the State government’s financial troubles and whose 
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functioning conflicted with the Bank’s economic and sectoral policies (Zanini 
2001:11-12). The politics of resource mobilisation itself created tremendous 
financial pressures on both the State and national governments. The national 
government as the primary disburser of resources tried to restrain the State’s 
sectoral expenditure through managerial and administrative reforms assisted 
by the Bank and the ADB. These reforms were more internal in nature and 
endeavoured to bring about greater efficiency within the SEB’s operations. 
The Bank’s, ADB’s and bilateral donor’s association with tariff and managerial 
reforms in the 1970s and 1980s bring to light the resistance to reordering the 
societal dynamics. This necessarily implied that the Indian state’s sectoral 
posturing of an interventionist state remained unchanged. The next chapter 
discusses the processes and mechanisms through which an attempt was 
made to change the Indian state’s sectoral posturing from an interventionist 
state to a regulatory state through state law.  
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Chapter 5 – Regulatory State & the Enactment of the Electricity 
Act 2003  
 
5.1. Introduction  
 
This chapter discusses changes in Indian state’s economic policy and practice 
from an interventionist to a regulatory state after the initiation of reforms in 
1991. This change in the state’s posturing reflected the larger global shift in 
the role of the state in economic activity. This change in the state’s posturing 
in the electricity sector was sought to be achieved by changing the state law 
(national state and States). This involved replacing the 1948 Act with the 
Electricity Act 2003, which ushered in a regulatory state. There was wide 
ranging popular political consensus regarding the need to change the state’s 
posture from a laissez faire to an interventionist state after independence. 
However, as discussed in Chapter 3 and as will be demonstrated in the 
present chapter, the move to establish a regulatory state was at the behest of 
an elite consensus at the national and State level.  
As discussed in Chapter 2, the term ‘regulatory state’ is essentially an 
analytical construct. However, neoliberal scholars have given it a normative 
flavour to mean ‘minimal state intervention for the purpose of correcting market 
failure’ (Yeung 2010:71). Yeung summarises the features of a regulatory state 
as entailing a ‘separation’ between state’s policy making functions and service 
delivery, a decline in hierarchical state control of economic activity, a ‘reliance’ 
on institutional arrangements of a regulatory agency and the need to ‘shift 
areas of economic life perceived as ‘high politics’ into the realm of ‘low politics’ 
(Yeung 2010:75). This chapter explores the changing conceptualisation of the 
role of the Indian state in economic activity, brought about through an elite 
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consensus at the national level and implemented at the State level. It illustrates 
the processes and actors who facilitated the legislative reform aimed at 
depoliticising the role of the Indian state in sectoral economic activity. By 
focussing on the reform period and the processes through which reform was 
undertaken, this chapter demonstrates that the regulatory reforms in the 
electricity sector at the behest of international financial institutions and bilateral 
donors were undertaken without paying attention to the sectoral regulatory 
attributes. It argues that the same resulted in legal pluralism in sectoral state 
law, a phenomenon that will be explored in Chapter 8.  
This chapter firstly discusses the processes whereby the national government 
consented to undertake policy reforms in exchange for the Bank’s financing. It 
then explores the introduction of the Bank’s regulatory reform model in India, 
in light of the Bank’s role as ‘globaliser’ of regulatory models (Woods 
2006:2).107 The chapter then discusses the reform experience of Orissa, the 
first Indian State to adopt the Bank’s global reform model. The section on 
Orissa108 illustrates the inter-organisational linkages between the Bank, ADB, 
bilateral donors and consultants.109 The chapter thereafter discusses the 
attempts by the national government to achieve a national sectoral consensus 
across the States, culminating in the Electricity Act, 2003. 
 
                                                          
107 Ngaire Woods describes the Bank and the IMF as globalisers as ‘they have integrated a 
large number of countries into the world economy by requiring governments to open up to 
global trade, investment and capital’ (Woods 2006: 2-3). 
108 The official name of the State of Orissa was changed to Odisha. This thesis, however, 
uses the name ‘Orissa’ as the State’s name was ‘Orissa’ during the reform period.  
109 The consultants and bilateral aid agencies did not have a direct impact at the national level, 
though the elements of the reform model developed by them was upscaled to the national 
level.  
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5.1.1. Methodology of Principles Actors and Mechanisms  
 
The chapter relies on the methodology of ‘principles, actors and mechanisms’ 
devised by Braithwaite and Drahos to trace the pathways of regulatory 
globalisation (Braithwaite and Drahos 2000). Braithwaite and Drahos are of 
the view that the processes of globalisation can be best traced if explored as 
a dynamic evolving out of interaction between principles, actors and 
mechanisms (Braithwaite and Drahos 2000:15). ‘Actors’ in regulatory 
globalisation include international organisation of states, non-governmental 
organisations, individual actors, states, epistemic communities etc. For them, 
principles ‘constitute an agreed standard of conduct’ (Braithwaite and Drahos 
2000:18). Principles have an instrumental function and ‘propel action in a 
certain direction’ (Braithwaite and Drahos 2000:18-19). Given the inherently 
abstract nature of principles, an agreement on them paves the way for 
subsequent negotiations on more detailed rules and legislation. Mechanisms 
are processes that enhance the propensity of certain forms of regulation to be 
replicated in other parts of the world. These processes include coercion, 
systems of reward, modelling, capacity building, etc. (Braithwaite and Drahos 
2000:17). Braithwaite and Drahos illustrate the interaction between actors, 
principles and mechanisms with the example of United States of America 
utilising the mechanism of economic coercion (sanctions) to enforce the 
principle of national treatment to promote compliance with intellectual property 
rights in other jurisdictions (Braithwaite and Drahos 2000:19). The chapter’s 
narrative explores the relationship between the mechanisms and principles 
through the actions and responses of actors. These actors in the Indian 
context range from international ones (i.e. intergovernmental financial 
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organisations), bilateral donors, the Indian state (both national and State), 
politicians, consultants and individuals.  
5.2. The 1991 Financial Crisis and Policy Linked Financing  
 
The year 1991 saw a change in the national government’s attitude towards the 
Bank and the Bank’s posturing towards India. As discussed in Chapter 3, 
despite having an active democracy economic changes were brought about 
by a small and elite group by ‘stealth’ (Kohli 2010:169; Nayar 2007:33). While 
India had obtained IMF loans on earlier occasions, and was one of the biggest 
borrowers in the developing world from the Bank, these institutions were not 
able to foray into policy based lending owing to governmental resistance. The 
1991 balance of payments crisis was different. Segments of the bureaucracy 
and intelligentsia, including the then newly elected national government 
represented by the then Finance Minister Dr Manmohan Singh,110 were willing 
to follow the economic policy prescription of the Bank and IMF (Chong 
2004:115). It was the presence of these actors, described as ‘eager pupils’ 
(Chong 2004:115) and ‘sympathetic interlocutors’ (Woods 2006:73), in the 
Indian bureaucracy, the political establishment and intelligentsia that helped 
the Bank secure the crucial linkage between project financing and policy 
reform.111  
                                                          
110 Manmohan Singh subsequently served as India’s Prime Minister from 2004 to 2014. 
Manmohan Singh was a strong critic of India’s economic policies and yet a governmental 
insider. His Ph.D. thesis at the University of Oxford, which was subsequently published as a 
book entitled India’s Export Trends and Prospects for Self-Sustained Growth, was a critique 
of the inward-looking trade policies. He had held important positions in what Woods terms the 
crucial ministries (Woods 2006:77). He was Deputy Chairman Planning Commission of India 
and Chief Economic Advisor to the Ministry of Finance and had been the Governor of the 
country’s central bank, i.e. the Reserve Bank of India (Prime Minister’s Office 2017). 
111 As discussed in Chapter 3, the 1991 crisis was preceded by political instability, i.e. a series 
of short term coalition governments at the national level. Even the 1991 government was a 
minority government with external support. As was observed in similar circumstances, in other 
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The regulatory reforms in the electricity sector at the State level ought to be 
contextualized in the light of this ‘historical timing’ (Hancher & Moran 
1989:295), marked by a ‘sense of crisis’ (Hancher & Moran 1989:284, Woods 
2006) at the national level. In order to appreciate the regulatory arrangements 
of the 2003 Act, it becomes essential to appreciate what Hancher and Moran 
term the historical context in which the reforms were undertaken (Hancher & 
Moran 1989:285), i.e. when the Bank wielded a tremendous ‘power to 
persuade’ (Woods 2006:65-83).  
5.3. Contextualising State Level Sectoral Reforms  
 
Between 1989 and 1993, the Bank and International Finance Corporation, in 
line with the new national governmental policy of allowing private investment 
in generation, helped the existing private sector operators increase their 
generation capacity.112 As discussed in Chapter 3, this corresponds with the 
push of the Indian national state towards encouraging the private sector in the 
1980s. This in turn generated tensions between the judiciary on one hand and 
the executive and legislature on the other. Established before the adoption of 
the 1956 Industrial Policy Resolution (Govt of India 1956), these private 
companies were the last bastions of private ownership in the country (ASCI 
2002). Some of these companies under the Bank’s tutelage would 
subsequently play an important role in attempts at privatization of the electricity 
distribution business at State level. The national government also decided to 
                                                          
jurisdictions by Woods (Woods 2006:71), the prevailing sense of economic crisis and political 
uncertainty, coupled with the presence of sympathetic interlocutors, greatly strengthened the 
Bank and the IMF’s leverage.  
112 This was made possible through an enhanced access to finance, ‘[b]etween 1989 and 
1994, IFC committed $256 million (loan plus equity) and syndicated an additional $85 million 
in loans for power generation and systems expansion in India’s private integrated entities’ 
(World Bank 1999b:3). 
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enhance electricity generation capacity by relaxing the foreign direct 
investment (FDI) restrictions in electricity generation (Chong 2004:113). These 
entities with substantial FDI were popularly referred to as Independent Power 
Producers (IPPs). From a sectoral perspective 1989 was also the year in which 
the Supreme Court interpreted electricity sector nationalisation as in keeping 
with the redistributive mandate of the Indian state.113  
The IPPs, however, were not willing to do business with the SEBs that held 
the transmission and distribution businesses at State level, owing to the latter’s 
deteriorating financial health. The Bank expressed its concerns about the 
sustainability of the private initiatives given the shaky finances of SEBs, who 
were the ultimate purchasers of power (World Bank 1996:6). As a 
consequence, the national government stepped in to underwrite agreements 
between the SEBs and IPPs. However, the SEBs and the States were not in 
a position to guarantee the investment of the IPPs, and the national 
government was not in a position to persuade the States to revamp their SEBs 
so as to make them financially viable (World Bank 1999b:2). The SEBs were 
also not able to honour the power purchase tariffs owed to the National Public 
Sector Undertakings, threatening their financial viability (Govt of India 
2001b:3; Planning Commission 2001:6). National Public Sector Undertakings 
like NTPC, NHPC and Powergrid were affected by SEB defaults (ADB 2000:3; 
ADB 2001:6). In fact, NTPC had taken over certain State owned generation 
facilities in lieu of dues owed to it (ADB 2001:6). In 1993, cumulative SEB 
losses had reached nearly rupees 1.8 billion or $US 30,774,227 which 
                                                          
113 Tinsukhia Electric Supply Co. Ltd V. State of Assam and Ors, (1989) 3 SCC 709 and 
Maharashtra State Electricity Board V. Thane Electric Supply Co. & Ors, (1989) 3 SCC 616.  
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amounted to nearly 0.5% of GDP (Chong 2004:114). 114 The electricity sector 
had become the focal point for the financial restructuring programme aimed at 
reducing budgetary deficits (Chong 2004:114).  
As discussed, the Bank’s previous efforts to bring about change at the SEB 
level were unsuccessful. This made the Bank conclude that the, ‘SEBs could 
not be revitalised within the political structure in which they operated in India’ 
(World Bank 1999b:10). The Bank was of the view that State government 
control of the sector would continue to dampen the progress made by national 
government’s initiatives at sectoral reform. In its view, increased political 
interference meant that tariff, operational and managerial reforms could not be 
carried out. This view of the Bank corresponds with the neoliberal attack on 
politics as observed by Chang (Chang 1999: 190). As discussed, in the Indian 
context, politicisation has led to the resource being controlled by the ‘dominant 
coalition’ (Bardhan 1998) to the exclusion of other social groups. Redistributive 
politics also resulted in continued reliance of the States on national funds for 
sectoral investment and expansion (World Bank 1999b:10). Given the national 
government’s fiscal crisis these funds were on the decline in the early 1990s 
(World Bank 1999b:10). The late 1980s and the early 1990s also saw the 
national government running into budgetary deficits, this limited the national 
government’s ability to leverage sectoral financing as a means to ensure the 
financial discipline of SEBs (Chong 2004). This decline in the national 
government’s financial capacity and the presence of ‘sympathetic 
                                                          
114 As per the currency conversion rates on 19 May 2014.  
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interlocutors’ (Woods 2006:73), strengthened the Bank’s position vis-à-vis the 
national government.  
5.4. The 1993 Policy Paper 
 
The World Bank’s policy paper, ‘The World Bank’s Role in the Electric Power 
Sector: Policies for Effective Institutional, Regulatory and Financial Reform’, 
(hereinafter the 1993 Policy/1993 Policy Paper) reviewed the Bank’s lending 
to the electricity sector worldwide (World Bank 1993a). The Bank notes that, 
in 1991-92, lending to the electricity sector constituted nearly 15% of its 
lending to developing countries (World Bank 1993a:11-12). The Bank 
observes that there has been a decline in the power tariffs of the publicly 
owned utilities in developing countries in real terms between 1979-1988 
(World Bank 1993a:12). It notes that, whereas earlier sectoral lending focused 
on governments, viewing electricity as a ‘publicly-provided good’, a cumulative 
review demonstrated, ‘a declining trend in the sector’s pricing, financial, 
technical and institutional performance, mainly due to governmental failure to 
address the sector’s fundamental structural problems’ (World Bank 
1993a:12).This included the non-increase and politicisation of tariffs coupled 
with sectoral inefficiencies in the nature of transmission and distribution losses 
and inefficient utility management across the developing jurisdictions, which 
were recipients of sectoral funding (World Bank 1993a:12). The policy paper 
describes the maladies associated with the publicly owned electricity sector 
across developing jurisdictions and these correspond with the sectoral 
shortcomings in India, discussed in Chapter 4. 
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The 1993 Policy Paper notes that the electricity sector spending had a direct 
impact on macroeconomic stability and increased public debt in developing 
countries, a trend evidenced in the sectoral spending and budgetary deficits 
(World Bank 1993a:12).115 The 1993 Policy proposes to address what the 
Bank viewed as the interconnected issues of institutional, i.e. at the level of 
the enterprise, regulatory arrangements and financial reform so as to improve 
the functioning of public sector (World Bank 1993a:11-13). In other words, the 
regulatory reform accompanying sectoral restructuring was primarily aimed at 
reining in public expenditure, which was threating the state’s fiscal stability.  
The 1993 Policy Paper (World Bank 1993a) reflects a change in the global 
sectoral consensus from public to private ownership (Chong 2004:94-96). This 
was in keeping with the wider international mood to privatize and liberalize, 
symbolised by the fall of the Soviet Union and the rise of the ‘Washington 
Consensus’ (Woods 2006:47-52; Stiglitz 2002).116 The regulatory model in the 
1993 Policy Paper owes its origin to the regulatory arrangements of the United 
States, a country that has a dominant influence on the Bank’s operations. This 
reinforces Hancher and Moran’s suggestion that ‘models emanating from 
countries exercising great economic and political power are most likely to be 
the objects of emulation’ (Hancher &Moran 1989:285).117 The Bank has played 
                                                          
115 The 1993 Policy Paper notes that, though governments had used power sector spending 
as a means to ensure ‘social equity’, the desired results had not always been achieved. It 
observes that excessive sectoral allocation has burdened the public exchequer with an over 
dependence on general taxes, leading to budgetary deficits. It moots the need to address 
issues of ‘social equity’ through mechanisms other than subsidies. This concept of fungibility 
in terms of the reallocation of resources would be reiterated in all subsequent State level 
sectoral restructuring documents of both the ADB and the Bank. 
116 The 1993 Policy Paper also documented similar Bank sponsored restructuring exercises 
being undertaken worldwide in Latin American countries, i.e. Chile and Argentina, developed 
nations like the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand, and Asian economies like the 
Philippines and Malaysia (World Bank 1993a:13, 42, 51, 70 & 75).  
117 Boaventura deSousa Santos terms this phenomenon ‘globalised localism’ (Santos 2002).  
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a significant part in this regulatory diffusion, with its new found institutional 
mandate aptly described by Ngaire Woods as that of being a ‘globaliser’ 
(Woods 2006:2).  
The 1993 Policy Paper required incorporation of the principles of transparent 
regulation, importation of services, commercialisation and corporatisation, 
commitment lending and private investment, in the sectoral restructuring 
exercise. The principle of transparent regulation makes all further sectoral 
lending contingent on the ‘establishment of a legal framework and regulatory 
processes satisfactory to the Bank’ (World Bank 1993a:14). Any country 
seeking sectoral financing needed to enact laws and establish a 
legal/regulatory framework to the Bank’s satisfaction. Therefore, reform of 
state law was the pre-requisite for availing any further financial assistance from 
the Bank. 
As Faundez observes legal reform measures proposed by the Bank reflected 
the Washington Consensus (Faundez 2010:183-184). Similarly, the regulatory 
arrangements imposed by multilateral financial institutions and bilateral donors 
endeavour to restrain the state (Tshuma 1999; Faundez 2010). As discussed 
earlier, regulatory choices have constitutional implications (Rawlings 2010:9). 
The template for legislative reform aimed at imposing constitution-like 
restraints on the state. This corresponds with David Schneiderman’s notion of 
neo-liberal constitutionalism which aims to give precedence to the economic 
over the political by imposing constitution-like restraints on the state 
(Schneiderman 2001:85).  
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 The Bank’s Policy required the regulatory framework to mention the ‘reform 
objectives, including tariff policies’, to ensure ‘transparency and openness’, 
and to establish ‘a legal structure that clearly defines the rules and procedures 
for reducing the level of government involvement and increasing the autonomy 
and accountability of enterprise directors and managers' (World Bank 
1993a:14). The Policy Paper further states that ‘[t]he dual role of the 
government as operator and owner of utilities has drawn governments into 
day-to-day interventions in power sector operations. There is therefore a need 
to set up some form of regulatory body as part of a broader governmental effort 
to redefine the respective roles of government, utility, and consumers’ (World 
Bank 1993a:14). It is in this context that the 1993 Policy Paper envisages the 
institution of the independent electricity sector regulator, i.e. a body that is 
independent from the government departments and the utilities. Under the 
new regulatory arrangements, the state would retain the power to decide the 
overall sectoral policy (World Bank 1993a:14). Therefore, the regulatory body 
becomes the institutional mechanism to monitor and enforce compliance with 
the sectoral arrangements of the regulatory state.  
It may be recalled that the Bank had sponsored reforms aimed at improving 
the managerial capacity and commercial viability of the SEBs in the 1980s and 
1990s, only to see them reversed with a change in government. The principle 
of commercialisation and corporatisation required the restructuring of State 
owned utilities into commercial organisations, working on commercial 
principles (World Bank 1993a:16). In this regard, the Policy Paper states as 
follows:  
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‘The Bank will assist in developing power sector strategies to bring 
about commercialization. For power enterprises to operate on 
commercial principles, they must be treated like commercial 
enterprises. They should pay interest and taxes; earn commercially 
competitive rates of return on equity capital; and have the autonomy to 
manage their own budgets, borrowing, procurement, salaries, and 
conditions pertaining to staff’ (World Bank 1993a:16). 
The principle of commercialisation and corporatisation in the 1993 Policy 
therefore institutionally required the unbundling of the monolithic SEB into 
separate companies undertaking functions of generation, transmission and 
distribution. This step was the precursor to eventual privatisation.  
The principle of importation of services refers to the Bank’s assistance for 
management contracts to run the utilities and coordinatory arrangements with 
similar utilities in developed countries, and other services like ‘plant 
maintenance, billing, revenue collection etc.’, which essentially involve 
‘contracting out’ certain areas of the utility’s functioning to foreign service 
providers (World Bank 1993a:16). The principle of private investment means 
that the Bank will ‘encourage private investment’ in the sector (World Bank 
1993a:18). The principle of commitment lending necessarily implies that it 
cannot be ‘business as usual’ anymore and that sectoral lending will be 
premised on the commitment to the principles in the 1993 Policy (World Bank 
1993a:17).  
The application of these principles is evident in the Bank’s State level power 
sector restructuring projects in India. As Braithwaite & Drahos rightly observe, 
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once there is an agreement on principles, the norm setting process becomes 
easier, and norms adopting the principles become most influential when ‘they 
become institutionalized in a regime which functions to bring about desired 
effects, or at least some desired effects’ (Braithwaite & Drahos 2000:529).  
5.5. Implementation of the 1993 Policy through Legislative Intervention  
 
In 1993, the Bank re-examined its India lending strategy owing to the failure of 
SEBs to bring about the necessary reforms. In the course of the next four 
years, the Bank cancelled loan commitments amounting to nearly $2.3 billion 
for non-compliance with the covenants in the loan documents (World Bank 
1999b:10). In the meantime, the commercial losses of SEBs reached US $2.2 
billion in the 1996 fiscal year, or about 0.8% of the GDP (World Bank 1996:1). 
The deficits in the SEB’s accounts were bridged by borrowing from the State’s 
tax revenues, which contributed to the budgetary deficits (World Bank 1996:3). 
In line with its policy paper, it suspended all financing from 1993, till such a 
time as the States were willing to embrace its sectoral restructuring 
prescription.  
Co-organisation of conferences is an oft repeated strategy of the Bank’s to 
achieve consensus (Woods 2006:66). The national government, which had 
expressed its willingness to undertake sectoral reforms, co-organised 
conferences with the Bank. 118 The October 1993 conference in Jaipur (World 
Bank 1993b), formally launched the collaboration between the Bank and the 
national government in India. At the conference, the Bank reiterated its 1993 
                                                          
118 The willingness to cooperate with the Bank is evident in the letter written by the Joint-
Secretary, Ministry of Power, Government of India, who wholly endorsed the Bank’s sectoral 
restructuring prescription (World Bank 1999b: Annex H). 
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Policy. The Bank also announced that it would no longer finance or guarantee 
power projects in States that do not restructure the sector along the lines of 
the 1993 Policy.119 
However, the national government, which was battling its own budgetary 
deficits, was not able to persuade the States to undertake the necessary 
reforms. One of the reasons for the States not supporting the reforms has been 
attributed to the absence of a critical mass of elites at the State level (Chong 
2004). The primary reason, however, was political (Dubash & Rajan 2001: 
3369). The provision of electricity through the institutional conduit of the SEB, 
was perceived by the electorate as a democratic entitlement. Tshuma 
observes that contrary to the Bank’s perception of legal reforms being 
‘technocratic and apolitical in character’, law ‘is an instrument of state power 
and its making and application involves gains and losses for different groups 
in society’ (Tshuma 1999:83). Chang voices a similar concern, wondering if 
depoliticisation can ever be possible, and suggesting that it only results in 
disempowering certain sections of a society to the benefit of others (Chang 
1999:190-191). This inherently political nature of legal reform will be discussed 
in greater detail in Chapter 7 with regard to experience of the State of Andhra 
Pradesh. The Bank restricted further sectoral lending and access to avenues 
of institutional finance through the National Public Sector Undertakings, and 
co-opted an indebted national government with ‘sympathetic interlocutors’ and 
‘eager pupils’ into endorsing its approach (Woods 2006:72-76; Chong 
2004:115-117). By making ‘commitment lending’ the norm (World Bank 
                                                          
119 This was followed by seminars on ‘Competitive Bidding for Private Generation’ in June 
1994 in Hyderabad and ‘Privatization of Power Distribution’ in June 1995 in Bangalore (World 
Bank 1996:7). 
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1993a:17), the Bank waited for the States to express their ‘willingness’ to 
reform.  
5.6. Contextualising SEB Reforms within the Context of the Bank’s 
State Level Policy Reform Approach  
 
The State level sectoral reforms have to be contextualised from the 
perspective of selective State level policy based financing proposed by the 
Bank in the context of India’s federal set-up and large size, which was 
considered too big for the Bank (Kirk 2011:47). The notion of selectivity also 
implied that ‘policy-based lending should reward and encourage demonstrated 
reformers, rather than attempting to “buy” reform up front’ (Kirk 2011:48). This 
policy was adopted by the Bank to selectively target countries in sub-Saharan 
Africa and was deployed at State level in India (Kirk 2011:48). The move 
towards direct engagement with the States also came in light of the Bank’s 
own research findings, which indicated that the national government used to 
substitute its resource disbursal to the States with the monies advanced by the 
Bank (Kirk 2011:58). The Bank wanted to gain direct control over this channel 
of financing through policy based lending (Kirk 2011:58). 
The policy linked lending was welcomed by technocrats like Montek Singh 
Ahluwalia, Shankar Acharya and Jairam Ramesh, who were associated with 
the national government (Kirk 2011:53). Edward Lim, Country Director of the 
Bank for India called upon the then Finance Minister P. Chidambaram 
proposing the strategy of direct policy linked lending to the States (Kirk 
2011:53). Kirk observes that Chidambaram was aware of the need to go for 
what he terms ‘second stage’ reforms, wherein the State governments were 
required to take action within their constitutionally delineated areas of 
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competence (Kirk 2011:53). This included ‘budgetary, institutional, and 
governance reforms’ (Kirk 2011:53). However, Kirk observes that, along with 
ushering in liberalisation, 1991 was also associated with the beginning of 
coalition governments at the national level, with regional parties playing a very 
important role in national government formation and continuance (Kirk 2011). 
Chidambaram was the Finance Minister in one such coalition supported by 
regional parties, on whom the national government could not impose fiscal 
discipline in the name of fiscal prudence (Kirk 2011:59). Chidambaram also 
could not discriminate between States by rewarding performance by deviating 
from time honoured mechanisms of equitable and proportionate distribution of 
national funds (Kirk 2011:59). Chidambaram viewed Lim’s offer of selective 
policy lending as a means to overcome both the constraints of coalition politics, 
i.e. the imposition of fiscal restraints, and to avoid allegations of favouritism in 
the resource transfer, as both can be now attributed to the Bank (Kirk 
2011:59). Both Lim and Chidambaram were of the view that the approach of 
selectivity will have a ‘demonstration effect’ on other States to emulate the 
successful ones (Kirk 2011:59). This culminated in Country Assistance 
Strategy released in December 1997 announcing the shift to select State level 
policy lending (Kirk 2011:60). In this context, Andhra Pradesh emerged as the 
‘flagship focus state owing both to the volume of Bank assistance and to the 
high national and even international visibility of the state’s chief minister’ (Kirk 
2011: 61). 120  The 2001 Country Assistance Strategy for the period 2001-2004 
was even more focused on select State level intervention and mentioned 
                                                          
120 In India’s Westminster model of federal legislative arrangements, the Chief Minister of the 
State occupies a position similar to the Prime Minister at the national level.  
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Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka and Uttar Pradesh as its focus States, with the 
possibility of including other States which display commitment to reforms (Kirk 
2011:62). It would be wrong to think that the national government had given 
up all control over the Bank’s engagement with the States; Chidambaram 
made it clear that the national government was in control (Kirk 2011:58). These 
coercive tactics on the part of the national government, as co-opted by the 
Bank, however, generated tensions between the national government and the 
States. Subsequently, between 1998 and 2003, the Bank had a ‘focus states’ 
approach, namely a direct lending relationship with States whose political 
establishment supported economic reforms (Kirk 2011:43). In that time period, 
the States of Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka and Uttar Pradesh received one third 
of the Bank’s assistance to India (Kirk 2011:43). 
5.7. Actors Associated with State Level Sectoral Reform  
 
This section discusses the role of the ‘actors’ such as the Chief Minister of the 
State and international consultants in adapting the reform model and the role 
of the ‘mechanism’ of technical assistance in formulating and replicating the 
model. It discusses the inter-organisational cooperation between the Bank, 
ADB and the bilateral donor agencies in the electricity sector. The ‘principles’ 
in the 1993 Policy were translated into ‘norms’, i.e. sectoral legislation, for the 
first time in the State of Orissa. The sectoral legislative model developed in 
Orissa was replicated across the States by the Bank and the ADB. Certain 
elements of the ‘Orissa Model’ (Haldea 2003:40) were subsequently scaled up 
to the national level through the Electricity Regulatory Commissions Act, 1998 
and the Electricity Act, 2003. Though varying in scope, all the enactments 
endeavour to implement the principles of the 1993 Policy Paper ushering in a 
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sectoral regulatory state. The following discussion brings to light the roles of 
actors like the State’s Chief Minister, international consultants, inter-
governmental lenders and bilateral donor agencies in incorporating a global 
regulatory model at the State level.  
5.7.1. The Reformist Chief Minister  
 
What made Orissa and, subsequently, Haryana and Andhra Pradesh 
approach the Bank, was not just the immediate fiscal deficit, but another 
important actor in the process of diffusion of the Bank’s regulatory reform 
model, namely the Chief Minister. Whereas it was the intelligentsia and 
bureaucratic elite that ushered in reforms at the national level, it was 
willingness at the level of the Chief Minister, the Chief Secretary (top 
bureaucrat) and the head of the SEB (the Chief Engineer or technocrat) at the 
State level that paved the way for the reform process. This process replicated 
what Woods’s identifies as the Bank’s modus operandi of initiating reforms 
through a small insular group of policy makers or politicians in relative secrecy, 
rather than through democratic deliberation (Woods 2006:76). However, 
unlike the elite bureaucrats and technocrats at the national level, the Chief 
Minister was answerable to the State’s electorate. Therefore, the initial mode 
of engagement set the tone for subsequent developments, i.e. limiting the 
reforms within what was politically feasible (Lal 2005:650). Political feasibility 
necessarily relied upon the links between affordable and accessible provision 
of electricity and democratic expectations.121  
                                                          
121 With the exception of the State of Orissa, where agricultural consumption constituted only 
6% of the total electrical consumption at the time of reform, the Bank’s reform model could not 
be implemented in its entirety in any other Indian State. This was owing to higher agricultural 
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The reform and restructuring project in Orissa attracted very little attention as 
the State had a low national profile (Dubash & Rajan 2001:3377). In Orissa, 
the reform process involved the application of the principles of ‘commitment 
lending’, which included the principles of ‘technical assistance’, ‘transparent 
regulation’, ‘enterprise commercialization and corporatization’ and ‘private 
investment’ and, to a lesser extent, the principle of ‘importation of services'. 
The sectoral restructuring project in Orissa aimed to free resources previously 
set aside for investment in the power sector and sought to lower the State’s 
fiscal deficit (World Bank 1996:31). The key impact of the reform process was 
to free the State from the burden of the power sector, so as to direct spending 
to other social sectors (World Bank 1996:31). This logic of ‘fungibility’ (Stiglitz 
2002) and better allocation of resources in sectors like education and health, 
was the reason given to justify the proposed entry of the private sector.122 This 
was the Bank’s, and subsequently the ADB’s, sectoral restructuring rationale 
for the States of Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat and Madhya Pradesh (ADB 
2000:15; World Bank 2004a:2; ADB 2001:4). ADB’s reform goals were similar 
to the Bank’s, they sought to make the sector self-sufficient in terms of funds 
for investment, as opposed to its then heavy reliance on budgetary allocation 
(ADB 2001:5). 
5.7.2. International Consultants  
 
The process of adapting the 1993 Policy Prescription to Indian conditions was 
left to international consultants hired by the bilateral donor agencies. It was 
                                                          
consumption in comparison with the total consumption in other States and associated electoral 
politics preventing the States from commodifying electricity.  
122 Joseph E Stiglitz uses this in relation to the IMFs prescription; it is, however, applicable to 
the Bank’s economic logic as well. 
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these consultants, made available in the name of providing ‘technical 
assistance', who conceptualised the way the new regulatory arrangements 
would work.123 The Bank helped secure technical and financial assistance 
from the ADB and DIFD for drafting the reform legislation and establishing the 
regulator, which were the pre-conditions for the disbursement of the loan. The 
provision of technical assistance preceded the sanction of the loan towards 
utility unbundling and the passage of reform legislation.  
In Orissa, the State government set up internal governmental committees to 
review the recommendations of the consultants, but little or no changes were 
made to the consultant’s proposals, given the limited experience of members 
of the committees about privatisation and liberalisation. To what extent the 
international consultants understood the Indian system in the short 
consultancy period was also debatable (Dubash & Rajan 2001: 3378). 
National consultants did question the international consultants and their 
understanding of the social and political implications of the proposed 
regulatory reforms. The national consultants believed that the international 
consultants only focused on the economic issues ignoring the social and 
political aspects of the reform (Dubash & Rajan 2001:3378). Wherever 
national consultants were engaged, they were engaged in a junior position to 
the international consultants, greatly diminishing their influence on the reform 
process (Dubash & Rajan 2001:3378). The senior role assigned to the 
international consultants also points to the lack of local ownership in the reform 
                                                          
123 The technical assistance provided to OSEB included ‘development and operational 
support, and distribution transaction advice’. DIFD extended its support to the tune of $75 
million towards the same (World Bank 2004b: 4). 
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process. International consultants in turn were influenced by the donor 
agencies and their perception of the issue of reforms as primarily financial in 
nature, and that privatisation was the only possible solution (Dubash & Rajan 
2001: 3378). 
As Ngaire Woods rightly observes, ‘local knowledge’ is neither valued nor is it 
taken into consideration when the Bank takes decisions (Woods 2006:55). 
Woods is of the opinion that ignoring local knowledge in the name of 
professionalism has proven disastrous for the Bank. In her words, ‘in some 
cases the professionalism and coherence of the institutions can lead to a 
certain kind of blindness and over rigidity that leaves them unable to deploy 
their formidable expertise’ (Woods 2006:55). The chain of command, i.e. 
hierarchies within the organisation, ensure that staff always toe the official line 
(Woods 2006:56) and the templates help the Bank to ‘“stand above” local 
knowledge and to claim a universally applicable expertise, based squarely in 
the discipline of economics’ (Woods 2006: 64).  
The reform process in Orissa highlights the donor and Bank consensus about 
the nature of reforms to be undertaken. These donors also happen to be the 
majority shareholders of the Bank and utilise the Bank’s financing to engage 
with the recipient country (Tan 2011). It is argued that giving due deference to 
local knowledge would have helped the international consultants understand 
the sectoral regulatory attributes, so as to engineer responsive regulatory 
interventions. The donors viewed the sectoral restructuring programme as a 
bankruptcy bailout (Dubash & Rajan 2001).124 They approached sectoral 
                                                          
124 This perception of regulatory reform being akin to bankruptcy bailout recurs in the Bank’s 
narrative of the reform process in Andhra Pradesh (World Bank 2004a:23).  
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restructuring with the aim of reducing budgetary deficits and enabling a more 
efficient private sector to take over the functioning of the utilities and bring in 
investments. It was evident that their ultimate goal was to ‘achieve consensus 
on a model rather than to evolve a model through consensus process’ (Dubash 
& Rajan 2001:3377). 
5.7.3. Bilateral Aid Agencies and Technical Assistance  
 
Consenting to the Bank’s terms of engagement, opened doors to aid from 
donors from the developed countries who effectively dictate the Bank’s 
agenda (Tan 2011:121). Orissa was also the State in which DFID and the Bank 
came together for electricity sector restructuring. Not only did the aid agencies 
prepare the necessary regulatory groundwork to initiate the reform process, 
they participated throughout the process of sectoral reorganisation and 
provided technical assistance for the reform process. It was these rules and 
regulations, framed in pursuance of the reform legislation, and the continued 
technical advice provided to the organisation institutionalising reform, i.e. the 
regulatory commission, which helped operationalize the legislative framework. 
5.8. The Reform Process in Orissa and Institutional Mechanisms Giving 
Effect to the Regulatory State  
 
The Bank and the national government agreed that all State level projects 
would be formally sponsored by the national government, which would make 
loans to the States (World Bank 1997b:10).125 All the State level power sector 
restructuring projects financed by the Bank and ADB, as evidenced in the 
cases of Orissa, Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat and Madhya Pradesh, were formally 
                                                          
125 Article 293 of the Constitution of India prohibits external borrowings by States.  
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sponsored by the national government (World Bank 1996:8; World Bank 
1999a:14; ADB 2000; ADB 2001).  
Fig 1 – State of Orissa         
Orissa conveyed its 
willingness to 
undertake sectoral 
reforms along the 
lines of the 1993 
Policy. The Orissa 
government’s 
sectoral policy 
statement of April 
1996 reiterates the 
principles of the 1993 
Policy document 
(World Bank 1996: Annexure 2.2, P.10). The Orissa Electricity Reform Act, 
1995, came into effect in January 1996 (World Bank 2004b:5). The public 
nature of ownership, below cost tariffs and continued provision of subsidies 
were the primary issues that the reform package intended to remedy in order 
to reduce the public deficit. The principles of transparent regulation, 
commercialisation and corporatisation were incorporated into the Orissa 
Electricity Reform Act, 1995, through provisions establishing the sectoral 
regulator and those disaggregating the monolithic SEB.126 The regulatory 
                                                          
126 Chapters 2 and 7 of the Orissa Electricity Reform Act, 1995. 
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architecture and institutional arrangements formulated in Orissa were 
replicated in other States and upscaled as the national legislation, i.e. the 
Electricity Act, 2003, with some modifications. This institutional architecture, 
as discussed earlier, came to be known as the ‘Orissa Model’. It is argued that 
the legislative endeavour to disaggregate the state giving effect to the 
normativity of the regulatory state in the Orissa Model is opposed to the 
aggregated state organisation of the interventionist state. This is represented 
below. 
Fig 2 – Sectoral Institutional Organisation of the Interventionist and Regulatory State 
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The figure on the left depicts the aggregated sectoral institutional framework 
of the interventionist state under the 1948 Act. The 1948 Act envisaged a 
closer relationship between the state and state owned SEB. The figure on the 
right depicts the dis-aggregated institutional arrangements envisaged by the 
Orissa Electricity Reform Act, 1995, implementing the 1993 Policy of the Bank. 
The enactment endeavoured to disaggreg 
 
ate the SEB into utilities undertaking the functions of generation, transmission 
and distribution. The 1995 Orissa enactment also established a sectoral 
regulator to insulate sectoral regulation from political and bureaucratic 
intervention.  
Andhra Pradesh adopted the Orissa Model when undertaking sectoral reforms 
under the aegis of the Bank. As will be discussed, despite the legal 
instrumentalist attempt to disaggregate the SEB and establish an autonomous 
regulator, the state and disaggregated utilities in Andhra Pradesh reorganised 
themselves in response to the societal expectations of an interventionist state, 
mimicking the organisation of the SEB. As will be established in Chapter 8, the 
re-aggregation of the SEB was made possible by political necessity and 
corresponding self-organisation and resultant self-regulation between the 
bureaucrats and technocrats comprising the disaggregated SEB.  
5.8.1. Outcome of Reform Process in Orissa 
 
Given that Orissa was the first State to embrace reform, the 1993 Policy was 
translated in its totality through upfront privatization of the unbundled SEB, 
outright withdrawal of sectoral subsidies and a steep increase in tariff (World 
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Bank 1996:14). The Bank’s ‘Implementation Completion Report’ on the Orissa 
project notes that the execution of the project was ‘unsatisfactory’ with regard 
to the ‘regulatory, institutional and tariff reforms’ (World Bank 2004b:6). The 
Bank notes that the State level power sector reforms, being undertaken for the 
first time in Orissa, were akin to a journey into ‘uncharted waters’ (World Bank 
2004b:3). It was disappointed with the outcomes and expressed concerns 
about the sustainability of the restructuring exercise (World Bank 2004b:5-6). 
In Orissa, where outright privatisation and withdrawal of subsidies were 
simultaneously undertaken, the privatised distribution companies were not 
financially sustainable. This was due to the high levels of pilferage, theft, 
transmission and distribution losses and non-recovery of payments for 
services (World Bank 2004b). The Bank apprehended that in the absence of 
revenues, the sector could plunge into the pre-reform scenario. It also blamed 
the State government for not displaying the requisite political will to crack down 
on theft (World Bank 2004b:14-16).  
 In 2004, when the Bank was reviewing the status of the reform 
implementation, CESCO, one of the privatised distribution companies, whose 
majority shares were owned by AES of the United States, was already under 
a statutory administrator. The Bank had actively encouraged AES to 
participate in the privatisation process in Orissa (World Bank 2004b:23). A 
contributing factor was that the ‘retail tariffs’ remained stagnant for three years 
(World Bank 2004b:14-16). The Bank acknowledged that the sudden 
stoppage of the subsidy at the initial stages of privatization was a mistake 
(World Bank 2004b:19). There was also not much progress on the rural 
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electrification front during the restructuring period and the agricultural sector 
suffered (Sharma et al. 2005: 574). 
The Bank observed that the private players such as the AES Corporation of 
United States and Bombay Suburban Electricity Supply, owned by Reliance 
Energy, which purchased the majority stake in the state utilities were not at 
fault. It blamed the State of Orissa for not being able to create a congenial 
business environment. This, in its opinion was essential as ‘private tolerance 
for losses is quite limited’ (World Bank 2004b: 20). It noted that though ‘de jure 
unbundling’ of OSEB was not anticipated, the governmental entity may 
regroup into its previous structure if the private players found the sector 
unviable and exited (World Bank 2004b:14-16). This was a very pertinent early 
observation, symptomatic of the sectoral dynamics in response to the 2003 
Act, which will be discussed in detail in the forthcoming chapters, in the context 
of State of Andhra Pradesh. 
5.9. Attempts at Generating a National Consensus for Sectoral Reform  
 
Attempts at reforms at the State level were not yielding the desired results. 
Many States preferred to continue with the SEB model despite restricted 
access to sectoral financing. The national government, which had endorsed 
the 1993 Policy, coordinated the Bank’s restructuring programmes at the State 
level and tried to generate a national level consensus for adoption of the 1993 
Policy and the accompanying legislative reform template developed in Orissa.  
5.9.1. Common Minimum National Action Plan for Power – 1996 
 
The deliberations at the Conferences of Chief Ministers organized by the 
national government’s Ministry of Power, reflect the attempt to depoliticise the 
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sectoral issues. The first indication of in principle progress towards generation 
of a national consensus was the adoption of the ‘Common Minimum National 
Action Plan for Power’ in 1996 (Govt of India 1996). The Action Plan 
acknowledged the precarious finances of the SEBs and the limitations on 
public investment in the sector. Given the scarcity of ‘public resources’ it 
advocated encouraging private investment in generation, transmission and 
distribution (principle of private investment) (Govt of India 1996). SEB 
restructuring was to be undertaken within a definite time frame, while the SEBs 
were to be given maximum autonomy with immediate effect (Govt of India 
1996). The Action Plan also recommended amendments to the Electricity Act, 
1910, and the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948, so as to set up a Central Electricity 
Regulatory Commission (CERC) for the Central government and the State 
Electricity Regulatory Commission (SERC) at the State level (Govt of India 
1996). The primary role of the Commissions was tariff fixation, with provision 
of an appeal to the State High Courts. The role of the SERCs was to rationalize 
tariffs, to ensure that the SEBs earned the statutory 3% rate of return and to 
see that cross-subsidization did not excessively burden any one segment of 
consumers (Govt of India 1996). The action plan also agreed to have a 
‘package of incentives and disincentives’ to promote tariff rationalisation at the 
State level (Govt of India 1996).  
5.9.2. Electricity Regulatory Commission’s Act - 1998  
 
The reforms proposed by the ‘Action Plan’ were still SEB-centric, and the 
States agreed to provide greater autonomy to the SEBs, which were to be 
subsequently corporatised and run on commercial principles. Given the 
complex national state and State dynamics of the federal polity, the progress 
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was extremely slow. The progress towards the enactment of the 2003 Act 
incorporating the architecture of the 1993 Policy into the national legislation 
was fiercely resisted by the States. As a consequence, the Electricity 
Regulatory Commissions Act 1998 which started as a draft endeavoring to 
repeal the 1910 and 1948 Acts and to replace them with legislation along the 
lines of the 1993 Policy could only be legislated as one establishing the CERC 
and requiring the States to establish SERCs (Upadhyay 2000: 1023). The 
sectoral dynamics at the State level remained pretty much unaltered. In fact, 
as one sectoral analyst put it, the resolutions passed at the Chief Ministers 
Conferences convened by the national government, were never taken 
seriously by the Chief Minsters once they returned to their home States 
(Ramachandra 2014a). As a consequence, these resolutions remained 
consensuses created on paper, and the political expectations within the State 
continued to determine the sectoral regulatory dynamic and the regulatory 
attributes.  
The political coordination through the Chief Ministers Conferences continued 
at the national level. In 2001, the Chief Ministers Conference adopted a 
resolution on the power sector reforms (Govt of India 2001a). Paradoxically 
the decision of political heads of States aimed to ‘depoliticise power sector 
reforms and speed up their implementation’ (Govt of India 2001a:9). The need 
for an all-party consensus so as to depoliticise the sectoral decision-making 
was very much the Bank’s priority, as reflected in its reporting of the State level 
reform process (World Bank 2004a:16). It was resolved that the States will 
encourage privatisation of the distribution business and that the national 
government will support the States promoting reforms (World Bank 2004a:10). 
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The 2001 Conference also agreed to appoint an ‘Expert Group’ under the 
Chairmanship of Montek Singh Ahluwalia to look into the outstanding 
payments of the SEBs to the National Public Sector Undertakings 
(Government of India 2001a:10).127 The report of the Expert Group stated that, 
as of 28th February 2001, SEBs were indebted to the National Public Sector 
Undertakings to the tune of approximately $US 7,002,027,600128 (Planning 
Commission 2001:6). It was evident that the SEBs could not undergo reform 
with their debt burden. Therefore, the expert group recommended that part of 
the debts had to be waived by the National Public Sector Undertakings. 
Correspondingly, the State governments were required to take over the SEBs 
financial liability. This scheme was made available to States willing to 
undertake reforms (Planning Commission 2001).  
5.9.3. Blue Print for Power Sector Development - 2001  
 
The Ministry of Power of the national government in its ‘Blueprint for Power 
Sector Development’, endorsed the one-time settlement of debts as 
recommended by the Expert Group (Govt of India 2001b:35-36). In the 
Blueprint, the Ministry noted that it was working on a package to support States 
willing to undertake the necessary reforms. This was in pursuance of the 
assurance of sectoral support given by the Bank’s President during his visit to 
                                                          
127The then Member of Planning Commission of India and Deputy Chairman of the Planning 
Commission of India from 2004-2014, Mr. Montek Singh Ahluwalia, has had an interesting 
career path. Alternating in employment between the World Bank, Government of India and 
IMF. In 2001, he went on become the Director of Independent Evaluation Office at IMF which 
he headed till 2004, when he was appointed Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission 
of India, a post that he held till May 2014 (the term of the Planning Commission is coterminous 
with the tenure of the Prime Minister).  In more ways than one Mr. Ahluwalia falls within the 
category of an ‘eager pupil’ (Chong 2004:115) or ‘sympathetic interlocutor’ (Woods 2006: 73) 
of the Bank and the IMF.  
128 USD conversion as per exchange rate on 10 June 2014.  
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India in 2000 and included ‘[s]tructural adjustment assistance for reforming 
states’ (Govt of India 2001b:35). Similarly, the States also entered into 
Memoranda of Understandings with the national government, so as to 
undertake reforms in a time bound manner with national assistance.129 The 
Blueprint document reiterates the national government’s commitment to enact 
sectoral legislation replacing the 1910, 1948 and 1998 Acts (Govt of India 
2001b:36). The features of the then proposed legislation involved freeing 
generation from the requirements of licensing, the setting up of regulatory 
commissions with provision for dispute resolution and tariff setting, scaling 
down of cross-subsidies, theft deterrent provisions and restructuring the SEBs 
(Govt of India 2001b:36).  
5.10. Conclusion - The Electricity Act, 2003 and the Sectoral Regulatory 
State  
 
The national government’s carrot and stick strategy, i.e. mechanisms of 
economic inducement (financial package for reform) and economic coercion 
(endorsing Bank policy and restricting sectoral finance options), culminated in 
the enactment of the 2003 Act. The 2003 Act was a comprehensive 
enactment. It repealed the 1910 and 1948 Acts and was broadly moulded on 
the principles of the 1993 Policy and the architecture of the ‘Orissa Model’.130 
The 2003 Act, based on the principle of transparent regulation, laid the 
groundwork for a nationwide unbundling and corporatisation of the SEBs 
                                                          
129 The package suggested by the expert group was in many ways a bribe being offered to the 
States to undertake the sectoral reforms. 
130 One important departure of the 2003 Act from the Orissa Model and the the Electricity 
Regulatory Commissions Act 1998 was the appellate review process. Whereas appeals from 
the decisions of the regulatory commission were referred to the State’s High Court in the 
previous enactments, the 2003 Act established a national appellate tribunal for the sector. 
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(principle of commercialisation) and the ushering in of an environment 
facilitative of private sector participation (principle of private investment). The 
statutory regulator was the institutional mechanism to enforce the new 
regulatory arrangements (independent regulation). It is argued that the 
enactment of the 2003 Act came to symbolize the state’s shift in sectoral public 
posturing from an interventionist state to a regulatory state. 
As discussed above, the process of introducing the new regulatory 
arrangements as traced through the methodology of ‘principles, actors and 
mechanisms’ (Braithwaite and Drahos 2000), did not pay adequate attention 
to the sectoral regulatory attributes. The arrangements sought to impose 
constitution like restraints on the role of the state in economic activity. They 
aimed to bring about three important changes in the sectoral dynamics through 
law informed by the rationale that technocratic sectoral decision making must 
be insulated from politics. These are: first, a separation of the state’s power to 
make policy from the provision of services; second, the unbundling and 
eventual privatisation of the monolithic sectoral utility, which was divided into 
corporate entities specialising in generation, transmission and distribution, and 
run along commercial principles; and finally, the establishment of an 
independent sectoral regulator that was at arm’s length from the state and the 
sectoral utilities. As discussed previously, ‘regulatory character’ has an 
inherent integrity that resists attempts at reorganisation which can lead to ‘less 
than intended’ consequences (Haines 2003). This thesis argues that all three 
attempted changes had ‘less than intended’ results. Tshuma, too, opines that 
legal interventions accompanying economic globalisation have ‘unintended 
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consequences’ which include the emergence of legal pluralism (Tshuma 
1999:91). 
 This thesis argues that, in the Indian context, these less than intended 
consequences are manifested by the emergence of legal pluralism in the 
sectoral state law. This phenomenon shall be explored in Chapter 8 of the 
thesis in the context of the sectoral reform experience of the State of Andhra 
Pradesh. The next chapter discusses the theories associated with legal 
pluralism. In particular, it discusses theories associated with regulatory 
globalisation and legal pluralism. It discusses self-organisation and resultant 
self-regulation as a source of legal pluralism. This will be established in the 
case of the reaggregation of the disaggregated SEB and the resultant self-
regulatory processes in the State of Andhra Pradesh in Chapter 8.  
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Chapter 6 - Regulatory Globalisation, Legal Instrumentalism 
and Legal Pluralism 
 
This chapter discusses the phenomenon of legal pluralism, i.e. the existence 
of multiple legal systems in society, as contrasted with legal centralism, which 
recognises singular state law as the only source of law. It discusses theories 
associated with legal pluralism and how the approach compliments the 
previous discussion pertaining to attributes of the regulatory space and ‘less 
than intended’ consequences of regulatory globalisation (Haines 2003). The 
theoretical discussion in this chapter helps contextualise the emergence of 
legal pluralism in sectoral state law in the State of Andhra Pradesh. 
As discussed in the previous chapters, the conceptualisation of an 
interventionist role for the Indian state in economic activity was sought to be 
reversed through legislation in order to reflect the changing global consensus 
advocating a regulatory state. This resulted in legislative changes to the 
sectoral state law in the electricity sector at the insistence of the Bank, ADB 
and bilateral donor agencies. The Bank’s non-consultative approach to 
regulatory change was evident in what Dubash and Rajan describe as the 
reform consultant’s objective in Orissa to ‘achieve consensus on a model 
rather than to evolve a model through consensus’ (Dubash & Rajan 
2001:3377). It is argued that the Bank’s approach to regulatory dissemination 
was premised on the simplistic assumption of a vacuum in the space between 
state and society and therefore a linear relationship between legislations and 
outcomes. This is evident in the Bank’s 1993 Policy which defines regulation 
as  
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‘The supervision and control of the economic activities of private and 
arms-length public enterprises by government in the interest of 
economic efficiency, fairness, health and safety. Regulation may be 
imposed simply by enacting laws and leaving their supervision to the 
normal processes of the law, by setting up special regulatory agencies, 
or by encouraging self-regulation by recognizing, and in some cases 
delegating powers to, voluntary bodies’ (World Bank 1993a). 
The Bank’s approach to regulation was therefore that of ‘imposing’ it through 
legislation. As will be discussed in Chapter 7, the Bank followed an approach 
similar to Orissa’s, i.e. introducing sectoral reforms through legislative change 
in Andhra Pradesh. This thesis argues that the same led to the emergence of 
legal pluralism in sectoral state law in Andhra Pradesh. This chapter firstly 
discusses the notion of legal pluralism and thereafter the complementarity of 
the approach to a spatial analysis of regulatory dynamics in India. The Bank 
intended to reposition the Indian state in the electricity sector through 
legislative change in state law, both national and States. In this context, the 
chapter discusses the assumptions and limitations associated with legislative 
interventions through state law and the resultant pluralism. It thereafter 
discusses the role assigned to state law by different authors examining the 
phenomenon of legal pluralism. It then discusses Sally Falk Moore’s notion of 
a Semi-Autonomous Social Field and how it is suited to observe the rise of 
legal pluralism given the Indian state’s regulatory attributes.  
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6.1. Differing Notions of Legal Pluralism  
 
According to Sally Engel Merry, legal pluralism is ‘a situation in which two or 
more legal systems coexist in the same social field’ (Merry 1988:870). Legal 
pluralism is a social reality and a social fact, and different legal systems have 
interacted throughout human history (Twining 2004:5; Twining 2010:516; 
Tamanaha 2008:375; Griffiths 1986:4). Twining states that viewing legal 
pluralism as a social fact helps emphasise the importance of local knowledge 
and ‘draws attention to the existence of normative orders that are generally 
ignored, overlooked, arcane or even invisible’ (Twining 2010:516). Merry 
argues that adopting an approach of legal pluralism helps shift the focus of the 
researcher from viewing law as a state centric phenomenon and draws 
‘attention to other forms of ordering and their interaction with state law’ (Merry 
1988:889). Examining scenarios from the perspective of legal pluralism helps 
understand ‘the cultural or ideological nature of law and systems of normative 
ordering’ (Merry 1988:889). Such an analysis helps shift the focus from 
examination of disputes to ‘analysis of ordering in non-dispute situations’ 
(Merry 1988:889-890). In the Indian context, this translates into an enquiry that 
goes beyond (but does not ignore) mere analysis of the decisions pertaining 
to implementation of statutory regulations. As will be demonstrated in this 
thesis, it includes observing how social, political and state actors 
accommodate or oppose a legislative intervention. 
Tamanaha observes that multiple legal systems coexisted in Europe in the 
past 2000 years, both during the Roman Empire and after its decline, and also 
in medieval Europe till the rise of the states after the conclusion of the treaty 
of Westphalia (Tamanaha 2008: 376,379). This in his opinion occurred 
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because of ‘[c]onsolidation of law in the hands of the state was an essential 
aspect of state-building process’ (Tamanaha 2008:376). The state in Europe 
was able to consolidate its hold over all other legal systems (Tamanaha 
2011:14) as it emerged as the ‘fundamental unit of political organization’ 
(Griffiths 1986:3). However, just as the state was emerging as the sole source 
and enforcer of law in Europe, colonisation by European states led to a new 
wave of pluralism in the colonies governed by them (Tamanaha 2008:381-
382). This phenomenon arose owing to the divergences between the law of 
the coloniser and that governing the societal relationships prior to the 
introduction of the colonial law (Tamanaha 2008:381-382). Writing in the late 
1980s, Merry defines this phenomenon as ‘classic legal pluralism’ and speaks 
of the study of legal pluralism in ‘non-colonised societies’, especially in Europe 
and United States of America, and labels it ‘new legal pluralism’ (Merry 
1988:872). New legal pluralism asserts that, ‘plural normative orders are found 
in virtually all societies’ (Merry 1988:873) and that the same are ‘embedded in 
relations of unequal power’ (Merry 1988:874).131  
Tamanaha observes that the process of ‘globalisation’ in the late 20th century 
has given rise to ‘another wave of legal pluralism’ as the power of the state is 
                                                          
131Gunther Teubner explores the phenomenon of pluralism attributable to the imposition of 
external law from a systems theory perspective. Teubner speaks about this in the context of 
law and society under the circumstances of the adoption of a legal system external to the 
social processes of the jurisdiction (Teubner 1998). He is of the view that an external law can 
never be fully internalised, but rather operates as an ‘irritant’ (Teubner 1998:12). In his words 
‘[l]egal irritants’ cannot be domesticated; they are not transformed from something alien to 
something familiar, not adapted to a new cultural context, rather they will unleash an 
evolutionary dynamic in which the external rule’s meaning will be reconstructed and the 
internal context will undergo fundamental change’ (Teubner 1998:12). In other words, Teubner 
suggests that the external influence operates through self-reflexive processing to provide 
change and this internalisation of the external in terms of the inherent systemic logic produces 
an interpretation different from what was intended and leads to the emergence of legal 
pluralism.  
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in decline (Tamanaha 2008:386). He gives as examples countries of the 
European Union surrendering some of their sovereign powers to the 
supranational organisation, the internal disaggregation of the states into 
smaller territories and the rise in movements for autonomy (Tamanaha 
2008:386). As discussed earlier, Tshuma observes that legal interventions 
accompanying regulatory globalisation result in ‘unintended consequences’ 
which include the emergence of legal pluralism in the recipient jurisdiction 
(Tshuma 1999:91). Moore acknowledges the relationship between legal 
pluralism and globalisation, however she also examines the notion of pluralism 
from the perspective of the ongoing transformation of the ‘state’ itself (Moore 
2001). She opines that  
 'pluralism' can refer to: (1) the way the state acknowledges diverse 
social fields within society and represents itself ideologically and 
organizationally in relation to them; (2) the internal diversity of state 
administration, the multiple directions in which its official sub parts 
struggle and compete for legal authority; (3) the ways in which the state 
itself competes with other states in larger arenas (the EU, for one 
instance), and with the world beyond that; (4) the way in which the state 
is interdigitated (internally and externally) with non-governmental, semi-
autonomous social fields which generate their own (non-legal) 
obligatory norms to which they can induce or coerce compliance (see 
note 6); (5) the ways in which law may depend on the collaboration of 
non-state social fields for its implementation; and so on’ (Moore 
2001:107). 
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6.2. Relevance Legal Pluralism to the Spatial Approach Uncovering 
India’s Regulatory Attributes 
 
Legal pluralism, like the spatial approach to regulation, argues that the space 
between the state and society is not a vacuum (Lange 2003:413). William 
Twining, who endorses the approach of legal pluralism, is critical of regulatory 
interventions based on ‘simplistic assumptions’ of a ‘[b]lank slate’ or a vacuum 
to be filled ignoring social phenomena in the nature of ‘struggle’ and 
‘resistance’ (Twining 2004:16-17). The ability to oppose or accommodate by 
social, political and state actors also indicates dispersal of regulatory power 
across the regulatory space as opposed to a hierarchical notion of state 
monopoly over regulation. Colin Scott observes that the analytical construct of 
regulatory space compliments the approach of legal pluralism by facilitating an 
analysis based on power relationships within the social sphere as opposed to 
portraying law and legal processes as being associated with the state alone 
(Scott 2001). Dispersal or fragmentation of power also necessarily implies that 
the nature of relationship between the actors in the regulatory space is defined 
by interdependence (Scott 2001:335). Scott argues that ‘dispersed nature of 
resources between organisations’ within the shared space make them 
interdependent and that the regulator ‘lacks monopoly over formal and 
informal authority’ (Scott 2001:330).  
Twining disagrees with the simplistic assumption of diffusion of law and argues 
that it is a much more complex phenomenon (Twining 2004:16). He opines 
that ideology, culture and technology play an important role in the diffusion of 
law (Twining 2004: 17). In the context of domestic legislative interventions, 
Griffiths argues that legal instrumentalism assumes a ‘normative vacuum’ in 
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the process of communication of the legislative intent to the individual recipient 
(Griffiths 1986:33-34). Griffiths opines that the ‘relationship between a rule and 
its social effects is conceived of in the instrumentalist paradigm as a 
straightforward causal one’ (Griffiths 2003:13). He opines that instrumentalism 
is essentially a policy maker’s perspective and ignores the social implications 
of the legal rules (Griffiths 2003:13). This is so because instrumentalism 
assumes that legislation produces ‘desired results’ as it describes ‘actual 
behaviour’ (Griffiths 2003:14). As discussed earlier, the Bank’s simplistic 
approach to regulation endeavours to ‘impose’ it through legal 
instrumentalism, disregarding social and political dynamics. As discussed, the 
space between state and society in India is not a vacuum and is highly 
contested. The Indian state is therefore continuously trying to engage and 
accommodate the resultant tensions. The discussion in the foregoing chapters 
has also established that the regulatory space associated with the role of the 
state in economic activity is captured by entrenched interests of rich farmers, 
industrialists and bureaucrats. The discussion also established that the 
constitutional dynamics associating the role of the state in economic activity 
with electoral expectations made the Indian state responsive to electoral and 
societal expectations. The state in India is proliferated and influenced by 
societal forces, and societal tensions are reflected in the nature and 
functioning of the state. That the same makes the Indian state non-
autonomous and permeable, unlike Majone’s (1994) notion of an autonomous 
European regulatory state or the South East Asian developmental state.  
The thesis also correlates the notion of a permeable Indian state susceptible 
to societal pressures (Mukherji 2016), with Moore’s notion of ‘the way the state 
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acknowledges diverse social fields within society and represents itself 
ideologically and organizationally in relation to them’ as a reason for the 
emergence of legal pluralism in state law (Moore 2001:107). The ideological 
or normative aspect in the context of this thesis is associated with the renewed 
societal electoral expectations of an interventionist role for the state in sectoral 
activity, as opposed to a minimalist regulatory state proposed by the Bank. In 
terms of the organisational reorganisation of the state in response to societal 
pressures, this thesis, and especially Chapter 8 on Andhra Pradesh’s 
experience with sectoral reform, focusses on two institutional solutions integral 
to the Bank’s sectoral reform model. These, as discussed in the context of 
reform process in Orissa and replicated in Andhra Pradesh, comprise, firstly, 
disaggregation of the institutional apparatus of the interventionist state, i.e. the 
State Electricity Board, into separate generation, transmission and distribution 
utilities and, secondly, the establishment of an autonomous sectoral regulator. 
However, as will be argued in Chapter 8, the permeable and non-autonomous 
Indian state had to reorganise itself in response to societal and electoral 
expectations, mimicking the institutional arrangement of the interventionist 
state, i.e. the SEB. This thesis argues that self-organisation, and resultant self-
regulation by state functionaries associated with the sector, as opposed to 
institutional organisation through statutory law, aimed at establishing a 
regulatory state results in pluralism in sectoral state law. Therefore, whereas 
state law endeavoured to disaggregate the institutional arrangements 
associated with the interventionist state, self-organisation and resultant self-
regulation led to the re-aggregation of the disaggregated SEB. State regulation 
and the resultant institutional disaggregation, as opposed to self-regulation by 
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state actors and institutional re-aggregation, are the plural variants of state 
law. Black notices a similar phenomenon in the context of the changing nature 
of the state, from what has been that of a traditional hierarchical monolith to 
one which is torn between the tensions of the ‘centrifugal’ and ‘centripetal’ 
forces requiring it to function in a disaggregated manner, especially through 
regulatory agencies, whilst simultaneously being able to supervise their 
functioning (Black 2007:66). The tensions in the Indian context are generated 
owing to conflicting normative and corresponding institutional organisation of 
the state, i.e. disaggregated state law institutions versus re-aggregated 
institutional configuration, reflecting the normativity of the interventionist state.  
6.3. Relationship between Plural Legal Orders 
 
Opinions differ as to the nature of the relationship between plural legal orders. 
Twining opines that, in the early exploration of legal pluralism, legal orders 
were conceptualised in ‘oppositional terms’, i.e. ‘conflicting or competing’ 
(Twining 2004:14-15).132 However, he is of the view that the relationship 
between legal orders (what he terms as ‘coexisting’) is far more ‘diverse’. 
According to him the relationship may range from ‘co-operation, co-optation, 
competition, subordination, or stable symbiosis; the orders may converge, 
assimilate, merge, repress, imitate, echo, or avoid each other’ (Twining 
2004:14-15). 
Peter Fitzpatrick explores ‘state law and its relation to a plurality of social 
forms’ (Fitzpatrick 1984:117). In his opinion ‘[s]ocial forms are constituted in 
                                                          
132 Sally Engel Merry was of the view that ‘[r]esearch in the 1980’s has increasingly 
emphasised the dialectic, mutually constitutive relation between state law and other normative 
orders’ (Merry 1988:880). 
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contradictory relations of support and opposition with a plurality of other social 
forms. I tentatively suggest that the more social forms stand in relation of 
integral support, the sharper is the opposition between them: “the more alike, 
the more dissimilar”’ (Fitzpatrick 1984:117). In this context Fitzpatrick uses the 
term ‘social forms’ to include those that are integral for the generation of ‘non-
state law’ and therefore connote legal pluralism (Fitzpatrick 1984:117). Merry 
opines that legally plural scenarios evolve over a period of time ‘through the 
dialectic between legal systems, each of which both constitutes and 
reconstitutes the other in some way’ (Merry 1988:889). Therefore, both 
Fitzpatrick (1984) and Merry (1988) are of the view that reflexivity be it 
between ‘[s]ocial forms’ or between ‘legal systems’ resulting in mutual 
reconstitution leads to the emergence of legal pluralism. This thesis endorses 
the approach of a reflexive reconstitution of different legal orders. It argues 
that the non-autonomous nature of the Indian state makes both enforcement 
of law by a state and resistance to state law by societal forces possible.  
Tamanaha enumerates six systems of normative ordering. These are the 
official or positive legal system, the customary normative system, the religious 
normative system, the economic or capitalist normative systems, the 
community/cultural normative system and, last but not least, the functional 
normative systems (Tamanaha 2008:397-399). By a functional normative 
system, he means a system ‘organised and arranged in connection with the 
pursuit of a particular function… their particular functional orientation makes 
them distinctive and shapes their nature’ (Tamanaha 2008:399). He gives 
examples of sports leagues, schools and universities to illustrate such systems 
(Tamanaha 2008:399). It will be argued in the course of this thesis that the 
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procedural solution to determine the role of the Indian state in economic 
activity put in place by the framers of the Constitution led to the emergence of 
a functional legal system. The functional legal system, in the Indian context, 
owes its normative leanings to the interventionist electoral aspirations 
pertaining to the role of the Indian state in economic activity. The 
interventionist normative leanings of the functional legal system also emerge 
from what Bardhan describes as the Indian political culture, which according 
to him is not congenial for implementing market reforms (Bardhan 1998:136-
137). 
Tamanaha explores the notion of ‘clashes’ between normative systems and 
their causal factors (Tamanaha 2008: 400). He says that the sources of 
normative ordering lay claim to one or more of the following, i.e. ‘they possess 
binding authority; they are legitimate; they have normative supremacy; and 
they have (or should have) control over matters within their scope’ (Tamanaha 
2008: 400). Given their competing ‘claims to authority’ Tamanaha is of the view 
that they are bound to clash and this is more likely when the ‘underlying norms 
and processes are inconsistent’ (Tamanaha 2008: 400).  
6.3.1. Relationship between State Law and Non-State Legal Orders  
 
According to Twining endorsing legal pluralism as a social fact does not 
necessarily imply that state law is not important or that ‘state law is withering 
away’ (Twining 2010: 489). Moore does not undermine the importance of state 
law, on the contrary Moore explores the ability of state law to influence social 
processes (Moore 1973:722-723). Moore opines that ‘[s]ince the law of 
sovereign states is hierarchical in form, no social field within a modern polity 
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could be absolutely autonomous from a legal point of view’ (Moore 1973:742). 
Moore, however, also suggests that ‘absolute domination’ through state law is 
inconceivable because of the fields of autonomy within the society (Moore 
1973:742). Merry appears to be in agreement with Moore in terms of the 
significance of state law and its influence on the understanding of the 
phenomenon of legal pluralism. This is evident in her observation that: 
 ‘I think it is essential to see state law as fundamentally different in that 
it exercises the coercive power of the state and monopolizes the 
symbolic power associated with state authority. But, in many ways, it 
ideologically shapes other normative orders as well as provides an 
inescapable framework for their practice.’ (Merry 1988:879).  
Fitzpatrick states that legal pluralism has been ‘ambivalent’ in relation to state 
law, and has either underplayed or overplayed its importance, either by 
elevating state law to a position of domination over plural legal orders, or by 
placing it on par with other legal orders in society (Fitzpatrick 1984:116). 
Fitzpatrick states that there is truth in both of these positions and that,  
‘[s]tate law does take identity by deriving support from other social 
forms. Thus, it would appear to be one social form among many, even 
as a subordinate form. But in the constitution and maintenance of its 
identity, state law stands in opposition to and in asserted domination 
over social forms that support it.’ (Fitzpatrick 1984:116).  
Thus, for Fitzpatrick ‘state law is integrally constituted in relation to a plurality 
of social forms’ (Fitzpatrick 1984:115). Fitzpatrick terms the phenomenon 
‘integral plurality’.  
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In the course of establishing the emergence of legal pluralism in sectoral state 
law, this thesis endorses Moore’s and Merry’s view, i.e. that state law has an 
undeniable role in influencing other normative orders (Moore 1973; Merry 
1988). This also corresponds with Mukherji’s (2016) observation that the 
Indian state, though permeable and surrounded by a strong society, can bring 
about change, and that it continues to exercise a dominant influence. 
Merry critiques the social fact study of processes of pluralism in the late 1980s. 
She observes that ‘[a] legal pluralist analysis tends to emphasise changes that 
occur through interactions between social fields but not those taking place 
within a social field. It is likely to miss the way a particular social field is 
gradually reshaped by a variety of ideological and political forces both within 
and outside it’ (Merry 1988: 891). Although this critique may no longer be true, 
Merry’s observation is important given its emphasis on the ‘ideological and 
political forces’ both inside and outside the social field in moulding it. It is 
argued that the scholarship on self-regulation and semi-autonomy, as a source 
of pluralism, as will be discussed in the context of SASF and self-regulation, 
examines the internal processes resulting in legal pluralism (Moore 1973; 
Griffiths 1986; Black 1996). The next section discusses the notion of SASF 
and its contextual relevance to observing the emergence of legal pluralism in 
the sectoral state law of Andhra Pradesh.  
6.4. The Semi-Autonomous Social Field  
 
The notion of SASF will be deployed in the forthcoming chapters to establish 
the emergence of legal pluralism in sectoral state law in the State of Andhra 
Pradesh. Sally Falk Moore’s notion of SASF acknowledges that state legal 
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interventions have to encounter social forces. Moore argues that it is the rules 
according to which a society organises itself that dictate compliance with state 
law (Moore 1973:721-722). In Moore’s words ‘[i]t is well established that 
between the body politic and the individual, there are interposed various 
smaller organized social fields to which the individual “belongs”’ (Moore 
1973:721). Moore calls these ‘smaller organised social fields’ SASF, and 
claims that the same provides a methodological tool for ‘defining areas for 
social anthropological study in complex societies’ (Moore 1973:722).  
Moore deploys the methodology of SASF from the perspective of the ‘small 
field observable to an anthropologist to be chosen and studied in terms of its 
semi-autonomy’ (Moore 1973:720). Moore emphasises the characteristic of 
semi-autonomy because the way societal processes organise themselves are 
not completely autonomous from state law and are influenced and amenable 
to the same (Moore 1973:721-723). At the same time, it is these semi-
autonomous processes resulting in SASF ‘that make internally generated rules 
effective are often also the immediate forces that dictate the mode of 
compliance or noncompliance to state-made legal rules’ (Moore 1973:721).  
Sally Falk Moore explores the limitations of state interventions in reordering 
established societal relationships through resistance to the imposition of state 
law by the Tanzanian state on the Chagga tribe (Moore 1973). Moore explores 
societal resistance from the perspective of law reflecting an ideological shift of 
the state towards economic activity, more specifically private property rights 
(Moore 1973: 731). Moore explores the Chagga tribe’s societal resistance to 
the redefinition of property rights through the Tanzanian government’s 
legislation converting ‘freehold land’ into ‘government leaseholds’ (Moore 
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1973:731). Moore observes that state law professing a particular economic 
ideology had little or no impact on the relationships between the Chagga 
(Moore 1973:734).  
Observing a similar resistance to legal interventions aimed at replacing the 
relationships of kinship through legislation, Moore observes that 
‘[r]elationships long established in persisting semi-autonomous social fields 
are difficult to do away with instantly by legislative measures’ (Moore 
1973:739). Moore further states that ‘the interdependence or independence of 
elements in the social scene may sometimes be revealed by just such 
piecemeal legislation’ (Moore 1973:743). Marina Kurkchiyan (2009) makes a 
similar observation in her study of the functioning of the institutional transplant 
of media regulators in Russia, established in pursuance of market reforms. 
She observes that the way an institutional transplant is internalised reflects the 
true nature of a society and that the process of adapting an external 
institutional transplant helps understand the true nature of a society’s 
organisation. In her words ‘[a]s the foreign idea is adopted, it will be adapted. 
The adaptations and interpretations that lie behind them can provide valuable 
insights into the society in which the players operate’ (Kurkchiyan 2009:340). 
The discussion on the emergence of a sectoral SASF in Chapter 8 reveals the 
dynamics of the internal organisation of the semi-autonomous or non-
autonomous Indian state, by observing the process of institutional re-
aggregation mimicking the erstwhile SEB, as opposed to the legislative 
objective of disaggregating it. 
Moore asserts that the influence of state law on SASF is ‘often exaggerated’, 
whereas the influence of SASF on state law is ‘often underestimated’ (Moore 
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1973:745). Moore is of the view that manifestations of the SASF vary. In her 
words, ‘Some semi-autonomous social fields are quite enduring, some exist 
only briefly. Some are consciously constructed, such as committees, 
administrative departments, or other groups formed to perform a particular 
task; while some evolve in the marketplace or the neighbourhood or elsewhere 
out of a history of transactions’ (Moore 1973:745). Therefore, according to 
Moore, SASF does not have a specific institutional structure and it can be 
either deliberately brought into existence or can take shape owing to social 
reorganisation. She advocates a processual methodology for identifying a 
SASF. Moore states that ‘[t]he semi-autonomous social field is defined and its 
boundaries identified not by its organisation (it may be a corporate group, it 
may not) but by a processual characteristic, the fact that it can generate rules 
and coerce or induce compliance to them…The inter-dependent articulation of 
many different social fields constitutes one of the basic characteristics of 
complex societies’ (Moore 1973:722). In other words, a SASF need not be a 
pre-defined and organised institutional body, like a corporation or an 
association, but can be identified by its ability to make rules and enforce 
compliance with the same. Moore emphasises that it is the characteristic of 
semi-autonomy that defines the social field (Moore 1973:722). The fields of 
autonomy, i.e. SASF, signify ‘modes of self-regulation’ which are not only 
important for processes within the social field but also mediate the relationship 
of the SASF with the larger society (Moore 1973:743). That semi-autonomy 
directs its actions vis-à-vis its constituents as opposed to viewing its behaviour 
as being merely transactional in nature (Moore 1973:722). Through her 
description of SASF, Moore provides a methodology to identify the semi-
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autonomous and self-regulatory social processes. In other words, self-
regulation is an essential feature of SASF and facilitates the identification of 
semi-autonomous processes. This characteristic of the SASF to ‘generate 
rules and coerce or induce compliance with them’ has been described as being 
reflective of ‘Shared Norms’ within the social field (Sportel 2011). Similarly, 
Lucy Finchett-Maddock traces the emergence of SASF from the perspective 
of ‘alternative normative fields’ (Finchett-Maddock 2010). She characterises 
the normativity of UK’s Social Centre Movement, as will be discussed shortly, 
as arising from a left-leaning anti-market ideology. Therefore, semi-
autonomous organisation is preceded by a normative consensus amongst the 
participants in a social field.  
Merry endorses Moore’s notion of the Semi-Autonomous Social Field (Merry 
1988:878). In her words  
‘The advantages of this concept are that the semiautonomous social 
field is not attached to a single social group, that makes no claims about 
the nature of the orders themselves or their origin (whether traditional 
or imposed), and that it draws no definitive conclusions about the nature 
and direction of influence between the normative orders. The outside 
legal system penetrates the field but does not dominate it; there is room 
for resistance and autonomy’ (Merry 1988: 878).  
Establishment of the SASF’s existence is premised on the identification of a 
processual nature of organisation, as the notion of SASF does not 
predetermine the nature of the organisation or the normativity associated with 
it (Merry 1988:878). This makes it an ideal methodology to trace the processes 
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and the corresponding organisational structure across the social sphere rather 
than identifying social processes based on a predetermined structural or 
normative criterion.  
It is argued that Moore’s notion of SASF enables a nuanced understanding of 
the way legislative interventions play out in the social space. SASF’s emphasis 
on the characteristic of semi-autonomy and the resultant self-regulatory 
processes help understand the reasons for compliance or non-compliance 
with state law. Moore’s conceptualisation of the limits of state law correspond 
with Griffiths observations on the limits of legislative interventions (Griffiths 
1986; 2003). Griffiths observes that the presence of SASF disproves the notion 
of ‘normative vacuum’ and that it is ideally suited to identify and observe the 
phenomenon of legal pluralism in a particular society (Griffiths 1986:34, 37). 
The exploration of the limits of legislative interventions by Moore, owing to 
societal resistance, corresponds with Twining’s critique of ‘simplistic 
assumptions’ informing the process of global diffusion of law ignoring social 
phenomena in the nature of ‘resistance’ and ‘struggle’ (Twining 2004:16-17).  
6.5. Studies Applying the Methodology of SASF  
 
This section explores the different contexts in which the notion of SASF has 
been deployed. These studies help bring out the characteristics of SASF which 
will be relied on to identify the emergence of legal pluralism in sectoral state 
law in Andhra Pradesh as opposed to viewing the institutional re-aggregation 
of the disaggregated SEB as merely transactional. These studies establish the 
following in terms of observing the emergence of legal pluralism associated 
with SASF, i.e. a. legal pluralism emerges as a result of resistance to the 
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imposition of law; b. such resistance is informed by an oppositional normativity; 
c. self-regulation as a form of plural legality emerges from the processes of 
self-organisation within the SASF; d. that state itself is one amongst the many 
societal SASF’s, a notion that comes closer to the non-autonomous attributes 
of the Indian state in economic activity; and e. that the SASF and the resultant 
institutional organisation is horizontal and based on a functional criteria as 
opposed to a hierarchical institutional organisation. This strengthens the 
thesis’s approach of deploying a regulatory space framework so as to observe 
the actor dynamics in response to regulatory interventions, introduced, 
ignoring a particular jurisdiction’s regulatory attributes. As discussed, Scott 
observes that an approach associated with regulatory space differs from the 
‘New Institutional Economics’ approach and does not consider the relationship 
between the regulators and regulatees to be hierarchical (Scott 2001:351). 
The present enquiry also observes the emergence of legal pluralism owing to 
a horizontal institutional reaggregation mimicking the SEB in response to a 
legislative model disaggregating the SEB and implementing hierarchical 
regulatory arrangements.  
Not all the studies observe the emergence of legal pluralism, but all of them 
approach the emergence of an SASF from the view point of differing normative 
perspectives. As discussed earlier, this thesis takes Tamanaha’s and 
Twining’s perspective of approaching legal pluralism from the perspective of 
normative pluralism (Twining 2010: Tamanha 2008). It is in this context that 
an analysis of these studies identifying SASF premised on normative criteria 
becomes significant.  
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Lucy Finchett-Maddock explores the emergence of ‘hidden law’ and SASF, as 
opposed to state law, in the context of the United Kingdom’s ‘Social Centre 
Movement’ (Finchett-Maddock 2010). She describes social centres as being 
‘of a very left-leaning radical political nature, seeking autonomy from the 
dominance of the market culture through the form of differing plateaus of anti-
authoritarianism’ (Finchett-Maddock 2010: 37). She describes them as being 
‘anarchist’ in nature based on a ‘rejection of the imposition of force upon the 
action of free and mutually inclined individuals’ (Finchett-Maddock 2010:38). 
She observes that the members of the social centres ‘self-organise’ and 
generate their own rules through ‘consensus’ and enforce compliance with the 
same (Finchett-Maddock 2010:38, 41). She labels these internally generated 
rules as ‘hidden law’ (Finchett-Maddock 2010:38). She argues that ‘[h]idden 
law, is an alternative form of semi-autonomous law, one that is horizontal and 
not vertical in its nature, and offers a glimpse into an ulterior means of social 
organisation’ (Finchett-Maddock 2010: 46). The social centres reflect an 
alternate normativity (Finchett-Maddock 2010: 50). In this context, she is of the 
view that ‘hidden law’ echoes Moore’s notion of SASF as it reflects both 
‘autonomy’ and ‘self-regulation’ (Finchett-Maddock 2010: 49). She identifies 
‘consensus’ amongst the participants as one of the characteristic features of 
‘hidden law’ (Finchett-Maddock 2010:49). She further suggests that ‘hidden 
law’ has a different organisational apparatus from that of state law and helps 
trace resistance to state law (Finchett-Maddock 2010:46-47).  
Iris Sportel explores the notion of SASF from the perspective of transnational 
networks consisting of non-governmental organisations, lawyers and state 
organisations like consulates sharing similar normative values (Sportel 2011). 
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Sportel’s observations pertain to organisations involved in the Netherlands 
and Morocco providing legal aid and facilitating the divorces of Dutch 
Moroccans (Sportel 2011:37-38). She argues that the same led to the 
emergence of a ‘transnational field of legal aid in Dutch-Moroccan divorces’ 
(Sportel 2011:38). In this context, Sportel explores the question of whether 
inclusion of governmental organisations, such as consulates, is consistent with 
Moor’s observation that SASF emerges ‘between the body politic and the 
individual’ (Sportel 2011:42). Sportel, however, argues that the 
 ‘“body politic” is not a monolithic, single institution; rather, it consists of 
many institutions and localities, including some outside its own territory, 
such as embassies and consulates. These different elements of the 
body politic may very well be part of other semi-autonomous social 
fields as well, including the transnational field of legal aid. Even though 
they are state institutions, I consider the embassies and consulates to 
be an important part of the transnational field of legal aid’ (Sportel 
2011:42).  
Sportel further asserts that the she included state embassies and consulates 
on the premise that SASF is processual in nature and that it can be identified 
by its ability to ‘generate rules and coerce or induce compliance to them’ 
(Sportel 2011:49-50). She identifies two important features of the transnational 
legal aid network resulting in the formation of the SASF, namely participation 
in shared activities and having shared norms (Sportel 2011). The shared 
activities of the organisations in the legal aid network include advising and 
educating those in the transnational divorce and influencing policy pertaining 
to transnational divorces (Sportel 2011:43-46). The agreement on the 
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victimisation of women in a transnational divorce process and the need to 
protect the rights of women is seen by Sportel to be reflective of a shared 
normative understanding between the participants in the SASF (Sportel 2011: 
47-48).  
The characteristics of SASF therefore include resistance to imposition of a 
normativity and an acknowledgement of the state not being a monolithic entity. 
The characteristics also includes horizontal, as opposed to a vertical or 
hierarchical organisation. As discussed, Colin Scott (2001) identifies vertical 
or hierarchical organisation to be a characteristic of institutions established in 
pursuance of neoliberal regulatory globalisation. The ability to generate rules 
internally and enforce compliance, i.e. to self-regulate, is a common feature 
across the studies. 
6.6. The Unique Attributes of the Indian State as the Reason for the 
Emergence of SASF and Resultant Legal Pluralism within the State  
 
This section contextualises the discussion of legal pluralism owing to the 
emergence of a SASF in terms of the Indian state. It observes that the 
examination of the regulatory attributes of the Indian state establish that it is 
semi-autonomous and porous and that the same makes SASF an ideal 
approach to observe the interaction between state law and societal actors. 
Analysing Moore’s notion of SASF, Filip Reyntjens observes that ‘[w]hile 
Moore does not say so explicitly, the state is but one of many SASFs, because 
its normative capacity is also ‘affected and invaded’ by the normative activity 
of other SASFs’ (Reyntjens 2015:349). Reyntjens further states that ‘SASF 
exist everywhere, and no state is fully autonomous, although of course its 
normative capacity is challenged more in some countries than in others’ 
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(Reyntjens 2015:351-352). This corresponds with Sportel’s observation that 
the body politic is not a monolithic whole and that it can be part of other SASFs 
(Sportel 2011:42).  
As discussed earlier, this thesis takes the view that the Indian state is not an 
autonomous monolithic whole. This is because, as discussed in Chapter 3, 
though occupying a prominent role in the nation’s regulatory space the state 
in India itself is relatively weak when compared to societal processes (Mukherji 
2016). This can be compared to Reyntjen’s observation of differing degrees of 
autonomy of different states (Reyntjens 2015:351-352). Rejecting the notion 
that the Indian state is a developmental state, Mukherji observes that the 
Indian state ‘is so penetrated by social actors’ that it does not display the 
requisite autonomy like a development state (Mukherji 2016:219-220). This is 
reflected in the entrenched interests of groups associated with state led 
development in the resources owned and distributed by the state, and includes 
politicians, bureaucrats, industrialists and the farmers (Bardhan 1998; Kaviraj 
2000; Varshney 2013). The procedural solution of the framers tying the role of 
the state in economic activity with electoral expectations resulting in a 
functional normative system makes the Indian state porous and responsive to 
societal pressures. Therefore, it is observed that the Indian state is semi-
autonomous by nature. It is argued that this attribute of the Indian state is 
reflected in implementation of state law. Therefore, state law in India both 
influences, and is influenced by, societal pressures.  
The other characteristic of semi-autonomy is the highly contested nature of the 
state’s role in economic activity. The state is torn between the tensions 
generated by ‘elite politics’ and ‘mass politics’ (Varshney 2007) and the 
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competing notions of developmental state, welfare state and regulatory state. 
In addition to these pressures external to the state, the organs of the Indian 
state, i.e. the executive and legislature on one hand and the judiciary on the 
other, are competing with one another so as to interpret the constitutional 
mandate, often resulting in divergent positions. The differing notions of the 
Indian state between the national state and the States created further tensions 
within the state. This semi-autonomous porous nature combined with ‘the way 
the state acknowledges diverse social fields within society and represents 
itself ideologically and organizationally in relation to them’ (Moore 2001:107) 
results in processes of self-organisation and the emergence of self-regulation 
within the Indian state, resulting in pluralism in state law. 
6.7. SASF, Self-Regulation and Horizontal Organization  
 
As discussed earlier, Moore states that SASF is identified by its ‘processual 
characteristic, the fact that it can generate rules and coerce or induce 
compliance to them’ (Moore 1973:722). Finchett-Maddock observes that the 
semi-autonomous legal processes need not rely on a vertical organisation, 
and that the organisation of the SASF can be horizontal as well (Finchett-
Maddock 2010:46). Julia Black explores the nature of organisation of self-
regulating bodies like professional bodies of lawyers, sport associations, trade 
bodies etc. Julia Black terms these self-regulating processes ‘[s]elf-regulatory 
associations’, she conceptualises them to be ‘horizontal’ in organisation linking 
different sections of society (Black 1996:28). Black’s notion of horizontal self-
organisation (Black 1996) corresponds with Moore’s processual methodology 
of identifying SASF (Moore 1973) and underlines the need to view these 
processes beyond the conventional hierarchical or institutional perspective. 
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This thesis takes a horizontal approach to the identification of the SASF. In 
other words, given that SASF is premised on identification of a processual 
nature of organisation, it does not predetermine the nature of the organisation 
or the normativity associated with it. This makes it an ideal methodology to 
trace the processes and the corresponding organisational structure across the 
social sphere, rather than identifying social processes based on a 
predetermined structural or normative criteria.  
The next section discusses the features, advantages and drawbacks of self-
regulation primarily from the view point of adopting self-regulation as a strategy 
by the state to regulate effectively (Baldwin et al 2012; Graham 1994; Ogus 
1995). Julia Black’s description of self-regulation includes the phenomenon of 
self-organisation without state intervention, which corresponds with the notion 
of self-regulation in SASF (Black 1996; Moore 1973; Griffiths 1983, 2003; 
Finchett-Maddock 2010). Both self-regulation as a state initiated process or 
self-regulation arising from a self-organising process exhibit similar 
advantages and drawbacks. It is argued that an understanding of these 
features will help identify the self-organising processes and resultant self-
regulation in the State level electricity sector in Andhra Pradesh in Chapters 7 
and 8.  
6.8. Semi – Autonomy and Self- Regulation  
 
6.8.1. Self- Regulation as a Characteristic of SASF  
 
This section focuses on the characteristic of self-regulation of the SASF. This 
characteristic will be relied on to establish the presence of a sectoral SASF in 
the State of Andhra Pradesh in Chapter 8. As discussed earlier, Moore states 
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that SASF is identified by its ‘processual characteristic, the fact that it can 
generate rules and coerce or induce compliance to them’ (Moore 1973:722). 
Julia Black explores the nature of organisation of self-regulating bodies, like 
professional bodies of lawyers, sport associations, trade bodies, etc. Julia 
Black terms these self-regulating processes ‘[s]elf-regulatory associations’, 
she conceptualises them as ‘horizontal’ in organisation, linking different 
sections of society (Black 1996:28).  
Speaking about self-regulation emerging from self-organising processes, 
Black argues that ‘the essence of self-regulation is a process of collective 
government’ (Black 1996:27). That the term ‘self’ is used to describe ‘a 
collective’, ‘‘[s]elf-regulation’’ describes the situation of a group of persons or 
bodies, acting together, performing a regulatory function in respect of 
themselves and others who accept their authority’ (Black 1996:27). She states 
that ‘[s]elf-regulation is neither a new phenomenon, nor one which is likely to 
disappear’ (Black 1996:25). She notes that professions, sports, and financial 
services are usually self-regulated (Black 1996:25). Black further argues that 
‘[s]elf-regulatory bodies can be significant sources of law in particular areas, 
and networks of self-regulatory systems exist in which different SRAs demand 
compliance with each other’s rules’ (Black 1996:25). This observation by Black 
corresponds with Moore’s observation on the presence of self-regulating semi-
autonomous social fields whose regulatory rationale normatively differs from 
state law (Moore 1973; Griffiths 1986, 2003). 
Black is of the view that self-regulatory processes are horizontally structured 
(Black 1996:29). In her words  
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 ‘… in acting as horizontal linkages between different systems, SRAs 
link politics not with individual but with other specialised sectors of 
society. They participate simultaneously within those different sectors; 
the legal rules governing their public status and those governing their 
internal democratic processes thus need to be reformulated in the light 
of the different claims of these sectors’ (Black 1996:29). 
In the context of self-regulation as a state strategy for regulation, Cosmo 
Graham borrows the definition used by Birkenshaw et al. and defines self-
regulation as ‘the delegation of public policy tasks to private actors in an 
institutionalized form’ (Graham 1994:190). Ayres and Braithwaite speak of 
self-regulation in the context of exploring regulatory solutions between the 
opposing choices of strong regulation and deregulation (Ayres and Braithwaite 
1992:101). They explore the possibility of adopting strategies in the nature of 
enforced self-regulation ‘as a form of subcontracting regulatory functions to 
private actors’ (Ayres and Braithwaite 1992:103). This sub-contracting 
challenges the notion of division between public law and private law, which 
according to Graham ‘ignores an important phenomenon characteristic of the 
modern state, namely the blurring of division between the public and private 
spheres’ (Graham 1994:189). Black endorses this blurring of distinction 
between public and private in the context of self-regulation and observes that 
‘[s]elf-regulatory associations (SRAs) combine the governmental function of 
regulation with the institutional and often legal structure and interests of a 
private body’ (Black 1996:28). 
Anthony Ogus argues that it would be wrong to slot all forms of self-regulation 
into one category. In this context, Ogus discusses the nature of self-regulatory 
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agencies in terms of their attributes, and states that they differ widely (Ogus 
1995:99). This view corresponds with Moore’s view of different forms and 
degrees of semi-autonomy (Moore 1973: 745). He states that ‘[t]here is no 
clear dichotomy in this respect between ‘‘‘self-regulation’’’ and ‘‘‘public 
regulation’’’, but rather a spectrum containing different degrees of legislative 
constraints, outsider participation in relation to rule formulation or enforcement 
(or both), and external control and accountability’ (Ogus 1995:99-100). Ogus 
makes crucial linkages in terms of self-regulation and public-regulation, i.e. the 
ability to intervene in autonomy. In his words, ‘at one extreme, rules may be 
private to a firm, association or organization; at the other, they may have to be 
approved by a government minister or some independent public authority’ 
(Ogus 1995:100). Ogus further states that even the rules issued by the SRA 
may have differing degrees of applicability, from being legally binding to being 
subject to discretionary and voluntary compliance (Ogus 1995:100). As 
discussed, the concept of SASF accommodates this notion of varying degrees 
of autonomy associated with self-regulatory processes (Moore 1973:745).  
6.8.2. Advantages and Drawbacks of Self-Regulation  
 
The advantages of self-regulation include greater expertise, increased 
compliance and reduction in costs of information and administration (Baldwin 
et al 2012; Graham 1994; Ogus 1995). The drawbacks, amongst others, 
include a lack of democratic accountability, the impact of decisions of actors 
in self-regulatory arrangements on third parties, inability to rein in errant 
members and the tendency of actors in self-regulatory processes to cartelise 
and impose barriers to entry for other actors (Baldwin et al 2012; Graham 
1994; Ogus 1995).  
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Baldwin and others opine that, ‘[s]elf-regulatory bodies can usually command 
higher levels of relevant expertise and technical knowledge than is possible 
with independent regulation’ (Baldwin et al 2012:139). Those who support self-
regulation also make a case for ‘regulatory effectiveness’, as they believe that 
‘self-regulators have a special knowledge of what regulated parties will see as 
reasonable in terms of regulatory obligations’ (Baldwin et al 2012:139). The 
reasonable standards in turn help promote greater ‘voluntary compliance’ 
when compared to ‘externally imposed regimes of control’ (Baldwin et al 
2012:139). 
Self-regulators have ease of access to information allowing them to formulate 
and monitor compliance with regulatory standards (Baldwin et al 2012:140). 
Their familiarity with the regulated parties allows them to interact informally, 
and this results in lower information, monitoring and enforcement costs 
(Baldwin et al 2012:140; Ogus 1995:97-98). Ogus observes that 
‘administrative costs’ in the case of self-regulation are borne by the 
participants in the activity and ‘in the case of independent, public agencies, 
they are typically borne by taxpayers’ (Ogus 1995:98). Graham opines that: 
‘By reducing reliance on statute, self-regulation offers a speedier, more 
flexible means of solving problems. By harnessing the expertise of 
those involved in the industry, government is able to overcome the 
information problems and standards can potentially be set higher than 
in a statutory scheme’ (Graham 1994:194). 
Critics of self-regulation view it as the ‘capture of power by groups who are not 
accountable through normal democratic channels’ (Baldwin et al 2012:142) or 
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established constitutional processes (Ogus 1995:98). The decisions taken by 
members of a self-regulatory arrangement may ignore the repercussions for 
non-members (Baldwin et al 2012:145). Graham notes that ‘negotiation and 
bargaining necessary to establish a self-regulatory scheme may take place 
without input from third parties’ (Graham 1994:195). The potential to abuse the 
position becomes even greater if the ‘rules affect third parties’ (Ogus 1995:99). 
Self-regulatory bodies have a track record of not being able to protect the 
public interest owing to their inability of ‘enforcing standards against errant 
members’ (Baldwin et al 2012:142). Self-regulating processes ‘may not cover 
all firms in an industry’ (Graham 1994:194).133 Self-regulatory bodies also have 
the power to determine whom to allow or disallow, this vests in them 
tremendous power to ‘enable incumbent practitioners to earn supra-
competitive profits’ (Ogus 1995:99).134 Graham notes that ‘self-regulation can 
lead to restrictive practices which discourage competition and innovation and 
work to the detriment of the consumer’ (Graham 1994:195). Therefore, self-
regulation can also be symptomatic of anti-competitive agreements between 
a select set of firms within a sector.  
6.9. ‘Juristic’ and ‘Social Science’ View of Legal Pluralism and 
Conceptualising the ‘Legal’ in Legal Pluralism 
 
Griffiths defines legal pluralism in two ways. The first is in terms of a legal 
system’s relationship with state law; the second dissociates itself from state 
processes and observes pluralism as ‘an empirical state of affairs in society’ 
                                                          
133 Graham refers to the self-regulatory processes as ‘Self-Regulatory Arrangements’ 
(Graham 1994:192). 
134 Ogus uses the term ‘Self-Regulatory Agencies’ to refer to self-regulatory processes (Ogus 
1995:97)  
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(Griffiths 1986:8). He is dismissive of notions of legal pluralism associated with 
state processes (Griffiths 1986:8). Griffiths gives the example of the state legal 
system recognising the applicability of other legal systems in the nature of 
customary law or religious law alongside the state system as pluralism in the 
‘weak sense’ (Griffiths 1986:5-8). For him, legal pluralism is a ‘descriptive’ 
phenomenon observable in social processes (Griffiths 1986:38). Sally Engle 
Merry categorises Griffiths’s characterisation of ‘weak’ versus ‘descriptive’ as 
the ‘juristic’ versus ‘social science’ view of legal pluralism (Merry 1988:871). 
This thesis adopts Merry’s phraseology of ‘juristic’ and ‘social science’ to 
describe the phenomenon.  
Griffiths gives a very expansive definition of the term ‘law’, i.e. ‘law is the self-
regulation of a semi-autonomous social field’ (Griffiths 1986:38).135 He further 
states that ‘‘law’ is present in every ‘semi-autonomous social field’, and since 
every society contains many such fields, legal pluralism is a universal feature 
of social organisation’ and opines that ‘all social control is more or less ‘legal’’ 
(Griffiths 1986:38-39). Griffiths relies on Moore’s notion of Semi-Autonomous 
Social Field to assert that ‘all social control is more or less ‘legal’’ (Griffiths 
1986:39). Moore, however, dismisses assigning the label ‘law’ to the 
processes identifiable by deploying her methodology (Moore 2001:106; 
Tamanaha 2008:394). Moore states that ‘[f]or reasons of both analysis and 
policy, distinctions must be made that identify the provenance of rules and 
controls’ (Moore 2001:106). 
                                                          
135 Moore’s notion of SASF acknowledges that state legal interventions have to encounter 
social forces. Moore argues that it is the rules according to which a society organises itself 
that dictate the compliance with state law (Moore 1973:721-722). 
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Sally Engel Merry objects to such a wide conceptualisation of ‘law’ and 
Tamanaha endorses Merry’s caution about terming all social ordering as law 
(Tamanaha 2008:393). In Merry’s words, ‘[i]n writing about legal pluralism, I 
find that once legal centralism has been vanquished, calling all forms of 
ordering that are not state law by the term law confounds the analysis’ (Merry 
1988: 878). This thesis takes the approach that not all modes of social control 
can be labelled as law. To that extent, though relying on the methodology of 
SASF this thesis’ approach is in agreement with Merry (1988) and Moore 
(2001), i.e. not all forms of social control can be termed as law.  
Twining observes that conceptualising what is ‘legal’ in legal pluralism has 
been controversial (Twining 2010:497). Twining is of the view that issues 
pertaining to ‘conceptualising law’ for the purpose of legal pluralism are not 
restricted to an analysis of pluralism (Twining 2010:515). Twining suggests 
that debates pertaining to pluralism and law pertain to the wider issues of 
conceptualising law (Twining 2010:515). Twining observes that ‘removing 
questions about conceptualising law from the agenda of theorizing about 
pluralism, opens the way to considering other issues – including switching the 
focus of attention to concepts of norms and of pluralism’ (Twining 2010:498). 
It is in this context that Twining endorses Tamanaha’s view that ‘that legal 
pluralism is best seen as a species of normative pluralism’ (Tamanaha 2008; 
Twining 2010:497).136 This thesis endorses Twining’s and Tamanaha’s view 
                                                          
136 Twining makes this observation in the context of examining the notion of ‘global legal 
pluralism’ and drawing linkages with a descriptive analysis of pluralism within the confines of 
a state. This endorsement of Twining’s  observations, however, pertains to the study of 
pluralism within the national space. Twining further states that ‘We all encounter normative 
pluralism every day of our lives. We treat it as a social fact and rarely speculate about it. If one 
treats legal pluralism as a species of normative pluralism, this helps to de-mystify legal 
pluralism by de-centering the state, providing links to a rich body of literature, and showing 
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that legal pluralism can be seen as a sub-set of ‘normative pluralism’. The 
normativity discussed in this thesis is the one associated with the role of the 
state in economic activity and its dominant manifestations, i.e. the 
interventionist state and the regulatory state.  
This thesis also adopts a social science view in identifying societal processes 
culminating in legal pluralism (Merry 1988:871). This is not to suggest that the 
state law in India does not accommodate the notion of legal pluralism in the 
juristic sense. In fact, the definition of ‘law’ under the Indian Constitution is 
expansive and states that ‘“law” includes any Ordinance, order, bye-law, rule, 
regulation, notification, custom or usage having in the territory of India the 
force of law’.137 However, it is contended that the SASF can only be identified 
by its processual nature through the social science approach. The SASF 
discussed in this thesis is associated with state functionaries in Andhra 
Pradesh and observes the phenomenon of pluralism in state law itself. Given 
that it is a phenomenon associated with the state law and state processes, it 
is argued that it is not possible for state law processes to identify and give 
recognition to the said alternate organisational structure and legality. It is in 
this regard that the social science approach helps identify the participants and 
processes resulting in semi-autonomy and legal pluralism.  
 
 
                                                          
that some of the puzzlements surrounding pluralism can usefully be viewed as much broader 
issues of general normative and legal theory’ (Twining 2010:515). 
137 Article 13 (3) (a) of the Constitution of India.  
195 
 
Chapter 7 – Regulatory Attributes of the Role of the State in 
Sectoral Activity in Andhra Pradesh  
 
7.1. Introduction  
 
The following discussion on the social, economic, legal and political dynamics 
in the electricity sector of Andhra Pradesh endeavours to establish that the 
state in Andhra Pradesh, like the national state, ‘cohabits a rather powerful 
society around a relatively weak state and a democratic political system’ 
(Mukherji 2016:233). The chapter demonstrates that the tensions in the Indian 
state, as discussed in Chapter 3, make the state in Andhra Pradesh’s 
electricity sector non-autonomous (Mukherji 2016), reflecting characteristics 
of semi-autonomy. The thesis attributes the emergence of legal pluralism in 
sectoral state law to this semi-autonomous nature of the State of Andhra 
Pradesh in the sector, along with the way the state ‘acknowledges diverse 
social fields within society and represents itself ideologically and 
organizationally in relation to them’ (Moore 2001:107). 
The Bank’s 1993 Policy, as adopted by the national government and 
implemented through legislative interventions, aimed at establishing a sectoral 
regulatory state, was implemented with the intention that the market and not 
politics would determine the allocation of resources. This model was sought to 
be implemented by Andhra Pradesh to revive the sector which was a drain on 
the State’s finances owing to redistributionist politics emanating from the 
notion of an interventionist state. As Tshuma, Chang and Faundez observe, 
the move to depoliticise economic decision-making itself proved to be political 
(Chang 1999; Tshuma 1999; Faundez 2010). It is argued that the adoption of 
an external regulatory model, which did not acknowledge the sectoral 
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regulatory attributes, generated tensions within the Indian state. The tensions 
in the context of the State level electricity sector have particular institutional 
manifestations,138 namely a ‘centrifugal’ (re-aggregated) and ‘centripetal’ 
(disaggregated) organisation of the state, corresponding to notions of an 
interventionist and a regulatory state respectively. As will be demonstrated in 
Chapter 8, sectoral state law endeavoured to disaggregate the institutional 
arrangements associated with an interventionist state. However, self-
organisation and resultant self-regulation by the semi-autonomous state in 
response to electoral expectations and bureaucratic and technocratic 
consensus on sectoral organisation resulted in re-aggregation of the 
disaggregated SEB. Institutional re-aggregation and self-regulation by state 
actors in pursuance of normativity of an interventionist state, as opposed to 
institutional disaggregation engineered by state law, are seen as the plural 
manifestations of state law in Andhra Pradesh’s electricity sector.  
This chapter discusses the co-evolution of the political, legal, economic and 
social developments in Andhra Pradesh. This is undertaken in the context of 
the corresponding national developments both in terms of the larger role of the 
Indian state in economic activity and the electricity sector, as discussed in 
Chapters 3, 4 and 5 of this thesis. The chapter firstly explores the reason for 
choosing the State of Andhra Pradesh to observe the impact of legislative 
interventions aimed at establishing a regulatory state. It establishes that the 
developments in the State of Andhra Pradesh and the nature of the state in 
Andhra Pradesh’s electricity sector mirrors the national regulatory attributes. 
                                                          
138 This thesis borrows this terminology from Julia Black’s (2007) categorisation of the 
tensions in the regulatory state.  
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The chapter then discusses the politicisation of the provision of electricity and 
the role of farmers’ movements in persuading the state to allocate the 
resource. It discusses the state’s response to social movements against rich 
landlords and upper castes and the women’s movement against the sale of 
country made liquor, or ‘arrack’, as a vindication of Mukherji’s (2016) 
observation that the Indian state is surrounded by a powerful society.  
The chapter thereafter discusses the issue of budgetary deficits owing to 
increased political competition and the politics of resource disbursal. It 
examines the home-grown reform model put forward by the sectoral 
bureaucrats and technocrats. The reform model emphasised a continued 
interventionist role for the state in economic activity and in coordinating 
sectoral activity. Andhra Pradesh however sought to implement the Bank’s 
1993 Policy advocating a regulatory state as opposed to the populist electoral, 
bureaucratic and technocratic perception of an interventionist role for the state 
in economic activity. The chapter thereafter discusses the terms of the Bank’s 
assistance and the legislation ushering in the sectoral regulatory state and 
corresponding institutional arrangements. The move towards establishing a 
regulatory state resulted in electoral reversals, forcing a course correction 
involving interventionist political posturing. The thesis argues that this change 
in political posturing towards an interventionist state, despite the sectoral 
legislation advocating a regulatory state, led to the semi-autonomous state 
reorganising itself institutionally and resulted in legal pluralism in sectoral state 
law. The following discussion therefore provides the necessary background to 
contextualise the economic, social and political developments after reform, 
which resulted in the state reorganising itself in the light of the electoral 
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expectations of an interventionist state and a bureaucratic and technocratic 
consensus regarding sectoral organisation.  
7.2. Reasons for Choosing Andhra Pradesh as the Focus Jurisdiction  
 
Andhra Pradesh was considered a leader in ushering in economic reforms at 
the State level in India (Srinivasulu 2004:3845; Suri 2004:5493). Unlike other 
States, Andhra Pradesh did not carry out the programme of economic reforms 
by stealth, it went public with it and combined it with governance reforms 
(Kennedy 2004:30, 46, 63). Suri observes that what sets Andhra Pradesh 
apart from other States is that 
 ‘the ruling party took an open ideological position in favour of a market-
oriented economy. Between 1997 and 2004, economic restructuring 
has virtually become the official ideology of the state government. It has 
also occupied a central place in political and electoral campaigns…The 
tension between economic reforms and welfare politics has been 
extremely intense in AP politics. Since 1991, the state has lived through 
the language of reforms and also the rhetoric of welfarism, sometimes 
in opposition and sometimes in combination’ (Suri 2005:135-136).  
It is this eagerness of the executive in Andhra Pradesh to change its public 
posturing from an interventionist state to a regulatory state that makes it an 
ideal jurisdiction to study the efficacy of legislations ushering in a regulatory 
state. Andhra Pradesh also becomes important because the electricity sector 
was the primary target for the proposed reforms. As will be evident, Andhra 
Pradesh also reflects the wider national phenomenon of redistributionist 
politics, leading to budgetary deficits and the State trying to make a course 
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correction through economic reforms at the behest of the Bank aimed at 
establishing a regulatory state.  
The period from 1998 to 2004, as discussed in Chapter 5, was associated with 
the Bank directly engaging the States, unlike the earlier practice of lending 
exclusive to the national government. This period corresponded with the Chief 
Ministership of Nara Chandrababu Naidu (hereinafter Naidu), the reformist, in 
Andhra Pradesh. As Kirk puts it ‘Andhra Pradesh was the public face of the 
Bank’s focus states strategy, and Naidu was the public face of Andhra 
Pradesh’ (Kirk 2011:63). Between 1998 and 2004, Andhra Pradesh, with 7% 
of the country’s population, received 12% of all assistance earmarked by the 
Bank to India (Kirk 2011:63). 2001-2003 was the ‘high point of engagement’ 
and Andhra Pradesh attracted one third of all external assistance received by 
India, be it from the Bank, ADB or bilateral sources (Kirk 2011:63). Kirk further 
observes that ‘DFID’s grants to AP in 2002 exceeded British aid to any other 
country’ (Kirk 2011:63). 
Suri describes the politics in Andhra Pradesh as tension between the notions 
of development and welfare (Suri 2005). That the same lead to the debate 
regarding the allocation of the State’s scarce resources to what was 
considered ‘productive investment’ or development, and welfare, or ‘using 
state resources to provide direct or indirect support to the needy in order to 
ameliorate their hardships. Development is rational economics, while welfare 
is populist politics’ (Suri 2005:133-134). This debate between development 
and welfare in the political space of Andhra Pradesh corresponds with what 
Chang observes to be the neoliberal critique of the interventionist state 
attacking politics (Chang 1999:190). 
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As will be evident in the following narrative, the national level attempts of the 
Indian state to change its public posturing and the corresponding State level 
endeavors to toe the national line, shared a reflexive relationship and 
influenced one another. The dynamics in Andhra Pradesh are reflective of the 
tensions and clamour for resources owned and allocated by the state. The 
following narrative brings to the forefront the actor dynamics associated with 
economic reform through legislative change. This helps understand the semi-
autonomous nature of the state in the electricity sector in Andhra Pradesh and 
to identify the institutonal organisation informed by normative notions of the 
role of the state economic activity.  
7.3. Andhra Pradesh – Demography and Socio-Economic Indicators 
 
Fig 3-State of Andhra Pradesh                                       The State of Andhra 
Pradesh was formed 
by combining the 
‘Telugu’ speaking 
States of Telangana 
and Andhra Pradesh 
in 1956. This was in 
consonance with the 
then national 
government’s policy of 
constituting States on 
a linguistic basis. It 
remained a united 
State of Telugu speaking people till June 2014 when it was bifurcated into its 
Boundaries of Andhra Pradesh from 1st Nov 1956 to 1st June 2014. 
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earlier constituent units of Telangana and Andhra Pradesh. Geographically 
Andhra Pradesh was the fourth largest State in India (Govt AP 2013:1). As per 
the 2011 Census, Andhra Pradesh had a population of 84.6 Million making it 
the fifth most populous state in India, with 7 per cent of the nation’s population 
(Census 2011). 67.02% of its population is literate (Census 2011). As 
discussed, the narrative of the events in this thesis and the corresponding 
analysis of the emergence of a sectoral SASF is restricted to the State 
formation in 1956 till bifurcation of the State in June 2014.  
Fig 4 – State of Andhra Pradesh Prior to Merger and After Bifurcation 
 
Andhra and Telangana 
States Prior to their Merger 
on 1st November 1956. 
Andhra Pradesh from 1st 
November 1956 to 1st June 
2014. Geographical 
boundaries of the State 
during the present enquiry. 
Andhra Pradesh and 
Telangana from 2nd June 2014 
till Present Date.  
 
Andhra Pradesh had a high proportion of rural population. 33.36% of the 
population live in urban areas whereas 66.64% of the population lived in rural 
areas (Census 2011). As per 2009-10 estimates of the Planning Commission 
22.8% of the rural and 17.7% of the urban population lived below the poverty 
line (Govt A.P. 2013:221). It has a high agricultural output and is called the 
‘Rice Bowl of India’ (Govt AP 2013:1). Incidentally rice is also a crop that is 
water intensive to cultivate and requires standing water in the fields. The State 
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is also in the forefront of production of commercial crops like tobacco, cotton, 
groundnut, etc. (Govt AP 2013:1). For the financial year 2012-13 the 
contribution of agriculture to the Gross State Domestic Product was 18.7%, 
the industrial and service sector’s shares were 24% and 57.7% respectively 
(Govt A.P. 2013:12). The State government estimates more than half of the 
population of the State is dependent on some form of agricultural activity or 
other to earn its livelihood (Govt A.P. 2013:24). The State government 
identifies the sector as a means to reduce poverty and also increase food self-
sufficiency (Govt A.P. 2013:24). The agricultural sector in Andhra Pradesh 
therefore plays a very important role both in terms of percentage of population 
dependent on it and the national goal of attaining food self-sufficiency. The 
higher prevalence of poverty in the rural areas is also reflective of the 
precarious finances of the agriculturalists.  
7.4. Andhra Pradesh 1956-1983 – Congress Party and Redistributive 
Politics  
 
Politically, Andhra Pradesh had been a Congress bastion till 1983, owing its 
grip on political power to Indira Gandhi’s flavour of redistributionary politics. In 
fact, as discussed in Chapter 3, Congresses’ nationwide electoral reversals in 
1967, associated with currency devaluation and other reform measures, and 
the post emergency scenario of 1977, were not reflected in the party’s 
performance in the State (Kale 2015:140; Kohli 2010:389; Shatrugna 
1985:138; Mukherji 2014:150). This was owing to Indira Gandhi’s personal 
charisma with the voters in Andhra Pradesh, who referred to her as 
‘Indiramma’ or ‘Mother Indira’ (Shatrugna 1985:139). Indira Gandhi’s power 
also emerged from the fact that Congress leaders in Andhra Pradesh were 
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more reliant on her pro-poor schemes and personal popularity than individual 
ability, this further reduced their ability to create a political base (Kohli 
2010:393). Indira Gandhi appointed four Chief Ministers between 1978-1983, 
who were considered to be political lightweights chosen on the basis of their 
loyalty, to ensure that they did not threaten her supremacy within the party 
(Harshe & Srinivas 1999:3103; Kohli 2010:391; Rubinoff 1997:2833). The 
change in Chief Ministers also witnessed frequent bureaucratic transfers 
amongst the senior bureaucracy within the State, thereby creating 
administrative confusion and discord (Kohli 2010:392).  
7.5. The Electricity Sector in Andhra Pradesh from 1956-1983 
  
7.5.1. The Establishment of the SEB and the Expansion of Capacity and 
Network 
  
State provision of electricity in Andhra Pradesh was initially undertaken 
through the State electricity department. The Andhra Pradesh State Electricity 
Board (hereinafter APSEB) was constituted in April 1959 under the provisions 
of the 1948 Act (Govt AP 1995:9). After the formation of the APSEB, the assets 
and functions of the electricity department were transferred to it (Kale 
2015:143). APSEB also took over many electricity utilities in the private sector 
making the sector wholly state owned by December 1961 (Kale 2015:143). 
APSEB played an important role in enhancing access and availability of the 
resource. It was able to increase the installed generation capacity from 
213MW to 4,729 MW in little over three decades 1960-61 to 1993-94 (Govt AP 
1995:9). Between 1960-61 to 1994-95 the number of towns and villages 
electrified increased from 2,680 to 27,610 and the number of electrified farm 
pump sets increased from 17,968 to 1.6 million (Govt AP 1995:9).  
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7.5.2. Farmers’ Movements and Shift in Allocation from Industry to 
Agriculture 
 
Though a substantial proportion of the State’s planned expenditure was on the 
sector, the sectoral policy’s focus was to attract industrial investors with 
subsidised tariffs (Kale 2015:144). Kale observes that, in its first two decades 
of operation, APSEBs allocation to industrial consumers exceeded all other 
segments (Kale 2015:146-147). Kale summarises the same in the following 
table (Kale 2015:147). 
Fig 5 – Percentage of Electricity Sales by Category of Consumer in Andhra Pradesh 
Percentage electricity sales in Andhra Pradesh by category of consumer, 
1960-1961 to 1975-1976 
 1960-1961 1965-1966 1970-1971 1975-1976 
Domestic  10.8 8.1 8.2 9.5 
Commercial 7.5 8.2 5.8 4.9 
Public lightning 2.3 1.9 1.6 1.1 
Industrial – low-tension 8.4 7.8 7.3 8.2 
Industrial-high-tension 56.3 56.1 58.7 55.6 
Agricultural 9.4 17.4 18.0 20.7 
Misc. 5.2 .6 .4 .1 
Source: Andhra Pradesh State Electricity Board, Administration Report, 1970-71 
and 1975-76. 
 
Kale notes that, in the initial years of State formation, the tariffs in Andhra 
Pradesh reflected the actual cost of supply to the rural areas and took a 
cautious approach to rural electrification (Kale 2015:137). In fact, agricultural 
tariffs also varied from region to region reflecting the actual cost of supply (Kale 
2015:137). Till the mid-1970s, per unit tariff payable by agriculturalists was 
more than that payable by the industrial consumers (Kale 2015:145). Kale also 
observes that there was no evidence of one segment being cross subsidised 
at the expense of the other (Kale 2015:145). This trend in the preferential 
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allocation of the resource to the industrial sector was reversed with the 
emergence of farmers’ movements in Andhra Pradesh demanding subsidised 
agricultural inputs. 
The farmers’ movements in Andhra Pradesh were part of the larger national 
phenomenon of ‘agrarian politicization’ (Kale 2015:148). The farmers’ 
movements in India have primarily targeted the Indian state (Pai 2011:391). In 
Pai’s words ‘The centrality of the State in a developing country characterized 
by agricultural backwardness means that farmers’ movements are largely a 
response to change in agricultural policy’ (Pai 2011:391). The movements 
were spearheaded by rich farmers who benefitted from the green revolution 
(Pai 2011:392). Therefore, the provision of subsidies for agriculture, be it in 
Andhra Pradesh or the rest of the country, must be contextualised from the 
perspective of the green revolution which was initiated in the mid-1960s (Birner 
and Sharma 2011:110). The provision of water, be it though surface irrigation 
or through electrical pump sets, was an indispensable input of the green 
revolution (Birner and Sharma 2011:110). Birner and Sharma note that when 
electricity pumpsets were initially introduced they were metered and farmers 
paid for the electricity consumed (Birner and Sharma 2011:110). The subsidies 
to the agricultural sector, which were integral for the success of the green 
revolution (aiming to achieve self-sufficiency), made a comeback in the 1970s 
as an electoral strategy to appeal to the farmers (Birner and Sharma 
2011:110). 
Many farmers associations emerged in Andhra Pradesh in the 1970s (Birner 
and Sharma 2011:110). These associations were often constituted on the 
basis of crops raised, like ‘the Andhra Pradesh Sugarcane Grower Association 
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was founded in 1973/74 and the Andhra Pradesh Cotton Growers Association 
in 1976/78’ (Birner and Sharma 2011:110). Kale observes that policies 
favouring farmers came to be adopted only in the late 1970s and through the 
1980s in response to ‘farmers’ movements’ (Kale 2015:144). The electoral 
issue of free and subsidised electricity must be viewed from this perspective 
of tensions between different societal groups to influence the state’s allocation 
of the resource.  
7.6. 1983 – Entry of Telugu Desam Party and Advent of Competitive 
Politics  
 
The entry of the Telugu Desam Party (hereinafter TDP) signalled political 
competition in the State (Kale 2015:142). Behind the founding of TDP was the 
disenchantment of the ‘Khammas’ a prosperous caste which had grown 
industrially, agriculturally and commercially with the Congress party (Kohli 
2010:394). The Congress was dominated and run by the ‘Reddys’ a traditional 
feudal agrarian caste with pan Andhra Pradesh presence (Kohli 2010:394). 
The time was therefore ripe for the emergence of Nandamuri Taraka Ramarao 
(hereinafter NTR), a popular matinee idol with a cult following, belonging to the 
Khamma caste, who played the roles of Hindu gods and saviour of the poor 
(Kohli 2010:395-396; Rubinoff 1997:2833).  
NTR Blended ‘charisma with populism’ (Rubinoff 1997:2833). Amongst others, 
NTR played on the injury to Telugu pride, owing to repeated interference with 
the democratically elected State governments by the national government, 
reducing Chief Ministers to puppets (Harshe & Srinivas 1999:3103; Kohli 
2010:396). More importantly, as part of his poll campaign, NTR announced a 
slew of populist policies from subsidized rice, free midday meals for school 
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children, to reservation for backward castes in educational institutions, 
attracting the traditional vote banks of the Congress (Kohli 2010:396; Rubinoff 
1997:2833; Shatrugna 1985:138). NTR was able to capitalise on the 
discontent of the farmer’s groups which ‘demanded state support for higher 
prices and subsidies for vital agrarian inputs, of which rural electrification and 
electricity tariffs were a central concern’ (Kale 2015:142).  
 
7.7. 1983-1989: TDP, Governance and Social Movements  
 
7.7.1. Subsidy Allocation and Governance  
 
After coming to power in 1983, the biggest budgetary subsidy outlay of the 
TDP government was the Rs.2 a kilogram of rice. The scheme performed well 
as the public distribution system functioned well and was accessible to the 
poor, both urban and rural (Pai 1996:145). The scheme’s initial qualifying 
criteria was expanded, allowing for a greater number of poor people to benefit 
from it (Pai 1996:145). As would be symptomatic of the State’s fiscal health for 
the times to come, the interim budget presented in 1983 had a ‘Revenue 
Account Deficit’ for the first time in more than a decade (Baru 1983:492). There 
was a shift in outlays from water and power sectors to ‘Social and Community 
Services’ (Baru 1983:492). 
NTR lost power to Congress in the 1989 elections owing to social issues in the 
nature of the Naxal disturbance (Left Wing Extremism) and upper caste 
dominance (Pai 1996:145). Increased Left Wing Extremism and upper caste 
atrocities on the lower castes owe their origins to the inability of the state in 
Andhra Pradesh to implement legislation aimed at redistributing land and 
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ensuring better conditions for agricultural tenants (Srinivasulu 2002; Thomas 
2014). This is an early indicator of the limitations of legal instrumentalism in 
redistributing resources and rearranging societal relationships. The next sub-
sections discuss the ‘class’ struggles in Telangana region and the ‘caste’ 
struggles in the Andhra region and their influence on the state in Andhra 
Pradesh. 
7.7.2. Rise of Left Wing Extremism in Telangana  
 
The villages of the northern Telangana were ‘dominated’ by landlords 
belonging to the upper castes (Srinivasulu 2002:17). The exploitation of labour 
involved extracting services without compensation referred to as ‘vetti’ 
(Srinivasulu 2002:17-18). The landlords also occupied village commons, acted 
as money lenders, adjudicated disputes, and imposed and collected fines 
(Srinivasulu 2002:18). The landlords, in addition to continuing the feudal 
dominance and exploitation of village life, also had access to the 
‘developmental resources’ of the state (Srinivasulu 2002:18). Srinivasulu 
attributes the reasons for the emergence of peasant class struggles in the late 
1970s to a shift in the State’s approach to the movements from that of ‘co-
option’, which involved implementing land redistribution legislations, and 
poverty alleviation measures to adopting ‘coercive’ measures against these 
underprivileged groups (Srinivasulu 2002:1). Srinivasuslu also attributes the 
‘class mobilisation’ in rural areas towards left-wing activism to the struggle for 
access to higher education for the backward castes and the Scheduled Castes 
for the very first time in the 1970s (Srinivasulu 2002:19) 
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The peasant movements were violently repressed by the State police 
(Srinivasulu 2002:27). Tactics included extrajudicial killings termed 
‘encounters’, this led to the left parties, particularly the Communist Party of 
India Marxist-Leninist, moving away from ‘popular mobilisation’ towards an 
armed struggle (Srinivasulu 2002:27). There was increased violence between 
the left wing extremists and the police in the 1980s and the 1990s (Thomas 
2014). More than 4000 people died as a result of the violence, of which 1,204 
died in-between 1990-96, i.e. when the violence was at its peak (Thomas 
2014). Incidentally, this was also the time when Naidu was looking to the Bank 
to reposition the role of the state in economic activity. The left wing extremists 
held their sway over many districts, especially in the Telangana region, and 
‘declared a virtual blockade of state-sponsored developmental’ activities 
(Thomas 2014). They had a huge social following, especially amongst the 
Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and backward castes, and were able to 
counter the oppression of the feudal landed castes, to curtail practices like 
‘vetti’ and to redistribute excess lands (Thomas 2014). By establishing 
people’s courts, they were able to make governmental officials answerable 
(Thomas 2014). They also undertook their own developmental activities, like 
building roads, providing and repairing irrigation facilities, ensuring the supply 
of quality agricultural inputs like seeds and fertilizers, protected tribal interests 
and redistributed surplus land from land lords to the landless (Thomas 2014).  
7.7.3. Violence against Lower Castes and the Dalit Movement in Andhra 
Region 
 
The green revolution made little or no difference to the social and economic 
conditions of the Scheduled Castes in the coastal regions of Andhra Pradesh 
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(Srinivasulu 2002:33). The incitement of violence against the Scheduled 
Castes heightened with the TDP in power as the Khamma community now in 
power was angry with them for not politically supporting them despite being 
socially dependent on them (Srinivasulu 2002:35). The attacks on Scheduled 
Castes in the villages of Karanchedu and Neerukonda by Khammas led to the 
emergence of the Scheduled Caste (Dalit) solidarity (Srinivasulu 2002:35).  
The emergence of left wing extremism in Telangana and Scheduled Caste 
movements in Andhra Pradesh was in many ways a direct consequence of the 
state not being able to implement legislation aimed at redistribution of land and 
state policies. Further, the resource intensive green revolution, reinforced the 
existing iniquitous social and economic relations in the countryside. The ability 
of the left wing extremists to prevent the State from functioning in their area of 
influence, alongside being able to coerce or regulate the way state officials 
discharge their functions, is proof of the fact that the state in Andhra Pradesh 
does not have absolute dominance over the social sphere. The perpetuation 
of iniquitous social relations, combined with access to state resources and the 
power of the upper castes resulted in atrocities against the Scheduled Castes 
and led to the emergence of Scheduled Caste or Dalit solidarity, forcing the 
state to react and check the atrocities of the upper castes.  
7.7.4. Women’s Agitation against Arrack – Political Support for NTR in the 
1994 Elections 
 
In the early 1990s, women’s agitation against the sale of liquor was gathering 
momentum in Andhra Pradesh. In 1990-91, Andhra Pradesh had the highest 
consumption of country made liquor, ‘arrack’, in the country (Reddy and 
Patnaik 1993:1062). The women’s movement against prohibition emerged 
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from the increased consumption of ‘arrack’ (Reddy and Patnaik 1993; Ilaiah 
1992). In 1989-90, excise duty on liquor contributed nearly 28% cent of the 
State’s revenues, and revenues from sale of arrack contributed 70-80% of the 
said revenue (Reddy and Patnaik 1993:1063). Arrack is a poor person’s drink, 
the State however was not inclined to prohibit its consumption or sale given its 
contribution to the exchequer (Reddy and Patnaik 1993). 
Reddy and Patnaik observe that in Andhra Pradesh the sale and consumption 
of arrack had two aspects, namely a ‘social’ or ‘gender’ dimension and a 
‘political’ one. From a gender perspective, men tend to spend most of their 
daily wages on arrack and thus fail to contribute to the family’s income (Reddy 
and Patnaik 1993:1064). Women have to struggle to make ends meet, provide 
for their children and also bear the physical abuse from a drunken husband 
(Reddy and Patnaik 1993:1064). One other social aspect of the consumption 
of arrack was that it was consumed more by Scheduled Castes, for whom, 
unlike the Upper Castes, there was no taboo associated with the consumption 
of alcohol (Reddy and Patnaik 1993:1064). On the political front, it was the 
larger nexus between the arrack contractors and suppliers, politicians, upper 
castes, the State bureaucracy and police that allowed the manufacture and 
sale of Arrack to continue (Reddy and Patnaik 1993; Ilaiah 1992).  
The women activists would halt auctions for the allocation of marketing rights, 
prevent arrack from being sold in the village shops and destroy stocks of 
arrack (Reddy and Patnaik 1993; Ilaiah 1992). Their tactics also included 
making men take an oath not to consume arrack in temples and publicly 
humiliating those who broke the oath and those who sold arrack (Reddy and 
Patnaik 1993; Ilaiah 1992). The women’s collectives resisted attempts by the 
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State government to disrupt their movement and such was their resilience that 
arrack had to be sold under police protection and was also sold in police 
stations (Reddy and Patnaik 1993:1059). Women defended themselves and 
enforced the restrictions on consumption of arrack by ingeniously using chilli 
powder, brooms, fire and sticks (Reddy and Patnaik 1993; Ilaiah 1992). These 
movements reinforce Mukherji’s observation that the state in India is 
surrounded by a powerful society (Mukherji 2016). 
 NTR, in a move to woo women voters, promised to implement complete 
prohibition (Suri 2002:36). NTR’s support for the agitation against liquor in 
1994 garnered him political support, helping him win the election, earning TDP 
the reputation of being the party of the poor (Harshe & Srinivas 1999:3103). 
Before discussing TDP’s performance after 1994, the next section discusses 
the performance of the Congress government between 1989-1994 and 
reasons for its electoral defeat in 1994 elections.  
7.8. 1989-1994: Congress & Economic Liberalisation 
 
The Congress Party was in power in Andhra Pradesh and at the national level 
between 1989 and 1994. P.V.Narasimha Rao, the Indian Prime Minister at the 
time, was from Andhra Pradesh and was a former Congress Chief Minister of 
the State (Pai 1996:143). The national Congress government insisted on fiscal 
discipline from the States after 1991, and this was particularly so in the States 
ruled by it (Pai 1996:143). This put the Congress ruled State government, 
which had to counter the electoral populism of TDP, in an unenviable position 
(Pai 1996:143). In Andhra Pradesh, Congress followed the path of fiscal 
restraint and rolled back the populist measures to a certain degree (Rubinoff 
213 
 
1997:2833). The rollback included restricting the beneficiary base of the rice 
subsidy scheme and other subsidies so as to reduce the budgetary deficit (Pai 
1996:145; Suri 2005:136). 
 
7.8.1. Issues in the 1994 Assembly Elections and Subsequent Fiscal Deficits  
 
The primary issues in the 1994 Assembly elections were inflationary trends 
and access to essential commodities, and distributional issues associated with 
the implementation of Rs.2 a kilogram of rice (Pai 1996:142). In the run-up to 
the 1994 elections NTR took advantage of the increasing perception within the 
State that the economic reforms favoured the middle class and the rich at the 
expense of the poor (Pai 1996:145). NTR argued that, though the food 
subsidies for the poor were severely curtailed, the subsidies to the rich famers 
were continued by the Congress in the State, he further promised subsidised 
electricity to farmers (Pai 1996:145; Suri 2005:137). Accordingly, TDP’s 1994 
manifesto aimed at the small farmers in the rural areas, unemployed in the 
urban areas and resumption of the rice subsidy scheme (Pai 1996:145-146). 
Congress’s manifesto was all praise for the national government for stabilising 
the economy, increasing employment and developments before the GATT etc. 
(Pai 1996:146). Pai observes that Congress’s manifesto, released by the 
national party, did not address the requirements of the State level electorate 
(Pai 1996:146). The manifesto, though advocating good economics and 
expenditure on projects like roads and dams, failed to understand that these 
works only catered to the middle class and it was the rice subsidy that directly 
benefitted the rural and especially the landless poor (primarily agricultural 
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labourers) (Pai 1996:146). The 1994 election victory of TDP was a turning 
point in Andhra Pradesh, as it pitched NTR’s version of welfare versus the 
economic reforms undertaken in the name of development by Congress (Suri 
2005:134). Pai observes that the 1994 election in Andhra Pradesh was an 
early indication of the pace and scope of reforms in a democratic set up, and 
the realisation that the same needed to be rolled out at a measured pace whilst 
paying due attention to the distributional issues affecting the poor (Pai 
1996:147). Pai observes that the Andhra Pradesh experience shows that 
‘elections in a democracy provide an in-built mechanism against harsh and 
painful reform pushed through at a fast pace’ (Pai 1996:147). The 1994 poll 
debacle at the State level led to much introspection within the Congress party 
in terms of its economic policy (Pai 1996:147). Congress had been a 
beneficiary of its politics of cultivating votes through the use of state resources 
since 1950s, accordingly the 1995 pre-electoral national budget reflected 
many pro-poor schemes (Pai 1996:147). 
After the 1994 electoral victory of TDP, the question being faced by the State 
was how to balance the rice subsidy, given the precarious financial condition 
resulting partly from the taxes foregone as a result of the imposition of 
prohibition (Sarma 1995:417). It was also opined that the rice subsidy was not 
properly targeted and that there was a significant number of non–poor who 
were beneficiaries of the scheme (Sarma 1995:419). As discussed earlier, 
revenue deficits had become part of the Andhra Pradesh budget since 1983-
84 (Sarma 1995:418). Sarma observes that the budgetary figures are an 
understatement of the expenditure as there was significant extra-budgetary 
expenditure as well (Sarma 1995:418). The burden of subsidising electricity 
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supplied by the State’s SEB further added to the deficit. The next section 
explores the politicisation of the provision of electricity and its repercussions 
on sectoral finances. 
7.9. Politicisation of Provision of Electricity and Dwindling Finances of 
APSEB  
 
The increasing influence of farmers’ movements led to diversion of the 
resource from industrial consumers to agriculturalists (Kale 2015:149). In fact, 
Kale observes that ‘[i]ncreasingly throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the 
supplies of electricity to industrial consumers were curtailed to allow greater 
allocation to farmers’ (Kale 2015:149). In the tussle for control over the scarce 
resources, the industrial consumer lost to the agricultural and domestic 
consumer (Kale 2015:149-150). This loss of control over the resource can be 
attributed to the fact that agricultural and domestic consumers were electorally 
significant as they outnumbered the industrialists, influencing allocation and 
pricing to their benefit.  
There was a reduction in electricity tariffs in the State after the election of the 
TDP government in 1983, which, amongst other populist measures 
announced a flat rate for the agricultural sector in its election manifesto (Birner 
et al. 2007; Birner et al. 2011). As a consequence, in that very year i.e. 1983 
the percentage of agricultural consumption went up by 50 per cent (World 
Bank 1999a:7). After 1983, the governments also started requiring the SEB to 
increase the number of agricultural connections by setting up targets 
(Medepalli 2016). Subsidisation of agricultural electricity also led to an 
increase in consumption and diverted resources from the industrial sector in 
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the nature of power cuts and quotas on the sector, to divert power to the 
agricultural sector (Kale 2015:149).  
APSEB was one of the most profitable SEBs in India till 1991. It had avoided 
the 1970’s trend that saw many SEBs incur losses (Shankar 2003:1171). The 
share of agricultural consumption in total consumption increased from around 
19 per cent in 1970-71 to 43 per cent in 1993-94 (Govt AP 1995:16, 23). In 
1993-94 the agricultural sector consumed 43 per cent of the power, but only 
contributed 3 per cent of APSEB’s revenues (World Bank 1997a:33). Industry 
consumed 33 per cent of the power supplied by APSEB, but contributed 70 
per cent of the SEB’s revenues for the corresponding period (World Bank 
1997a:33). Nearly 1.6 million pump sets were electrified by the APSEB and, 
though the cost of supplying electricity was Rs.1.26 per unit, the agriculturalists 
were only charged Rs.0.6 per unit, requiring the State to provide nearly 
Rs.1000 Crores or $14,741,660.00 in subsidy (Govt AP 1995:51). Therefore, 
the pricing of agricultural electricity shifted from being more expensive than 
industrial electricity to being subsidised, and in fact cross-subsidised, by the 
industrial sector. The Bank notes that ‘AP is one of the four Indian states with 
the highest industrial power rates. It appears that potential for cross-
subsidizing agriculture by taxing industry has been largely exhausted’ (World 
Bank 1997a:33). The disproportionate tariff burden could not be sustained by 
the industrial sector, which switched over to captive generation, reducing 
APSEB’s ability to cross subsidise (Shankar 2003:1173). The State 
government did subsidise the SEB, but the subsidy to the SEB was in the 
nature of conversion of debt into equity by the Government, this book 
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adjustment left the SEB cash strapped, doing little to improve its liquidity 
(Shankar 2003:1173). 
The period between 1990 and 1996 also saw an increase in unmetered sales 
of electricity, i.e. transmission and distribution losses,139 and agricultural 
consumption. This was primarily because the agricultural sector was no longer 
metered owing to the State announcing a flat rate based on the capacity of the 
pump set used. There was also an attempt by APSEB management to conceal 
the inefficiency in the distribution business and the failure to detect and prevent 
theft. Also, improper billing and corruption adversely affected the financial 
health of the SEB (ASCI 2008:1). A culture emerged of non-payment by 
consumers and collusion between the consumers and the SEB employees 
who continued to supply to defaulting consumers (Shankar 2003:1173). This 
collusion was rampant in the domestic/residential segment and also, to an 
extent, in the industrial sector. Those vested with discretion i.e., ‘linemen, 
officers, meter readers, and billing clerks’ were the most corrupt (Lal 2005). 
Together these factors contributed to the under recovery of revenues. In fact, 
for the period 1994-95 to 1999-2000 only 39-41% of the electricity 
purchased/generated by the Board was billed (Ramachandra 2003:134-137). 
These factors severely affected the SEBs financial fortunes, necessitating the 
State government to explore means to revive the utility.  
 
 
                                                          
139 This according to Dubash & Rajan (2001) was a ‘euphemism for theft’.  
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7.10. NTR & Sectoral Reforms: The Report of the High Level Committee 
 
7.10.1. Sectoral Reform Strategy under NTR 
 
Andhra Pradesh, under NTR, was aware of the national government’s push 
towards sectoral liberalisation and the developments in neighbouring Orissa, 
which was actively engaging with the Bank. Despite its populist interventionist 
sectoral posturing, the NTR led TDP government was aware of the precarious 
nature of the State’s finances. It was of the view that further public investment 
in the sector, especially in generation, may no longer be possible. The State 
government constituted a High Level Committee (hereinafter the HLC) to 
examine the State’s power sector (Govt A.P. 1995:1). The HLC gave 
recommendations to address the sectoral issues but its reform strategy was 
different from that recommended by the Bank.  
7.10.2. Mandate, Composition and Approach of the HLC 
 
The HLC’s mandate required it to examine the organisation of the sector and 
propose measures to restructure it along with suggesting an appropriate 
organisation ‘to ensure that the tariffs promote optimum use of scarce 
resources of the State’ (Govt AP 1995:2). This was to include examining ‘the 
scope for private sector assuming total responsibility for generation, 
transmission and distribution of electricity’ (Govt AP 1995:2).  
The HLC comprised of technocrats and bureaucrats who were familiar with the 
functioning of the sector.140 HLC’s report was submitted before Andhra 
                                                          
140 The Chairman, Hiten Bhaya was a former member of the Planning Commission of India. 
Mr. Narla Tata Rao was a technocrat and a prominent figure in the nation’s electricity sector. 
He played an important role in setting up the SEB in the State of Madhya Pradesh and was 
actively associated with the SEB in Andhra Pradesh. T.L.Shankar and E.A.S.Sarma were 
career bureaucrats belonging to the Indian Administrative Service, with expertise in the energy 
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Pradesh approached the World Bank for financial assistance. When the HLC 
was deliberating reforms in Andhra Pradesh, the sectoral restructuring in 
Orissa was in a nascent stage. Mr. Balram Reddi, the then Chairman of the 
SEB and the Convener of HLC, notes that they were aware of the 1993 Policy 
(Kotamreddi 2014a).141 However, despite being aware of the Bank’s model 
and having consulted the Bank during the preparation of its report, HLC’s 
recommendations differed from the Bank’s 1993 Policy. This is evident in the 
restructuring solution, road map to privatisation, and the functions and 
composition of the sectoral regulator proposed by the HLC. HLC’s 
recommendations have to be appreciated from the perspective of local 
knowledge of actors familiar with the sectoral dynamics. It is argued that the 
HLC’s recommendations also reflect the technocratic and bureaucratic 
consensus regarding the institutional organisation of the sector in Andhra 
Pradesh. A consensus which would influence the way the State re-aggregated 
in response to the electoral expectation of an interventionist state after the 
Bank sponsored reforms disaggregated the SEB.  
The HLC’s recommendations were in keeping with an interventionist role for 
the state in economic activity. At the same time the HLC was aware of the 
State’s desire to not make any further investments in the sector, nor stand 
guarantee to the independent power producers, even if they were supplying to 
APSEB (Govt AP 1995:42). The report reflects the balance it sought to strike 
between these competing demands. 
                                                          
sector. The Chairman of APSEB K. Balarama Reddi, a career technocrat, was both a member 
and convenor of the HLC. 
141 Mr. Balram Reddi also mentioned that the HLC was aware of the sectoral restructuring 
experience in Latin America as implemented by the World Bank and had access to documents 
pertaining to the same (Kotamreddi 2014a). 
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7.10.3. Restructuring APSEB and a Coordinatory Role for APSEB 
 
At the time of constitution of the HLC, APSEB had over 70,000 employees and 
8 million consumers, the majority of whom resided in rural areas (Govt AP 
1995:64). It recommended that the SEB be reorganised on functional lines, 
i.e. as generation, transmission and distribution entities (Govt AP 1995:65). In 
terms of organising the distribution segment, the HLC opined that it must be 
firstly reorganised into smaller wholly state owned companies. It was insistent 
that the privatisation process must be gradual (Govt AP 1995:129).142 
 The HLC noted that the restructuring must take into consideration the 
interests of the employees, especially their job security and career growth 
(Govt AP 1995:65). HLC did not want to change the existing service conditions 
of the workers. The idea of the HLC was to operate the distribution business 
along commercial lines, co-opt the employees of the distribution companies by 
making them part of the management and subsequently make them co-owners 
by offering them shares in the course of the disinvestment process (Govt of 
A.P.1995:72,77). The HLC recommended that the State government enter into 
talks with the employees and their unions so as to explain and convince them 
about the necessity for reforms and the career opportunities they presented 
(Govt AP 1995:131). The HLC, in its report, notes that regulatory reform must 
also provide a conducive environment for the growth of the private sector (Govt 
AP 1995:65). 
                                                          
142 The HLC was of the view that the distribution companies must first be given to private 
players on the basis of management contracts, then on a lease hire basis for a private player 
and then subsequently the ownership may be transferred to a private player through equity 
participation, either partial or total (Govt AP 1995:76-77). 
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The HLC was not inclined to do away with APSEB as it was of the view that 
APSEB had certain statutory functions under the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948. 
More importantly, it was of the view that ‘[a]n interface with the government is 
also necessary’ (Govt AP 1995:67). It proposed retention of APSEB as a 
holding company with no functions at the operational level. This holding 
company was to oversee the sectoral development at the State level, advise 
the State government as and when required, oversee the functioning of the 
subsidiaries and oversee the process of privatisation of the distribution 
companies (Govt AP 1995:67). Balram Reddi, the Convenor of the HLC, 
opined that the holding company solution was put forward as the members 
thought they needed an agency to coordinate the working of the companies, 
as all their activities were interconnected (Kotamreddi 2014a). The HLC’s view 
on the need for a state owned utility to coordinate sectoral activity appears to 
endorse what Chang views as inalienable coordinator function of the state in 
economic activity (Chang 1999:192-197).143 
7.10.4. Establishment of Regulatory Commission, Composition and 
Functions  
 
The HLC proposed the establishment of a statutory Regulatory Commission 
to oversee the sectoral arrangements proposed by it. It was of the view that 
the Regulatory Commission must be vested with adequate powers to function 
in an independent and autonomous manner (Govt AP 1995:111. It proposed 
a Regulatory Commission comprising of four members from the judicial, 
                                                          
143 Chang uses the term ‘coordination’ in the context of the state ensuring ‘complementary 
investments’ (Chang 1999). The use of the term ‘coordination’ in the present context 
corresponds with the state ensuring that complementary decisions being taken across the 
sectoral participants to mutual advantage.  
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technical, financial disciplines and an economist with sound understanding of 
the sector (Govt AP 1995:112). It further clarified that the Regulatory 
Commission will be headed by the judicial member, who would be a judge of 
the highest State level constitutional court, i.e. the High Court (Govt AP 
1995:112).144 It is interesting to note that the HLC, which comprised of 
bureaucrats and technocrats, did not put undue emphasis on bureaucratic 
expertise, and that it explicitly wanted a judicial appointee to head the 
Regulatory Commission. 
7.10.5. A Pro-Active and Distributary Role for the Regulatory Commission  
 
The HLC vested in the sectoral Regulatory Commission the power to fix tariffs 
and redistribute revenues where necessary (Govt of A.P. 1995:108). The 
HLCs report notes that,  
‘In the event that State Government desiring that certain categories of 
consumers should be supplied power at rates lower than the cost of 
supply fixed by the Commission, then it will be for the Commission to 
decide the manner in which the burden should be shared between the 
Government, the producers and the distributors’ (Govt of 
A.P.1995:110).  
In other words, as opposed to the procedure for subsidy fixation by the State 
government under the present arrangements, the Regulatory Commission had 
                                                          
144 The technical member shall be of the rank of a Chief Engineer of the SEB (Govt of AP 
1995:112). That the finance member should have worked as ‘Finance Director’ of a large 
public sector undertaking or of the rank of Principal Secretary to the State government with 
experience in financial matters (Govt AP 1995:112,119). In terms of the qualifications of the 
economist, the HLC favoured a person adept in infrastructural matters and of the rank of a 
professor in a reputed university or equivalent in qualification (Govt AP 1995:112). It 
recommended a restricted term for the members (Govt AP 1995:112).  
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the power to fix the proportion of subsidies for each category as well as the 
cross subsidy burden to be borne by the sectoral participants. The HLC vested 
in the Regulatory Commission the mandate to allocate the sectoral resources.  
It was of the view that much of the subsidy must be cross subsidised. This 
would involve the industrial consumers paying higher than their cost of supply 
to compensate for the lower tariff of agricultural consumers, with the rest to be 
borne by the State government. This ratio was to be decided by the Regulatory 
Commission. That the Regulatory Commission would also examine the 
amount of cross subsidy to be borne by the industrial sector (Govt AP 
1995:52). The Regulatory Commission therefore was given the role of 
allocation and distribution of resources and balancing sectoral interests as 
opposed to a mere tariff fixation function. They reiterate the same when they 
observe that the State government ‘can then make its case before the 
Regulatory Commission which can then decide objectively how this burden 
has to be shared by different categories of consumers’ (Govt AP 1995:73). 
HLC was of the view that the subsidies should be restricted to the ‘small, 
marginal and subsistence farmers’ and that the regulatory commission would 
fix the subsidy rates as per the category of the agriculturist, level of 
consumption and the level of the water table (Govt AP 1995:52). This would 
also be accompanied by better metering arrangements (Govt AP 1995:52). 
The Regulatory Commission, in addition to fixing tariffs, was required to 
formulate standards of performance which would be applicable to the 
providers and it would be empowered to impose fines for non-adherence to 
the same (Govt AP 1995:79). Though the State government accepted the 
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report, it chose to seek the Bank’s assistance for sectoral restructuring 
(Shankar 2003:1174).  
7.11. Nara Chandrababu Naidu and the State’s Engagement with the 
Bank  
 
The HLC was constituted by NTR in January 1995 and it submitted its report 
in April 1995. The period following submission of the report witnessed internal 
changes in the ruling party’s leadership and involved NTR being replaced by 
Naidu as the Chief Minister in August 1995. Naidu, who was NTR’s son-in-law, 
ousted him to become the State’s Chief Minister. 
Naidu initially supported NTR’s electoral agenda revolving around Telugu 
pride and welfare politics (Kirk 2011:64). However, after wresting power from 
NTR, Naidu took the stand that subsidies towards food and power, coupled 
with the policy of prohibition, were disastrous for the State (Kirk 2011:64).  
Approaching the Bank was also made possible because of a change in the 
Bank’s lending policy. As discussed in Chapter 5, the Bank’s policy based 
lending to States was endorsed by the national government to fiscally 
discipline the States, which were reluctant to fall in line with the national 
government’s endeavour to usher in a regulatory state.  
The Bank endeavoured to realign the State level sectoral dynamics on the 
lines of the principles enunciated in its 1993 Policy (World Bank 1993a). As in 
the case with the national government, the State government was 
experiencing a fiscal crisis. However, as will be evident in the following 
narrative, the Bank’s intervention would not have been possible without the 
active support of the State’s Chief Minister, who emerged as the most 
prominent actor in the reform process. Chandrababu Naidu belonged to the 
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category of what Lal describes as the ‘new age Chief Minister’, with a reformist 
outlook (Lal 2005:650). What made the Naidu era, i.e. between 1995-2004, 
different from NTR’s in terms of undertaking reforms was ‘a radical departure 
in the way they were sought to be implemented and publicly articulated’ (Suri 
2005:139). As Mukherji observes ‘Naidu strived to replace populism with good 
economic governance during his tenure as AP’s chief minister between 1995 
and 2004’ (Mukherji 2014:151). In the context of the financial impact of populist 
sectoral posturing under NTR, the electricity subsidy bill for the year 1995, i.e. 
the year Naidu assumed office, was nearly USD 487.1 Million (Mukherji 
2014:151). The other actors ushering in the reform process include a national 
government eager to fiscally discipline the States, bilateral aid agencies and 
international consultants.  
Naidu, who had just assumed the reins of power wanted to emerge from the 
shadow of his illustrious predecessor by projecting himself as a reformer. 
Naidu was an economist by qualification and preferred being referred to as the 
CEO of the State (Asia Society 2001; Kale 2015:138; Mooij 2005:3; Suri 
2005:152). Naidu was described as a ‘moderniser’ and viewed economic 
reforms as a means to bring about much required change (Harshe & Srinivas 
1999:3103). As discussed, TDP owed its pro-poor image to subsidised rice, 
subsidised power to the farm sector and housing schemes for the poor 
(Srinivasulu 2004:3846). Naidu reversed these policies in his drive to liberalise 
the State’s economy (Srinivasulu 2004:3846). Naidu increased the price of 
subsidised rice, as well as electricity, imposed restrictions on recruitment to 
the State’s public services, lifted the prohibition which had depleted the State’s 
revenues (Harshe & Srinivas 1999:3104; Kennedy 2004:46; Vaugier-
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Chatterjee 2001:995).After the 1996 parliamentary elections the Government 
of Andhra Pradesh released a white paper on the State’s finances, which 
advocated fiscal restraint (Suri 2005:139).145 The Bank’s scoping report on the 
State’s finances and economic potential in January 1997, titled ‘Andhra 
Pradesh: Agenda for Economic Reforms’ marked the beginning of the reform 
process (Kirk 2011:66). In the report, the Bank observed that the State’s 
growth had been below its potential and attributed the same to its inability to 
provide essential infrastructure, such as roads, ports and irrigation, and social 
services, such as education and health, and that these resources were being 
allocated to ‘subsidy and welfare programs’ (World Bank 1997a: i-ii). It noted 
that the fiscal situation further deteriorated because of the State’s decision to 
provide rice at a subsidy and simultaneously impose prohibition which affected 
the revenues (World Bank 1997a: ii). It is in this context that the report noted 
that the power sector is a drain on the State’s scarce resources and that the 
SEBs losses have put strain on public finances (World Bank 1997a:vi). 
With reference to the power sector, the report noted that the power shortages 
were linked to underinvestment in generation capacity and the loss making 
SEB. It estimated that an annual investment of $US 2.5 billion was required 
over the next 6 years to make the State self-sufficient in electricity (World Bank 
1997a:vii). It made the case for private sector participation to bridge the 
investment gap (World Bank 1997a: vii). It also advocated the adoption of its 
1993 Policy prescription and a roll back of agricultural subsidies (World Bank 
                                                          
145 Naidu was attracted to the Malaysian growth story and sought to emulate the same (Kirk 
2011:65). Such was his enthusiasm that when World Bank President Jim Wolfensohn visited 
India in October 1996, Andhra Pradesh was not on the radar, Naidu however flew to Delhi and 
made a power point presentation to Wolfensohn and Lim (the country head of the Bank), 
impressing Wolfensohn and setting the wheels for assistance in motion (Kirk 2011:65-66).  
 
227 
 
1997a: vii). It is in this context that the Bank made the linkage between fiscal 
reform in Andhra Pradesh and power sector financing, as discussed in its 1993 
Policy (World Bank 1993a:16; World Bank 1997a:vi-vii). The reform was aimed 
at improving the creditworthiness of the sector and to reduce the losses of the 
SEB (World Bank 1997a: vii).  
The Bank’s report became controversial in terms of the secrecy surrounding 
its preparation, the methodology adopted and the findings. There were 
concerns that the A.P. Agenda for Economic Reforms, did not appreciate the 
data properly (Rao 1998:1499-1502). Its methodology for arriving at 
conclusions with regard to agriculture, industry and the electricity sector in 
particular were disputed (Rao 1998:1499-1502). It was argued that the report 
preparation and its acceptance in secrecy showed a marked departure from 
the existing ‘relationship between people and governance’ (Rao 1998:1502). 
This was contrasted with the earlier instances of socially responsive policy-
making illustrated by the imposition of prohibition as a result of the mass anti-
liquor social movement supported by the TDP to come to power in 1994 (Rao 
1998:1502). It is also pertinent to note that both electricity subsidies to the farm 
sector and prohibition were policies formulated in response to social 
movements which subsequently translated into electoral preferences, with the 
TDP co-opting these issues in its electoral manifesto.  
In January 1999, the State government released a document titled 
‘Swarnandhra Pradesh: Vision 2020’ which was prepared in association with 
Mckinsey and Company (Suri 2005:141). The vision document made the 
government’s ideology and intentions very clear ‘[t]he document gave primacy 
to market forces and rejected the theory that the state alone can be the driving 
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force for economic development and eradication of poverty’ (Suri 2005:141). 
Accordingly, there was a roll back of the subsidy on rice, which was viewed as 
a drain on the exchequer (Suri 2005:141). The State government also lifted its 
policy of prohibition which had led to reduced revenues (Suri 2005:141). 
7.12. Bank Sponsored Sectoral Restructuring Process – Sectoral 
Disaggregation and Centripetal Institutional Framework  
 
Andhra Pradesh was the third national government sponsored and Bank 
financed, power sector restructuring project after the States of Orissa and 
Haryana (World Bank 2004a:17). The sectoral restructuring comprised a 
crucial component of a larger project, i.e. the Andhra Pradesh Economic 
Restructuring Project (World Bank 1998). The Andhra Pradesh Economic 
Restructuring Project, in turn, was the first State level programme in keeping 
with the Bank’s 1998 Country Assistance Strategy, which prioritised State level 
engagement (World Bank 1997b). The Bank viewed the electricity sector 
reform project as the single most important ‘structural and fiscal reform’ in 
Andhra Pradesh (World Bank 1999a:3).  
As discussed, Andhra Pradesh had undertaken an internal exercise through 
the HLC which proposed sectoral restructuring within the matrix of public 
ownership. The alternatives proposed by Andhra Pradesh included a package 
to ‘revitalize’ the SEB, whilst retaining its structure. But the Bank rejected the 
suggestion citing its experience with SEB reform at State level in the 1980s. 
As Ngaire Woods rightly observes ‘local knowledge’ is neither valued nor is it 
taken into consideration when the Bank takes decisions (Woods 2006:55). It 
is argued that this dismissive attitude of the Bank towards local knowledge 
prevented it from understanding the true sectoral dynamics in Andhra 
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Pradesh. This thesis argues that it is important to acknowledge and 
incorporate local dynamics when initiating legal reform. The approach of legal 
pluralism helps better understand local dynamics (Twining 2010) and alternate 
normative orders present in the state’s regulatory space. The Bank went on to 
declare that the policy makers in Andhra Pradesh were aware and 
acknowledged that the sectoral crisis was caused by politicisation of decision 
making processes of APSEB (World Bank 1999a:7). 
The reform process, was seen as a way to shift public spending from the 
electricity sector to the social sectors of education and health, similar to what 
the Bank observed in its 1993 Policy (World Bank 2004a:2). The restructuring 
programme had two developmental goals, namely to bring about a change in 
public expenditure in the power sector so that the savings could be diverted to 
other social sectors, and secondly to undertake sector specific restructuring 
so as to improve investments, supply scenario, etc. The ultimate objective of 
the sectoral reform was ‘for the Government to withdraw from the power sector 
as an operator and regulator of utilities and to have commercially operated, 
largely privately owned utilities functioning in a competitive and appropriately 
regulated power market’ (World Bank 1997a:8). Therefore, complete sectoral 
privatisation and a roll back of the interventionist state was the ultimate 
objective of the Bank’s reform prescription. Unlike the HLC, which advised a 
cautious approach to the process of sectoral regulation, especially the 
managers’ and employees’ ability to internalise the rationale for reform, the 
Bank had a pre-set rigid time-table detailing the reform process (World Bank 
1999a:4). This is reproduced below 
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Phase I  Establishment of a new legal, regulatory and institutional 
framework, functional unbundling of the system, corporatization 
of sector entities, and removal of some of the most critical 
bottlenecks of the power system (1999-2001) 
Phase II Regulatory Commission and the corporate entities fully 
functional, privatisation of part of the distribution business, 
partial restoration of creditworthiness of the sector, and 
improvements in system efficiency (2001-2003) 
Phase III Completion of privatization of distribution business, 
consolidation of the functioning and financial performance of the 
new power utilities (2003-2005) 
Phase IV  Achievement of higher customer satisfaction through reduction 
of power deficit, attainment of higher quality and efficiency in 
electricity services, and deepening of power sector reforms to 
increase competition and private participation (2005-2007) 
 
As is evident from the Bank’s phraseology, these goal posts are general in 
nature, which is reflective of the Bank’s straightjacketed approach to sectoral 
reform. This paved the way for the unbundling of the SEB, and the 
establishment of the Regulatory Commission. The privatisation of at least one 
distribution business was the prerequisite for the release of the second tranche 
of the loan (World Bank 1999a:17-18). Unlike the restructuring exercise in 
Orissa, as discussed in Chapter 5, there was to be no intermediary stage of 
placing the unbundled entities under a management contract (World Bank 
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1999a:19). The Bank advocated outright privatisation. This approach was in 
stark contrast to the internal exercise i.e. the report of the HLC, which favoured 
a more gradual approach to privatisation of the distribution business (Govt of 
A.P. 1995). 
7.12.1. Pre-Reform Commitments – Policy Ownership  
 
As evidenced in the case of Orissa, Andhra Pradesh had to demonstrate its 
willingness to undertake the reforms and make them ‘irreversible’ (World Bank 
1997a:11). The government of Andhra Pradesh initiated a series of reforms or 
what Celine Tan terms as ‘prior actions’ (Tan 2011:124) to comply with the 
pre-disbursal requirements and continue compliance to qualify for the next 
tranche of the loan. The new sectoral policy announced by the State 
government in 1997 reflected the Bank’s 1993 Policy. The reform legislation 
was modelled on the Orissa Electricity Reform Act, 1995. It was passed by the 
State legislature before the Project Appraisal Document was submitted to the 
Bank’s Board for approval.146 The bilateral donors funded the technical 
assistance for formulating the sectoral policy and reform legislation. The 
consultancy services were proposed to be supported through grants from 
organisations such as the Canadian International Development Agency 
(CIDA), the UK Department for International Development (DFID), the United 
States Agency for International Development (USAID), etc. (APSEB 1997:23). 
This appears to be a kind of volte face from the approach of the HLC headed 
by the technocrats and bureaucrats associated with the APSEB, who were 
                                                          
146 The Project Appraisal Document, dated 25th January 1999, notes that Andhra Pradesh had 
fulfilled its pre-reform commitment to enact the Reform Act 1998 and adoption of a new 
sectoral policy (World Bank 1999a:11).  
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confident of undertaking the reforms with internal expertise. There was intense 
resistance to the introduction of the reform legislation from both the opposition 
in the legislative assembly and the employees of the APSEB. The next section 
will discuss the actors in the State’s regulatory space opposed to the reform 
process who, amongst others, include the SEB’s employees and the left 
parties. 
7.13. Resistance to New Sectoral Regulatory Arrangements  
 
7.13.1. Resistance in Legislature  
 
The Congress Party, the Communist Party of India (CPI) and the Communist 
Party of India Marxist CPI (M), organised a sit in in the Andhra Pradesh 
legislative assembly when the reform legislation was introduced by Naidu 
(Kale 2015:153). Naidu responded to Congresses’ opposition by reading out 
from the Congress party’s recent manifesto for the parliamentary elections 
where it had promised similar reforms in the sector (Kale 2015:153). The 
opposition to the reform legislation continued into the next day and those 
opposing it were suspended from the house (Kale 2015:153; Madduri 2003). 
There was no deliberation and the legislation was passed in the absence of 
the opposition (Kale 2015:153; Madduri 2003).  
7.13.2. Employee Resistance and the Tripartite Agreement  
 
Employees of APSEB were aware of Orissa’s reform experience and that not 
everything was smooth sailing in that State after the reforms (Medepalli 
2016).147 They went on strike when the legislation was being tabled in April 
                                                          
147 Medepalli Satya Murthy, an active member of the APSEB Engineers Association and the 
Zonal Secretary of the East Zone at the time, suggested that the Engineers Association was 
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1998 (Suri 2005:153). Such was the resistance to the passage of the reform 
legislation, that police intervention was required to control the protesting 
employees (World Bank 2004a:19). The employee’s union construed 
corporatisation to be equivalent to privatisation (Ramachandra 2014a). It took 
some time to convince the unions that restructuring does not necessary imply 
privatisation (Ramachandra 2014a). This affected the ‘employee efficiency’ 
and morale, adding to the SEBs dwindling finances (Shankar 2003:1174). 
Time was lost making peace with employee unions, and the ‘transfer scheme’ 
of the Reform Act 1998 assured the employees the continuation of service 
conditions and benefits (Upadhyay 2000:1027). 
Tripartite agreements were entered between the associations or unions, the 
State government and APSEB to allay the aspersions of the employees. 
Medepalli Satya Murthy was a signatory to one such ‘Tripartite Agreement’, 
entered between APSEB, APSEB Engineers Association and the Government 
of Andhra Pradesh to safeguard the interest of the employees (Medepalli 
2016).148 The phraseology of this agreement will be discussed in this sub-
section and the agreement is referred to as ‘Tripartite Agreement’ for the 
purposes of the present discussion. Similar agreements were signed with the 
workers unions as well (Medepalli 2016). Medepalli Satya Murthy observes 
that, though certain modifications were made to the agreements subsequently, 
the pith and substance remained the same (Medepalli 2016). The assurances 
                                                          
opposed to privatisation and conducted many seminars in and around Hyderabad and 
throughout the State, discussing the benefits and drawbacks of the reforms (Medepalli 2016). 
The members of the Engineers Association attended national seminars organised on similar 
lines. Their opposition to privatisation was associated with fear of loss of employment 
(Medepalli 2016).  
148 Tripartite Agreement Between the Government of Andhra Pradesh, APSEB and A.P. State 
Electricity Board Engineers Association (Regd.No. 874 of 1975).  
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in the Tripartite Agreement included a ‘guarantee that there will be no 
retrenchment’ or change in employee status or service conditions in the event 
of reorganisation of APSEB into one or more corporate entities.149 It stipulated 
that the terms and conditions of the employees in the reorganised entities shall 
be governed by the existing service rules, pertaining to promotions, transfers, 
leave and allowances, etc.150 It further asserted that any changes to the 
existing conditions of service as under the SEB will be made possible only 
upon mutual negotiations without affecting the existing benefits.151 This was to 
include the obligation towards retirement benefits in the nature of pensions, 
provident fund etc.152 The successor corporate entities were required to 
continue these obligations of SEB.153 The agreement further requires the 
assurances to be incorporated in the Reform Act and the Rules implementing 
it.154 
These agreements became part of the legislative provision of the Reform Act 
1998 (Medepalli 2016; Upadhyay 2000:1027).155 Medepalli observes that this 
resulted in a more receptive attitude of the employees towards the 
restructuring (Medepalli 2016). It is argued that the tripartite agreements, 
continuing the employee service conditions including retirement benefits, such 
as pensions, played an important role in continuing state ownership and 
                                                          
149 Clause 4(a) of the Tripartite Agreement.  
150 Clause 4(b) of the Tripartite Agreement.  
151 Clause 4(b) of the Tripartite Agreement. 
152 Clause 4(h) of the Tripartite Agreement. 
153 Clause 4(h) of the Tripartite Agreement. The agreement also assures that there will be no 
break in the service of the employees and that they will be given an option to choose which 
successor entity to join (Clause 4(k) of the Tripartite Agreement). In the event of the newly 
formed corporate entities not abiding by the agreement, it would be the State government’s 
duty to ensure that the newly formed corporate entities abide by the terms of the agreement  
(Clause 4(q) of the Tripartite Agreement) 
154 Clause 4(r) of the Tripartite Agreement. 
155 Section 24 (2) Second Proviso of the Andhra Pradesh Electricity Reform Act, 1998. 
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generating cohesiveness between the resulting entities. It is also argued that 
the continuation of the governmental service conditions, accompanied by a 
demonstration of employee resistance to reforms prior to introduction of the 
reform legislation, raised doubts concerning any further attempts at sectoral 
privatisation. It is observed that any private player would find the service and 
pension related costs of a state owned utility prohibitive to operate. 
7.14. The Andhra Pradesh Electricity Reform Act, 1998  
 
The Reform Act 1998 amongst other things, sought to restructure APSEB into 
independent corporate entities in the areas of generation, transmission and 
distribution. It endeavoured to redefine the relationship between the State and 
the electricity utilities through the establishment of a sectoral Regulatory 
Commission by the name of ‘Andhra Pradesh Electricity Regulatory 
Commission’ (hereinafter APERC).156 
7.14.1. An Autonomous Commission  
 
The APERC was the institutional mechanism used to enforce the statutory 
provisions, giving effect to the principle of transparent regulation. The Reform 
Act 1998 reiterates that APERC in the course of its functioning, shall act as an 
‘independent statutory body corporate’ and that the same ought to reflect in its 
decision making. 157 APERC is vested with the ‘exclusive power’ to make 
regulations to discharge its functions.158 It has the power to issue orders and 
enforce them through imposition of fines in the event of non-compliance.159The 
                                                          
156 Section 3 (1) of the Andhra Pradesh Electricity Reform Act, 1998.  
157 Section 11(2) of the Andhra Pradesh Electricity Reform Act, 1998. 
158 Section 9(2) of the Andhra Pradesh Electricity Reform Act, 1998. 
159 Commission’s power to Pass Orders and Enforce Decisions. Part IX of the Andhra Pradesh 
Electricity Reform Act, 1998. 
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decisions and orders of APERC shall be in writing, and it is required to assign 
reasons for the same.160 
APERC is empowered to issue licenses to the players and determine the 
conditions of licences.161 APERC can frame regulations prescribing the 
standards of performance informing consumers of their rights, upon consulting 
the utilities, consumer representatives and affected parties.162 It is empowered 
to fix tariffs, however such tariff fixation shall not show any undue preference 
to any particular category of consumers.163 The Reform Act 1998 requires the 
tariffs to be reasonable and to promote economic efficiency.164 Interestingly, 
the Reform Act 1998 requires the APERC to ‘endeavour to fix tariff in such a 
manner that, as far as possible, similarly placed consumers in different areas 
pay similar tariff’.165 APERC is required to promote sectoral competitiveness 
and progressively involve the private sector, whilst ensuring a fair deal to the 
consumers.166  
7.14.2. Unbundling of the State Electricity Board  
 
The Reform Act 1998 requires the State government to prepare a transfer 
scheme to give effect to the unbundling of APSEB.167 As discussed earlier, 
unbundling of the SEB was in keeping with the principle of commercialisation 
and corporatisation. As per the Reform Act 1998 unbundling was to take place 
                                                          
160 Section 9(7) of the Andhra Pradesh Electricity Reform Act, 1998. 
161 Section 11(1) (c) of the Andhra Pradesh Electricity Reform Act, 1998. The licensing powers 
of the Commission is further elaborated in Part VI of the Reform Act titled ‘Licensing of 
Transmission and Supply’.  
162 Sections 33& 34 of the Andhra Pradesh Electricity Reform Act, 1998. 
163 Section 26(7) (a) of the Andhra Pradesh Electricity Reform Act, 1998. 
164 Section 26(7) (b) of the Andhra Pradesh Electricity Reform Act, 1998. 
165 Section 27(8) of the Andhra Pradesh Electricity Reform Act, 1998. 
166 Section 11(1) (f) of the Andhra Pradesh Electricity Reform Act, 1998. 
167 Section 23 of the Andhra Pradesh Electricity Reform Act, 1998. 
237 
 
in three phases. The first phase involved a transfer of property rights and 
liabilities of the SEB to the State government.168 The second phase involved 
the creation of two state owned companies, one dedicated to generation169 
(APGENCO) and the other responsible for transmission and distribution 
(APTRANSCO). 170 The third phase involved further disaggregation of 
APTRANSCO into one transmission (hereinafter referred to as APTRANSCO) 
and four distribution utilities (hereinafter referred to collectively as 
DISCOMS).171 All the disaggregated utilities were constituted under the 
Companies Act, 1956, as wholly owned government companies. 
It states that terms of conditions of employees transferred to the successor 
companies through the transfer schemes shall not be ‘less favourable’ to those 
enjoyed by them in the SEB and shall be in line with the tripartite agreement 
entered between the State government, SEB and the employees.172 This 
provision was included in accordance with the tripartite agreement discussed 
earlier. The Reform Act 1998 permits the State government to advance and 
guarantee loans and payment of interest thereon of companies wholly or 
partially owned by the State after reorganisation.173 
7.14.3. Sectoral Role of State Government and Relationship with APERC 
 
The State government’s role is curtailed by law from being that of a sectoral 
participant actively associated with the day to day decision-making of the 
                                                          
168 Section 23(1) of the Andhra Pradesh Electricity Reform Act, 1998. 
169 Section 23(2) of the Andhra Pradesh Electricity Reform Act, 1998. 
170 Section 13 of the Andhra Pradesh Electricity Reform Act, 1998. The section specifies the 
functions of APTRANSCO. 
171 Section 23(5) of the Andhra Pradesh Electricity Reform Act, 1998. 
172 Section 24 of the Andhra Pradesh Electricity Reform Act, 1998. 
173 Section 27 (3) & (4) of the Andhra Pradesh Electricity Reform Act, 1998. 
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utility, as observed in the pre-reform sectoral dynamics to sectoral policy 
making.174 It further requires all policy directions to be issued in a manner 
consistent with the statutory objects. The Reform Act 1998 emphasises that 
the State government shall in no way ‘adversely affect or interfere with the 
functions and powers of APERC, including, but not limited to, determination of 
the structure of tariffs for supply of electricity to various classes of 
consumers’.175 In other words, the statutory arrangements ensure that the 
State government does not in any way impinge on the autonomous functioning 
of APERC. Further, the State government is required to consult APERC 
regarding any rules or legislations proposed in lieu of any policy decision taken 
by it.176 The enactment permits the State government to declare subsidies to 
a particular class or classes of consumers, upon APERC’s approval of the 
same, the State government can compensate the said utility for the same.177 
The APERC is empowered to determine the timeline and the terms and 
conditions of payment of the subsidy amounts by the government to the 
utilities.178 This differs from the HLC’s recommendation, which vested the 
power to determine subsides and allocate the resource in the Regulatory 
Commission. 
As discussed, the statutory mandate included an unbundling (disaggregation) 
of APSEB, which at the time of the initiation of reforms, was the most important 
sectoral ‘organisation’. The Bank was of the view that the unbundling of the 
sectoral organisation and its subsequent privatisation would make the sector 
                                                          
174 Section 12 (1) of the Andhra Pradesh Electricity Reform Act, 1998. 
175 Section 12 (1) of the Andhra Pradesh Electricity Reform Act, 1998. 
176 Section 12 (4) of the Andhra Pradesh Electricity Reform Act, 1998. 
177 Section 12 (3) of the Andhra Pradesh Electricity Reform Act, 1998. 
178 Section 12 (3) read with 27 (1) of the Andhra Pradesh Electricity Reform Act, 1998.  
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more efficient. Hancher and Moran argue that regulatory regimes are 
influenced by the dynamics of their regulatory space and that dominant 
sectoral organisations leave their imprint on the nature of regulation (Hancher 
&Moran 1989).179 Marina Kurkchiyan, in her analysis of the adaptation of an 
institutional transplant in Russia, observes that ‘[a]s the foreign idea is 
adopted, it will be adapted. The adaptations and the interpretations that lie 
behind them can provide valuable insights into the society in which the players 
operate’ (Kurkchiyan 2009:340). In other words, Kurkchiyan is of the view that 
‘[t]he process of adaptation creates an opportunity to examine the receiving 
society’s established practices and way of thinking’ (Kurkchiyan 2009:337). 
The dominant sectoral organisation, i.e. the SEB had a ‘coordinatory’ function 
as identified by the HLC contributing to the emergence of what Black refers to 
as ‘centrifugal forces’ (Black 2007). Chapter 8 brings to the fore the 
‘centrifugal’ processes, giving effect to an interventionist and coordinatory role 
for the state in sectoral economic activity, which in turn leads to institutional 
re-aggregation of the state mimicking the erstwhile SEB and the emergence 
of legal pluralism in sectoral state law.  
7.15. 1999-2004: Re-election of Nara Chandrababu Naidu and 
Implementation of Reforms  
 
The Reform Act was passed in 1998 and Naidu came under increasing 
criticism for his economic policies. Though an advocate of reform, winning the 
1999 election was equally crucial for Naidu, as they were the first elections 
contested by TDP without its founder and crowd puller NTR (Suri 2005:147). 
                                                          
179 Though Hancher & Moran’s analysis is with regard to ‘advanced capitalism’, it is opined 
that this is applicable in the context of Andhra Pradesh.  
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The ensuing 1999 election to the State legislative assembly was viewed as 
crucial to gauge the public opinion on reforms and Naidu emerged victorious 
(Kirk 2011:67). This result however was more in the nature of a false positive 
for the reforms. In fact, Naidu owed his electoral success to two factors, 
namely a last minute electoral alliance with the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) 
which led to a transfer of votes in TDP’s favour and a return to NTR’s welfare 
model by Naidu in the days preceding the election (Kirk 2011:67; Kale 
2015:156). To quote Suri, ‘[l]ike a political wizard, Chandrababu Naidu pulled 
out one welfare scheme after another from his hat, averaging one every week’ 
(Suri 2005:147). The opposition was not prepared for this change in approach 
just before the election and was put on the back foot (Suri 2005:147). 
Though Naidu publicly expressed his displeasure towards agricultural 
subsidies, the tariffs were not increased till after the 1999 elections, i.e. after 
APERC began functioning (Kale 2015:152). Kale observes that the delay in 
increasing tariffs and making APERC functional prior to the elections was 
deliberate (Kale 2015:153). This was because, unlike in neighbouring Orissa, 
the farmers were a formidable political force in Andhra Pradesh (Kale 
2015:153). Kale also observes that Naidu was given relaxation from tariff 
increase by the Bank and the national government, given that TDP was a 
major political player in the national coalition which could risk collapsing if 
Naidu withdrew support (Kale 2015:153). Thus, at a very early stage of reform 
implementation, the inevitability of engaging politics, as opposed to insulating 
economic decision making from politics, becomes clear.  
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7.15.1. Consumer Resistance to Electricity Reforms  
 
As discussed, though constituted prior to the elections, APERC began 
functioning after the elections. Naidu assumed that the 1999 electoral victory 
was as an endorsement of his reform strategy (Srinivasulu 2004:3849). The 
power sector reforms led to a hike in power prices and Naidu refused to take 
any measures to alleviate the hardship (Srinivasulu 2004:3849). Naidu’s firm 
stand on electricity sector reforms after the 1999 elections galvanised the 
opposition (Srinivasulu 2004:3849). 
Public resistance to the tariff setting process was supported by the opposition, 
which had expressed its displeasure in the legislature at the time of enactment 
of the reform legislation (Kirk 2011:69). When APERC organised public 
consultations aimed at tariff revision, it was met with opposition especially from 
the farmers lobby (Kirk 2011:69). APERC also barred the media from covering 
the hearing, drawing negative publicity (Kirk 2011:69). The Commission 
increased power tariffs across all the categories, which included a 54% 
increase for domestic or household consumers (Kirk 2011:69). 
Kale observes that Naidu’s electricity sector reform ‘stimulated the longest 
agitation in the state centered on an economic issue’ (Kale 2015:139). The 
increase in power tariffs by APERC led to an upsurge of public opinion against 
the government and also the Bank (Kale 2015:157). The popular upsurge also 
led to members of Naidu’s own party expressing reservations about the 
reforms (Kale 2015:157). The Bank’s involvement was further politicised when 
its President, James Wolfensohn, inadvertently remarked that the tariff 
escalation should have been higher (Kirk 2011:69-70). Kirk observes that the 
242 
 
Congress was now armed with an ‘even more effective rhetorical weapon’, i.e. 
that Naidu had surrendered the State’s ‘economic sovereignty’ to the Bank, 
much on the lines of NTR’s rhetoric of protecting ‘self-respect’ of the Telugus 
from the interfering national Congress Party (Kirk 2011:69-70). The Congress 
and the Left parties opposed the sectoral reforms through agitations and public 
mobilisations (Suri 2005:150). One such demonstration involving nearly 
25,000 protestors saw the government taking a hard stance which resulted in 
the death of two persons and 26 others sustaining injuries in the ensuing police 
firing (Kirk 2011:69; Srinivasulu 2004:3849).  
7.16. 2004 Elections – Losing the Plebiscite on Reforms 
  
Naidu neglected the agricultural sector and rural economy leading to a sectoral 
crisis, as reflected in the weavers and farmers’ suicides (Srinivasulu 2009:8). 
The Congress based its poll campaign around the neglect of the agricultural 
and handloom sector (Srinivasulu 2004:3849). The neglect of the agricultural 
sector was apparent in the State government not being able to control activities 
of companies supplying low quality seeds, pesticides and chemicals and 
reluctance of the state to intervene in the prices of agricultural inputs especially 
electricity (Srinivasulu 2004:3849). This resulted in many farmers committing 
suicide (Srinivasulu 2004:3849).  
The leader of the Congress Party, Y.S.Rajashekhar Reddy (hereinafter YSR) 
undertook a 1,500 km campaign by foot in May 2003 and this struck a chord 
with the underprivileged and the masses (Suri 2004:5494; Suri 2005:163). The 
campaign by foot helped the Congress connect with farmers, handloom 
weavers and constituencies affected by the reforms projecting the government 
as being pro-rich and prioritising information technology and biotechnology, 
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whilst neglecting issues affecting livelihoods (Srinivasulu 2004:3850). YSR 
called Naidu an agent of the Bank. He rebuked the claims of development 
stating that Naidu’s concept of development resulted in farmer’s suicides 
owing to neglect of agrarian problems (Suri 2004:5494; Suri 2005:163). As 
discussed, the majority of the population in Andhra Pradesh is dependent on 
agriculture for its livelihood.  
The 2004 elections to the State’s Assembly were in many ways plebiscitary in 
nature in terms of people’s mandate on the economic reforms initiated by 
Naidu and Naidu in turn projecting it as a referendum for his governance 
(Srinivasulu 2004:3845, 3847; Suri 2004:5497). The united opposition in the 
elections portrayed the contest as a test of approval of Naidu’s economic 
policies (Suri 2004:5493). Interestingly, in 1994 the TDP advocated welfare 
whereas the Congress sought to play the reform card, in 2004 it was the 
Congress vouching for welfare and the TDP for reforms (Suri 2004:5493). Suri 
traces the reason for politicisation of the reform issue in Andhra Pradesh as 
opposed to the other States undergoing reforms like Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, 
Orissa etc to Naidu’s endeavour to emerge from the shadow of his illustrious 
predecessor who advocated welfare politics (Suri 2005:151).  
The sectoral reforms came to occupy a central role in the electoral discourse. 
The Congress headed by YSR campaigned with the electoral promise of free 
power to the farm sector and promised not to increase tariffs for at least three 
years (Kale 2015:158; Kirk 2011:72). This was criticised by Naidu as 
irresponsible and he claimed that ‘free power’ meant ‘no power’ and that the 
transmission lines could only be used to dry clothes thereafter (Srinivasulu 
2004:3851; Kirk 2011:72). Mukherji observes that Naidu supported a policy of 
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‘subsidized uninterrupted power’ rather than free power demanded by the 
Congress (Mukherji 2014:153). Naidu also argued that the provision of free 
electricity would not be agreeable to the Bank, given the loan conditionalities 
(Suri 2004:5495). Congress was quick to brand Naidu as ‘anti-farmer and pro-
World Bank’ (Suri 2004:5495). The opposition’s narrative of the reform process 
can be summed up with the claim that ‘the state’s economic reform was 
externally imposed and anti-poor’, Naidu in his defence pleaded with the 
electorate for more time for the reforms to take effect (Kirk 2011:72). This 
eroded the pro-poor image of TDP making it lose its support base amongst the 
farmers. In the ensuing discourse about the repercussions of the reform, the 
Bank became the face of the reforms (Srinivasulu 2004:3851).  
The Congress’s turn to populism to wrest power also invoked the historical 
memories of Indira Gandhi’s pro-poor approach of the 1970s by promising to 
bring back ‘Indramma Rajyam’ or the rule of Indira Gandhi (Srinivasulu 
2004:3852). In addition to free electricity to the agricultural sector, Congress 
also promised subsidised agricultural loans, new irrigation projects and the 
resumption of recruitment in the State civil services (Suri 2004:5495). TDP 
fared badly in both the State legislative assembly and national parliamentary 
elections in 2004 (Suri 2005:163). Out of the 294 Assembly constituencies, 
TDP won only 47 seats in the 2004 elections, as opposed to 180 seats in the 
1999 polls (Mukherji 2014:163). The Congress, on the other hand, won 185 
seats out of the 294 seats in 2004 and formed the government with a 
comfortable majority. TDP’s 2004 electoral defeat can be attributed to an 
excessive focus on urban issues whilst neglecting the agricultural and rural 
sectors (Suri et al 2009:112). A post poll survey indicated that the TDP had 
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lost its vote share amongst almost all sections of society, and especially 
‘women, farmers and the poor’ (Suri 2005:165).  
7.17. 2004-2014: Congress and Return to Indira’s Rule  
 
The Congress government introduced a slew of pro-poor and pro-farmer 
measures between 2004 and 2009. YSR, in his first act as Chief Minister, 
signed the government order implementing free power to the farm sector in full 
public view immediately after taking the oath of office (EPW 2009b:5; Kale 
2015:158; Kirk 2011:72). The Congress government also built houses for the 
poor under a scheme named after Indira Gandhi ‘Indiramma’ (Mother Indira) 
keeping up its promise to bring back her rule (EPW 2009b:5). The Congress 
government reintroduced the subsidised rice scheme, announced pensions 
for widows and the aged, and took up major infrastructural initiatives (EPW 
2009b:5).180 The Congress government also announced a host of welfare 
policies, which included loan waivers for agriculture, subsidised agricultural 
inputs, irrigation projects, and health benefits, including treatment in private 
hospitals, fee waiver in educational institutions (Srinivasulu 2009:8; EPW 
2009a).  
Srinivasulu argues that this was possible because of increased state revenues 
owing to economic growth (Srinivasulu 2009:8). The tax revenue, as 
percentage of the State’s GDP, increased from 5.2% in 1995-96 to 10.1% in 
2007-2008, and this further enhanced the ability of the State to provide the 
                                                          
180 The massive infrastructural projects funded by the State, i.e. irrigation projects, housing 
schemes and roads, also helped the Congress Chief Minister cultivate loyalists, to whom the 
contracts for the execution of these projects were entrusted (EPW 2009b:5). 
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pro-poor measures (Srinivasulu 2009:8). As discussed in Chapter 3, Jean 
Dreze and Amartya Sen draw a similar conclusion regarding the increase in 
the tax revenues presenting the state with an opportunity ‘to make good use 
of public revenue for enhancing living conditions through public services and 
support’ in the context of the national government (Dreze & Sen 2014:270). 
TDP could not recover ground lost in 2004 in the 2009 elections (Suri et al 
2009:110). The Congress, however, did not announce any new welfare 
measures, but reiterated its commitment to continuing the benefits being 
provided by the State (Suri et al 2009:111). The Congress came back to power 
in the 2009 and was in power till 2014, i.e. till the State was reorganised into 
the two separate States of Andhra Pradesh and Telangana.  
7.18. Provision of Free Power and Resource Exploitation 
 
The decision to provide free electricity both by NTR led TDP in the 1980s and 
1990s and YSR in 2004 resulted in increased consumption. Mukherji observes 
that NTR’s policy of billing farmer’s as per the capacity of their pump sets, i.e. 
as per the horse power, rather than the actual energy consumed resulted in 
there being no incentive to conserve electricity (Mukherji 2014:159). Free 
provision of the resource of electricity also led to over exploitation of another 
resource, namely ground water (Kumar et al 2011). The indiscriminate 
exploitation of the groundwater resources led to a lowering of the water table 
and a corresponding increase in pump set capacity to draw water from greater 
depths, and therefore higher electricity consumption (Medepalli 2016).  
Studies in Andhra Pradesh indicate that rich farmers benefitted 
disproportionately over poor farmers from the provision of free electricity 
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(Mukherji 2014:166). This reinforces the argument that the rich farmers as part 
of the ‘dominant coalition’ (Bardhan 1998) shape the discourse of the mass 
politics surrounding provision of agricultural electricity, given their influence 
over the countryside. Peddireddi Chengal Reddy, former Secretary General 
and presently Advisor to the Consortium of Indian Farmers Associations and 
a prominent farmer leader in Andhra Pradesh, was of the view that populist 
politics have done more harm than good for the farmers (Peddireddi 2014). 
Peddireddi opined that farmers were caught in the wave of political populism 
and that issues of efficient utilization of scarce resources, like water and 
electricity and planning cropping patterns, appeared to have been ignored in 
the popular political discourse (Peddireddi 2014).  
Mukherji, based on interaction with farmer’s representatives in Andhra 
Pradesh, observes that the quality of power supplied deteriorated with the 
announcement of free power. The supply issues include a higher incidence of 
voltage fluctuations, which damaged the pump sets, and an underinvestment 
in rural transformers, which have affected the distribution system (Mukherji 
2014:166-167). According to Mukherji farmer’s representatives were not very 
happy with the duration of supply of free power as the DISCOMS were only 
providing 4 hours of supply, as opposed to the promised 7 hours per day 
(Mukherji 2014:167). He observes that the same was owing to the fiscal 
constraints of providing agricultural electricity on the distribution companies 
(Mukherji 2014:167). Another aspect of free electricity is that it is supplied late 
into the night, causing great inconvenience to farmers (Mukherji 2014:167). 
Provision of power in the night has also increased the risk of electrocution and 
associated deaths (Mukherji 2014:167). One of the reasons for provision of 
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free electricity late at night is a reduction in consumption from paying 
consumers in the city, with the result that the generation capacity can be 
utilised to supply the countryside. This in turn throws up issues of allocation of 
the resource between the urban and rural populace.  
7.19. Conclusions  
 
The role of the state in sectoral economic activity in Andhra Pradesh reflects 
the national attributes. The narrative of the chapter traces this through the 
interventionist phase and the regulatory state phase. What comes out clearly 
is that the State of Andhra Pradesh’s ability to implement economic policies is 
subject to social co-optation and approval. This becomes very clear 
considering its inability to enforce land reform legislation aimed at land 
redistribution, given the resistance from the upper castes immediately after 
independence. Politics associated with resource distribution and the tensions 
between the constituents of the ‘dominant coalition’ (Bardhan 1998) led to a 
decline in the sectoral fortunes. This forced the populist Chief Minster, i.e. 
NTR, to rethink sectoral strategy. The downturn in sectoral fortunes also 
corresponded with societal agitations based on economic issues. Both the 
emergence of left wing extremism, which made parts of the State out of 
bounds for the State government, and the movements of the landless 
peasants and Dalits against the upper caste rich landlords have their origins 
in the economic injustice ingrained in the rural property relations reinforced by 
caste. The green revolution, which shifted the State’s attention from land 
redistribution to agricultural productivity, further reinforced these iniquitous 
caste and consequent economic relations. The agitation of the Dalit and 
backward caste women against the arrack lobby was also an agitation against 
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state support for the politician and upper caste nexus. TDP’s turn to populism 
in the nature of food subsidies, government employment, prohibition etc. 
aimed to appease the economic hardships of the populace, which had not had 
access to state resources for millennia. The relationship between social power 
and political power in Andhra Pradesh becomes evident in the upper caste 
violence against lower castes who were socially dependent on the former but 
voted against them. The ability of the rich farmers, who are also upper castes, 
to sway votes of the marginal and small farmers brings to light the relationship 
between social power and political power and resource allocation by the state. 
The impact of free power on ground water levels, making them unsustainable, 
is another unintended consequence of the State’s populist public posturing. 
These developments reinforce the ability of social forces to influence state 
behaviour in Andhra Pradesh. It also brings to fore the fact that the state in 
Andhra Pradesh, like the national state, is constantly trying to mediate and 
negotiate these tensions.  
The legislation aimed at insulating the State’s economic decision making from 
politics and a roll back of the state from economic activity was sought to be 
implemented by the Bank in this socio-political milieu. Though occupying a 
prominent position, the state in Andhra Pradesh is relatively weak in 
comparison with societal processes. The state in Andhra Pradesh, like the 
national state, is permeable and susceptible to societal pressures. As 
discussed, Reyntjens observes that differing states have differing degrees of 
autonomy (Reyntjens 2015:351-352) and, according to Sportel, the ‘“body 
politic” is not a monolithic, single institution’ (Sportel 2011:42). The same 
makes the state in Andhra Pradesh one amongst the many social fields within 
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the regulatory space, with a relatively greater, if not absolute, power to 
influence change. It will be argued that this semi-autonomous nature of the 
state in Andhra Pradesh, combined with what Moore observes to be ‘the way 
the state acknowledges diverse social fields within society and represents 
itself ideologically and organizationally in relation to them’ (Moore 2001:107) 
results in processes of self-organisation and the emergence of self-regulation 
within the Indian state. These processes of self-organisation and self-
regulation are informed by a normativity which is opposed to the normativity of 
the regulatory state, in pursuance of which the statutory institutional 
organisation was put in place. As will be demonstrated, these self-regulatory 
processes, informed by a particular normativity and organising themselves in 
a non-hierarchical alternate institutional framework, result in pluralism in 
sectoral state law in Andhra Pradesh.  
TDPs electoral defeat in the 1994 and 2004 elections also brings to light the 
societal resistance to the notion of a regulatory state. The interventionist public 
posturing of the Congress after 2004, as opposed to the posturing adopted by 
it after the 1991 reforms, demonstrates that the state had to reposition itself 
as regards its role in economic activity and political articulation of the same. 
While the state in Andhra Pradesh was able to reposition itself in the spheres 
of politics and economics, it is argued that state law remained unchanged 
because the national enactment, i.e. the Electricity Act, 2003 endorsed the 
principles and institutional mechanism of the 1993 policy of the Bank. This 
position was incompatible with the State’s interventionist posturing after 2004 
in the spheres of politics and economics, which had repositioned themselves 
given the resistance to the normativity of the regulatory state. This 
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incompatibility of the state’s legal posturing with its repositioning in the spheres 
of politics and economics resulted in the emergence of alternate regulatory 
legality.  
The next chapter traces the emergence of this alternate regulatory legality, 
resulting in pluralism in state law in the State level electricity sector in Andhra 
Pradesh. This is established by tracing the emergence of a sectoral SASF 
owing to the way the state in Andhra Pradesh ‘acknowledges diverse social 
fields within society and represents itself ideologically and organizationally in 
relation to them’ (Moore 2001:107). The attributes of the susceptibility of the 
Indian state to tensions, external and internal; the relative weakness of the 
Indian state vis-à-vis societal forces; the entrenched interests of the ‘dominant 
coalition’, comprising bureaucrats, industrialists and rich farmers who vie for 
the state’s resources, and the porous and semi-autonomous nature of the 
state (Bardhan 1998; Mukherji 2016 ; Sportel 2011; Reyntjens 2015 ) facilitate 
this internal institutional reorganisation of the state in Andhra Pradesh, 
contrary to the institutional organisation envisaged under the sectoral 
legislation. This in turn results in the emergence of legal pluralism in sectoral 
state law in the State of Andhra Pradesh.  
 
 
 
 
 
252 
 
Chapter 8 – Sectoral Semi-Autonomous Social Field and Legal 
Pluralism in State Law in Andhra Pradesh  
 
The sectoral legislation, i.e. the Reform Act, 1998, was a conscious attempt 
by the State of Andhra Pradesh to usher in a regulatory state. This was sought 
to be achieved through institutional disaggregation of the SEB into separate 
generation, transmission and distribution companies in pursuance of the 
principle of corporatisation and commercialisation, and by establishing an 
independent sector regulator in pursuance of the principle of transparent 
regulation. However, the electoral/citizen expectations from the state 
continued to be that of a disburser of resources. The evident public opposition 
to the regulatory reforms culminated in electoral reversals for the Congress 
and the TDP in 1994 and 2004 respectively. This in turn sent a clear political 
signal requiring the state to reposition itself as a disburser of resources.  
While such repositioning could be achieved with relative ease in the sphere of 
politics, given the posturing of the Congress in the course of the 2004 
elections, this was more challenging in the field of law. This was because 
regulatory change was brought about legislatively through the Reform Act 
1998, with the intention of making it irreversible. Subsequently, the institutional 
changes in the nature of unbundling of the monolithic SEB and the 
establishment of an independent regulator were scaled up to the national level 
through the Electricity Act 2003. Given that the national legislation takes 
precedence over that of the State’s, a corresponding change of posturing in 
the legislated state law was no longer possible. As observed in the previous 
chapter, the state in Andhra Pradesh is permeable and prone to societal 
pressures, which makes it semi-autonomous and one amongst the many 
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social fields in the State’s regulatory space. The same allows it to acknowledge 
the ‘diverse social fields within society and represents itself ideologically and 
organizationally in relation to them’ (Moore 2001:107). The institutional 
arrangements associated with the regulatory state involved segregation 
between ownership and regulatory functions, and the disaggregation of the 
SEB into generation, transmission and distribution utilities. The thesis argues 
that the semi-autonomous nature of the State in the electricity sector in Andhra 
Pradesh allows it to re-aggregate institutionally and to self-regulate its 
activities in response to the normativity of an interventionist state associated 
with electoral expectations. This chapter argues that the same gives rise to 
legal pluralism in the sectoral state law in Andhra Pradesh.  
In fact, as will be demonstrated in the course of the chapter, the ‘centrifugal’ 
forces (Black 2007) which re-aggregate the disaggregated state utilities mimic 
the institutional structure of the disaggregated SEB. Marina Kurkchiyan (2009) 
observes that the way an institutional transplant is internalised reflects the true 
nature of a society. The re-aggregation of the disaggregated utilities, 
mimicking the institutional structure of the SEB, is reflective of the larger 
bureaucratic and technocratic consensus regarding the sectoral organisation, 
and the same is facilitated by the electoral expectations of an interventionist 
state. 
As will be discussed, the alternative institutional arrangements that aim to 
reposition the state in the sphere of law corresponding with the change in its 
economic and political posturing become more pronounced after Naidu’s 
electoral debacle of 2004. The plural forms of state law, for the purposes of 
the present discussion, have been categorised as what Anthony Ogus terms 
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‘public regulation’, or statutory state law in the present context, and ‘self-
regulation’ (Ogus 1995:99-100). The following discussion regarding the 
emergence of a sectoral SASF also endorses Merry’s notion of the permeable 
nature of SASF owing to semi-autonomy, allowing it to both give effect to the 
normativity of the state law and resist it when it is opposed to the same (Merry 
1988:878). This is evidenced by the phenomenon of the same actors or 
personnel participating in the organisation and operation of differing 
institutional arrangements, giving effect to both public regulation and self-
regulation. The conscious construction of the alternate institutional 
arrangements, with their enduring nature and their organisation informed by a 
particular normativity and sustained through self-regulation, facilitate their 
categorisation as a form of non-statutory state law.  
8.1. SASF and Self-Regulation as an Attribute of SASF 
 
As discussed in Chapter 6, the notion of SASF has been deployed to observe 
resistance to imposition of law in a variety of contexts. In the context of the 
present enquiry, SASF has been deployed to identify processes having a 
shared conception of normativity (Finchett-Maddock 2010; Sportel 2011). 
Moore deploys the methodology of SASF from the perspective of the ‘small 
field observable to an anthropologist to be chosen and studied in terms of its 
semi-autonomy’ (Moore 1973:720). The observable field of analysis 
establishing the presence of a SASF in the electricity sector of Andhra Pradesh 
involves the disaggregated constituent units of the State Electricity Board, i.e. 
APSEB, which continue to be owned and managed by the State, the 
Regulatory Commission, i.e. APERC, and governmental officials associated 
with the electricity sector.  
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The chapter endorses Moore’s view that a SASF is ‘processual’ by nature 
(Moore 1973:722). Julia Black terms the self-regulating processes as ‘Self-
regulatory associations’ or SRAs, she conceptualises them to be ‘horizontal’ 
in organisation, linking different sections of a society (Black 1996:28). It is 
argued that Black’s notion of horizontal self-organisation (Black 1996) 
corresponds with Moore’s processual methodology of identifying SASF 
(Moore 1973) and underlines the need to view these processes beyond the 
conventional hierarchical or institutional perspective. Accordingly, this chapter 
takes a horizontal approach to the identification of the SASF. As will be 
evident, SASF operationalised by the bureaucratic arrangements cuts across 
the hierarchies and organisational statuses, i.e. the state, Regulatory 
Commission and the State owned utilities.  
8.1.1. Structural and Behavioural Elements of Sectoral Self-Organising 
Processes in Andhra Pradesh  
 
The emergence of sectoral SASF is established by studying both the structural 
and behavioural aspects of self-organisation. The structural, i.e. the 
emergence of alternative institutional mechanisms through bureaucratic self-
organisation, is explored through the functioning of two institutional 
arrangements incorporated into the Reform Act, 1998 aimed at disaggregating 
the State. The first involves the arrangements disaggregating the SEB into 
independent corporations undertaking functions of generation, transmission 
and distribution in accordance with the principle of commercialisation and 
corporatisation. The second involves the establishment of an independent 
sectoral regulator in pursuance of the principle of transparent regulation, 
distancing ownership from regulation. The chapter argues that the alternative 
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institutional arrangements emerge as a result of ‘centrifugal’ forces (Black 
2007) aimed at operationalising the functions of ‘coordination’ and ‘conflict 
management’ (Chang 1999) of the state. The structure of the SASF is traced 
through bureaucratic appointments to the Commission and inter-institutional 
transfers, i.e. from State owned utilities to the Commission and vice-versa.  
The behavioural aspect is established through an examination of the cases 
appealed against the orders of the Commission to the appellate forums, 
namely the State High Court and the Appellate Tribunal for Electricity. The 
cases reveal behaviour symptomatic of self-regulation between the personnel 
of the State government, unbundled utilities, and the Commission. Behavioural 
aspects are also established through interviews with utility functionaries and 
sectoral actors. Since self-regulation is symptomatic of SASF, this behaviour 
in turn strengthens the argument of an alternative institutional framework 
giving effect to SASF.   
8.2. Structural Aspects of the Sectoral SASF  
 
It is argued that the SASF resisting the legislative attempt to unbundle the SEB 
is ‘consciously constructed’ (Moore 1973) through administrative mechanisms 
and carefully coordinated intra-governmental transfers. It is constituted with 
the objective of ensuring continued state coordination of sectoral activity. This 
sectoral SASF cuts across the institutional framework established by the 
Reform Act, 1998.  
Another feature of the SASF, in the context of the present analysis, is its ability 
to both maintain its autonomy and resist whilst simultaneously participating in 
the sectoral activity (Moore 1973). In the context of this thesis, this translates 
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into functionaries of the Regulatory Commission and the State owned utilities 
discharging their functions assigned by state law and corresponding 
institutional arrangements whilst selectively resisting the normativity 
associated with state law when inimical with electoral expectations from the 
state and bureaucratic and technocratic consensus regarding sectoral 
organisation. This SASF is operationalised by the very functionaries occupying 
institutional positions created by the sectoral legislation, i.e. the Reform Act, 
1998. As discussed by Moore, SASF is a permeable framework which both 
operationalises and resists the legislative intent of state law. The expectations 
of an interventionist state are also in keeping with the interests of ‘professional 
class’ in the ‘dominant coalition’ which included the technocrats in the public 
sector utilities and the bureaucrats. However, as Bardhan observes, the 
‘professional class’ is self-serving and derives its power through its role as the 
dispenser of state’s largess (Bardhan 1998). This is translated in the 
bureaucratic and technocratic consensus regarding sectoral organisation in 
the recommendations of the HLC and the institutional framework of the 
sectoral SASF. Bureaucratic and technocratic organisation plays an important 
role in the emergence of alternate institutional organisation in the nature of re-
aggregation of the erstwhile SEB.  The SASF is operationalised by 
coordination between the unbundled State owned utilities and appointments 
made from the unbundled utilities and the State bureaucracy to the 
Commission. The emergence of alternate institutional organisation is explored 
from the perspective of frustrating the principle of commercialisation and 
corporatisation and the principle of transparent regulation, premised on which 
the SEB was disaggregated and the regulator was established. 
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 8.3. Principle of Commercialisation and Corporatisation – 
Disaggregation of the SEB 
 
The objective of the unbundling process was to create independent 
corporatised entities capable of administering their affairs and taking 
commercial decisions independent of the State government. The ultimate 
objective of the reform measures was complete divestiture of the state from 
sectoral activity (World Bank 1997a:8). It is argued that, though unbundled into 
legally separate corporate entities, the expectations of the ‘dominant coalition’ 
(Bardhan 1998), especially the rich farmers, bureaucrats and technocrats, 
mediated by the politicians resulted in the unbundled utilities coordinating their 
activities through bureaucratic networks, mimicking the SEB. It is further 
argued that these networks operationalise the sectoral SASF, which resists 
the imposition of the statutory normativity of public law, whilst being integral to 
the institutional processes giving effect to the statutory normativity.  
8.4. Political Ramifications of Distribution Companies Functioning on 
Commercial Basis  
 
As discussed, the first phase of disaggregation of the SEB involved 
constituting two utilities, one undertaking generation (APGENCO) and the 
other undertaking the transmission and distribution functions (APTRANSCO). 
The final phase of the disaggregation, i.e. unbundling of APTRANSCO into 
one transmission and four regional distribution companies, or DISCOMS, was 
due to take place on 9th June 2005. This occurred after Naidu’s 2004 electoral 
debacle and after the new Congress government came to power. As discussed 
earlier, Congress had come to power in 2004 on the plank of providing free 
electricity to farmers and other welfare oriented measures. The principle of 
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corporatisation and commercialisation requires the utilities to be run on a 
commercial basis, this means that each distribution company had to 
individually procure power, maintain books of account and approach the 
Commission for a separate tariff. The disaggregation of the distribution 
business into four regional utilities resulted in each company having a different 
consumer composition and correspondingly different revenue and expenditure 
(Medepalli 2016; Paruchuri 2016). For example, certain regions have high 
agricultural consumption and certain others have greater industrial demand, 
making the utility serving the latter region profitable and the former perpetually 
loss making. The Eastern region in Andhra Pradesh is primarily canal irrigated, 
as the area constitutes a river basin, whereas the South-Western region of the 
State, i.e. Rayalseema, and the Northern region, comprising Telangana, are 
irrigated primarily through pump sets, hence their having a greater demand for 
agricultural electricity, which is not profitable to supply (Medepalli 2016; 
Paruchuri 2016).  
The subsidy element in the tariff formula has two components. The first being 
a direct subsidy through budgetary allocation from the State government and 
the second being a cross-subsidy from a higher tariff than the cost of supply 
imposed on the industrial consumers. This necessarily means that different 
regions serviced by different utilities will have different pricing for similarly 
placed consumers (as per their category, i.e. domestic, commercial etc.), as 
each utility will have a different mix of consumers to calculate the cross subsidy 
and the quantum of State subsidy (Medepalli 2016; Paruchuri 2016). Since the 
distribution business was state owned and managed, differential tariffs for 
similarly based consumers would be perceived as discriminatory by the 
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electorate. Medepalli observed that the government wanted to avoid this 
situation, in his words ‘you have to buy peace in the State, you cannot have 
heartburn amongst the people in different regions’ (Medepalli 2016). So as to 
get over this statutory institutional arrangement resulting in differential tariffs 
for similarly placed consumers and the resultant political ramifications, the 
Congress government constituted the Andhra Pradesh Power Coordination 
Committee (hereinafter APPCC). The APPCC came into existence on 7th June 
2005, i.e. a couple of days before the statutorily mandated disaggregation into 
a transmission and four regional distribution companies was to take effect.181  
8.5. The APPCC – Coordinating the Statutorily Disaggregated Utilities  
 
Those associated with the sector observe that the APPCC has been created 
for administrative convenience and to maintain uniformity of power supply and 
tariffs (Paruchuri 2016; Sayana 2016). APPCC ensures uniformity of tariffs 
though the single buyer model, in which APPCC procures on behalf of the 
DISCOMS (Paruchuri 2016). This is because, if the DISCOMS were to 
purchase power separately, one may purchase at a higher rate and the other 
at a lower rate (Paruchuri 2016). APPCC also ensures maintaining uniformity 
of power supply by determining how much electricity is allocated to each 
distribution company (Paruchuri 2016). Therefore, in effect the state becomes 
the allocator of resources, i.e. electricity. This becomes clear in a government 
order effective from the date the DISCOMS were separated from 
                                                          
181 G.O.Ms.No.58, Energy (Power. III) Department, dated 07.06.2005 brought about the 
separation between the transmission business on one side, and distribution and trading on 
the other, transferring the latter to four state owned distribution companies, and was to take 
effect from 09.06.2005. G.O.Ms.No.59, Energy (Power. III) Department, dated 07.06.2005 
established APPCC i.e. the coordinating mechanism comprising the heads of transmission 
and distribution utilities.  
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APTRANSCO, which allocates the power generated by APGENCO to the 
DISCOMS.182 The next subsection discusses the institutional arrangements 
and the governmental justification for its establishment. It becomes obvious 
that the APPCC puts in place an institutional arrangement that generates 
‘centrifugal’ forces. The structure and operation of APPCC is also reflective of 
the technocratic and bureaucratic consensus arguing for a coordinatory role 
for the state in sectoral activity, as reflected in the recommendations of the 
HLC.  
8.5.1. APPCC, Composition and Functions – Coordination between the 
Transmission and Distribution Companies.  
 
The APPCC was constituted by the government of Andhra Pradesh in 
pursuance of its executive powers. The government order constituting it states 
that it has been established ‘for the purpose of smooth transition to this new 
arrangement, the Government considers it necessary to put in place an 
institutional arrangement for effective co-ordination as well as building 
capacity of DISCOMS to handle new functions’.183 The official stand on the 
APPCC continues to be that it is a transitional arrangement to provide 
necessary hand holding for the DISCOMS.184 Though a transitional 
arrangement, there is no sunset clause in the governmental order constituting 
                                                          
182 G.O.Ms.No.53, Energy (Power. III) Department, dated 28.04.2008. This G.O. was made 
operative with retrospective effect from 09.06.2005, i.e. the date of unbundling of 
APTRANSCO into one transmission and four distribution companies. 
183 Item 1 of G.O.Ms.No.59, Energy (Power. III) Department, dated 07.06.2005. 
184 The composition and functions of APPCC came under judicial scrutiny in a case 
challenging the Commission’s decision to allow the APPCC to file petitions on behalf of the 
DISCOMS. In this case the appellate forum held that the APPCC is a transitionary mechanism 
and that it was not empowered under the provisions of the Electricity Act, 2003 to file the 
petition on behalf of the DISCOMS. See, India Cements Ltd. and Another V. Chairman, 
APSERC, Hyderabad and Others MANU/AP/0722/2011. 
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it. The political necessity of maintaining uniform tariffs appears to be the 
reason to continue with the APPCC. 
The APPCC is headed and convened by the Chairman and Managing Director 
of the state transmission company, i.e. APTRANSCO.185 Its members include 
the Director (Finance & Commercial) of APTRANSCO, the Director 
(Coordination) of APTRANSCO, and the Chairman and Managing Directors of 
all DISCOMS.186 Incidentally, all the Chairmen and Managing Directors of the 
DISCOMS and APTRANSCO belong to the Indian Administrative Service 
(IAS). As discussed, IAS is also the only service that interacts directly with the 
political establishment (Vithal 1997:214). The bureaucrats ‘define career 
success by the importance of the posts that they are assigned to’ (Iyer and 
Mani 2008:9). Though the politicians are constitutionally prohibited from 
altering the service conditions of the bureaucrats, they can influence the 
service postings of the IAS (Iyer and Mani 2008). The politicians in turn use 
this power to assign postings to control the officers of the IAS (Iyer and Mani 
2008). It is argued that this interrelationship between the IAS and the 
politicians ensures appropriate sectoral coordination. It is further argued that 
the officers of the IAS play an important role in recreating the processes of 
SEB, defeating the statutory objectives of corporatisation and 
commercialisation. APPCC allows the State government to retain its influence 
over the utilities of the disaggregated SEB undertaking the functions of 
generation, transmission and distribution. 
                                                          
185 Item 2(3) of G.O.Ms.No.59, Energy (Power. III) Department, dated 07.06.2005. 
186 Item 2(4) of G.O.Ms.No.59, Energy (Power. III) Department, dated 07.06.2005. 
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The government order vests in APPCC the power to direct APTRANSCO and 
the DISCOMS, to ‘provide necessary information, requisite support and 
depute its staff for efficient discharge of its functions’.187 The APPCC is vested 
with the mandate to examine issues pertaining to bulk supply and independent 
power producers, and to advise the distribution companies where 
appropriate.188 APPCC continues to function as per the mandate of the 
government order (Paruchuri 2017). When questioned about the legality of the 
institutional arrangements of APPCC, Paruchuri observed that it may ‘not be 
in consonance with law, but there is no prohibition also’ (Paruchuri 2016). He 
notes that the Electricity Act 2003, prohibits the transmission company to trade 
in electricity and requires the distribution company to undertake the said 
activity (Paruchuri 2017). However, because the DISCOMS are unable to 
undertake the said activity, the APPCC was established (Paruchuri 2017). He 
says that the present arrangement does not violate any statue as 
APTRANSCO does not purchase power and its account is independent of that 
of the DISCOMS. All the transactions regarding trading are carried out by the 
DISCOMS only (Paruchuri 2017). Paruchuri describes the institutional 
arrangements endeavoured by the APPCC as follows, ‘without violation of any 
company law, and without any positive violation of provisions of electricity law 
an adhoc arrangement is maintained for tariff, uniformity of service quality and 
quantity and administrative convenience’ (Paruchuri 2016). 
                                                          
187 Annexure A of G.O.Ms.No.59, Energy (Power.III) Department, dated 07.06.2005. 
188 Annexure A of G.O.Ms.No.59, Energy (Power.III) Department, dated 07.06.2005. 
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8.5.2. Role of APPCC in the Tariff Setting Process 
  
As discussed, given the variation in the demand and composition of categories 
of consumers, even a single buyer policy will not be able to ensure uniform 
tariffs across regional DISCOMS. In order to arrive at the said uniform tariff, 
there is a need to have a uniform procurement price. In order to arrive at a 
uniform procurement price, the entirety of consumption across companies is 
taken into consideration. Uniformity of the cost of service is arrived at by 
calculating the total cost of service for the entire State after considering 
individual profits and losses and deciding as to how to distribute it amongst 
different categories of consumers, i.e. agriculture, industry, domestic, 
commercial, etc. (Paruchuri 2016). The entirety of consumption is taken and 
the accounts of the distribution companies are worked backwards accordingly 
(Paruchuri 2016; Medepalli 2016). These book adjustments are reflected in 
the balance sheets and tariff petitions of the individual companies, so as to 
comply with the statutory provisions of both the Companies Act 1956, the 
Reform Act 1998 and the Electricity Act 2003. In other words, even the tariff 
petitions and the annual records submitted to the Commission are worked 
backwards, keeping in mind the electoral compulsions of ensuring uniform 
tariffs, the proportion of subsidies and cross-subsidies and a coordinated 
approach to the allocation and distribution of the resource. This prior 
coordinatory exercise ensures that uniform tariffs can be fixed across 
categories. For example, domestic consumers across the State pay the same 
tariff irrespective of the distribution company’s consumer composition. Since 
the Commission relies on the records of the distribution companies and the 
account statements submitted by them, the prior coordinatory exercise 
265 
 
projecting a uniform cost to serve enables the fixation of uniform tariffs for 
consumers belonging to a particular category irrespective of the distribution 
company serving them.  
8.6. Other Aspects Hindering Implementation of Principle of 
Corporatisation and Commercialisation 
 
8.6.1. Continued Need of Political Approval of Utility’s Commercial Decisions  
 
Ramachandra observes that the institutional changes that implement the 
Reform Act, 1998 have been formal and not substantive, and that there is little 
difference in terms of sectoral organisation after the unbundling 
(Ramachandra 2014a). She is of the opinion that if the DISCOMS are 
independent corporate entities, then they should take independent decision 
regarding power procurement, either through short term buying or bilateral 
arrangements for the summer months, when the demand is high. However, in 
the case of Andhra Pradesh, the DISCOMS go to the Chief Minister for 
approval of power purchase expenses, whereas, ideally, such a decision 
should have been arrived at after consulting the Commission (Ramachandra 
2014a).  
The failure to implement the principle of commercialisation and corporatisation 
is evident in the continued interference of the State government in the internal 
decision making processes of the utilities. The subsidy being integral to the 
tariff proposals placed before the Commission appears to be a primary reason 
for continued state interference in the utility management. A senior manager 
in one of the distribution utilities, on the condition of anonymity, disclosed that 
the utilities prepare the Annual Revenue Requirement document, or the tariff 
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petition, to be filed with the Commission by 30th November every year. 
However, they have to wait till February for tariff and budgetary approval from 
the government, in other words, the utility’s Annual Revenue Requirement 
submission is interlinked with the government’s budgetary processes 
(Interviewee C 2016). 
8.6.2. Rules of Corporate Governance Ignored  
 
Rules of corporate governance are not followed in the managerial practices of 
the entities comprising the unbundled SEB (Ramachandra 2014a). State 
owned utilities do not even have independent directors on the company’s 
Board as required by law (Ramachandra 2014a). Ramachandra observed 
that, at the time of unbundling, there was a perception that if the SEB is 
corporatised then things would change, but what changed was only the 
nomenclature of the companies and it was business as usual (Ramachandra 
2014a). Similarly, there was only a change in the designation of the employees 
after unbundling, and that there were hardly any lateral entries for 
professionalising the top management (Ramachandra 2014a). Ramachandra 
observes that there is no buy in or ownership of the reform process by the 
management (Ramachandra 2014a). The training programmes associated 
with reform were run on grants and, once the money ran out, the programme 
came to an end (Ramachandra 2014a). There is no ownership of what is to be 
done (Ramachandra 2014a).  
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8.6.3. Role of External Consultants in Erosion of Internal Decision-Making 
Capacity  
Sayana observes that the State government undertook training funded 
through USAID, ADB and World Bank to help the employees understand the 
new processes and the functioning of an independent utility (Sayana 2016). 
However, the initial training and orientation vanished after some time and the 
consultants gradually took over (Sayana 2016). Given that the regulations 
were new and there was little internal understanding of aspects of the new 
regulatory norms the utilities began relying on consultants (Interviewee C 
2016).  
Whereas in the early days of reform, the consultants would come and seek 
inputs from the personnel at the operational level, this was discontinued after 
some years (Sayana 2016). In Sayana’s opinion, the consultants must first 
discuss their proposals with the Chief Engineers and Superintending 
Engineers and only then submit their report to the Board of Directors (Sayana 
2016). Over a period, consultants began to present their proposals directly to 
the DISCOM’s Board of Directors, without consulting the functionaries who are 
supposed to implement the recommendations at the operations level (Sayana 
2016). Sayana further observed that at the time of transition, the involvement 
of officers in the decision-making processes of the consultants was 
compulsory and that, at present, it is only voluntary (Sayana 2016). He opined 
that authoritative questioning of the consultants is missing (Sayana 2016). He 
also suggested that the consultants are supposed to discuss and facilitate an 
internalisation of the processes but that is not happening at present (Sayana 
2016). Finally, he noted that the internal expertise was watered down owing to 
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the consultant’s interference (Interviewee C 2016; Sayana 2016). Another 
interviewee endorsed Sayana’s observation, he was of the view that the 
regulatory capacity has been captured by a few consultants like KPMG, PWC 
and E&Y (Interviewee C 2016). The reforms have not succeeded at the utility 
level, as the expertise associated with implementing the new arrangements 
has not percolated to all the levels in the utility (Sayana 2016). It is argued that 
this resulted in weakening of the internal organisational structures and 
administrative processes put in place in pursuance of the Reform Act, 1998, 
facilitating the emergence of the SASF.  
8.7. Principle of Transparent Regulation - Erosion of Autonomy of 
Independent Regulatory Commission  
 
As discussed, the 1993 Policy wanted to end the ‘dual role’ of the state as 
owner and regulator (World Bank 1993a:14). The 1993 Policy further stated 
that an independent sectoral regulator was required ‘to redefine the respective 
roles of government, utility, and consumers’ (World Bank 1993a:14). In other 
words, the sectoral regulator was the institution with the mandate to enforce 
the statutory sectoral arrangements. Statutory institutional autonomy from 
sectoral actor dynamics allowed it to enforce compliance with them.  
A perusal of the staffing patterns of the Commission establishes that the 
personnel appointed to the first three layers of the organisational hierarchy 
and in charge of the decision-making processes were associated with the 
larger State bureaucracy and the State owned utilities. The organisational 
hierarchy is also reflective of the organisation of the bureaucracies of the State 
departments and the public sector undertakings, i.e. the officers belonging to 
the All India Services heading the departments staffed by officers of the State 
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bureaucracy or the State owned utilities. Analysis of the historical data on 
staffing patterns and appointments made to the Commission from July 22nd 
1999 till 10th October 2014, establishes that particular services have laid claim 
to the different functional specialisations of the Commission. This erodes the 
arm’s length nature of the Commission, negating the legislative intent.  
There is an escalation in the intensity with which certain positions in the 
Commission were incorporated into the organisational processes of the State 
owned utilities after the 2004 elections. This establishes the reorganisation of 
the semi-autonomous state in response to the electoral expectations and pre-
existing bureaucratic and technocratic consensus. This occurs through 
bureaucratic appointments from the State owned utilities and the appointment 
of retired personnel from the State administration. In fact, as will be evident in 
the following narrative, most appointments to officer level positions after 2004 
have been on deputation, and certain positions filled by regular appointees in 
the initial phases appear to be increasingly filled by personnel deputed from 
the State owned utilities and those from State services. 
8.7.1. Method of Securing Information on Staffing Patterns  
 
Applications for information were filed under the Right to Information Act, 2005 
requesting information pertaining to the qualifications and prior appointments 
and experience of the Chairman, Members and Officers of the Commission.189 
The information pertaining to the Support Staff190 (non-officer cadre) was not 
                                                          
189 The applications dated 27th July 2015 were made to The State Public Information Officer 
at the Andhra Pradesh Electricity Regulatory Commission. The information was furnished on 
5th August 2015. The application pertaining to the Chairman and Members is annexed as 
Annexure-I and the application for the Officer cadre personnel is annexed as Annexure-II.   
190 Personnel officiating as Support Staff provide administrative assistance to the officers of 
the Commission and these posts include those of secretaries, accountants, computer 
270 
 
sought as the present enquiry pertains to the key personnel associated with 
the decision-making processes within the Commission. The information was 
sought for the time period 22nd July 1999 till 10th October 2014.191 10th 
October 2014 was the last day of Commission constituted prior to the 
reorganisation of the State of Andhra Pradesh into States of Telangana and 
Andhra Pradesh, which continued to function after the notified date of 
bifurcation, i.e. 2nd June 2014.192 
The first application sought information pertaining to the qualifications and 
career information of the Members and Chairmen of the Commission prior to 
their appointment as per the records of the Commission.193 This information 
was requested so as to explore the relationship between the composition of 
the Chairman and Members of the Commission and the larger bureaucracy, 
especially the All India Services, i.e. the national government cadre which is 
hierarchically superior to the State government cadre and heads the 
departments staffed by the State government cadre. Information was also 
sought as to the period during which the posts were vacant, so as to ascertain 
the reason for them being vacant.  
                                                          
operators, clerks, drivers, security staff etc. These positions have also been categorised as 
Class C and Class D positions in the 2013 Supplementary Regulations (Regulation 4(i) (b) of 
the 2013 Supplementary Regulations). 
191 It was assumed that 22nd July 1999 was the date of notification of operations of the 
Commission. The Commission however provided data from 3rd April 1999 to 10th October 
2014. 
192 The administrative and institutional arrangements prior to bifurcation continued given the 
transitional arrangements post reorganisation of the State of Andhra Pradesh into Andhra 
Pradesh and Telangana. 
193 The composition of the Commission is mentioned in the Andhra Pradesh Electricity Reform 
Act, 1998. Part II of the Andhra Pradesh Electricity Reform Act, 1998 provides for the 
constitution of the Andhra Pradesh Electricity Regulatory Commission. Section 3 Clause 2 
prescribes that there shall be Two Members and One Chairman. The Andhra Pradesh 
Electricity Regulatory Commission (Appointment of Chairman and Members) Rules 1999 
provides for the selection procedure of the Chairman and Members of the Commission. 
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The second application requested the Commission for information regarding 
all officers recruited, appointed, promoted and officiating in the Commission 
from July 22nd 1999 till 10th October 2014. It also requested information 
pertaining to the position and organisation of the official prior to and after 
officiating in the designated post in the Commission. This was sought to 
establish the movement of the functionaries between the Commission and the 
disaggregated utilities which comprised the APSEB. In terms of organisational 
hierarchy, the Commission comprises of the Chairman and Members, Officers 
and Support Staff.194  
 
8.8. Staffing Patterns of the Chairman and Members of the Commission 
 
The Reform Act 1998, envisages three Members to the Commission of whom 
one is designated as the Chairman. The Reform Act 1998, requires one of the 
Members to be a ‘graduate Electrical Engineer with adequate experience in 
generation or transmission or distribution of electricity’.195 It requires the other 
two members to have a graduate qualification with a specialisation in 
disciplines like law, economics, commerce, finance, accountancy or 
administration.196 It further stipulates that no person below the age of 55 can 
be appointed as a member of the Commission. Incidentally a graduate degree 
is the minimum qualification to be eligible to give the qualifying examination 
                                                          
194 These regulations have been revised twice. The first amendment took place in 2006 and 
Supplemental Regulations to the 1999 Regulations were brought into effect in 2013. The 2013 
Supplementary Regulations were formulated under the power vested in Sections 181 read 
with Section 91(2) & (3) of the 2003 Act with prior approval of the State government. The 2013 
Supplementary Regulations further categorised officers in to three categories, however the 
broad categorisation of ‘Chairman and Members’, ‘Officers’ and ‘Support Staff’ shall be 
adopted to refer to the respective categories. 
195 Section 5 (1) (i) of the Andhra Pradesh Electricity Reforms Act, 1998. 
196 Section 5 (1) (ii) of the Andhra Pradesh Electricity Reforms Act, 1998. 
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for the All India Services, and 55 years comes close to the age of 
superannuation in public bureaucracies in India, which varies from 58 to 60 
years.197 One of the Members is appointed as Chairman.198 The Selection 
Committee to select the Members is headed by a retired Chief Justice of any 
State High Court, or a retired Supreme Court judge who officiates as the 
Chairman. Other members of the Selection Committee comprise the Chief 
Secretary of the State of Andhra Pradesh and the Chairman of the Central 
Electricity Authority.199 The Reform Act 1998, designates the Secretary of the 
State’s Energy Department as the ex-officio Convenor of the Selection 
Committee.200  
8.8.1. Chairman of the Commission  
 
The Chairman to the Commission has always been a retired officer from the 
Indian Administrative Service. A service which enjoys a position of primacy 
over all other all India services. The change in political establishment in 2004 
also coincided with the retirement of the first Chairman who, though an officer 
of the Indian Administrative Service, belonged to the national cadre and had 
retired as the Union Home Secretary. All subsequent appointments after 2004 
have been those of the Chief Secretaries belonging to the State cadre.201 
Incidentally, the Chief Secretary is also the ex-officio member of the Selection 
Committee selecting the Members. This throws up the possibility of the Chief 
                                                          
197 This is the approximate age of superannuation in State owned utilities and that of the all 
India services and State departments.  
198 Section 3(2) of the Andhra Pradesh Electricity Reforms Act, 1998. 
199 Section 4(1) of the Andhra Pradesh Electricity Reforms Act, 1998. 
200 Section 4(2) of the Andhra Pradesh Electricity Reforms Act, 1998. 
201 The Chairmen appointed during this tenure were K.Swaminatham (retired Chief Secretary, 
from 05.08.2004 to 27.01.2008), A.Raghotham Rao (retired Chief Secretary, from 16.07.2008 
to 24.04.2013) and V.Bhaskar (retired Special Chief Secretary from 19.09.2013 to 
10.10.2014). 
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Secretary being a judge in his or her own cause. Some interviewees observed 
that this allegation was averted through a technicality, i.e. the Chief Secretary, 
though a member of the Selection Committee, recuses himself or herself from 
the decision making process for that particular post of Member (Ramachandra 
2014a). However, it is obvious that the Chief Secretary, as the top bureaucrat 
of the State, exercises influence over the decision. This conclusion is further 
strengthened by the fact that the ex-officio Convenor of the Selection 
Committee, i.e. the Secretary of the Energy Department of the State 
government, is also subordinate to the Chief Secretary in the State’s 
bureaucracy. 
The preference for bureaucratic appointments of officers belonging to the 
Indian Administrative Service, especially the Chief Secretary to the post of the 
Chairman, appears to be to secure political control over the processes of the 
Commission. The Chief Secretary is the top bureaucrat in the State, who 
reports to the Chief Minister and has the power to transfer other bureaucrats 
between postings (Iyer and Mani 2008:7). In this context, it is observed that 
the higher status, i.e. that of the Chief Justice of the State and High Court 
Judge, vested on the Chairman and Members appears to be the bureaucratic 
motivation of politically well-connected bureaucrats to gravitate towards these 
positions after retirement. The subsequent national enactments which are 
applicable to the State, i.e. the Regulatory Commissions Act, 1998202 and the 
Electricity Act, 2003203 empower the State governments to appoint retired 
judges of the State High Court as Chairman of the Commission. The 
                                                          
202 Section 17(7) of the Electricity Regulatory Commissions Act, 1998.  
203 Section 84(2) of the Electricity Act, 2003. 
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preference for bureaucratic appointments is strengthened by the 
counterfactual that is non-appointment of a person with judicial background as 
a Chairman of the Commission in the period under reference. Commenting on 
the bureaucratic appointments to the position of Chairman to the Commission, 
Ramachandra observes that in the tussle between the Indian Administrative 
Service and the judiciary, the judiciary has lost out (Ramachandra 2014a). 
8.8.2. Members of the Commission  
 
As discussed, the Commission comprises three Members, of whom one is 
designated as the Chairman. Amongst the other two, the Reform Act, 1998, 
requires one Member to be a graduate engineer and the other to come from a 
range of listed qualifications, i.e. law, economics, commerce, finance etc. 
However, as depicted in the organogram hosted on the Commission’s website, 
it appears that the Members have been given the broad designations of 
Member Technical and Member Finance.204 Though the requirement of a 
Member Technical appears in the Reform Act, 1998, (only qualifications and 
not the nomenclature), there is no corresponding requirement for Member 
Finance, either in the Reform Act 1998 or the accompanying Rules. This 
selection preference appears to have excluded a whole range of disciplines 
mentioned in the enactment, which includes law, economics, commerce etc. 
from the consideration of the Selection Committee.  
Four persons have been appointed as Member Technical in the period of 
reference. All persons appointed to the post of ‘Member Technical’ are retired 
electrical engineers from the State owned electricity utilities. This could be 
                                                          
204 This categorisation was confirmed in course of interaction with the officers of the 
Commission. 
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partly because of the statutory requirement that no person below the age of 
55 can be appointed as a member of the Commission.205 In effect all the 
Members Technical have been associated with APTRANSCO and this public 
utility has effectively captured the post of Member Technical.206  
The appointee’s prior experience appears to have been the reason for the 
nomenclature ‘Member Finance’, given that there are no corresponding 
references to the said designation in the Reform Act, 1998, or the 
accompanying Rules as discussed above. As with the position of Member 
Technical, there have been four appointees since the Commission’s inception. 
To the exclusion of the last appointee, all his predecessors were from the all 
India services associated with Revenue and Accounts and Audit Service.207 
The last appointee is from a state owned distribution utility and this sends a 
clear signal of the post being incorporated into the utility’s bureaucracy.208  
Interestingly, the Electricity (Supply) Act 1948, when stipulating the 
composition of the SEB’s Board, specifies that there can be no more than 
seven and no less than three members.209 Additionally, it specifies three 
                                                          
205 Section 5 (1) (ii) Second Proviso of the Andhra Pradesh Electricity Reforms Act, 1998.  
206 The first Member Technical, i.e. A.V. Subba Rao, held the post of Member Projects with 
the Andhra Pradesh State Electricity Board before his superannuation. A.V. Subba Rao was 
a Member of the Commission between 22.07.1999 to 02.04.2002. The second and third 
appointees to the post were retired Chief Engineers of APTRANSCO or the unbundled 
transmission entity which in the first phase of unbundling also comprised the distribution 
business. They were K.Sree Rama Murthy from 05.06.2002 to 03.06.2006 and R. 
Radhakishan from 16.06.2006 to 15.06.2011. The last appointee for the period under 
reference, i.e. R. Ashoka Chari, was a Chief Engineer in the Andhra Pradesh Power 
Coordination Committee from 03.05.2012 to 10.10.2014. 
207 The first and third appointees were retired officers from the Indian Revenue Service. These 
were D. Lakshminarayana retired as Chief Commissioner of Income Tax from 22.07.1999 to 
28.04.2003 and C.R. Sekhar Reddy retired as Commissioner of Income Tax from 14.08.2008 
to 13.08.2013. The second appointee was a retired officer from another all India service, i.e. 
the Indian Accounts and Audit Service, i.e. Surender Pal, was former Principal Accountant 
General of Andhra Pradesh from 31.10.2003 to 16.06.2008. 
208 The last appointee was a former Director at the State owned distribution entity, i.e. the 
Andhra Pradesh Central Power Distribution Company Limited, i.e. P.Rajagopal Reddy, from 
06.11.2013 to 10.10.2014. 
209 Section 5 of The Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948. 
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particular specialisations to be represented by three different members at all 
times, namely commercial matters and administration, electrical engineering 
and experience of accounting and financial matters in a public utility 
undertaking, preferably an electricity supply undertaking. The three 
parameters of administration, engineering and finance, determined to be the 
minimum disciplines to be represented in the composition of the SEB’s Board 
under the 1948 Act, appear to have become the mandatory qualifications to 
the exclusion of all other statutorily prescribed disciplines in the 1998 Act. This 
is reflected in the preference for appointing personnel from the Indian 
Administrative Service, electrical engineers from the State owned utilities and 
bureaucrats with financial expertise.  
8.9. Staffing Patterns of the Officers of the Commission  
 
8.9.1. Officers - Procedure and Qualifications for Selection   
 
The selection committee for the purposes of Officers (Class A) comprises the 
Chairman and the Members of the Commission.210 The recruitment and 
service conditions of the officer cadre in the Commission are governed by the 
Principal Regulations 1999,211 the 2006 Amendment to the 1999 
Regulations,212 and the Supplementary Regulations 2013.213 The regulations 
                                                          
210 If necessary, as per the 2013 Supplementary Regulations, the selection committee can co-
opt an expert as a member of the Selection Committee (1999 Regulations, Regulation 8(a)). 
The qualifications for appointment of Officers to the Commission is stipulated in Appendix-I of 
the 1999 Principal Regulations and the Supplementary Regulations 2013 reiterate the criteria 
of the 1999 Principal Regulations (2013 Supplemental Regulations, Regulation 7).  
211 Andhra Pradesh Electricity Regulatory Commission (Method of Recruitment and 
Conditions of Service of Officers and Staff) Regulations, 1999. 
212 The Andhra Pradesh Electricity Regulatory Commission (Method of Recruitment and 
Conditions of Service of Officers and Staff) (First Amendment) Regulation, 2006. 
213 Supplementary Regulation to Principal Regulation (No.3 of 1999) of Andhra Pradesh 
Electricity Regulatory Commission (Method of Recruitment and Conditions of Service of 
Officers and Staff) Regulation, 2013.The Principal Regulation 1999, the 2006 Amendment and 
the Supplementary Regulations 2013, were formulated by the Commission after consulting 
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apply to the Officers and Support Staff.214 The present examination, is 
restricted to the Officer cadre as it is associated with the decision making 
processes.215 The positions are listed in Annexure - IV. 
The qualifications for the positions are categorised into minimum and 
desirable. Both the officers and support staff may be appointed on a regular, 
contract service or on a deputation basis from the Government Departments 
or the organisations of the Central and State Governments.216 The stipulation 
of the posts and categories of officers and staff does not necessarily imply that 
the Commission has to fill all the posts of either the Officers or the Support 
Staff.217 As is evident in the tables depicting the cadre strength of the Officers 
(both 1999 Principal Regulation and 2013 Supplemental Regulations), Class 
A personnel/officers are further categorised into Category- 1, Category -2, and 
Category- 3. Category 1 officers head the various functional administrative 
divisions within the Commission. Category – 1 includes the positions of 
Commission Secretary, Director Engineering, Director Law, Director Tariff and 
Director Administration.218 Category – 2 comprises of Joint Director level cadre 
                                                          
the State government in pursuance of the Commission’s power to make regulations under the 
Andhra Pradesh Electricity Reform Act, 1998 (1998 Act). 
214 1999 Regulations, Regulation 2 and 2013 Supplementary Regulations, Regulation 2. The 
rules applicable to the State and Subordinate services in Andhra Pradesh are applicable to 
the Officers of the Commission 1999 Principal Regulations state otherwise (2013 
Supplementary Regulations, Regulation 2(2)). Even the 1999 Regulations state that A.P. Civil 
Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules 1991 and A.P. Civil Services Conduct 
Rules of 1964 as applicable to the employees of the State Government are applicable to the 
employees of the Commission (1999 Regulations, Regulations 27-29). In addition to the same, 
in the event of there being no specific service regulation covering a particular area then the 
regulations governing the employees of the State government become applicable to the 
employees of the Commission (1999 Regulations, Regulation 29). 
215 These comprise the positions categorised as ‘Officers’ in the 1999 Regulations and 
‘Class A’ in the 2013 Supplementary Regulations. 
216 1999 Regulations, Regulation 4 (ii); 2013 Supplemental Regulations, Regulation 6.  
2171999 Regulations, Regulation 5.  
218 1999 Regulation, Regulation 4 (i) (a); 2013 Supplemental Regulations, Regulation 3.  
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and Category – 3 comprises of Deputy Director level cadre. The next sub-
section discusses appointments to Category -1 positions. 
 
8.9.2. Category -1 Positions, Commission Secretary and Director Level 
Appointments  
 
The regulations state that the appointments can be made on a regular219 or 
direct recruitment basis, 220  in addition to deputation and contractual 
appointments. All Category 1 positions have been filled either by deputies or 
contractual appointees belonging to the larger civil service. The only exception 
to this is the position of Director (Administration), a post which involves 
managing the internal administration of the Commission and officiated by a 
regular appointee. It is observed that the criteria for appointment facilitated 
governmental appointments. However, the shift in political posturing from a 
regulatory state to an interventionist state in Andhra Pradesh in 2004 ensured 
that only deputed officers who will revert to the parent utility and not retired 
personnel are appointed. This is the most significant shift in the staffing 
patterns that has occurred after 2004. The position of Director Law is filled 
through contractual appointment of retired District Judges, and all other 
appointments to the positions of Secretary to the Commission, Director 
Engineering and Director Tariff have been on a deputation basis from the State 
owned utilities. The position of Director (Tariff), which till recently was filled by 
a regular appointee, was filled by a deputee from the State owned utility after 
the earlier incumbent appointed before 2004 left office.221 This shows a clear 
                                                          
219 1999 Regulations, Regulation 4 (ii). 
220 2013 Supplemental Regulations, Regulation 6. 
221 The appointment was on contract basis. L.Manohar Reddy from APCPDCL 21.11.2011 to 
10.10.2014. 
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link between Category-1 officers and the personnel in the larger State 
bureaucracy and State owned utilities. A more detailed description of the 
staffing patterns in the Director level positions is given in Annexure-III.  
8.9.3. Joint Director and Deputy Director Positions 
 
Joint Director and Deputy Director positions comprise the third and fourth 
(final) tiers of the officer level appointees in the Commission. The position of 
Joint Director has remained vacant since establishment of the Commission for 
extended periods of time across all functional departments to the exclusion of 
the position of Joint Director Information and Technology. It appears that this 
tier was completely redundant to the functioning of the Commission until 
recently, when the positions of Joint Director were filled on promotion by those 
officiating as Deputy Directors. Interestingly no new appointments were made 
to the positions of Deputy Directors, who were promoted to Joint Director rank. 
 
The designation of Deputy Director in the Commission comprises of a mix of 
regular, contractual appointments and appointees through deputation. The 
positions of Deputy Director Consumer Assistance,222 Deputy Director 
                                                          
222 All appointments made to the position Deputy Director Consumer Assistance are on 
deputation from the State owned electricity utilities. T. Ranga Rao on deputation from 
A.P.TRANSCO (13.05.1999 to 16.05.2002); P. Mohan Reddy on deputation from A.P.GENCO 
(12.07.2002 to 05.12.2003); V.N.V. Ramana Rao on deputation from A.P.TRANSCO 
(6.12.2003 to 31.03.2005); P. Karunakar Babu on deputation from A.P.CPDCL (24.06.2005 
to 23.06.2007); K. Vijaya Kumar on deputation from A.P.TRANSCO ( 12.11.2007 to 
21.11.2012 and again 20.01.2014 to 10.10.2014). The post remained vacant in the intervening 
period of K. Vijay Kumar’s reassignment to the post through deputation. The only exception 
being an appointee on delegation from the Central Public Sector Utility, Power Finance 
Corporation for a month. S. Srinivasa Rao on deputation from Power Finance Corporation 
from 17.05.2002 to 14.06.2002.  
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Transmission223 and Deputy Director Tariff/Accounts & Financial Analysis224 
have been filled through deputation. An examination of the job description of 
these positions filled through deputation reveals that the positions are integral 
to the functioning of the state owned enterprises and are associated with 
appraisal of their functioning and protecting consumer interest. The Deputy 
Director Consumer Assistance is required to follow up the utility’s performance 
pertaining to consumer grievance redressal. The Deputy Director Consumer 
Assistance is also required to assist the Commission to secure compliance 
with consumer protection related standards of performance by the utilities.225 
Similarly, the Deputy Director Transmission is required to process applications 
for issuance of transmission and bulk supply licences, monitor the functioning 
of the licensees and submit reports pertaining to their compliance to the 
Commission. The Deputy Director Transmission is also required to ensure that 
the generation utilities adhere to the regulations formulated by the 
Commission. 
This would necessarily imply that the first three layers of the organisational 
hierarchy of the Commission is associated with the larger public bureaucracy 
and the State owned electricity utilities whom the Commission is required to 
                                                          
223 The position of Deputy Director Transmission has been filled by candidates on deputation 
from the State owned electricity utilities. P. Ashok Kumar on deputation from Haryana Vidyut 
Prasar Nigam Ltd from 15.12.1999 to 15.12.2004; S.B.V. Rajesh on deputation from 
A.P.TRANSCO from 29.08.2005 to 12.06.2008;A.V.L.K.Jagannadha Sarma on deputation 
from APEPDCL from 02.02.2009 to 10.10.2014. 
224 The initial appointment for post of Deputy Director Tariff/Accounts & Financial Analysis was 
a regular appointment followed by a series of appointments by deputation from public sector 
electricity undertakings both Central and State. M.N. Ravi Shankar, a regular appointee from 
29.10.1999 to 28.05.2003; M.G. Gunasekaran on deputation from NPCIL from 01.08.2003 to 
31.03.2008; K. Hari Prasad on deputation from A.P.TRANSCO from 31.10.2008 to 
10.10.2014. 
225 These functions correspond with Sections 33 to 35 of the Andhra Pradesh Electricity 
Reform Act, 1998.  
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regulate. It is argued that this trend in appointments has eroded the 
organisational independence and autonomy of the Commission.  
8.10 Sectoral SASF and Resultant Legal Pluralism 
  
As discussed, this chapter intends to identify the sectoral SASF by observing 
the structural and behavioural aspects associated with it. The emergence of 
legal pluralism in sectoral state law is identified through the behavioural aspect 
of self-regulation arising from the self-organising processes of the SASF. It is 
argued that the self-regulating processes are not transactional in nature, but 
are operationalised structurally through the re-aggregation of the dis-
aggregated SEB. This structural reorganisation can be traced through Moore’s 
observation that an SASF is processual in nature (Moore 1973). The 
organisation of the SASF is horizontal, as opposed to the vertical or 
hierarchical institutional organisation proposed by the Bank. The identification 
of a horizontal institutional organisation also compliments Colin Scott’s 
observation that a regulatory space approach helps transcend the hierarchical 
institutionalist focus of the ‘New Institutional Economics’ (Scott 2001).  
The Regulatory Commission which is established to oversee the functioning 
of the sectoral arrangements ushering in a regulatory state is increasingly 
integrated into the State’s bureaucracy and technocracy. This occurs through 
the appointment of retired civil servants/retired employees of the state owned 
power utilities, officers on deputation from the state owned power utilities and 
retired officers or officers on deputation from the extended State bureaucracy 
to the positions of members and officers of the Regulatory Commission. This 
integration of the Commission’s personnel into the larger State bureaucracy 
and technocracy erodes the hierarchical and supervisory position of the 
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Commission, making its relationship with the sectoral players more linear or 
horizontal.  
One other example of horizontal coordination and institutional dynamics is the 
APPCC. As discussed, the APPCC comprises the Managing Directors of the 
DISCOMS and APTRANSCO. Commenting on the administrative and 
managerial practices of the unbundled state utilities, one interviewee stated 
that ‘only heads have increased but body is the same’ (Interviewee C 2016). 
By ‘heads’ the interviewee was referring to the Managing Directors of the 
newly constituted state utilities, who belong to the Indian Administrative 
Service and give effect to the arrangements of APPCC. It is argued that the 
constitution and functioning of the APPCC and the coordination between the 
DISCOMS and APTRANSCO and DISCOMS and APGENCO is indicative of 
a re-aggregation of the disaggregated SEB by the State in response to the 
electoral expectations of an interventionist state and the bureaucratic-
technocratic consensus regarding the sectoral organisation. Dr. Usha 
Ramachandra endorses the view that the unbundled state companies inter-
relate in a manner which mimic the operation of the SEB (Ramachandra 
2014a). These illustrations of horizontal institutional organisation help sustain 
the normativity of the interventionist state. The horizontal institutional 
organisation, however, also undermines the hierarchical statutory institutional 
architecture of the regulatory state, as demonstrated in the absorption of the 
Commission into the State’s bureaucracy and technocracy. Excessive 
interference by the State government in the operational and managerial affairs 
and reliance on external consultants eroded the corporate identity of the 
utilities constituted from the unbundled SEB. It is argued that this weakening 
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of the institutional processes associated with state law make the institutional 
processes constituted through the sectoral SASF stronger.  
Therefore, the constitution of APPCC, continuing interference by the State 
government and the weakening of institutional processes associated with the 
principles of commercialisation and corporatisation in the disaggregated 
constituents of the SEB, and the Regulatory Commission becoming an 
extension of the State’s bureaucracy and sectoral technocracy, facilitated the 
emergence of the sectoral SASF. This horizontal organisation itself arises as 
a result of resistance to imposition of the normativity of the regulatory state 
through state law. The recurrent nature of the processes in the nature of 
staffing patterns in the Commission, the decisions of the Commission reflective 
of self-regulation and the continuation of APPCC, which was initially supposed 
to be a transitional mechanism, are evidence of enduring arrangements 
reflective of the larger political, technocratic and bureaucratic consensus 
mirroring the normativity of an interventionist state. This alternative institutional 
organisation backed by the normative consensus gives the self-regulatory 
arrangements the flavour of alternate regulatory legality and results in legal 
pluralism in sectoral state law in Andhra Pradesh.  
8.11. Behavioural Characteristics of the Sectoral SASF  
 
Though brought into existence by external pressures, it is argued that the 
internal self-regulatory dynamics of the SASF go unchecked under the present 
regulatory arrangements in the legislated state law. As discussed, the 
institutional organisation of the SASF reflects the pre-reform bureaucratic and 
technocratic consensus regarding sectoral institutional organisation. These 
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dynamics are in the nature of drawbacks associated with self-regulation. The 
drawbacks of self-regulation amongst others include a lack of democratic 
accountability, the impact of decisions of actors in self-regulatory 
arrangements on third parties, an inability to rein in errant members and the 
tendency of actors in self-regulatory processes to cartelise and impose 
barriers to entry for other actors (Baldwin et al 2012; Graham 1994; Ogus 
1995). As discussed earlier, self-regulation is a symptom of SASF. These 
drawbacks of self-regulation in the sectoral SASF become evident upon a 
perusal of cases instituted against the orders of the Regulatory Commission. 
This also establishes the presence of pluralism in sectoral state law, with 
processes of public regulation and self-regulation existing side by side and 
operationalised by the same functionaries.  
An examination of the decisions of the statutorily designated appellate bodies 
brings to light instances of non-compliance with the statutory mandate by the 
Commission. As will be evident, the instances of non-compliance with the 
statutory mandate are reflective of drawbacks associated with self-regulatory 
processes. As discussed, self-regulation is a symptom of self-organising 
SASF which is associated with the emergence of legal pluralism. The following 
discussion on behavioural aspects of the self-regulating SASF strengthens the 
observation pertaining to the structural aspects discussed earlier in this 
chapter and vice-versa.  
8.11.1. Methodology Adopted for Case Law Analysis 
 
The analysis of appeals from the orders of the Commission is based on the 
premise that appellate bodies are required to uphold the statutory provisions 
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i.e. statutory normativity in the process of reviewing the orders of the 
Commission. The Electricity Act 2003 saved the Reform Act 1998,226 as a 
consequence, the Commission constituted under it continued to function under 
the preview of both the enactments. The Reform Act 1998, designated the 
Andhra Pradesh High Court (hereinafter APHC), i.e. the highest court of 
appeal at the State level, as the forum for appeal from the Commission’s 
orders.227 The Electricity Act 2003, established a statutory Appellate Tribunal 
(hereinafter the AT) to hear appeals from the orders of the Commission.228 The 
cases for discussion have been sourced from the reputed Indian online case 
database ‘Manupatra’. The process of identification of sectoral issues 
pertaining to self-regulation is based on an examination of all appellate cases 
challenging the decision of the Commission as hosted on the database till 28th 
February 2015. The preliminary search came up with 48 cases before the AT 
and 40 cases before the APHC.229 All 88 cases have been reviewed, however 
from these 54 cases having a direct bearing on the principles of 
commercialisation and corporatisation and that of independent regulation form 
the basis of the present analysis.  
                                                          
226 Section 185 (2) (a) of the Electricity Act, 2003. 
227 Section 39 of the Andhra Pradesh A.P. Electricity Reform Act, 1998. 
228 Part XI of the Electricity Act, 2003 titled ‘Appellate Tribunal for Electricity’. Section 111 of 
the Electricity Act, 2003, provides for the appeal to the Appellate Tribunal. Despite the 
constitution of the AT, the APHC exercised its constitutionally vested territorial jurisdiction and 
entertained cases questioning the orders of the Commission when it deemed necessary to 
interfere. The APHC also entertained Writ Petitions against the orders of the Commission 
while it was the designated appellate forum. See. RCI Power Limited V. Union of India (UOI) 
and Ors. 2003(3) ALD 762.The APHC entertained pleas of parties approaching it as the forum 
of first instance instead of the Commission against the iniquitous and discriminatory behaviour 
of the distribution companies, reflective of their fears of a biased decision by the Commission. 
See Venkataraya Fibres Pvt. Ltd. V. State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors. 2009(1) ALD 5; Andhra 
Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation V. Central Power Distribution Company of Andhra 
Pradesh Ltd. 2008(5) ALD 787 and National Energy Trading and Service Limited and 
Others V. Central Power Distribution Company of A.P. Ltd. and Others. 2013(4) ALD 585. 
229 The same is a fairly representative sample, if one were to exclude unreported cases and 
cases not hosted on the database. 
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As discussed in Chapter 6, decisions taken by members of a self-regulatory 
arrangement may ignore the repercussions on non-members who are not part 
of the decision making process (Baldwin et al 2012:145; Ogus 1995:99). In the 
context of this thesis, it is argued that actors other than the State officials and 
employees of State owned utilities are often not consulted in the course of 
decision making affecting their interests. Self-regulatory bodies have the 
power to determine whom to allow or disallow, this vests in them tremendous 
power to ‘enable incumbent practitioners to earn supra-competitive profits’ 
(Ogus 1995:99).230 Cosmo Graham notes that ‘self-regulation can lead to 
restrictive practices which discourage competition and innovation and work to 
the detriment of the consumer’ (Graham 1994:195). The following cases are 
reflective of the anti-competitive effects of self-regulation in the sectoral SASF. 
Cases are also symptomatic of the Commission not being able to protect the 
public interest owing to its inability in ‘enforcing standards against errant 
members’ (Baldwin et al 2012:142).  
8.11.2. Impact of Self-Regulatory Arrangements on Non-Members of the 
SASF  
 
As discussed earlier, members of a self-regulatory arrangement ignore the 
repercussions of their actions on non-members or third parties (Baldwin et al 
2012:145; Ogus 1995:99). In fact, instances of the Regulatory Commission 
deciding by only consulting the State utilities constituted nearly 15% or 8 out 
of 54 appellate actions analysed in here. It is argued that the operation of the 
SASF and the co-option of the functionaries of the Commission in this SASF 
                                                          
230 Ogus uses the term ‘Self-Regulatory Agencies’ to refer to self-regulatory processes (Ogus 
1995:97). 
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has resulted in the Commission adjudicating sectoral conflicts in a manner 
detrimental to the interest of the consumers and private generators. The 
Commission is an instrumentality of the state and the Reform Act 1998, and 
Electricity Act 2003, declare its proceedings to be judicial in nature.231 This 
requires the Commission to adhere to the principles of natural justice by giving 
due notice and consulting the affected parties before passing orders or 
notifying regulations. The appellate forums have observed that the 
Commission only consulted the State owned utilities and kept the private 
generators and the consumers in the dark before deciding on issues.232  
One of the very first cases to be appealed involved the Commission convening 
a meeting of private generators on the pretext of reviewing the progress of 
their projects.233 In course of the meeting, the Commission conveyed its intent 
to prohibit direct sale of electricity to third parties. It ordered the private 
generators to enter into wheeling arrangements 234 with the state transmission 
company i.e. APTRANSCO to supply power to third parties. The order 
observed that the Commission had previously consulted the Chairman and 
Managing Director of APTRANSCO and Principal Secretary, Energy 
Department of the State. On appeal the APHC was of the view that the 
                                                          
231 Section 52 of the A.P. Electricity Reform Act, 1998 and Section 95 of the Electricity Act, 
2003.  
232 Rithwik Energy Systems Limited represented by its Director V. Transmission Corporation 
of Andhra Pradesh Ltd. and Ors. 2008 ELR (APTEL) 237; GMR Industries Ltd. V. Andhra 
Pradesh Electricity Regulatory Commission. MANU/ET/0005/2007; Vemagiri Power 
Generation Limited V. Transmission Corporation of A.P. Ltd. and Ors. MANU/ET/0150/2007; 
Sardar Power Pvt. Ltd. V. Andhra Pradesh Electricity Regulatory Commission and Ors. 
MANU/ET/0054/2013; M/s. IL&FS Wind Farms Limited V. Andhra Pradesh Electricity 
Regulatory Commission and Ors. MANU/ET/0095/2013; Ind-Barath Energies Ltd., Hyd. V. 
State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors. 2000(3) ALD 546; Vishnu Cements Limited V. Central 
Power Distribution Company of Andhra Pradesh Limited and Anr. 2003(4) ALD 405 and India 
Cements Ltd. and Anr. V. Chairman, APSERC, Hyderabad and Ors. 2011(6) ALD 35.  
233 Ind-Barath Energies Ltd., Hyd. V. State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors. 2000(3) ALD 546. 
234 Wheeling refers to transmission of electricity through the transmission lines. 
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Commission, by denying the generators a fair hearing, had violated the 
principles of natural justice.235 Other instances involving violation of principles 
of natural justice requiring the intervention of the appellate forums include the 
Commission amending the power purchase agreements after consulting the 
state transmission company, i.e. APTRANSCO, without the knowledge of the 
private generators who were parties to it.236 In yet another case, the 
Commission reduced the price of the energy supplied by the private generating 
company to the state owned distribution companies, without the generator’s 
knowledge.237 
There are also instances of the Commission not considering the interests of 
the consumers, the cases pertaining to Fuel Surcharge Adjustment are a good 
example of the same. Though the tariffs are fixed on an annual basis, there is 
an inbuilt flexibility in the tariff formula for the generation companies to pass 
on to the consumer costs in the nature of increase in fuel prices, changes in 
taxation and other variable costs in the next quarter and this is termed Fuel 
Surcharge Adjustment (Paruchuri 2017). So as to retrieve the same, the 
DISCOMS are required to approach the Commission with a petition to bill the 
consumers the differential in the next quarter and pass it on to APGENCO 
(Paruchuri 2017). Fuel Surcharge Adjustment in fact comprises a part of the 
power purchase cost (Kotamreddi 2014). The Commission in one case 
allowed a petition condoning the delay of the state owned distribution 
                                                          
235 Ind-Barath Energies Ltd., Hyd. V. State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors. 2000(3) ALD 546. 
236 Rithwik Energy Systems Limited represented by its Director V. Transmission Corporation 
of Andhra Pradesh Ltd. and Ors. 2008 ELR (APTEL) 237; GMR Industries Ltd. V. Andhra 
Pradesh Electricity Regulatory Commission. MANU/ET/0005/2007 and Vemagiri Power 
Generation Limited V. Transmission Corporation of A.P. Ltd. and Ors. MANU/ET/0150/2007. 
237 Sardar Power Pvt. Ltd. V. Andhra Pradesh Electricity Regulatory Commission and Ors. 
MANU/ET/0054/2013 and M/s. IL&FS Wind Farms Limited V. Andhra Pradesh Electricity 
Regulatory Commission and Ors. MANU/ET/0095/2013. 
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companies filing a petition for Fuel Surcharge Adjustment without consulting 
the consumers.238 APHC set aside the order of the Commission and directed 
the state owned distribution companies to file applications for FSA afresh for 
the determination of the Commission. 
8.11.3. Self-Regulation and Anti-Competitive Practices  
 
Promotion of sectoral competition has been seen as one of the objectives of 
the 2003 Act and the Reform Act 1998.239 The Reform Act 1998 states that it 
is one of the functions of the Commission to promote competitiveness and the 
participation of the private sector.240 The 2003 Act, empowers the Commission 
to issue directions to generation, transmission and distribution companies if 
they abuse their dominant position or enter into a combination or agreement 
that has an adverse effect on competition.241 The Commission can also 
regulate the distribution and transmission companies so as to promote sectoral 
competition.242 The 2003 Act requires the Commission to be guided by factors 
that ‘encourage competition, efficiency, economical use of resources, good 
performance and optimum investments’ when specifying the terms and 
                                                          
238 India Cements Ltd. and Anr. V. Chairman, APSERC, Hyderabad and Ors. 2011(6) ALD 35. 
Other appeals agitating non–consultation with consumers include Vishnu Cements Limited V. 
Central Power Distribution Company of Andhra Pradesh Limited and Anr. 2003(4) ALD 405; 
Sriramagiri Spinning Mills Limited V. The State of Andhra Pradesh, Department of Energy and 
Ors. 2013(3) ALD 298 and Dhanalakshmi Cotton & Rice Mills Pvt. Ltd. V. Southern Power 
Distribution Company of A.P. Ltd. MANU/AP/1543/2014. Other instances of the Commission’s 
non-coulsultative approach include its notice for proceedings not specifying the nature of 
issues to be deliberated before the Commission as evidenced in the case of Nava Bharat 
Ferro Alloys Ltd. V. A.P. Electricity Regulatory Commission MANU/ET/0004/2006. In one 
particular instance, the relief sought and the order passed had no correlation. See R.V.K. 
Energy Pvt. Ltd., Hyderabad V. A.P.S.E.B., Hyderabad and Anr. 2002(3) ALD 196. In one 
another case, non-publication of new regulations in the official gazette prior to them being 
implemented led to them being set aside. See M/s. Dhanalakshmi Iron Industries Limited and 
Ors. V. A.P. Electricity Regulatory Commission and Ors. MANU/AP/3650/2013. 
239 Finds mention in the Preambular provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Electricity Reform 
Act, 1998 and the Electricity Act, 2003. 
240 Section 11 (1) (f) of the Andhra Pradesh Electricity Reform Act, 1998.  
241 Section 60 of the Electricity Act, 2003 titled ‘Market Domination’. 
242 Section 23 of the Electricity Act, 2003 titled ‘Directions to Licensees’. 
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conditions for the determination of tariff.243 However, after its establishment, 
the Commission has taken decisions and passed orders that had the effect of 
restraining private generators from supplying directly to consumers and 
blocked open access.  
Issues pertaining to competition arise in 14 out of the 54 cases considered for 
analysis. These cases constitute 26% of the cases analysed.244 Of these, the 
actions directly related to or indirectly arising out of the Commission’s decision 
to prohibit third party sales245 and discouraging open access246 constitute the 
majority. The appellate forums have not examined the issues under 
consideration from a competition law perspective, nor do their decisions 
                                                          
243 Section 61 of the Electricity Act, 2003 titled ‘Tariff regulations’.  
244 These include Small Hydro Power Developers Association and Ors. V. Andhra Pradesh 
Electricity Regulatory Commission and Ors. MANU/ET/0094/2006; Transmission Corporation 
of A.P. and Anr. V. Andhra Pradesh State Electricity Regulatory Commission and Anr. 
MANU/ET/0048/2006; RVK Energy Pvt. Ltd. V. Central Power Distribution Co. of Andhra 
Pradesh Ltd. and Ors. MANU/ET/0140/2007; Jocil Limited V. Southern Power Distribution 
Company of Andhra Pradesh Limited and Anr. MANU/ET/0055/2008; Velagapudi Power 
Generation Limited V. Southern Power Distribution Co. of A.P. MANU/ET/0022/2010; 
Sitapuram Power Limited and Zuari Cement Limited V. Transmission Corporation of Andhra 
Pradesh Ltd. MANU/ET/0080/2010; M/s SLS Power Limited V. Andhra Pradesh Electricity 
Regulatory Commission and Ors. MANU/ET/0018/2012; M/s. S.N.J. Sugars and Products 
Limited V. Transmission Corporation of Andhra Pradesh Limited. MANU/ET/0024/2013; SLT 
Power & Infrastructure Projects Pvt. Limited V. Andhra Pradesh Electricity Regulatory 
Commission. MANU/ET/0133/2014; Gayatri Sugars Ltd. V. APNPDCL. MANU/ET/0201/2014; 
Ind-Barath Energies Ltd., Hyd. V. State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors. 2000(3) ALD 546; LVS 
Power Ltd. V. Transmission Corporation of A.P., Limited, Hyderabad and Ors. 2002(4) ALD 
784; R.V.K. Energy Pvt. Ltd., Hyderabad V. A.P.S.E.B., Hyderabad and Anr. 2002(3) ALD 196 
and M/s Balaji Energy Private Limited V. Southern Power Distribution Company Ltd. of A.P 
and Others. 2013(5) ALT 212.  
245 Small Hydro Power Developers Association and Ors. V. Andhra Pradesh Electricity 
Regulatory Commission and Ors. MANU/ET/0094/2006; Transmission Corporation of A.P. 
and Anr. V. Andhra Pradesh State Electricity Regulatory Commission and Anr. 
MANU/ET/0048/2006; Jocil Limited V. Southern Power Distribution Company of Andhra 
Pradesh Limited and Anr. MANU/ET/0055/2008; M/s. S.N.J. Sugars and Products Limited V. 
Transmission Corporation of Andhra Pradesh Limited. MANU/ET/0024/2013; SLT Power & 
Infrastructure Projects Pvt. Limited V. Andhra Pradesh Electricity Regulatory Commission. 
MANU/ET/0133/2014; Gayatri Sugars Ltd. V. APNPDCL. MANU/ET/0201/2014; Ind-Barath 
Energies Ltd., Hyd. V. State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors. 2000(3) ALD 546; LVS Power Ltd. 
V. Transmission Corporation of A.P., Limited, Hyderabad and Ors. 2002(4) ALD784 and M/s 
Balaji Energy Private Limited V. Southern Power Distribution Company Ltd. of A.P and Others. 
2013(5) ALT 212. 
246 RVK Energy Pvt. Ltd. V. Central Power Distribution Co. of Andhra Pradesh Ltd. and Ors. 
MANU/ET/0140/2007 and Sitapuram Power Limited and Zuari Cement Limited V. 
Transmission Corporation of Andhra Pradesh Ltd. MANU/ET/0080/2010 .  
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address issues pertaining to competitiveness resulting in a final definitive 
answer. That said, all the cases discussed here reflect the implications of the 
Commission’s decisions for sectoral competition. 
The 2003 Act defines ‘open access’ as ‘non-discriminatory provision for the 
use of transmission lines or distribution system or associated facilities’ by any 
generator, transmitter, distributor or consumer as per regulations framed by 
the appropriate Commission.247 In other words, the Commission is required to 
promote an environment congenial to sectoral competition. Third party sales 
in the context of the case law discussed is the freedom of the generator to sell 
power using the existing transmission network directly to the consumer, 
without the need to enter into a power purchase agreement with the state 
owned distribution company. Prohibition of third party sales, as is evident, 
amounts to a violation of the principle of open access. 
The first case involves a private generator who had established a power plant 
in pursuance of the governmental policy prior to the Reform Act 1998. The 
policy permitted private generators to either supply directly to prospective 
consumers or utilise the then APSEB’s transmission infrastructure.248 The 
commissioning of the project was delayed and the Reform Act, 1998, 
constituting the Commission came into operation. As the commercial launch 
was nearing, the generator approached the Commission seeking an 
exemption from obtaining an electricity supply license. However, keeping the 
said application in abeyance, the Commission passed an order stating that it 
                                                          
247 Section 2 (47) of the Electricity Act, 2003.  
248 LVS Power Ltd. V. Transmission Corporation of A.P., Limited, Hyderabad and Ors. 2002(4) 
ALD 784. 
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would not permit third party sales.249 At this point it will be pertinent to note 
that, though the Reform Act, 1998 required the Commission to promote 
competition, there was no provision requiring it to promote open access.250 
This necessarily implied that the generator could not sell power to any other 
person apart from the sole distribution licensee namely APTRANSCO when it 
was still undertaking distribution business, prior to its further unbundling into a 
transmission and four distribution companies. Accordingly, the generator 
terminated its agreements with the prospective industrial consumers and 
approached APTRANSCO. After initial negotiations APTRANSCO informed 
the Commission that it was not in a position to purchase power from the 
generator as it had surplus power. As a consequence, the generator 
approached the Commission requesting it to pass orders directing 
APTRANSCO to purchase power. The Commission passed an order stating 
that it could not force APTRANSCO to purchase power from the generator. 
The generator appealed to APHC against the order. Relying on the doctrine of 
promissory estoppel, APHC noted that APTRANSCO was a party to the 
proceedings prohibiting third party sales and had subsequently entered into 
negotiations with the generator. It accordingly held that the behaviour of 
APTRANSCO was arbitrary defeating the spirit of the Reform Act 1998, which 
endeavoured to promote private investment in the sector. It observed that 
Section 11 (1)(f) of the Reform Act 1998, requires the Commission to promote 
competitiveness and progressively involve the participation of the private 
                                                          
249 It would be pertinent to note that, though the Reform Act, 1998 requires the Commission 
to encourage competition, there was no explicit provision in that enactment requiring it to 
promote third party sales.  
250 Some interviewees noted that that the explicit provision pertaining to open access in the 
Electricity Act, 2003 was included given the Commission’s stand in Andhra Pradesh.  
293 
 
sector so as to ensure a fair deal for the consumers. APHC further observed 
that the Commission’s suo-moto order prohibiting the third party sales was 
passed as a response to a representation made by staff and engineers 
associations of APSEB.251 APHC observed that it was surprising that the 
engineers of APTRANSCO were aggrieved by third party sales by private 
power producers and found it all the more surprising for the Commission to 
have acted on the same. APHC further noted that no material was placed 
before the Commission by APTRANSCO to substantiate its contention of 
surplus availability of power and that the Commission did not understand the 
functions vested in it under the Reform Act 1998. It directed the Commission 
to consider the matter afresh and directed APTRANSCO to enter into a power 
purchase agreement with the generators.252 
In one other case arising out of similar facts, the private generator challenged 
the Commission’s order prohibiting third party sales directly before the APHC, 
instead of entering into negotiations with APTRANSCO as discussed in the 
previous instance.253 It was argued that the Commission had exceeded its 
jurisdiction, i.e. whereas the generator’s applications were made seeking an 
exemption from obtaining a licence, the Commission directed the generator to 
directly sell electricity to APTRANSCO. APHC observed that such a move by 
the Commission only aimed to make APTRANSCO financially healthier at the 
cost of private generating companies. In keeping with the observations in the 
                                                          
251 LVS Power Ltd. V. Transmission Corporation of A.P., Limited, Hyderabad and Ors. 2002(4) 
ALD 784, Para 50.  
252 LVS Power Ltd. V. Transmission Corporation of A.P., Limited, Hyderabad and Ors. 2002(4) 
ALD 784, Para 66. 
253 APHC 4 (I) R.V.K. Energy Pvt. Ltd., Hyderabad V. A.P.S.E.B., Hyderabad and Anr. 2002(3) 
ALD 196. 
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previous case, the APHC opined that the Commission had favoured 
APTRANSCO.254  
In yet another case, the AT was of the view that the methodology adopted 
by the Commission for calculating cross subsidy surcharge, made the power 
generated expensive, and was stifling open access.255 The AT observed 
that open access should not be burdened with high surcharges. AT was of 
the view that the legislative provisions have to be implemented in a manner 
facilitative to promoting open access and enhancing competition.256  
8.11.4. Anti-Competitive Practices Emanating from Coordination between 
TRANSCO and DISCOMS  
 
It is observed that institutional coordination involving the sectoral transmission 
and distribution entities, which are wholly state owned has stifled the growth 
of the private generation segment. The anti-competitive practices become 
evident in the transmission and distribution companies’ endeavour to obstruct 
open access (Sayana 2016, 2017). According to Sayana this is because 
DISCOMS know that if they give open access they will incur losses (Sayana 
2016). Usually the industrial and commercial consumers seek open access, 
losing them would mean losing consumers who pay higher tariffs so as to 
cross subsidise the agricultural and domestic consumers.  
                                                          
254 In one other matter, the AT was of the view that the Commission could not force private 
generators to sell electricity to the state utilities in contravention of the State government’s 
policy prior to the establishment of the Commission. See Small Hydro Power Developers 
Association and Ors. V. Andhra Pradesh Electricity Regulatory Commission and Ors. 
MANU/ET/0094/2006. 
255 RVK Energy Pvt. Ltd. V. Central Power Distribution Co. of Andhra Pradesh Ltd. and Ors. 
MANU/ET/0140/2007 . 
256 RVK Energy Pvt. Ltd. V. Central Power Distribution Co. of Andhra Pradesh Ltd. and Ors. 
MANU/ET/0140/2007, Para 26.  
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In order to apply for open access, the private generators have to seek the 
consent of the State Load Dispatch Centre (hereinafter SLDC).257 The SLDC 
regulates the amount of electricity supplied into the transmission system by 
the generators so as to ensure grid stability and integrity. One way of looking 
at the SLDC’s functioning is that it protects the transmission network from 
fluctuations in the nature of surges or low voltage. The SLDC can regulate the 
quantum of power in the grid and all generation licensees are required to 
comply with the directions of the SLDC. The Electricity Act, 2003 requires the 
SLDC to be operated by a government company, authority, or corporation 
established under a State enactment. However, pending the notification of 
such an arrangement, the SLDC is to be operated by the State’s transmission 
company. Shiva Rao observed that APTRANSCO operated the SLDC in 
Andhra Pradesh and a separate State entity was not created for the period 
under reference (Paruchuri 2017). Suryaprakasa Rao observes that, so as to 
apply for open access, the private generators have to take the consent of 
SLDC, as it regulates the quantum of power supplied in the grid. It is here, he 
says that there is a nexus between the APTRANSCO and DISCOMS. He 
observed that APTRANSCO which operates the SLDC and the DISCOMS 
‘gang up’ and refuse the permission to supply (Sayana 2016). This is made 
possible as APTRANSCO continues to be the operator of the SLDC.  
8.11.5. Coordination between DISCOMS and APGENCO 
 
The coordination between DISCOMS and APGENCO can be established 
through deliberate underpayment of APGENCO and absence of litigation 
                                                          
257 The provisions pertaining to SLDC are discussed under the heading ‘Intra-State 
Transmission’ in Sections 30-33 of the Electricity Act, 2003.  
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between the DISCOMS and APGENCO, despite their billing decisions 
affecting APGENCO’s finances. As per one informant, the DISCOMS do not 
pay for the full amount of power procured from APGENCO (Interviewee B 
2015). The DISCOMS first pay the private generators and then proceed to pay 
APGENCO. In one instance involving underpayment of moneys due to 
APGENCO, the Energy Secretary to the State was advised by the legal 
counsel of APGENCO to petition the Commission for the provisional release 
of payments from DISCOMS (Interviewee B 2015). However, the Energy 
Secretary was reluctant to take any action against the underpaying DISCOMS 
(Interviewee B 2015).  
Further, it is open knowledge that the officials of DISCOMS and APGENCO 
communicate informally for disbursement of moneys due from the DISCOMS 
(Interviewee B 2015). The disbursements from the DISCOMS are never 
demanded in full, but rather are demanded to cover immediate costs 
(Interviewee B 2015). This is reflected in APGENCO’s officials telephoning the 
DISCOMS requesting moneys to be dispatched towards procurement of coal 
or payment of salaries (Interviewee B 2015). Then again, the money is not as 
per actual requirement, but a bargain for immediate revenue requirements, for 
example if the generation company requires 100 crores ($1550429.00) then 
they ask for 120 crores ($1860514.80) and DISCOMS release 100 crores 
($1550429.00) (Interviewee B 2015). In reality, the DISCOMS may be owing 
APGENCO much more. The difference of receivables from the DISCOMS to 
APGENCO went over Rs.1200 Crores between 2006 and 2009 (Interviewee 
B 2015). The legal counsel for APGENCO advised it to approach the 
Commission, but APGENCO was not inclined to do so (Interviewee B 2015). 
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Finally, the State government brokered a deal between the DISCOMS and 
APGENCO and the moneys owed were brought down to 800 crores 
($12403432.00) from 1200 crores ($18605148.00) (Interviewee B 2015). The 
400 crores ($6201716.00) that were written-off would subsequently be a 
burden on the public exchequer (Interviewee B 2015). 
8.11.6. Billing Decisions of DISCOMS and their Financial Impact on 
APGENCO  
 
APGENCO is also financially affected by the billing decisions of the DISCOMS 
owing to the political posturing by the State government. A clear indicator of 
this is the non-imposition of the Fuel Surcharge Adjustment prior to the 
elections to the State Assembly in 2009. The Fuel Surcharge Adjustment, as 
discussed earlier, comprises a part of the tariff which is not fixed by the 
Commission so as to allow the generators flexibility to pass on escalation in 
fuel prices and other variable costs to the distributors, this results in an 
increase in consumer tariff. In 2009, YSR the Chief Minister who had come to 
power on the plank of free agricultural electricity directed the DISCOMS to not 
pass on the Fuel Surcharge Adjustment costs to the consumers in lieu of 
impending elections (Kotamreddi 2014). The Chief Minister directed that the 
moneys shall be recovered from the State government (Kotamreddi 2014). 
After the elections, the status quo continued, the Chief Minister, though elected 
for a second term, passed away in a helicopter crash, and no decision was 
taken as to how to pass on the Fuel Surcharge Adjustment to the consumer 
(Kotamreddi 2014). In addition to this, even the Chairman of the Commission 
did not decide on the pending Fuel Surcharge Adjustment petitions of the 
DISCOMS (Kotamreddi 2014). History repeated itself in 2014, when the Fuel 
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Surcharge Adjustment was not determined by the Commission, as it was the 
election year and the same would affect the government’s electoral prospects 
(Madduri 2014). The absence of any action on part of APGENCO to claim the 
additional costs for generation from the DISCOMS is indicative of an 
underlying agreement and the belief that it will be compensated from the 
State’s exchequer eventually.  
8.11.7. Absence of Litigation between the DISCOMS and APGENCO 
 
As discussed, there are several instances of litigation between the 
DISCOMS and private sector generators, these include decisions identifying 
anticompetitive practices owing to collusion between DISCOMS and 
APTRANSCO hindering open access. In a review comprising all cases 
arising on appeal from the orders of the Commission (88) before the 
appellate bodies over a period of 17 years, i.e. from the time of constitution 
of the Commission, i.e. from July 1999 till February 28th 2015, there is not a 
single reported case between APGENCO and DISCOMS. Instances 
involving non-compensation of APGENCO by the DISCOMS for the energy 
supplied and the subsequent payment of the amounts due by the State 
government mirror the coordination between APGENCO and the DISCOMS 
and also the continued macro sectoral coordination by the State 
government.  
8.11.8. Other Decisions of the Commission Adversely Affecting the Interests 
of Private Generators  
 
15 appellate actions, i.e. 28% of the cases analysed, involve decisions of the 
Commission adversely affecting private generating companies utilising 
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renewables sources for generation. These include hydro power, wind power, 
biomass and bagasse.258 In addition to perceiving the Commission’s 
behaviour as being discouraging of generation through renewable sources, 
these can also be viewed as being discouraging of private generation, as all 
the matters pertain to private generators. A closer examination brings to light 
the fact that such behaviour contrary to the statutory and constitutional 
mandate arises owing to the Commission favouring and coordinating its 
actions with the State owned utilities. Appellate forums also noticed delays in 
tariff fixation and tariff revision by the Commission causing undue hardships 
to the generators.259 Certain decisions set aside by the appellate forums also 
point to an absence of judicial discipline on part of the Commission.260 
                                                          
258Ind-Barath Energies Ltd., Hyd. V. State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors. 2000(3) ALD 546; 
Small Hydro Power Developers Association and Ors. V. Andhra Pradesh Electricity 
Regulatory Commission and Ors. MANU/ET/0094/2006; Small Hydro Power Developers' 
Association and Ors. V. Transmission Corporation of A.P. Ltd. & Ors. MANU/ET/0033/2008; 
Rithwik Energy Systems Limited represented by its Director V. Transmission Corporation of 
Andhra Pradesh Ltd. and Ors. 2008 ELR (APTEL) 237; Transmission Corporation of A.P. and 
Anr. V. Andhra Pradesh State Electricity Regulatory Commission and Anr. 
MANU/ET/0048/2006; Transmission Corporation of Andhra Pradesh Ltd. V. A.P. State 
Electricity Regulatory Commission and Anr. MANU/ET/0007/2007; Guttaseema Wind Energy 
Company Pvt. Ltd., rep. by its Managing Director Mr. Anil Chalamalasetty V. Andhra Pradesh 
Electricity Regulatory Commission and Ors. MANU/ET/0061/2011; M/s SLS Power Limited V. 
Andhra Pradesh Electricity Regulatory Commission and Ors. MANU/ET/0018/2012; M/s. SLS 
Power Limited Ors. V. Andhra Pradesh Electricity Regulatory Commission. 
MANU/ET/0191/2012; M/s. S.N.J. Sugars and Products Limited V. Transmission Corporation 
of Andhra Pradesh Limited. MANU/ET/0024/2013; Sardar Power Pvt. Ltd. V. Andhra Pradesh 
Electricity Regulatory Commission and Ors. MANU/ET/0054/2013; M/s. IL&FS Wind Farms 
Limited V. Andhra Pradesh Electricity Regulatory Commission and Ors. MANU/ET/0095/2013; 
Biomass Energy Developers Association V. Andhra Pradesh Electricity Regulatory 
Commission. MANU/ET/0130/2014; SLT Power & Infrastructure Projects Pvt. Limited V. 
Andhra Pradesh Electricity Regulatory Commission. MANU/ET/0133/2014 and Gayatri 
Sugars Ltd. V. APNPDCL. MANU/ET/0201/2014. One other action before the appellate forum 
involving a generator relying on renewable sources has not been included as the issue does 
not attract special mention to the generator’s source of power. See Hyderabad Chemicals 
Limited V. Andhra Pradesh Electricity Regulatory Commission. MANU/ET/0031/2008. 
259 M/s Balaji Energy Private Limited V. Southern Power Distribution Company Ltd. of A.P and 
Others. 2013(5) ALT 212; M/s SLS Power Limited V. Andhra Pradesh Electricity Regulatory 
Commission and Ors. MANU/ET/0018/2012 and M/s. SLS Power Limited Ors. V. Andhra 
Pradesh Electricity Regulatory Commission. MANU/ET/0191/2012. 
260 The cases also bring to fore instances where the Commission was found wanting in its 
adjudicatory role as a quasi-judicial body. There were instances when the Commission did not 
answer the question posed by the AT, when it remanded a case for reconsideration. See M/s. 
S.N.J. Sugars and Products Limited V. Transmission Corporation of Andhra Pradesh Limited. 
300 
 
 
8.11.9. Court’s Specific Observations Regarding the Coordination between 
the Commission and State Utilities 
 
Given the parameters of judicial restraint, courts usually refrain from 
commenting on issues that are extraneous to the legality of the matter before 
them. However, in the course of its adjudication, APHC did observe that there 
was coordination between the activities of the Commission and the State 
owned utilities. The specific observations, discussed herein, were made in the 
context of appeals arising from the order or conduct of the Commission. In one 
case arising from the order of the Commission prohibiting third party sales by 
the private generators, the APHC observed as follows  
‘By the impugned order, it appears to us that while lifting the 
A.P.TRANSCO from the debt traps, the Regulatory Commission has 
thrown the private companies into debt traps’.261 
In a matter concerning an exorbitant increase in wheeling charges payable by 
the generators to APTRANSCO from 2% promised by State government to 
promote private investment to 56.8% after the Reform Act 1998 came into 
                                                          
MANU/ET/0024/2013 and M/s. Konaseema Gas Power Limited V. Andhra Pradesh Electricity 
Regulatory Commission and Ors. MANU/ET/0044/2013. In other cases, it did the 
inconceivable, i.e. it decided the matter on merits while observing that the cause of action was 
barred by limitation. See Lanco Kondapalli Power Limited V. Andhra Pradesh Electricity 
Regulatory Commission. MANU/ET/0004/2015 . The Commission also passed orders beyond 
the scope of the relief claimed. See R.V.K. Energy Pvt. Ltd., Hyderabad V. A.P.S.E.B., 
Hyderabad and Anr. 2002(3) ALD 196. The first Commission under the 1998 Act levied grid 
supply charges and wheeling charges only to be struck down, as the Commission did not have 
the statutory power to impose them. The cases of Vishnu Cements Limited V. Central Power 
Distribution Company of Andhra Pradesh Limited and Anr. 2003(4) ALD 405 and RCI Power 
Limited V. Union of India (UOI) and Ors. 2003(3) ALD 762 discuss the issues pertaining to 
grid supply charges and wheeling charges respectively.  
261 R.V.K. Energy Pvt. Ltd., Hyderabad V. A.P.S.E.B., Hyderabad and Anr. 2002(3) ALD 196, 
Para 15. 
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effect, the APHC observed that there was active collusion between the 
Commission and APTRANSCO.262  In its words,  
‘A reading of the impugned order shows how the Commission went out 
of the way to pull out the licensee from the debt trap. From various 
orders passed by the Commission, we have a feeling that the 
Commission is acting more as an agent of the licensee and trying to 
save the sinking ship under its own weight at the cost of private 
Generating Companies’.263   
In one another case questioning the fixation of Fuel Surcharge Allowance 
without consulting the consumers, APHC set aside the order of the 
Commission and the judge opined as follows264  
‘Before parting with this judgment, I am compelled to observe that the 
functioning of the Commission as revealed in the present proceedings 
is unsatisfactory and not in consonance with the objective for which the 
Commission was created. The record of proceedings shows the failure 
of the Commission to discharge its functions. The proceedings indeed 
show a state of affairs and leave much to be desired’.265  
In one case, the Commission condoned the delay of the state owned 
distribution utilities in filing their quarterly applications for Fuel Surcharge 
Adjustment despite the regulations explicitly barring it.266   APHC observed 
                                                          
262 RCI Power Limited V. Union of India (UOI) and Ors. 2003(3) ALD 762. 
263 RCI Power Limited V. Union of India (UOI) and Ors. 2003(3) ALD 762, Para 176. 
264 India Cements Ltd. and Anr. V. Chairman, APSERC, Hyderabad and Ors. 2011(6) ALD 35. 
265 India Cements Ltd. and Anr. V. Chairman, APSERC, Hyderabad and Ors. 2011(6) ALD 35.  
, Para 134. 
266 APHC 15 (III) M/s. Jairaj Ispat Limited, Rep. and Ors. V. A.P. Electricity Regulatory 
Commission and Ors. MANU/AP/1398/2012. 
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that the Commission had to act in an impartial manner and should not have 
favoured the distribution companies at the cost of sacrificing consumer 
interest.267 
8.12. Intermittent Moments of Autonomy and the Emergence of the 
Commission as a Deliberative Space  
 
As discussed, the notion of SASF discussed here endorses Merry’s idea of 
permeable nature of SASF owing to semi-autonomy, allowing it to both give 
effect to normativity of state law and resist it when it is opposed to the same 
(Merry 1988:878). Dubash in his analysis of the functioning of the regulator in 
Andhra Pradesh observes that the regulator, in pursuance of the statutory 
mandate, has formulated regulations so as to facilitate public hearings, 
established a consumer advisory committee allowing the interests of various 
consumers to be represented and a website that provides information 
regarding its functioning (Dubash 2013:109). He observes that the consumer 
groups in Andhra Pradesh ‘have somewhat disrupted and injected themselves 
into the triangular negotiation between APERC, the government, and the 
utility. The main avenue for doing so is forcing release of information, and 
forcing public, documented, responses to raised objections, thereby limiting 
the extent to which adjustments in key parameters can be made behind the 
scenes’ (Dubash 2013:110). It appears that the procedural aspects of the 
regulatory mechanism in the nature of public hearings and the need to respond 
to objections during the tariff fixation process have indeed made minor inroads 
                                                          
267 APHC 15 (III) M/s. Jairaj Ispat Limited, Rep. and Ors. V. A.P. Electricity Regulatory 
Commission and Ors. MANU/AP/1398/2012, Para 43. It should also be noted that the period 
of non-filing of FSA also corresponds with the year preceding the elections. The FSA’s were 
filed after the elections. This case also reveals the revenues lost owing to this political 
coordination. 
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into what was a very insular arrangement under the APSEB. Interactions with 
civil society interveners before the Commission in course of the field work 
strengthens this observation of Dubash. 
Sreekumar Nhalur from Prayas Energy Group, a prominent civil society 
organisation working in the area of electricity regulation, was of the view that 
the Commission is far more approachable and its functioning is far more 
transparent than the previous SEB related arrangements (Nhalur 2014). 
Peddireddi, a prominent farmer leader, is of the view that the Commission 
provides an alternate forum for greater deliberation on issues of quality of 
service which could not be debated in the arena of popular politics (Peddireddi 
2014). Madduri Thimma Reddy, from the People’s Monitoring Group on 
Electricity Regulation, a prominent civil society intervener before the 
Commission, was of the view that the present regulatory framework was far 
more effective than the past framework, but the way it is implemented is 
problematic (Madduri 2014). The need to implement the regulations in 
pursuance of the statutory mandate appears to have given a foothold for the 
civil society interveners to hold the actors under the statutory regulatory 
arrangements accountable. 
 However, it is still a long way before a culture of deliberative decision making 
is established. Civil society interveners observe that in the initial years of 
establishment the Commission used to organize regular public consultations 
on a variety of topics, that public hearings at present were restricted to 
deciding the tariff petitions (Nhalur 2014). Even though the number of 
submissions before Commission during the tariff determination proceedings 
are relatively high, they comprise of multiple similar submissions (Madduri 
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2014). Submissions made by a few interveners are copied by others. That this 
is primarily owing to absence of adequate capacity in the civil society and 
consumer groups to participate in an extremely technocratic process (Madduri 
2014). 
8.13. Conclusion  
 
The aforementioned discussion on the creation of the sectoral SASF and the 
resultant processes of self-regulation points to the conclusion that it is not 
popular expectations and mass politics that are the cause of the failure of the 
sectoral arrangements proposed by the Bank. The Bank’s model did not take 
into account the relative weakness of state law vis-à-vis the societal process 
in India and the ability of societal processes to mould the state’s institutional 
organisation and consequently its behaviour. The Bank failed to understand 
that legal regulation of economic activity in sectors associated with mass 
politics must necessarily address the processes associated with the way the 
state reorganises itself in response to the political processes, rather than 
isolate state regulation from politics. This approach becomes essential given 
the semi-autonomous nature of the Indian state. The Bank’s model on the 
other hand was premised on the autonomous nature of the state and ability of 
law to further strengthen its autonomy.  
As discussed, the self-regulatory processes owe their origin to the conscious 
constitution of a sectoral SASF by the State government acknowledging the 
electoral expectations of an interventionist state, which was opposed to the 
statutory normativity (public law) reflective of regulatory state. The normativity 
of the regulatory state and interventionist state also result in the state 
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organising itself in a disaggregated and re-aggregated manner. The dynamics 
within the SASF, i.e. processes of self-regulation, lead to the emergence of 
legal pluralism in sectoral state law. The two variants of state law are the 
statutory or public law and processes of self-regulation. It is pertinent to note 
that the processes of self-regulation emerge as a consequence of the 
constitution of the sectoral SASF by the state. The processes of self-regulation 
as discussed, have an adverse effect on the State’s finances, decisions 
pertaining to the allocation of the resource, i.e. electricity, private sector 
participation and consumer interests. This necessarily implies that the focus 
of sectoral regulatory arrangements must be on regulation of self-regulatory 
processes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
306 
 
Chapter 9 – Conclusion 
 
9.1. Summing Up  
 
The national state in India embraced the regulatory state model in 1991, which 
was to be implemented in the State level electricity sector through legislation 
based on the Bank’s 1993 Policy (World Bank 1993a). The rationale for the 
turn to the regulatory state was that previous sectoral decision making was too 
politicised and resulted in inefficient provision of electricity and draining of the 
public exchequer. The Bank’s conditionality at a time of crisis, i.e. the early 
1990’s, further facilitated this transition. Law was seen by the Bank and other 
multilateral financial institutions as a means to roll back the state in keeping 
with the Washington Consensus (Tshuma 1999:76). Though legal reform 
necessarily implied a foray into political issues, the Bank justified it by stating 
that legal reform was necessitated by and aimed at ‘institutional 
transformation’ as part of its governance agenda (Faundez 2010:181-183). 
The legislation implementing the 1993 Policy, especially the principles of 
commercialisation, corporatisation and transparent regulation aimed to 
institutionally disaggregate the State by unbundling the SEB and establishing 
a sectoral regulator. In what came to be known as the Orissa model, the 
principles of the 1993 Policy were translated into domestic legislative 
provisions by international consultants with little regard for understanding the 
unique attributes of the role of the state (national and State) in economic 
activity in India.  
The State of Andhra Pradesh, though aware of the global and national state’s 
tilt towards a regulatory state and reform process in Orissa, undertook an 
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internal sectoral evaluation exercise through the HLC, comprising bureaucrats 
and technocrats. HLC’s recommendations emphasised the necessity for 
sectoral coordination within public ownership and a more gradual approach to 
reforms. It advocated a cautious approach to realigning the existing sectoral 
dynamics and privatisation. Its recommendations included the establishment 
of a sectoral regulator headed by a judicial member reflecting the larger 
constitutional scheme of checks and balances. It vested in the regulator, the 
power to determine access to sectoral resources, be it the quantum of subsidy 
or cross-subsidy across the different categories of consumers. This included 
acknowledging the political significance of sectoral subsidies, need for 
institutional coordination across electricity generation, transmission and 
distribution, and giving due regard to the concerns of the employees, 
technocrats and bureaucrats associated with the SEB and the sector. The 
recommendations and observations of the HLC appear to reflect an 
understanding of the attributes of the role of the Indian state (national and 
State) in economic activity and the State in the electricity sector.  
The unique attributes of the Indian state (national and State) include the 
influence of changing global notions of the role of the state in economic activity 
and the relative weakness of state vis-à-vis social forces described by Bardhan 
as the ‘dominant coalition’ (Bardhan 1998). However, this weakness is only 
relative as the state retains the ability to influence social change. Another key 
feature is the non-autonomous (Bardhan 1998; Mukherji 2016) or semi-
autonomous attribute of the Indian state, resulting from external and internal 
tensions. The external tensions include the changing global dominant 
consensus on the role of the state in economic activity. The reasons for the 
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internal tensions include the Constituent Assembly’s procedural solution, 
which rejected juridification in favour of linking the scope and extent of the role 
of the state in economic activity with electoral expectations. This led to the 
emergence of a functional normative system (Tamanaha 2008) focussed on 
the redistribution function of the state, with periodic elections reinforcing the 
interventionist expectations from the state. The same also led to the 
emergence of politics of resource allocation in India and the emergence of the 
‘dominant coalition’ (Bardhan 1998). The non-juridification of the role of the 
state in economic activity also led to inter-institutional tensions between the 
judiciary, on one hand, and the executive and legislature on the other. The 
national state’s act of embracing the regulatory state ideology after 1991 
generated further inter-institutional tensions and tensions between the national 
state and the States.  
Despite having undertaken an internal exercise evaluating institutional and 
corresponding legislative options for sectoral reform, the State of Andhra 
Pradesh’s reformist Chief Minister approached the Bank in anticipation of 
financial assistance. Andhra Pradesh adopted the Orissa Model incorporating 
the 1993 Policy. This translated into unbundling the monolithic APSEB into 
commercially independent generation, transmission and distribution utilities 
and establishing an autonomous sectoral regulator in pursuance of the Reform 
Act 1998. In Andhra Pradesh, the process of depoliticisation through legal 
instrumentalism was inimical to the interests of the ‘dominant coalition’, 
especially the rich farmers, career bureaucrats and technocrats associated 
with the sector, and electoral expectations of an interventionist and 
redistributionist state in the sector. TDP’s 2004 electoral defeat brought to light 
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the inherently political nature of legal reform aimed at depoliticising sectoral 
regulation. This in turn sent a clear political signal requiring the state to 
reposition itself as a disburser of resources. While such repositioning could be 
achieved with relative ease in the sphere of politics, given the posturing of the 
Congress during the 2004 elections, this was more challenging in the field of 
law. 
The experience of establishing a regulatory state in Andhra Pradesh’s 
electricity sector corresponds with Dubash and Morgan’s observation that 
political influences on the regulatory decision-making processes impede the 
implementation of rules associated with a regulatory state (Dubash and 
Morgan 2013). Haines observes a similar phenomenon, in what she describes 
as the ‘less than intended’ consequences of regulatory globalisation owing to 
the influence of the unique attributes of a jurisdictional space (Haines 2003). 
In the context of legal interventions accompanying economic globalisation, 
Tshuma opines that such interventions have ‘unintended consequences’, 
which includes the emergence of legal pluralism (Tshuma 1999).  
Thus the 1998 Act, incorporating the 1993 Policy of the Bank intended to 
institutionally reorganise and regulate the State of Andhra Pradesh, but 
resulted in ‘less than intended’ consequences and legal pluralism in sectoral 
state law. The reasons for the emergence of legal pluralism include the semi-
autonomous attribute of the Indian state (national and State) and it being prone 
to the influence of a strong society. The discussion regarding the SASF 
brought to the fore the fact that the state is not a monolithic whole, but is one 
amongst the many SASFs in society, and that different states exhibit different 
levels of autonomy (Reyntjens 2015; Sportel 2011). Mukherji’s observation 
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that the Indian state ‘is so penetrated by social actors’ that it does not display 
the requisite autonomy of a development state (Mukherji 2016:219-220) 
supports the argument of a semi-autonomous Indian state. The thesis 
demonstrates that it is these same forces that allowed the state to organise 
itself ‘ideologically’ (normatively) and ‘organizationally’ (institutionally) in 
response to the influence of ‘ideological and political forces’ (Merry 1988:891; 
Moore 2001:107). The result is a reassertion of the normativity of the 
interventionist state through an institutional re-aggregation of the legislatively 
disaggregated regulatory state. This was made possible through bureaucratic 
self-organisation resulting in self-regulation leading to the emergence of plural 
forms of sectoral State law.  
The operation of the alternate sectoral state law is demonstrated through the 
structural and behavioural aspects of self-organisation and resultant self-
regulation. Regarding the structural aspect, the thesis demonstrates that the 
sectoral SASF is ‘consciously constructed’ (Moore 1973) through 
administrative orders and intra-governmental transfers. The consciously 
constructed self-organising processes aimed at resisting the normativity of the 
regulatory state are operationalised by the very actors vested with the statutory 
duty to operationalise a sectoral regulatory state. The APPCC, brought into 
existence through an executive order of the government of Andhra Pradesh, 
is one example of such a structural arrangement aimed at reaggregating the 
disaggregated utility. It comprises bureaucrats and technocrats of the 
disaggregated utilities, and has been constituted with the objective of 
maintaining uniform consumer tariffs to avert electoral discontent. Similarly, a 
study of the staffing patterns and appointments to the Commission made over 
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15 years, from 1999 to 2014, revealed that particular services have laid claim 
to the different functional specialisations of the Commission. Over time, the 
first three layers of the Commission’s hierarchy came to be staffed by the 
larger public bureaucracy and sectoral technocracy, eroding the institutional 
autonomy of the Commission.  
The behavioural aspects of the alternate legality, i.e. self-regulatory 
arrangements, in the electricity sector of Andhra Pradesh are characterised by 
the drawbacks of self-regulation. The drawbacks amongst others include the 
absence of democratic accountability, the possible negative impact of 
decisions of actors in self-regulatory arrangements on third parties and an 
inability to rein in errant members and the tendency of actors in self-regulatory 
processes to cartelise and impose barriers to entry for other actors (Baldwin 
et al 2012; Graham 1994; Ogus 1995). These issues have been established 
through a review of decisions of appellate bodies in 54 cases with a direct 
bearing on the principles of commercialisation, corporatisation and 
independent regulation; principles that the Reform Act 1998 endeavoured to 
institutionalise through legal reform. Thus, there is self-regulation by the 
sectoral actors associated with disaggregated utilities comprising the erstwhile 
SEB and the larger State bureaucracy and consequent legal pluralism in 
sectoral state law. This institutional re-aggregation by the actors responsible 
for implementing the statutory normativity of the Reform Act 1998 makes the 
statute less than effective (Haines 2003; Tshuma 1999). The institutional re-
aggregation mimics the coordinating framework recommended by the HLC, 
which was aware of the true sectoral dynamics and the sectoral attributes of 
the State of Andhra Pradesh.  
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From a methodological perspective, the analytical construct of ‘regulatory 
space’ (Hancher and Moran 1989) helped understanding the unique attributes 
of the state’s role in economic activity and the associated actor dynamics 
beyond the narrow statutory and institutional confines. The methodology of 
‘principles, actors and mechanisms’ (Braithwaite and Drahos 2000) 
complements the spatial approach to regulation, especially in the present 
context of observing global dissemination of regulatory norms. Moore’s notion 
of SASF explains the institutional re-organisation of the non-autonomous 
Indian state (at the sectoral level) to give effect to the normativity of the 
interventionist state (Moore 1973). A combination of these three 
methodologies helps establish the emergence of legal pluralism in sectoral 
state law in India. 
9.2. Ability of the Indian State to Accommodate Competing and 
Conflicting Normativities  
 
At the root of the emergence of legal pluralism in sectoral state law are the 
normative notions associated with the role of the Indian state (national and 
State) in economic activity and the ability of the Indian state to accommodate 
the competing notions. The Constituent Assembly’s endeavour to resist the 
path of juridification of the role of the state in economic activity allows both 
national state and State to accommodate the opposing normativities. The 
question asked is how are the national state and State able to accommodate 
these competing notions of their role in economic activity? What is the basis 
of the uneasy coexistence which takes place without fracture of the state 
apparatus, chaos and administrative disarray? It is observed that the capacity 
of the Indian state (national and State) to accommodate and institutionally 
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reorganise itself in relation to the competing normativities arises out of 
constitutional pluralism, owing to the deliberate endeavour of the 
Constitution’s drafters to prevent juridification of the role of the state in 
economic activity. This notion of constitutional pluralism was further nurtured 
through the intra-institutional tensions between the legislature and the 
executive on one hand and the judiciary on the other in relation to the 
interpretation of the constitutional provisions on the role of the national state 
and State in economic activity.  
It is argued that the non-acknowledgement of the alternate institutional 
arrangements by state law (national and State) resulted in the law’s inability to 
rein in the sectoral dynamics it was designed to address, namely politicisation 
and the entrenched interests of the dominant coalition. This creates an uneasy 
relationship between the two normativities, unlike the earlier consensus on a 
mixed economy where areas of operation of the state and private activity were 
segregated through a consensus between the state and the private actors. 
True, the Indian state (national and State) can accommodate conflicting 
normativities and their institutional manifestations; however, it is argued that 
the limited power to regulate the sectoral dynamics are expended in 
accommodating and maintaining this uneasy coexistence, rather than focusing 
on the sectoral issues pertaining to allocation of resources and quality of 
supply. This is one of the reasons for the sectoral finances not improving and 
the sector continuing to be a drain on the national state and State’s finances, 
and the resource continues to be controlled and appropriated by the 
constituents of the dominant coalition. Given this scenario, the challenge for 
the Indian state (national and State) is to establish how best to leverage its 
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relatively strong regulatory capacity vis-à-vis the dominant coalition in order to 
achieve the constitutional mandate of ensuring that ‘the ownership and control 
of the material resources of the community are so distributed as best to 
subserve the common good’.268 
9.3. Need for Regulatory Interventions in India to Move Beyond 
Institutionalising a Particular Normativity  
 
Dubash and Morgan (2013) acknowledge that ‘rule based’ institutional 
solutions may not be the best way forward for developing country jurisdictions 
where politics inevitably impedes the functioning of rules aimed at establishing 
a regulatory state. They are, however, of the view that the same does not 
render the rules irrelevant. Dubash and Morgan lean on the literature of the 
development state and advocate embedding the regulatory state through the 
notion of ‘embedded autonomy’. Amongst other ideas, they advocate 
deliberative politics as a means to embed the regulatory state. In the context 
of the implementation of the Reform Act 1998 in Andhra Pradesh, procedural 
aspects in the nature of public hearings and corresponding deliberations 
before the Commission appear to have been able to check some of the self-
regulatory processes by making the Commission accountable. Civil society 
actors, consumer activists and farmers’ leaders have endorsed this 
observation (Nhalur 2014; Madduri 2014; Peddireddi 2014). That said, it is 
argued that the deliberative space within the present regulatory arrangements 
is not a neutral space and is an embodiment of the normativity associated with 
the regulatory state. As described by Karen Yeung (2010), the term regulatory 
state is used to connote a roll-back of the state from the policy of 
                                                          
268 Article 39(b) of the Constitution of India. 
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interventionism associated with the welfare state and the developmental state. 
It is argued that the same will limit the scope of deliberations before the 
Commission and corresponding regulatory interventions to those advocating 
a minimalist state. This is opposed to the popular expectations of an 
interventionist state, which uses its role in economic activity to reduce 
inequalities by promoting equitable access to electricity.  
In the Indian context, it is argued that it is neither possible nor desirable to 
institutionalise or embed a particular normativity, be it interventionist or 
regulatory. It is not possible to embed the rationality of the regulatory state as 
the state in India is semi-autonomous and porous, whereas autonomy is the 
prerequisite for embedding or institutionalising. It is not desirable because the 
statutory regulatory arrangements and the deliberative space within the 
regulator are not merely there to check errant political resource allocation but 
represent a particular normativity, i.e. the normativity of a regulatory state 
which is opposed to the political normativity of an interventionist state.  
The historical examination of the role of the Indian state (national and State) 
in economic activity in the foregoing chapters has made the Indian state’s 
inability to institutionalise a particular normativity abundantly clear. In the late 
1960’s and early 1970’s, Indira Gandhi’s push towards nationalisation and 
state intervention, and corresponding constitutional amendments in pursuance 
of her version of socialist state interventionism, targeted private capitalists and 
businesses whilst catering to the interests of the rich farmers and bureaucrats. 
This resulted in the politics of resource mobilisation, leading to a fiscal crisis 
and the eventual tilt to a regulatory state. In Andhra Pradesh’s electricity 
sector, this attempt at institutionalising an interventionist state resulted in the 
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industrialists being burdened with excessive cross subsidies, making 
electricity from the State-owned utilities expensive. This made the 
industrialists invest in captive generation, resulting in greater losses for 
APSEB. These events in the early 1990’s provided the narrow constituency of 
industrialists, national politicians, technocrats and bureaucrats with the 
opportunity to usher in a regulatory state, which attempted to restrain the role 
of the state in economic activity through institutional restructuring. However, 
both attempts of the Indian state (national and State) to vociferously advocate 
a particular normativity as informing the role of the state in economic activity, 
be it Indira Gandhi’s version of an interventionist state or that of the post 1991 
regulatory state, had to confront the reality of a powerful society, and the ability 
of the dominant coalition to influence the state (national and State) to do its 
bidding. In Andhra Pradesh’s electricity sector, this translated into the resource 
being prioritised to cater to the rich farmers to the detriment of the industrialists 
and the underprivileged. Thus, the dominant coalition representing the rich 
farmers, bureaucrats and technocrats was able to undermine the Reform Act 
1998 and the corresponding institutional changes through alternate 
institutional reorganisation resulting in legal pluralism. 
However, the same does not necessarily imply that institutions do not have a 
role in the regulation of economic activity and promoting equitable resource 
allocation. It is argued that the Indian state (national and State) must deploy 
institutions within a much larger strategy aimed at engaging the whole gamut 
of actors in the regulatory space. The same calls for regulatory interventions 
to engage the sectoral dynamics, rather than insulate and confine them to a 
rigid predefined institutional framework. Institutions and their mandate must be 
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designed to accommodate and mediate the competing notions of the role of 
the state in economic activity. It is argued that such an approach helps 
acknowledge the self-regulating processes and engage them. The next 
section elaborates this approach in the context of Andhra Pradesh’s electricity 
sector.  
9.4. Regulation as Engaging Spatial Dynamics and Mediating Actor 
Relationships 
 
The spatial approach to sectoral regulation that is discussed in this section is 
premised on acknowledging the semi-autonomous nature of the Indian state 
and its relative weakness vis-à-vis the dominant coalition. It differs from the 
Bank’s approach of insulating economic decision making from the larger social 
and political dynamics by institutionalising a particular normativity. In the 
context of the present discussion pertaining to the electricity sector this 
approach translates into four specific interventions, namely: acknowledging 
the inter-institutional tensions; the nature of the political discourse and the 
underlying power-play of the dominant coalition; the role of deliberative politics 
before the Commission and a more nuanced understanding of the way the 
sectoral participants organise themselves, as reflected in the HLC’s 
recommendations. It incorporates elements of the HLC’s recommendations, 
Dubash and Morgan’s observation regarding the role of the deliberative 
processes in strengthening regulatory oversight; and the need to make 
deliberations associated with regulatory decision-making part of the larger 
political discourse as opposed to the present scenario of limiting them to 
deliberations within the regulatory institution, i.e. the Commission. This 
translates into the following suggestions. 
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9.4.1. Strengthening the Institution of the Regulator, i.e. the Commission 
 
The Commission, as established by the Reform Act 1998, is presently co-
opted into the larger sectoral bureaucracy and technocracy. A conscious 
attempt has to be made to effectively put a ban on appointments through 
deputation and employment of retired contractual employees. One of the 
suggestions that has been mooted is the creation of an all India (national) 
‘Regulatory Service’ to train a distinct cadre of personnel with an 
understanding of the activity of regulation and the technocratic wherewithal 
presently in the exclusive domain of the State-owned utilities. Also, the fact 
that it will be a national level service helps exploit the tensions between the 
national state and the States, given the national state’s endeavour to establish 
a regulatory state and the State level state resisting such an attempt. This will 
allow the Commission to develop a distinct independent identity and reduce, if 
not totally eliminate the influence of the State government. 
The second suggestion to strengthen the institutional independence of the 
Commission would be to implement the HLC’s suggestion of a judicial 
appointee heading the Commission. This is to prevent the present practice of 
bureaucrats regulating bureaucrats and the resultant shortcomings of self-
regulation. As observed in the review of appellate cases arising from the 
orders of the Commission, the judiciary has always been critical of the 
functioning of the Commission and the erosion of the Commission’s 
independence. Unlike the bureaucrats who merely associate the Regulatory 
Commission with career progression, higher status and salaries, a judicial 
appointee is not affected by such considerations. Such an approach also 
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compliments the larger scheme of constitutional checks and balances and 
leverages the inter-institutional tensions. 
 The third suggestion to strengthen the institutional framework of the 
Commission would be to strengthen the deliberative processes as suggested 
by Dubash and Morgan (2013). No doubt, as observed by the civil society 
interveners and farmers and consumer groups, the deliberative processes 
before the Commission are a big leap forward in comparison with the secretive 
SEB. However, the nature and scope of deliberations appear to differ over 
time. Further, though the number of submissions as noted by Dubash (2013) 
appear numerous, Madduri (2014) observes that they are merely repetitions 
of the submissions of a select few. This is primarily because of the highly 
technocratic and complex nature of the tariff setting process and the 
associated deliberations. The generation of an effective debate on regulatory 
issues before the Commission requires an increase in the capacity of civil 
society and consumer rights groups to participate in the deliberative 
processes. This will in turn ensure that the Commission functions in 
accordance with its statutory mandate. 
9.4.2. Making Regulatory Deliberations Part of the Larger Political Discourse  
 
It is argued that there is a need to deliberate regulatory issues such as 
quantum of tariff and quality of power suppled in the political discourse 
influencing electoral outcomes. This suggestion does not endeavour to 
dismiss mass politics as being irrelevant. It acknowledges that mass politics in 
India reflect the popular expectations from the state and infuse the normativity 
of interventionist state. It does, however, call for a more nuanced political 
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discourse surrounding the pricing and allocation of electricity for a more 
equitable allocation of the resource. Such an approach acknowledges that the 
foundational issue for sectoral regulation in Andhra Pradesh is the underlying 
social and economic inequalities allowing the constituents of the ‘dominant 
coalition’ to influence the state to act on their behalf, amongst other means, by 
influencing political preferences. However, insulating economic decision-
making through legislated institutional autonomy is not a solution, given the 
semi-autonomous and permeable attribute of the Indian state and its 
propensity to be influenced by the dominant social forces. 
Mukherji (2014), in his empirical study on agricultural electricity consumption 
patterns in Andhra Pradesh, established that it is the rich landlords who benefit 
from free electricity, rather than the marginal and small farmers. However, 
during the 2004 elections, Naidu’s rational analysis regarding sectoral fortunes 
and the possibility of supplying quality electricity for longer hours if it were 
subsidised, rather than YSR’s claim to free electricity, fell on deaf ears. As 
predicted by Naidu, free electricity was qualitatively poorer and was supplied 
late in the night and for a much shorter time than required by farmers. Had the 
regulatory deliberations regarding the quality of supply and associated costs 
been made part of the discourse of ‘mass politics’, the electorate, especially 
the small agriculturalist, would have understood the true implications of their 
voting preferences. In terms of social hierarchy, the upper castes are also the 
landlords. It is argued that making regulatory deliberations part of the larger 
political discourse will also raise awareness and give legitimacy to the 
demands of the oppressed. This will also generate a dialogue to resist the 
demands of the rich landlords, whilst also enabling equitable and qualitative 
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provision and utilisation of the scarce resource. This way, the discourse in the 
arena of ‘mass politics’ will strengthen the deliberations within the regulator.  
9.4.3. Acknowledging the True Nature of Sectoral Organisation and Adopting 
an Incremental Approach to Sectoral Reform  
 
The re-aggregation of the disaggregated utilities, mimicking the institutional 
structure of the SEB, is reflective of the larger bureaucratic and technocratic 
consensus regarding the sectoral organisation. As observed by Marina 
Kurkchiyan (2009), the way an institutional transplant is internalised reflects 
the true nature of a society. The members of the HLC were aware of this 
organisational structure and were of the view that the same emerged from the 
state’s role in sectoral coordination and conflict management. Accordingly, 
they advised an incremental approach to disaggregation of the SEB and 
proposed that the SEB be retained as a holding company to coordinate the 
activities of generation, transmission and distribution performed by 
subsidiaries. The HLC advocated a cautious approach to privatisation and was 
of the view that privatisation could wait till such time as the utilities developed 
the internal capacity to manage their affairs. It was also acutely aware of the 
nature of employee resistance and prescribed a policy of rewards in the nature 
of employee stock options and greater employee engagement prior to 
disaggregation. 
The Bank’s approach, implemented through the Reform Act 1998, however, 
wanted to follow a pre-set accelerated schedule for sectoral disaggregation. It 
is observed that the immediate disaggregation of the SEB also resulted in a 
dispersal of internal managerial capacity, prompting a re-aggregation through 
the institutional process of APPCC. The government order constituting the 
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APPCC, amongst other reasons, clearly states that the said arrangement is to 
support the newly formed distribution companies, which have no prior 
experience in matters pertaining to power procurement and facilitate a 
smoother transition. The absence of any tangible benefits but for talk of career 
progression within the disaggregated entity, which was likely to be privatised, 
resulted in the employees taking a rigid approach to their service conditions. 
The tripartite agreements ensured the continuation of governmental service 
conditions, making the unbundled utilities less attractive for private investment. 
The uncovering of the alternate institutional processes mimicking the erstwhile 
SEB, the absence of adequate managerial expertise to function as a corporate 
entity, evidenced by increasing dependence on consultants, and the inability 
to ward off State government’s interventions point to the prudence of HLC’s 
incremental approach to reform through co-optation and the capacity building 
of the utility’s employees. The present institutional organisation mimics the 
pre-reform patterns. It is therefore suggested that the State government revisit 
the reform process and adopt incremental measures along the lines suggested 
by the HLC, so as to better implement the principles of corporatisation and 
commercialisation.  
The unique regulatory attributes of every jurisdiction (Haines 2003) determine 
the way regulatory models are received and implemented (Merry 2006; 
Kurkchiyan 2009). The Bank sponsored regulatory reforms endeavoured to 
regulate the Indian state. However, the normative and institutional elements of 
the Bank’s global 1993 Policy were moulded to the way the Indian state 
organised itself in response to the democratic expectations and the interests 
of the dominant coalition. This resulted in a ‘less than intended’ consequence 
323 
 
i.e. the inability to give effect to the statutory mandate reflective of the global 
model and emergence of legal pluralism in sectoral state law. The foregoing 
analysis establishes the limitations of regulatory globalisation and the need for 
formulating regulatory interventions by taking local knowledge and societal 
dynamics into consideration. 
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Annexure I 
To,                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
The State Public Information Officer, 
Andhra Pradesh Electricity Regulatory Commission,  
A P E RC, # 11-4-660, 
 4 th Floor, Singareni Bhavan, 
 Red Hills, Hyderabad - 500 004. 
 
Respected Sir 
                 Subject: Application for Information Under the Right to Information 
Act, 2005.  
 
The following information is sought from your organisation under the 
provisions of the Right to Information Act, 2005. Part II of the Andhra Pradesh 
Electricity Reform Act, 1998 provides for the constitution of the Andhra 
Pradesh Electricity Regulatory Commission. Section 3 Clause 2 prescribes 
that there shall be Two Members and One Chairman. The Andhra Pradesh 
Electricity Regulatory Commission (Appointment of Chairman and Members) 
Rules 1999 provides for the selection procedure of the Chairman and 
Members of the Commission.  
 
The applicant hereby requests the information in the format specified below, 
with relation to the qualifications and career information of the Members and 
Chairmen of the Andhra Pradesh Electricity Regulatory Commission prior to 
their appointment as Members and Chairpersons as per the records of the 
Andhra Pradesh Electricity Regulatory Commission and also certain 
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information pertaining to their tenure in office. The statutory provisions 
mentioned in the preceding paragraph provide for appointment of one 
Chairman and two Members. For the sake of clarity the positions of members 
have been demarcated as Member 1 and Member 2.  
The information is being sought for the period July 22nd 1999 till 10th 
October 2014.  
Sl.No. Position Name of 
Person 
Officiating  
Tenure 
in Post  
Details of  
Qualifications and 
Position/Employment 
Prior to Appointment  
 
Time 
Period(s) 
Position 
was 
Vacant. 
1 Chairman      
2 Member 
1 
    
3 Member 
2  
    
 
With regards 
Adithya  Krishna Chintapanti 
A-23(2-2-18/31) 
Durgabai Deshmukh Colony 
Hyderabad – 500013 
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Annexure II 
To,                                                                                                                                                                              Date: 
The State Public Information Officer, 
Andhra Pradesh Electricity Regulatory Commission,  
A P E RC, # 11-4-660, 4 th Floor, Singareni Bhavan, 
 Red Hills, Hyderabad - 500 004. 
 
Respected Sir 
                     Subject: Application for Information Under the Right to Information Act, 2005.  
 
The following information is sought from your organisation under the provisions of the Right to Information Act, 2005. 
The Andhra Pradesh Electricity Regulatory Commission (Method of Recruitment and Conditions of Service of Officers and Staff) 
Regulations, 1999;  The Andhra Pradesh Electricity Regulatory Commission (Method of Recruitment and Conditions of Service of 
Officers and Staff) (First Amendment) Regulation, 2006;  and The  Supplementary Regulation to Principal Regulation (No.3 of 1999)  
of Andhra Pradesh Electricity Regulatory Commission (Method of Recruitment and Conditions of Service of Officers and Staff) 
Regulation, 2013 , have governed the sanctioned strength, method of recruitment and conditions of service of the Officers and Staff 
of the Andhra Pradesh Electricity Regulatory Commission.  
 
The applicant hereby requests the following information in the format specified below divided into queries following the sanctioned 
strengths, staffing patterns and mode of recruitment as specified by the 1999 regulations and subsequent amendments and 
supplementary regulations. The information is being sought for the period July 22nd 1999 till 10th October 2014.  
 
Query 1. Please provide information regarding all officers recruited/appointed /promoted/officiating in the following posts as 
enumerated in the Andhra Pradesh Electricity Regulatory Commission (Method of Recruitment and Conditions of Service of Officers 
and Staff) Regulations, 1999 as amended by The Andhra Pradesh Electricity Regulatory Commission (Method of Recruitment and 
Conditions of Service of Officers and Staff) (First Amendment) Regulation, 2006 for the time period July 22nd 1999 till July 30th 
2013. 
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Sl.
No
. 
Post of Officer Name 
of 
Officer
. 
Nature of 
Appointment. Please 
specify the following: 
a. Regular basis. 
b. Contract 
services 
c. On deputation.  
d. Others 
(Please Specify) 
Tenur
e in 
the 
post. 
Prior employment 
or position held. 
Or 
Parent 
Department/ 
Organisation if on 
deputation.  
Position 
occupied or 
employment 
after 
relinquishing 
charge.  
Or  
Department or 
Organisation 
deputed to 
after 
relinquishing 
charge.  
Time 
Period(s) 
Position 
was Vacant.  
 Commission Secretary       
 Director Engineering        
 Director/Law        
 Director/Tariff       
 Director/Administration        
 Adviser to Commission 
(Post 1) 
      
 Adviser to Commission 
(Post 2) 
      
 Adviser to Commission 
(Post 3)  
      
 Joint Director/Engineering        
 Joint Director/Law       
 Joint Director/Tariff 
(Accounts & Financial 
Analysis)  
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 Joint Director /Tariff 
(Economics) 
      
 Joint Director /Tariff 
(Engineering)  
      
 Joint Director /Information 
Technology 
      
 Deputy 
Director/Transmission 
      
 Deputy 
Director/Distribution  
(Post 1) 
      
 Deputy 
Director/Distribution 
(Post 2) 
      
 Deputy Director /Law 
(Post 1) 
      
 Deputy Director /Law 
(Post 2) 
      
 Deputy Director/Tariff 
(Accounts & Financial 
Analysis) 
      
 Deputy Director/Tariff 
(Economics) 
      
 Deputy Director / Tariff 
(Engineering) 
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Query 2. Please provide information regarding all officers recruited/appointed /promoted/officiating in the following posts as 
enumerated in the Andhra Pradesh Electricity Regulatory Commission (Method of Recruitment and Conditions of Service of Officers 
and Staff) Regulations, 1999 as amended by The Andhra Pradesh Electricity Regulatory Commission (Method of Recruitment and 
Conditions of Service of Officers and Staff) (First Amendment) Regulation, 2006 and the Supplementary Regulation to Principal 
Regulation (No.3 of 1999)  of Andhra Pradesh Electricity Regulatory Commission (Method of Recruitment and Conditions of Service 
of Officers and Staff) Regulation, 2013 for the time period  July 30th 2013 till 10th October 2014.  
 
 
 
 Deputy 
Director/Information 
Technology  
 
      
 Deputy 
Director/Personnel  
 
      
 Deputy Director/Pay and 
Accounts 
      
 Deputy 
Director/Consumer 
Assistance 
      
 Deputy Director /Media 
(Till 24.04.2006). 
Executive Assistant to 
Commission Secretary 
(From 25.04.2006) 
      
 Personnel Officer       
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Sl.No
. 
Post of Officer Name of 
Officer. 
Nature of 
Appointment. 
Please specify 
the following : 
a. Regular 
basis. 
b. Contract 
services 
c. On 
deputation
.  
d. Others 
(Please 
Specify) 
Tenure in 
the post. 
Prior employment 
or position held. 
Or 
Parent 
Department/ 
Organisation if on 
deputation.  
Position occupied or 
employment after 
relinquishing charge.  
Or  
Department or 
Organisation deputed 
to after relinquishing 
charge.  
Time 
Period(s) 
Position 
was 
Vacant.  
 Commission 
Secretary 
      
 Director/ 
Engineering 
      
 Director/ Law       
 Director/ Tariff       
 Director/ 
Administration 
      
 Joint Director/ 
Engineering 
      
 Joint Director/ 
Law 
      
 Joint Director/ 
Tariff 
(Accounts & 
Financial 
Analysis) 
      
 Joint Director/ 
Tariff 
(Economics) 
      
 Joint Director/ 
Tariff 
(Engineering) 
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 Joint Director/ 
Information 
Technology 
      
 Deputy 
Director/ 
Transmission 
      
 Deputy 
Director/ 
Distribution 
      
 Deputy 
Director/ Law 
      
 Deputy 
Director/ Tariff 
(Accounts & 
Financial 
Analysis) 
      
 Deputy 
Director/ Tariff 
(Economics)  
      
  Deputy 
Director/ Tariff 
(Engineering)  
      
 Deputy 
Director/ 
Information 
Technology 
      
 Deputy 
Director/ 
Personnel 
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With regards 
Adithya Krishna Chintapanti 
A-23 (2-2-18/31) 
Durgabai Deshmukh Colony 
 Deputy 
Director/ Pay & 
Accounts 
      
 Deputy 
Director/ 
Consumer 
Assistance 
      
 Executive 
Assistant to 
Commission 
Secretary 
      
 Deputy 
Director / 
Planning & 
Power 
Procurement  
      
 Deputy 
Director / Legal 
Procedures 
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Annexure III 
 
Detailed analysis of Class I Category Appointments to the Commission 
between July 22nd 1999 till 10th October 2014.  
a. Commission Secretary  
The additional desirable qualifications for the post of Commission Secretary 
includes ‘knowledge or experience in a regulated industry or with a regulatory 
body in Power Sector’.269 This appears to have ensured the appointment of 
persons with a governmental background either from the State administration 
or State owned utilities. Five persons have been appointed as ‘Commission 
Secretary’ in the period under reference and all appointments either have been 
on contractual basis or on deputation. Barring one appointment from the 
Income Tax Department, all appointees are from the State owned electricity 
utilities, i.e. the erstwhile APSEB or APTRANSCO and the state owned 
distribution company (APCPDCL).270 There was a shift from contractual 
appointment of retired personnel to appointment by deputation after 2004. This 
resulted in Secretaries reverting to their respective posts in the State owned 
electricity utilities after completing their term in the Commission.271  
b. Director Engineering  
The minimum qualifications comprise a degree in electrical or power 
engineering and twenty years of engineering experience, with at least five 
                                                          
269 1999 Regulations, Appendix I.  
270 T.B.Narasimha Rao from APSEB (Contract – 11.10.1999 to 15.06.2003); S. Surya Prakasa 
Rao from APSEB (Contract – 16.06.2003 to 11.04.2007); G.V.Nagesh from A.P.TRANSCO 
(Deputation- 12.11.2007 to 30.11.2008); M.Ravindra Sai from Income Tax Department 
(Deputation – 10.07.2009 to 12.04.2011); and M.D.Manohar Raju from Andhra Pradesh 
Central Power Distribution Corporation Limited (Deputation – 20.08.2011 to 10.10.2014).  
271 G.V.Nagesh from A.P.TRANSCO (Deputation- 12.11.2007 to 30.11.2008); M.D.Manohar 
Raju from APCPDCL (Deputation – 20.08.2011 to 10.10.2014) 
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years of managerial experience in ‘large power utilities with generation, 
transmission and distribution facilities’.272 It is argued that the minimum criteria 
of 20 years’ experience and belonging to ‘large power utilities with generation, 
transmission and distribution facilities’ appears to exclude those associated 
with the private sector, which has no presence in transmission and distribution 
segments. The information provided by the Commission confirms the same. 
In fact, but for a brief two year stint by a person on deputation from a national 
public sector undertaking,273 all the personnel appointed to the post of Director 
Engineering, i.e. six out of seven postings, were either on contract or 
deputation from the State owned power utilities.274 The initial two 
appointments were on a contract basis.275 All the subsequent appointments, 
i.e. after 2004, were on deputation,276 leading to circulation of personnel 
between the Commission and the state owned power utilities.  
c. Director Law 
The minimum qualifications for appointment as Director Law is a degree from 
a recognised university, eligibility to practice law, with a minimum fifteen-year 
professional experience or experience in the State/national government or that 
of a Judge of a District Court. Additional qualifications include knowledge of 
                                                          
272 1999 Regulations, Appendix I. 
273 K.Pratap, from Power Grid Corporation of India Limited on deputation from 29.08.2005 to 
18.08.2007.  
274 The word State Public Sector Utilities is used to denote both the erstwhile APSEB and its 
successor unbundled entities of A.P.TRANSCO, A.P.GENCO and the four DISCOMS.  
275 V. Rama Rao from APSEB (Contract – 12.10.1999 to 02.01.2002); V. Siva Prasad Rao 
from APSEB (Contract – 09.05.2002 to 08.05.2005) 
276 K.Pratap from Power Grid Corporation of India Limited (Deputation - 29.08.2005 to 
18.08.2007); S. Ramanuja Rao from APSPDCL (Deputation – 23.08.2007 to 28.02.2009); 
P.V.Subrahmanyam A.P.TRANSCO (Deputation- 04.07.2009 to 28.02.2011); 
D.R.Vishwanath Rao A.P.TRANSCO (Deputation – 31.10.2011 to 31.10.2012 ); M.Sathya 
Murthy A.P.TRANSCO (Deputation – 07.12.2013 to 31.03.2014 thereafter on Contract 
01.04.2014 to 10.10.2014 , though subsequently reappointed on contractual basis his original 
appointment was on deputation basis therefore his posting is considered as on deputation for 
this analysis.  
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the power sector, experience in legal advice in commercial issues, amongst 
others. It is surprising that the Director Law does not need to have specific 
knowledge of laws of the power sector as a minimum qualification, however 
legal services under the State or Central government and the judicial services 
is one of the essential criteria. A perusal of the appointees indicates that all 
the appointees are retired District Judges, retired from the State’s Judicial 
Services and appointed on a contractual basis.277  
d. Director Tariff  
The minimum qualifications for the position are a doctorate in economics or 
degree in electrical or power engineering.278 It also requires a minimum of 
fifteen years’ experience as a professional economist or engineer, which must 
include five years in a managerial position involving professional staff. Two 
persons have held the position of Director Tariff at the Commission in the 
period under reference. The first appointee was initially brought on deputation 
to the Commission from the Industrial Development Bank of India Limited and 
subsequently given a regular appointment and retired from the post on 
31.12.2008.279 The position was filled by a candidate from the State owned 
power utility.280 This was the first appointment to the position after 2004 and 
                                                          
277 The appointees in the time period under reference are all retired officers of the State’s 
Judicial Services appointed on contract. They are V. Veera Raghavan (13.10.1999 to 
25.04.2001 & 24.06.2001 to 07.05.2003); D.S.Prasad (16.06.2003 to 15.11.2005); 
K.Rajagopala Reddy (20.04.2006 to 19.04.2009); K. Sanjeevarao Naidu (28.10.2009 to 
30.04.2013).  
278 It is interesting to note that to be Director Tariffs one needs a doctorate in economics or 
degree in engineering which are two very different disciplines and also degrees of academic 
achievement. Also prior experience in developing tariffs in public utilities is likely to make the 
post an exclusive preserve of the State Owned Power Utilities.  
279 Dr.Geeta Gouri (Deputation from IDBI 04.01.2000 to 31.12.2003 – Regular appointment 
01.01.2004 to 31.12.2008). 
280 The appointment was on contract basis. L.Manohar Reddy from APCPDCL 21.11.2011 to 
10.10.2014. 
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the choice of candidate reflects the broader trend in appointing personnel from 
the State owned utilities.  
e. Director Administration 
The minimum qualifications for appointment are a degree from a recognised 
university, fifteen years’ experience in an administrative post associated with 
human resources development. The additional qualifications include 
experience in managing a government organisation and knowledge of 
government accounting and budget procedures. Therefore, though a purely 
human resources management position with no additional requirement for 
technocratic functioning of the Commission, the additional qualifications 
makes prior governmental experience desirable. There have been two 
appointees, the first appointed on a contractual basis was from the State 
owned Transport Corporation281 and the next director was from the State’s 
Commercial Taxes Department and appointed on a regular basis.282 This is 
the only Director level post that has been filled by a regular appointee for a 
significant period of time. The same also indicates that the filling up of posts 
with officers on deputation from the State public sector power utilities is a 
deliberate decision.283  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
281 S.Venkata Narayana, from the Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation between 
11.10.1999 to 19.11.2002 .Mr.Narayana passed away when in office.  
282 C. Rama Krishna, regular appointee from 02.06.2003 to 10.10.2014.  
283 1999 Regulations, Regulation 8 (b); 2013 Supplemental Regulations, Regulation 4.  
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Annexure IV 
 
Positions in the Officer Cadre of the Commission 
1999 Regulations (No. of sanctioned 
positions mentioned in square 
brackets) 
2013 Supplementary 
Regulations to the 1999 
Regulations. (Positions 
correspond with the officers 
sanctioned strength) 
(a) Officers  
(i) Commission Secretary [1] 
(ii) Director Engineering [1] 
(iii) Director/Law [1] 
(iv) Director/Tariff [1] 
(v) Director/Administration [1] 
(vi) Adviser to Commission [3] 
(vii) Joint Director/Engineering 
[1] 
(viii) Joint Director/Law 
(ix) Joint Director/Tariff 
(Accounts & Financial 
Analysis) [1] 
(x) Joint Director /Tariff 
(Economics) 
(xi) Joint Director /Tariff 
(Engineering) [1] 
Class - A Category – 1  
 (a) Commission Secretary  
(b) Director/ Engineering  
(c) Director/ Law  
(d) Director/ Tariff  
(e) Director/ Administration  
Category –2  
(a) Joint Director/ Engineering 
 (b) Joint Director/ Law  
(c) Joint Director/ Tariff 
(Accounts & Financial Analysis) 
 (d) Joint Director/ Tariff 
(Economics) 
 (e) Joint Director/ Tariff 
(Engineering)  
(f) Joint Director/ Information 
Technology  
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(xii) Joint Director /Information 
Technology[1] 
(xiii) Deputy 
Director/Transmission[1] 
(xiv) Deputy 
Director/Distribution[2] 
(xv) Deputy Director /Law [2] 
(xvi) Deputy Director/Tariff 
(Accounts & Financial 
Analysis) [1] 
(xvii) Deputy Director/Tariff 
(Economics) [1] 
(xviii) Deputy Director / Tariff 
(Engineering) [1] 
(xix) Deputy 
Director/Information 
Technology [1] 
(xx) Deputy Director/Personnel 
[1] 
(xxi) Deputy Director/Pay and 
Accounts [1] 
(xxii) Deputy Director/Consumer 
Assistance [1] 
(xxiii) Deputy Director /Media [1] 
(xxiv) Personnel Officer [1] 
 
 
 
 
Category - 3  
(a) Deputy Director/ 
Transmission 
 (b) Deputy Director/ Distribution 
 (c) Deputy Director/ Law  
(d) Deputy Director/ Tariff 
(Accounts & Financial Analysis) 
 (e) Deputy Director/ Tariff 
(Economics)  
(f) Deputy Director/ Tariff 
(Engineering)  
(g) Deputy Director/ Information 
Technology 
 (h) Deputy Director/ Personnel  
(i) Deputy Director/ Pay & 
Accounts 
 (j) Deputy Director/ Consumer 
Assistance 
 (k) Executive Assistant to 
Commission Secretary 
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 (l) Deputy Director / Planning & 
Power Procurement  
(m) Deputy Director / Legal 
Procedures 
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